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INTRODUCTION 
Feminist epistemology has two aims: to show the androcentrism present in certair 
paradigmatic accounts of what counts as good knowledge and to provide us «itl 
alternatives. In this thesis I will follow that tradition and I will argue for a ne%ý 
epistemological paradigm that avoids androcentrism and revises our concept of 
knowledge. I will support a theory grounded in feminist standpoint epistemology, but with 
influences of feminist empiricism and postmodernism. 
In the first chapter of the thesis I will show how the conceptual links between gender, 
knowledge and reason have excluded women as reliable knowers. I will also show how al 
a symbolic level, given that the characteristics linked to femininity have been undervalued, 
we have obtained a distorted picture of what knowledge and reason are. I will use science 
to illustrate how exclusion on the basis of gender has taken place (both actually and 
symbolically). 
The second chapter will be devoted to analysing the different types of feminist 
epistemology. In this chapter I will begin to show how feminists argue against the 
traditional links between masculinity, knowledge, science and reason. In the first place, I 
will talk about feminist empiricism, to show how feminists have tried to reinterpret 
concepts such as objectivity, in an attempt to obtain a knowledge that apprehends the 
world faithfully, and that includes different perspectives within it. Afterwards, I will 
analyse standpoint feminist epistemology. I will explain the classic position argued for by 
Harstock and point out its main problems. I will explain how she privileges women as 
epistemic agents, due to the fact that they occupy a marginal position, but also, due to 
their development of a political consciousness as feminists. Then, I will describe the way in 
which postmodernist philosophy has influenced feminist epistemology by making feminists 
aware of the dangers of essentialism and universalism. Finally, I will review some of the 
new versions of standpoint epistemology that aim to avoid the main problems that the 
early theory had to face. To conclude the chapter I will argue that even if feminist 
epistemologists offer valuable alternatives, there are some questions that remain unsolved. 
The first question is the use of experience, central to standpoint epistemology and also to 
empiricist epistemology. This use of experience is very problematic from a postmodernist 
point of view. Second, the necessity of postulating the existence of communities that have 
those experiences in common. 
In chapter 3I analyse carefully Scott's arguments against particular uses of experience, 
and argue against her criticisms, even if some of her insights help me to postulate a 
concept of experience that withstands postmodern criticisms. I also argue, in opposition to 
postmodernism, that it is possible to have communities that acknowledge difference while 
still accepting that their members share some experiences in common. I rely on the work 
of some postcolonial feminist philosophers (Stone -Mediatore, Johnson Reagon) to 
support my arguments. I will review some of the ways in which feminists have used the 
concept of experience as the bases of feminist knowledge, and conclude that it is possible 
to use a non-naive concept of experience to ground feminist knowledge. I thereby have the 
basis to argue for a form of epistemology that is in the tradition of standpoint 
epistemology, but overcomes some of its difficulties. 
In chapter 4, I will argue further for a change of paradigm in epistemology, in which 
practical knowledge is revalued. I argue for practical knowledge for two reasons: to 
explain how marginalized knowers can access parts of reality that people in the 
mainstream cannot access, and to show how our concept of knowledge is too close to 
propositional knowledge, excluding other types of knowledge from our analysis'. Both 
moves will help us to reinstate women as knowers in their own right, by changing the 
symbolic relations between knowledge and gender and also by explaining how in certain 
contexts women can be better knowers than males. 
I continue with this project in chapter 5, arguing that accepting practical knowledge as a 
form of knowledge allows us to develop an epistemology which does not rely exclusively 
on propositional content. I engage with the work of McDowell, and I underline the 
importance of non-conceptual content in any epistemological inquiry. My support of 
practical knowledge, as well of other types of knowledge with a non propositional 
1 In this chapter I argue against reductionist moves made by diverse authors: Snowdon. Mellor. Alcofiand 
Dalmiya 
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content, implies a revision of what counts as justification in epistemology, as well as a 
revision of the concept of rationality. I analyse the concept of justification in chapter 5, 
and expand on the arguments in chapter 6 where I also tackle the changes that are 
necessary in our concept of rationality. I claim that rationality has been defined as the 
opposite from intuition and feelings (which are in the realm of the feminine) and that this is 
a misrepresentation of how reason actually works. I support the idea that intuitions are 
based on a form of non-propositional type of knowledge which remain tacit, but that, 
being grounded in practices, can be justified within epistemic communities. Intuition has 
some of the characteristics of rational decision making. The opposition between intuition 
and reason is challenged. A pattern begins to emerge that makes clear that by changing 
one of the concepts in the equation (gender-knowledge-reason), we are forced to revise all 
the other related concepts. The concepts symbolically linked to the feminine begin to take 
a prominent position in our new paradigm of knowledge. In this chapter, works by 
Polanyi, and Fricker are used to support my claims. I also analyse critically some aspects 
of Kuhn's theory. 
In chapter 7I stress that the concept of knowledge that I am supporting is both personal 
and social. The social aspect of knowledge consists in being justified, articulated and 
produced socially. The personal aspects of knowledge that I have underlined are those 
related to the gaining of tacit, practical and experiential knowledge through participation 
in practices. I claim that our concept of expertise should include these individuals who 
having acquired their knowledge in a practical and experiential way, have not been 
traditionally considered to be reliable knowers. In this chapter I also tackle the issue of 
how to produce more objective knowledge by including the knowledge of subjects 
marginalized by our epistemological paradigm. Harding's theory on how to produce 
objective knowledge is analysed in detail. I argue that taking the experiences of 
marginalized people to ground knowledge will allow us to apprehend the world more 
filly. I centre my analysis on the role of women as privileged epistemic agents, in doing so 
I accept that "women" as a collective identity is the site of difference. Understanding 
across differences is a central issue in the debates regarding the possibility of collective 
identities, such as "women". It is also central for any epistemology that tries to encompass 
the views of people belonging to different marginalized epistemic groups. In this chapter I 
begin to analyse the difficulties of understanding across difference and suggest some 
protocols to ease them (work by Lugones, and also by Seller is used to support my 
arguments). This issue is also relevant for the theory that I support in chapter 8, where I 
analyse the question of objective knowledge, because given that there is more than one 
community that has been marginalized, and that the members of communities are not 
identical, the issue of understanding across differences becomes central. 
In chapter 8, the paradigm of knowledge that I have been supporting is clearly delineated. 
I argue for an epistemology able to account for a plurality of theories about the world, but 
that does not fall into relativism (theories put forward by Longino and by Haraway are 
analysed in this chapter, and used to support my views). The choice of theories will be 
made by taking into account questions such as: how the knowledge has been acquired, 
who is the knower, how the knowledge has been validated. In certain circumstances 
knowledge justified by practices can be more valuable than that formally grounded in 
theories that have been articulated "propositionally". I claim that more attention should be 
paid to undervalued epistemic virtues, in addition to and as a way of realising that of 
empirical adequacy. In the paradigm of knowledge that I support, marginalized 
knowledges will be pivotal to epistemological progress because marginalized knowers can 
provide us with aspects of reality that will otherwise remain hidden, while also providing a 
critical aspect with relation to more dominant forms. Both characteristics allow the 
development of more objective knowledge. 
CHAPTER 1 
0. Introduction 
Feminist epistemology is a diverse enterprise, but amidst diversity, we can find a common 
origin for all its forms. Feminist epistemology has its origins in the realisation that science 
and other areas of knowledge were in a number of senses 'masculine". Feminist 
epistemologists engaged in critiques of science and knowledge because of their masculinist 
form while at the same time trying to develop accounts of knowledge that were more 
congenial to their own political and ethical agendas. 
In this first chapter I will explain the ways in which the feminine has been symbolically 
linked with lesser types of knowledge, minor forms or rationality, and nature. In contrast, 
masculinity has been linked to theoretical knowledge, full rationality, and with science. 
Linking these concepts together has implied the positive evaluation of all the concepts that 
appear related to the masculine, and the devaluation of what it is related to the feminine, 
as well as having as a consequence the actual exclusion of women from science and from 
the most valued realms of knowledge. I will argue that it is necessary to change the 
conceptual links between these concepts if we want more adequate accounts of 
knowledge, reason, and of gender. 
Science is the paradigmatic form of knowledge in our current society. I will analyse the 
concept of objectivity, most commonly associated with science, a concept which is closely 
united to the symbolic definition of masculinity. I will argue that this ideal of objectivity is 
flawed where it is defined both as the opposite to subjectivity and as i--quiring tile 
independence of data and theories. I will also argue that this ideal of objectivity is neither 
present in actual science, nor desirable. I will show how science has reflected the values, 
interests of and prejudices of its creators, and therefore how it has been biased towards 
masculinist values. I will devote the last section of the chapter to analysing the different 
senses in which science can be taken to be gendered. 
1. What is feminist epistemology? 
The nature of feminist epistemology still is unknown to many in academia. It is often 
believed that feminist epistemologists are anti-epistemology, against reason, or that they 
argue for the existence of different ways of knowing for women. Even if there are 
examples of these types of theories in the area, feminist philosophers interested in 
epistemology have addressed the main epistemological questions that have been present in 
the history of the subject for centuries; and among them it is possible to find some that are 
closely related to mainstream epistemology, others that revalue suppressed traditions, and 
finally those that develop new ways of approaching their fields of study. ' In this first 
section I will point out some of the characteristics that many of these theories have in 
common. This is not an easy task because on the one hand, there is a common political 
interest in the work of all of them, but on the other hand, just as in the work of non- 
feminist philosophers, theories on feminist epistemology can differ enormously from each 
other'. One of the most influential books in the area has the following statement in its 
introduction; "Our title, Feminist Epistemologies, should alert readers that this newt- 
research program is internally heterogeneous and irreducible to any uniform set of 
theses. The feminisms that make up this new problematic are diverse, often having in 
common only their commitment to unearth the politics of epistemology. "3 
Nevertheless, even if heterogeneity is acknowledged, feminist work in this area has been 
classified under different categories. One of the earliest classifications was suggested by, 
S. Harding4 who distinguished between: feminist empiricism, standpoint epistemology and 
postmodernism. I will make use of these labels, even if many feminist theories could be 
considered to belong to more than one group. Feminist epistemological theories can also 
be classified together with the more mainstream epistemological theories: contextualist, 
coherentists, those who argue for naturalized epistemology, and so forth. There is not a 
unique methodological approach that unifies feminist epistemology. As S. Haack notices, 
''E efi apparent agreenmefnt, e. g., that feminist epistemology it'ill stress the social aspects 
H. Longino (1993), p 101. 
J. Nelson and L. Hankinson Nelson (1994), p 487. 
L. Alcoff and E. Potter (1993), p 3. 
S. Harding (1986). 
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of knowledge, masks significant disagreement about what this means. " Given the 
diversity of theories within the area, it has been argued that it is more appropriate to talk 
about feminist epistemologies rather than feminist epistemology. 6 Once we have 
acknowledged the diversity of theories under the general category of feminist 
epistemologies, I will proceed to signal what these have in common 
All feminist epistemologies have a common origin. Feminist epistemology emerges from 
the reflection about the theoretical consequences of recognizing the implicatedness of the 
subject in the production of knowledge. When feminists acknowledged epistemology as an 
area relevant to feminist analysis, they became aware of the masculinist bias present in our 
conceptions of knowledge and reason. The main aim of feminist epistemology was to 
make visible those androcentic biases. Nowadays, feminist epistemology has two main 
aims; the first is to criticize our current knowledge practices (particularly science); 
disclosing any traces of sexism, ' and the second is to provide us with alternative practices 
or theories . 
It has been argued that these aims, are not within the scope of epistemology, because 
genuine knowledge is value neutral and thus does not reflect the gender of the knower 
(this argument has been used by opponents of feminist epistemology as well as by those in 
favor of it. 8) Science has been taken to be a good illustration of this general point; It has 
been maintained that science itself cannot be androcentric, merely the scientist producing 
the theories. ' Nevertheless, most feminist epistemologists and a number of other thinkers, 10 
5 S. Haack quoted in J. Nelson and L. Hankinson Nelson (1994), p 487. 
6A common mistake among those who argue against the merits of feminist epistemology or feminist 
philosophy of science is to take the many different theories available as if they were just a common 
enterprise. See, for instance, B. R. Gross (1994), p 438. Gross argues against the possibility of having a 
feminist science, and gives eight possible descriptions of «hat such science would be like. Many of them 
get discarded because they do not fit Harding's model. 
R. Bleier (1986), p 1, indicates some of the features that feminists have criticized in science: absolutism, 
authoritarism, determinist thinking, cause-effect simplifications, androcentrism, ethnocentrism, 
pretensions to objectivity and neutrality. 
8 R. Bleier (1986). 
9 B. Gross (1994). 
10 K. Lennon and M. Whitford (eds) 1994, p1 "Work within feminist epistemology therefore shares 
preoccupations and critical moments with other important strands of recent thought: the writings of 
Marxists and critical theorists, who for decades have argued that much of contemporary culture reflects 
bourgeois interests, other scholars who have pointed to the Eurocentrism of contemporary knowledge- 
production, radical philosophers of science, who have highlighted the role of value judgment in scientific 
practice, and, importantly for this volume, the theorists of what is now called postmodernism". L. 
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believe that the production and evaluation of knowledge reflects the values and interests of 
those who produce it, and that the production of knowledge has a close relation with 
power. Feminist epistemologists are interested in disclosing the presence of some of these 
values in science and in epistemology; not only in particular instances (such as individual 
scientific theories) but also on a more general conceptual level (why certain types of 
knowledge are not as highly regarded as others, for instance). Disclosing the role of values 
in the production of knowledge and the relation between knowledge and power has 
produced a change in our concepts of knowledge and of science. If we accept that 
knowledge is not value neutral, our traditional concepts of objectivity are in jeopardy. It is 
one of the main concerns of feminist epistemology to explore the possibilities that such an 
acceptance leaves open. 
Other common concerns in feminist epistemologies are due to the fact that theorists have 
developed an awareness of the great diversity of voices that are part of their community. If 
in the early years of feminist epistemology there was a tendency to universalize the 
experiences of those women who did the theorizing as if they were representative of all 
women's experiences, nowadays, and due to the general influence of postmodernism and 
postcolonialism, feminists doing epistemology recognize the importance of diversity. 
There are, however, some important issues that any theory that attempts to include 
different voices has to address, and these are tackled by feminist epistemologies: how can 
different voices be articulated so as to form a coherent view? if obtaining a coherent view 
implies focusing on the commonalties and forgetting the differences, should we aim for 
such a view? should we attribute the same value to all perspectives or should we prefer 
some of them over others? Different feminist epistemologies answer these questions 
differently, but common to all the answers is a preoccupation with issues related to 
knowledge and power that derive directly form the existence of difference. 
Hankinson Nelson, (1995a), p 38, has argued that, even if some of the questions that feminist 
epistemology addresses have been considered irrelevant in traditional epistemology, there are other 
issues 
that are central to their "traditional" concerns. For instance, who is the primary bearer of 
knowledge and 
what the relationship is between epistemology and other theories, practices and interests. 
Finally. she also 
points out that "As the references to Dewey. Rorty, and Quine indicate, this view of epistemology 
is not 
uniquely feminist, although feminist analysis which reveal relationships between philosophical positions 
(including feminist positions) and specific socio-political contexts and interest further the use for it. 
(1995a), p44. 
s 
Finally, there is another characteristic that is present in feminist ep istemology' in general 
and that is the question of accountability . 
Theories are not just accountable to their 
particular epistemic communities (for instance, scientist to the scientific community), but 
rather to society as a whole. They consider that the consequences of accepting a theory 
have to be part of the evaluation of the theory. Epistemology is closely linked with ethical 
considerations. 
Summarizing, there is a great diversity within the types of theories that can be classified as 
feminist epistemology, therefore it is more correct to talk of feminist epistemologies. All 
of them have a common origin, which was the acknowledgment of sexist biases in our 
definition and production of knowledge, and all of them try to offer viable alternatives. 
Apart from this common origin, feminist epistemologies also share a high degree of 
awareness of the issues of difference; of the relation between production of knowledge 
and power; and, finally, a preoccupation with the consequences of the acceptance of 
theories in relation to the societies that produce them. 
2. Conceptions of Knowledge and Rationality as gendered. 
This section has been divided in two subsections, in the first one I will deal with the issue 
of gendered knowledge and in the second one I will explore the relationship between 
gender and rationality. 
2.1 Gendered knowledge 
Epistemology is devoted to the definition and study of knowledge. Knowledge is 
contrasted with opinion, and with true belief. In order to have knowledge, a true belief has 
to be justified. What counts as justification is a central debate in epistemology. It is 
believed that a true bel; °f is justified when it is acquired in an appropriate manner. The 
skeptic argues that it is impossible to justify our beliefs, and the traditional epistemologist 
tries to escape this conclusion. This is a very sketchy characterization of the main aims of 
epistennolopv, but it is enough to understand how in the core of epistemology there is a 
bias towards the stud` of a particular type of knowledge: the classic definition of 
9 
knowledge as true belief links, irremediably, the fate of knowledge with that of truth as it 
is expressed propositionally. Those types of knowledge whose content cannot be 
expressed in a propositional form either have to undergo a reduction that «wi11 allow us to 
analyse them as propositional, or they are excluded from our classical analysis of 
knowledge. If something cannot be put in a propositional form we cannot determine if it is 
true or not. 
In the following chapters, I will argue for a more inclusive model of what counts as 
knowledge, so that practical knowledge is neither reduced nor excluded from our 
epistemologies. I will endowe practical knowledge with some of the attributes that have 
been given to traditional propositional knowledge, such as being justifiable, and I will also 
argue for changes in our concept of knowledge, such as why truth should be the only 
virtue of epistemological inquiries 
The heading of this section links knowledge with gender; an unlikely coupling for 
traditional epistemology, grounded as it is on the idea of a disembodied knower, of which 
Descartes is a champion. Descartes' methodological doubt is the paradigm of the 
epistemological search for knowledge, and he insists that this is a purely mental process 
that everybody can undertake. In principle, it does not matter who the knower is, if she 
follows the dictates of reason, she will reach universal conclusions. Nevertheless, as 
Elizabeth of Bohemia protested in a letter to Descartes; "the life I am constrained to lead 
does not allow me enough f ree time to acquire a habit of meditation in accordance with 
your rules. Sometimes the interest of my household, which I must not neglect, sometimes 
conversations and civities I cannot eschew, so thoroughly dejects this weak mind with 
annoyances or boredom that it remains, for a long time afterwards, useless for anything 
" else. 
Continuously, in the history of our western civilization, we have found that women have 
been excluded from certain practices of knowledge. A clear example of this is provided by 
the very small number of women that have made scientific discoveries. The exclusion has 
G. Lloyd (1995). p 49 Princess Elizabeth to Descartes, 10/20 June 166 3. Translated by J. Bloom, in 
Descartes: his Moral Philosophy and Psychology, Harvester Press (1978). pl 11. 
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been both practical (women did not enter the public spheres where knowledge was 
produced) and symbolic. In this section I will concentrate on the fact that there are types 
of knowledge that have been considered `feminine" and less valuable, where others are 
privileged and taken to be "masculine". 
The distinction between feminine and masculine types of knowledge fits the general 
stereotypes of what is considered to be feminine and masculine in general; "At the most 
general level, impersonal theoretical knowledge is coded 'masculine'. Personal 
knowledge- the kind of knowledge that is inseparable from the knowers's identity, 
biography, and emotional experiences- is coded feminine'. Theoretical knowledge is 
thought to be masculine in part because it lays claims to objectivity, which is thought to 
be achieved through the rigorous exclusion from thought of feminine subjectivity - of 
emotions, particularity, interests, and values. These uses of gender symbolism have 
epistemic import because they structure a hierarchy of prestige and cognitive authority 
among kinds of knowledge, and hence of knowers, that is homologous with the gender 
hierarchy. "12 
The most immediate implication of this gendered characterization of knowledge is that 
masculine knowledge is privileged over feminine knowledge. In a later chapter of the 
thesis, I will argue that it is wrong to embrace theoretical knowledge as paradigmatic and 
claim that it is superior to more piactical or personal types of knowledge because, in 
actual fact, both are intimately related. A further implication of the distinction between 
masculine and feminine types of knowledge is that emotions and feelings have been 
ignored in our analysis of our production of knowledge, which means that we have 
privileged an ideal that portraits knowledge as detached and impersonal, even if there are 
many examples that illustrate how in many cases ignoring non-detached and personal 
knowledge we cannot obtain a good picture of reality. 13 
12 E. Anderson (1995). p 63. 
1; F. Anderson (1995). p 65-6, illustrates how "detachment" has distorted the studying of certain cognitive 
processes. For instance, she mentions a study by Hearne (1982), who explained howw. unless we take into 
account the relationship built between animals and their trainers. it is impossible to understand the 
behaviour of the former. In relation to experimental psychology for the study of humans, she uses the work 
of L. Sherif (1987) to show how the gender of the researched/researcher, influences the research. 
The same tendency that we find in our definition of knowledge is also present in our 
conception of rationality. We have defined rationality by opposing it to passion, emotions, 
and feelings. Furthermore, we have followed too closely the Cartesian model that 
separates the mind and the body, forgetting that we are embodied agents. In these dualist 
distinctions mind and reason are characterized as masculine, and emotions, feelings, and 
the body as feminine. This symbolic identification has had practical consequences, and as I 
have already pointed out, women have been excluded from certain types of knowledge and 
have been endowed with a different type of rationality. 
2.2 Gender and rationality. 
In this section I will review the work of some philosophers to show how they have 
introduced gender differences in order to illustrate the existence of different types of 
rationality and knowledge, after which I will review the ways in which feminist writers 
have reacted to the exclusion of the feminine from full reason. 
2.2.1 Gendered characterizations of reason in our philosophical tradition. 
In our philosophical history there has not been a homogeneous definition of reason. For 
instance, the opposition of the rational mind to the body, as it appears in Descartes' 
philosophy, would have been foreign to the Greeks as a civilization. The radical separation 
between reason and feeling that we can also find in Descartes' philosophy would have 
been challenged by Plato. The relation of opposition between passions and reason 
is 
opposed by Hume; but, whatever the definition of reason that we have agreed upon, there 
is always a tendency in philosophers to postulate a cognitive difference for women, and 
full rationality has always been linked with masculinity. 
In the work of many philosophers, there is a metaphorical association between women and 
lesser types of knowledge, or with different types of rationality. The consequence 
is that, 
when their discourses became allegorical, the feminine side of the soul 
(for instance) 
would represent irrationality; or when a distinction is drawn between higher and 
lower 
types of knowledge, in which one is more rational than the other, the feminine will 
be 
12 
associated with the later, and carry the lower evaluation. Lloyd has researched this area in 
detail and I will use a few examples taken from her work to illustrate this general point. 
Let's take the philosophy of Philo. He distinguishes between reason and sense perception, 
and claims that proper knowledge consists in focusing on the knowledge provided by our 
reason instead of on the knowledge obtained through the senses. He describes the 
relationship between both types of knowledge by comparing them with the relations 
between the two genders. So as a woman can make men slaves through tempting them 
with pleasure, in the same way, if we are too fond of sense-perception we will just get 
knowledge of the mundane through our bodies and will forget to focus on proper 
knowledge; knowledge which is given by reason and which resides in the mind. The way 
in which he defines each term of the comparison is by opposing it to the other, the 
difference between them having an evaluative weight, so one of the terms is considered 
more valuable than the other. All the less valuable terms are seen as the negation of the 
more highly regarded ones. So elements are not just different, but also opposite and carry 
different values. His system establishes many dualities that are still present in our culture14 
(and that were there also before him), and that can be summarized as follow 
-Men are associated with: reason, living, entire, free, sound, elder, good, genuine, tends to 
the divine order, the immutable, the blessed, the active. 
-Women are associated with: sense-perception, lifeless, irrational, bad, slave, young, 
incomplete, diseased, foreign, clings to what is born and perishes, passive. 
We should make a distinction between the allegorical relation between women and reason 
and the `actual" relation between them. Philo considered women to be rational, even if 
they were used allegorically to represent sense-perception in opposition to reason. 
Nevertheless, in his texts, he occasionally slips and takes literally the link between women 
and a lesser type of rationality. He argues that women are actually inferior to males, but 
that they can overcome their natural inferiority by denying what i, - feminine in them, so 
they are potentially as rational as males, just they have a more difficult route towards 
"proper" reason. 
"' G. Lloyd (1995). p 25. 
l) 
After Philo, and with the rising influence of Christianity in philosophy, there was a 
tendency to attribute full rationality to women. We can see this tendency in the philosophy 
of Agustine of Hippo whom, even if resisting some of the most misogynistic moves, still 
attributed a different, inferior, form of rationality to women. The inequality is explained in 
terms of their physical differences. The relationship is allegorically articulated in the 
following way: women are subordinated to males (due to their biology) as some forms of 
practical reasoning are subjected to more abstract ones. 15 So the allegory still reinforces 
the idea that there is a different, and indeed inferior, rationality for women. Women are 
considered to be helpmates, not made in the image of God, to represent passion, and are 
closer to the body than males. Women are rational but less so. The same message is also 
present in the work of Aquinas, for whom, on the one hand women are rational, but on the 
other hand, their reason is considered to be defective. The defect in their reason is not 
directly attributed to their biological differences, but it is allegorically placed in this realm. 
There are also philosophers for whom male and female rationality is the same, but who 
believe that given the way in which society is organized, due to our division of labor based 
on gender, females are not given a chance to develop their intellects in the same way as 
males. I have already pointed out that Descartes, one of the advocates for universal 
rationality, thought that reason was present in all human beings and that all of them could 
follow his recommended rules for obtaining knowledge. But he acknowledged that women 
are not given the space in which they may devote their time to do it, so they are actually 
excluded from science. Descartes privileges a particular type of knowledge above all the 
others, which is obtained by a method from which women are excluded. So, effectively, 
women's knowledge is relegated to an inferior position. 
There have also been a tendency to exclude women completely from the realm of reason, 
as we can see in the work Bacon. It has been often remarked that in the use of sexual 
metaphors by Bacon, to illustrate the domination of the scientific mind over matter, nature 
is characterized as feminine. According to Lloyd; "The intellectual virtues involved in 
being a good Baconian scientist are articulated in ler'nis of the right attitudd¬' to the 
. 
fC 1111rniiie: chaslit l', respect C110 restrain 
(.. ) The metaphors do not merell, exj)re. `s 
15G. Loyd (1995). p 31. 
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conceptual points about the relationship between knowledge and its objects. Thei' gi1, c a 
male content to what it is to be a good knower. "16 Women are excluded from rationality, 
given that nature, as matter, is seen as lacking a mind, as a mechanism. If we compare this 
conception of knowledge with the Platonic version, in which the known (the forms) are 
abstracted from matter and contemplated by the mind, we can see how the Baconian 
project implies a transcendence of the feminine. Women are located outside the rational, in 
the realm of a mechanistic nature. 
Up to this point I have argued that the feminine has been symbolically linked to lower 
types of knowledge, and that their relation to reason is considered to be more precarious 
than that of males. I have also claimed that the insistence on difference, this time not 
merely symbolic, was a means to theoretically ground the disequilibrium of power between 
the sexes. This has been done by `haturalizing" the sources of it, so women have been 
attributed a lesser rationality due to their closeness to the physical world, their closeness to 
their bodies, their biology, or their particular ways of life. Does this mean that our concept 
of rationality is so ingrained with our stereotypes of masculinity that we cannot include 
women in it? 
2.2.2 Women and Reason 
Alcoff argues that the feminist critique of reason can be located within a long tradition that 
begins in the 18th century and includes the works of Kant, Hegel, Marx, Nietzche, Freud 
and the Frankfurt School. According to Alcoff, the feminist contribution to this strand of 
thought would be the addition of the dimension of sexual difference. " As I have already 
explained, Lloyd shows how the feminine has been symbolically excluded from reason in 
our tradition, so it is within the scope of feminism to try to reconstruct that concept, in 
order to accommodate women in the realm of rationality. In this section, I will show how, 
following the traditional view that biological differences are the bases for intellectual 
differences, some femininsts have taken the body to be the source of irrationality in 
women. While some have argued that women can keep those tendencies on check, and 
'6 G. Llo\'d (1995), p 17. 
17 L. Alcoff (1995), p 6?. 
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therefore attain the same rationality as males, others have claimed than women should be 
proud of their irrationality and promote it. Some feminists have attributed different types 
of reason to women, and have argued that we should change our concept of reason to 
accommodate these. On a different line of thought, other feminists have claimed that 
women are actually outside reason, that rationality, and philosophy, as the product of 
reason, are androcentric, and that women cannot and should not enter that realm; but that 
this does not imply irrationalism. I will analyze all these different positions in relation to 
this issue. 
First I will look at the assumptions underliying the claim that if women are to be rational in 
a proper (male) sense, then they have to lose their feminine attributes. Grimshaw points at 
two good examples of it: Wollstonecraft and De Beauvoir. 
She explains how Wollstonecraft believed that women have to overcame natural obstacles 
to share the same degree of rationality as males. She claimed that women can attain "a 
character as human beings regardless of the distinction of sex". " Nevertheless, 
rationality in women has to be achieved, it is not a given. She agreed with Rousseau19 who 
thought that women are "degraded by an excess of sensuality "20, a tendency that should 
be overcome in order to attain rationality. Wollstonecraft disagreed with essentialist 
explanations and thought that this tendency to sensuality was just the product of the 
conditions that are prescribed to control female sexuality. According to Wollstonecrart, 
women have to be reeducated to attain reason. Instead of changing our concept of reason 
as detached from passions, she prefers to change our `nature" as women (or what was 
attributed to women as their nature). 
Grimshaw also points out that De Beauvoir `posited an ideal of autonomy and 
independence for women which can be seen, like Kant's theory of moral worth, to 
encapsulate an ideal of masculinity "'' as well as thinking that the type of qualities and 
18 J. Grimshaw (1988), p 25. 
19 The separation between women and rationality or certain types of rationality is not always considered to 
be negative. Rousseau, for instance. takes women to be moral models, because they are closer to nature 
than males. Due to this closeness, women are unable to attain complete rationality. 
20 J. Grimshaw (1988), p 24. 
21 J. Grimshaw (1986), p 46. 
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capacities traditionally associated with the masculine should be emulated by women, she 
also takes both female activities and biology22 as an obstacle to obtain transcendence. Both 
theories maintain the link between reason and certain norms of masculinity, even if they 
accept that women can access it 
A second type of relation that can be established between women and reason is that of 
accepting the dichotomy, by saying that women are actually irrational, but considering 
irrationality as a positive trait: `feminist theorists such as Daly and Griffin argue that if 
the `man of reason' is associated not only with rationality but also with domination, the 
rape of nature and all the attendant evils of the modern world, then women are fortunate 
not to be a part of it. They argue that the feminine' values of caring, nurturing, 
relatedness, and even, in the case of Daly, mystery and spirituality (i. e., irrationality) 
should be privileged above that of the male. In short, they accept the dichotomy and go 
on to argue that we should reverse it by privileging what has hitherto been 
disPriviledged. the feminine. "23 Effectively, this type of theory accepts that rationality is 
linked with masculinity and that women benefit from being exclude from it. 24 The problems 
with this approach are diverse: a) it has conservative implications because it accepts the 
dichotomy in the existent terms, so the feminine values, even if exalted have fixed 
connotations and one of them is their inferiority, and b) it entails universalism and 
essentialism because it implies that there is a feminine nature independent of historical and 
local variations. 25 
Nussbaum explains how some feminist writers26 celebrate irrationalism in the form of anti 
logic. These writers identify reason with logical thinking and argue against the basic laws 
22 J. Grinishaw says that "In The Second Sex de Beauvoir often seems to see women's biology as a burden, 
and despite her recognition that attitudes to things like menstruation and pregnancy are socially formed, 
she nevertheless often strongly conveys the impression that she sees them as intrinsically making it more 
difficult for women to achieve human transcendence. " (1986), p 119. 
23 S. Heckman (1990). p 41. 
24 I think that this type of theories have some traits in common with the contemporary tendency to criticise 
instrumental reason. For a brief account of this tendency in epistemology, see A. Tanesini (1999). p 21 3- 
214. 
25 This criticism is developed by J. Grimshaw (1986), p 17. 
26 M. Nussbaum (1994) mentions the work of R. Ginzberg (published by the American Philosophical 
Association Newsletter on Feminism and Philosophy, vol 88, No. 2 March 1989), but refers to a general 
trend amongst feminist writers. 
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of logic that they take to represent patriarchal oppression. 27 Nussbaum has criticized these 
attempts on philosophical grounds, by claiming that they use weak arguments", and also 
on feminist grounds by arguing that they promote a picture of women that feminism has 
taken centuries to overturn, and that they do not advance the political goals of feminism 
(given that reasoned argument is the only way of justifying those goals). 29 Nussbaum is 
worried that the critique of reason is going to leave feminists unable to support their 
political and philosophical positions. Nevertheless she accepts that these critiques of 
reason not just the feminist criticism, are right when they point out that "the role (ýf 
human interest and desire in inquiry , and its cooperative or communal character, 
concerning, as well, the contribution of the emotions to good reasoning about personal 
and political choice. "30 Therefore, even if she favors reason, and the fact that women are 
as rational as men, she considers that there are some necessary changes to be made in our 
conception of reason. I will analyze the scope of the changes in more detail later on. 
I have reviewed different positions in relation to women and reason: first, those who claim 
that reason is universal, and that women just have to be educated to attain it; then those 
who say that women are irrational; and finally those who argue that, even if women are 
rational and reason is universal, we should introduce changes in our concept of reason to 
include traits that have been considered `feminine". Now I will introduce another 
possibility, the claim that men and women have different types of rationality. 
There are feminist theorists who believe that women have different rationality not in a 
metaphorical sense but rather, actually, due to the different ways of life that women have 
led in most societies. They think that women develop a sensuous rationality and argue that 
it is desirable to distinguish between different types of rationality. By maintaining the 
difference, they are able to criticize and enlarge our ideas of what should count as reason, 
while at the same time they characterize women as rational. C. McMillan's work 
exemplifies this type of theory. She argues that our concept of reason is too narrow, and 
that it does not allow us to distinguish between different types of reasoning, abstract 
27 M. Nussbauºii (1994), p 59. 
,` N1. Nussbaum (1994), p 59. 
29 N1. Nussbaum (1994), p 59. 
30 N1. Nussbaum (1994), p 61. 
reasoning and reasoning involved in practical knowledge. The latter type of reasoning is 
acquired and sanctioned socially and is displayed while engaging in certain practices. She 
argues that there are other activities, apart from doing science that involve knowledge and 
rationality, and claims that we should distinguish between the rationality found in scientific 
theories and the type that is non-formalizable and that involves the learning of traditions. 
On a similar line, she also argues for the inclusion of feelings in our accounts of ethical 
reasoning, and by doing this she is underlying the importance of feelings in our cognitive 
evaluations. " 
I think that this move is important because when we acknowledge the existence of more 
than one type of rationality we challenge the oppositional nature between rationality and 
emotions, between reason and the body. This allows us to change the relations of 
opposition at the core of our conceptual organization, and the position of women will 
switch around with the new relations between the terms. I want to underline that these are 
not the conclusions that McMillan obtains. She maintains the traditional implications of 
femininity and masculinity, attributing different types of rationality to male and females, 
that are in accordance with the prototypes that we have analyzed in the previous section. 
Nevertheless, there are other philosophers that attempt to make the changes that I have 
indicated at the beginning of the paragraph. Miranda Fricker, whose work will be analyzed 
in detail in later chapters, has develop arguments to revise our concept of rationality on 
the grounds that I have indicated above. These changes will allow us to make new links 
between gender and reason which will change our conceptions of both. 
As I have just indicated, I favor a revisionist view of reason; that is, I believe that reason is 
universal, but that its conceptual links need to be revised so as to include traits that have 
been excluded because they represented the feminine; traits which, in actual fact, are at the 
core of our rationality. The belief that we can change the concept of reason through 
philosophy has been challenged within feminism, by thinkers that have been classified a: 
`Yadical" In the following paragraphs, I will review the dispute between radicals and 
reformists that is at the center of the current literature on the issue of feminism and reason. 
;1A review of McMillan's views on rationality is given by A. Hardie(1983), and also by J. Grimsha" 
(1983). 
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Rosi Braidotti introduced the reformist/radical distinction (which has been followed btiy 
Lovibond, Grosz, Alcoff, and Tanesini). The radicals hold that there is a structural 
connection between reason and male power, and therefore, it is not possible to reform 
reason, while the reformists aim to change the concept of reason within the traditions of 
philosophy (even if they suggest changes to what it should be considered philosophical). 
Radicals and reformists have adopted different strategies regarding embodiment. Braidotti 
is concerned with the idea of the self that appears in post-Cartesian philosophy. This takes 
the self to be transparent to itself, and that implies that human subjectivity and 
consciousness coincide. She is interested in showing how post-Freud, it is not right to 
maintain that characterisation of the self, and problematizes any philosophy that is 
grounded on it. The reformists agree with the radicals in the critique of disembodied 
reason, but they attribute a different role to the body. The radicals make a psychoanalytic 
reading of the relationships between the body and the mind, in which the body represents 
the unconscious and is the basis of desires and the real motivator for our actions, implying 
that the self has not priviledged access to his or her reasons for action. And the reformists, 
even if they agree that the self is not transparent to itself and need the society to give 
meaning to its inner life, argue that agency is at the centre of our life, and that we can 
critically reflect on our reasons for acting. 
The consequences of their different approaches towards the body imply differences 
in 
relation to philosophy. While radicals believe that women have to go outside of reason to 
find the symbolic feminine that it is suppressed in our current symbolic system, reformist 
think that we should use the traditional tools of philosophy such as argument and 
justification, in order to reform our concept of reason and enlarge it in such a way that will 
not exclude women or the feminine from reason. 
Furthermore, radicals accuse reformists of missing the core of the problems because they 
do not acknowledge that reason is necessarily masculine, while reformists claim that to say 
that philosophy is the product of a masculine reason does not allow women to 
legitimise 
feminism as a political and epistemic option. 
20 
What is the alternative that radicals offer in place of our current use of reason? Lovibond 
claims that radicals take gender to be the basic structure of domination and reason as the 
product of the current sexual power structure, 32 which implies that women should be 
critical with the current ways of theorising and develop ways in which voices that have 
been silenced can be included. They argue that that theoretical positions should be 
nomadic and evolving, so as to include the voices of others. Nevertheless, it is important 
to underline the fact that radical feminists do not renounce theorizing and consider that 
feminists will be able to represent women and the world more adequately than other 
current theories even if they think that women will not speak as such unless "they became 
the authors of a feminist cogito'. "33 Thus, feminist women should contribute to the 
formation of a `feminine symbolic'. 
Lovibond criticises the radicals because they do not live up to the standards they suggest 
are adequate for a feminine thinking. Furthermore, they contradict themselves when they 
argue for `nomadic' theories while at the same time determine that there are certain forms 
of theorising that are more adequate for developing feminist agendas. Lovibond points out 
that Braidotti, for example, "indulges freely - both in theoretical and in practical contexts 
- in the kind of value judgement typical of truth-oriented philosophy. "34 According to 
Lovibond, Braidotti also criticises the work of other authors for their lack of coherence, 
and for shifting positions, which seems to be at odds with her own advice for theorising. 
She also uses the language of enlightenment modernism in her support of the rights of 
women. She has not emancipated from pre-modern conceptions of the subject, and finally, 
she is committed to the development of feminist political goals but she cannot justify her 
choice as desirable unless she is able to support it as non-arbitrary. 
Despite the apparent differences, Alcoff argues that both projects (radical and conformist) 
have many things in common, for instance, both argue that our current concept of reason 
needs to be criticised and transformed. 35 The radicals, as well as the reformists, want to 
32 S. Lovibond (1994). p 77. 
;; S. Lovibond (1994). p 78. 
3-' S. Lovibond (1994). p 81. 
L. Alcoff (1995), p 68. 
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"articulate a project that involves epistemic progress (.. ) a more representative truth, for 
women. "36 
She insists that to criticise rationality does not imply irrationality or arrationality. Reason 
has many forms, and reasoned argument is just one; "a part of what Is contained in our., 
or any other philosophical writings. "3" She says that we should break the 
rhetorics/philosophy distinction. Rhetorics, then, with its reliance on emotions and 
aesthetics over logical criteria, could be a way of getting closer to the truth, instead of a 
way to deliver a truth that has been already discovered; "if truth is not separable from the 
dialogical process within which it emerges, then the rules of philosophical argument and 
of conversational argument (or persuasion) begin to emerge. For example, i 'c might 
want to take into account the background of our partner in dialogue in terms of 
expressing meaning, knowing that the meaning s/he will hear through our words it'll/ 
partly be affected by her or his own horizon of interpretation. And to the extent meaning 
is connected to truth, this process will not be irrelevant to assessing either the 
justification or truth-status or our claims. "38 The analysis of the use of metaphors in 
philosophical texts shows us how they are used both to "invoke unsupported premises 
that work to offer support for other premises in the text"39 and to structure an 
"unstructured concept domain. "40 Pointing out the metaphors will make manifest such 
unsupported premises, and changing them will re-map our conceptual systems. Those uses 
involve a type of rationlatity that is different from that uniquely concerned with the validity 
of arguments. 
Alcoff sees the above as a project for reconstructing reason that is supported by the work 
of the radicals, and not far away from the project of the reformists. 41 "The work of the 
radical fen7inists contributes to this project of reformulating reason by teaching iss to 
read differently, to analyse logical relations between propositions alongside the silent 
invocations of word choice and the implicit arguments advanced by metaphor. They help 
36 L. Alcoff (1995), p 68. 
3' L. Alcoff (1995), p 69. 
3" L. Alcoff (1995), p 71. 
3) L. Alcoff (1995), p 73. 
L. Alcoff (1995), p 73. 
L. Alcoff (1995). p 75. 
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us to develop a simultaneous attentiveness to the emotional context of a text along. si /' its 
sui face pronouncements, without eliminating either from efficacy over meaning. ' 
On the same line, of thought, Alessandra Tanesini43 also suggests that radicals and 
reformist share the project of criticising reason, even if radicals make an "external" 
critique and reformists make an "internal" critique. 
Still, there is an apparently irreconciliable difference at the heart of both types of feminism: 
their views on sexual difference. While reformists try to change the use of sexual 
difference in metaphors to inform reason, the radicals want to find a feminine symbolic, 
and this bring us back to their differences in the characterisation of the body. While Lloyd 
favours a view of the body that is close to Spinoza, and assumes that there are mental 
differences as there are sexual differences, she also claims that the mind is socially 
constructed and that therefore, the differences are not natural. But Braidotti, "seems to 
assume that since bodies are sexually differentiated, this difference must imply that an 
embodied reason is also sexed. "44 
Their positions regarding reason present two problems. In the first place, if women cannot 
think as women in the current symbolic system, then their experiences have to arise from a 
body essentially conceived. Braidotti herself accepts the essentialism in her position and 
claims that "a feminist woman theoretician who is interested in thinking about sexual 
difference 
... today cannot afford not to 
be an essentialist. "as This also implies that 
women's experiences cannot be expressed within the current linguistic resourses. 
Lovibond argues that we can distinguish between "discursive forces that do, and those 
that do not, adequately represent my experience as an embodied female subject". 46 
Therefore, even if women's experiences are generally silenced, women occasionally 
succeed in expressing themselves. That is, even within the current masculinist symbolic 
system, we can talk. And, what it is more, we either "remain within the dominant 
' L. Alcoff (1995), p 75. 
4; A. Tancsini (1999). 
44 A. Tanesini (1999), p21. 
a` Quotation in S. Lovibond (1 o)1)4), p 78 
S. Lovibond (1994), p 80. 
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symbolic system, or else forfeit the ability to communicate. "'- 
The second question that arises is not directly related to their view on sexual difference, 
but rather, to their view on the self, and it is that of agency. If we deny the possibility of 
being able to take decisions and give reasons for our actions and choices, we seem to be 
precluding the possibility of politics. Tanesini points out that Braidotti has lately moved 
towards trying to think of a genderless rationality, by using Haraway's cyborg as a 
paradigm of an agent that does not need to be endorsed with a particular type of 
unconscious tied to its gender. Tanesini claims that even if psychoanalysis is correct and 
our mental contents are not always transparent to us (that is, they are in need of 
interpretation), this does not mean that subjects cannot be conceived as agents, because 
"their behaviours at least sometimes flows from their intentions. "48 She underlines that 
rationality is a feature that individuals possess because they belong to communities. 49 She 
claims that `rationality should be understood in terms of communal practices. "" 
Reflections on those practices can bring about changes in our concept of rationality. It is 
therefore possible to challenge our concept of rationality from within philosophy. 
I believe that it is possible to change our concept of reason via philosophical dialogue, but 
I will argue that in order to do it, we have to change other related concepts such as 
knowledge. I will argue for changes in our epistemological paradigm that will allow us to 
recognize the importance of practices in the production of knowledge. By acknowleging 
that relating to the world appropriately is to count as knowledge, we will be able to 
account for a rationality that is defined in a broader sense than merely accounting for the 
validity of arguments. I will support the idea that rationality can be attributed on the basis 
of an appropriate engagement with the world. I will develop all these issues in chapters 
five and six. 
3. Science and Objective Knowledge. 
47 S. Lovibond (1994), p 80 
18 A. Tancsini (1999). p 227. 
49 A. Tancsini (1999). p 227. 
50 A. Tancsini (1999). p 227. 
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If there is a kind of knowledge that is held to be conducive to truth in our dominant 
culture is that of science and scientific knowledge. s' It is widely believed (and not just by 
those uncontaminated by philosophy) that science offers an adequate picture of reality. 
that is, we think that scientific theories are true and represent the world as it is. Science 
has been defined as "a systematic public enterprise, controlled by logic and empirical 
fact, whose purpose is to formulate the truth about the natural world. "52 
One of the main reasons why science has such an enormous degree of credibility is due to 
its claim of fitting an ideal of objectivity that can be characterized as "au ideal that 
subjects all scientific statements to the test of independent and impartial criteria 
recognizing no authority of persons in the realm of cognition. "S3 This means that any 
person could apply the scientific method and obtain confirmation for the theories that 
others have postulated by using the same methods. Any differences between different 
knowers is erased by the correct application of the scientific method. Therefore, 
objectivity in science is obtained by applying a method that erases any subjective bias that 
the scientist could inadvertently bring into his theories: objectivity is defined as the 
opposite to subjectivity. 
Following the scientific method, any observer of a phenomenon, should be able to discern 
which of the available theories to explain it is the more appropriate. It is presupposed that 
there are "objective" grounds to prefer one theory over another. This implies that the 
observation of data (used as evidence to justify theories) is theory-neutral, that is, data and 
theories are independent from each other, so choosing between two rival theories is just a 
question of arbitrating which one better fits the evidence procured by observation. 
Thus the objectivity of the knowledge obtained via the scientific method is grounded on 
two presuppositions, one that the observers should be interchangeable, and the second that 
data is independent from theories. Both presuppositions have been challenged and it has 
been argued that this particular ideal of objectivity is neither present in science, nor, in 
many cases, it is desirable either. 
51 Sec H. Longino (1993), p 102 for an anal\'sis of the relations between science and epistcnmology. 
52 1. Schefllcr (1981), p 256 
53 I. Schefllcr (198 1), p 253, 
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3.1 Objectivity v Subjectivity. 
I will refer first to objectivity as the opposite of subjectivity. The subjectivity of the 
individual scientist is held in control by reference to independent checks. Impartiality is 
supposed to be attained by the elimination of subjective bias. Part of the scientific ethos 
consists in admitting that the beliefs held by an individual can be proven to be wrong under 
examination by the scientific community. As well as rejecting whole theories, the control 
of the community is supposed to remove prejudices that the individual could have brought 
to the investigation. This ideal of objectivity also implies that scientists have to "acqui. re 
an impersonal regard for the judgments of others, for what matters is not who they are, 
but whether they properly voice the import of controlling standards. Detachment and, 
therefore, interchangeability of individual scientists becomes a condition for objectivity. 
Some of the stronger criticisms of this ideal of interchangeability, came from feminist 
theories. Feminists scholars with an interest in the role of women in science and also as the 
subjects of science, have pointed out that there are structures in the production of science 
that exclude women from science, and that our conceptual organization implies that 
women are less able to engage in particular types of knowledge. Thus, the ideal of 
interchangeability actually does not apply. Nevertheless, the fact that there is a gender 
imbalance in the scientific community does not imply that if more women were doing 
science their theories would be different to those put forward by males. 
However, some feminists have argued that it makes a difference in the choice and 
development of theories if the scientist is a man or a woman. Women can produce 
scientific tºieories of the same quality as males, but the content of those theories could 
be 
different from that produced only by an all-male scientific community. This type of 
approach that acknowledges that the biography of the scientist can play a role 
in the 
production of theories is not unique to feminists in the study of science. The 
history of 
science teaches us about individuals who have solved resilient problems by approaching 
them in a new way, and many times the biographical references are the key when we try to 
dilucidate the genesis of new scientific theories. 
I. Schcmci (198 1). p 25_, 
In order to support the ideal of objectivity as interchangeability, and therefore, to avoid 
the interference of these biographical elements in the production of science, philosophers 
of science have distinguished between the context of discovery and the context of 
justification. " The context of discovery is that in which hypotheses are devised, and the 
context of justification is the process of their evaluation. In a traditional characterization of 
science, subjectivity is allowed to play a role in the first realm, but it is eliminated in the 
second one by adhering strictly to the method of science in the justification of theories. So 
it is possible to agree with those who claim that female scientists would chose to devote 
their time to study different realms of knowledge, or that will capture particular aspects of 
reality, without having to accept that they will do science in a different way. The gender of 
the scientist might influence the context of discovery, but not the context of justification. 
Nevertheless, it has been argued that there are biases that do not disappear in the context 
of justification, and that the distinction between these two realms does not fit the history 
of science or the actual practices of scientists. 
In relation with the second of these objections, I will point out that it is not clear that the 
justification of theories can be carried out following the scientific method and without 
accounting for factors such as the inventive imagination of the individual scientist. 
Occasionally, we encounter rival theories that do not suggest a particular test to decide 
between them. Devising and carrying out a test involves imagination, skill, and intuitive 
judgment. `6 If this is so, there are difficulties in adhering closely to an ideal method in the 
design and choice of experimentation. Consequently, it has been suggested that the 
context of justification should be limited to the assessment of evidence. Nevertheless, 
assessing evidence is relative to the results of tests and also implies non methodical skills 
and judgments of the type encountered in the context of justifications' Thus, there is no 
sharp division between characteristics or featu. es of the context of discovery and those in 
the context of justification. Alex Bird offers an interesting example to illustrate this claim. 
55 1. Scheler (1981), pl54 acknowledges that it was H. Reichenbach who first drew the distinction 
between the context of discover and the context of justification in Experience and Prediction, Chicago, 
Universittiy of Chicago Press. ch. 1, sec. 1. 
56 Sec A. Bird (1998) p 260-2 for an interesting example. 
57 A. Bird (1998), p 262. 
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In 1989 two chemists claimed that they had demonstrated the low-temperature fusion of 
deuterium to form helium. This was a huge step in relation to the production of energy by 
cold fusion, so their experiment attracted great attention. Many other scientists reported 
the same results in their tests; therefore, the hypothesis was confirmed. Later on, they 
retracted their claims. Some of them thought that there could be other reasons to account 
for the results and determined that the results were not due to cold fusion, because there 
was a fault in the apparatus used for the experiment. But what make them suspect that the 
data did not support the theory in the first place if everything seemed to fit perfectly? Bird 
concludes that; "the assessment of hypothesis against the evidence is not simply a matter 
of seeing whether the evidence is plausibly explained by the hypothesis, but also of 
considering whether there is reason to think that it is the best explanation of the evidence. 
To do that, it will be necessary to conceive of what the alternative explanations might be. 
But conceiving of possible explanations is part of what we called the "context of 
discovery ", which we said was not amenable to method. It is not always possible to 
distinguish the context of discovery from that of justification. Although the distinction 
may be a useful one, the fact is that for most of science, the two are bond up together; the 
one requires the other. "S8 
The second argument against the usefulness of the distinction between the contexts of 
discovery and justification was that it does not eliminate certain types of biases; for 
instance, some theories are accepted because they support the prejudices of the scientific 
community that is judging them. There are biases that are not due to individual 
preferences, but rather, that reflect the main ideology of society and that are so ingrained 
in our systems of thought that they pass undetected. 59 Scientific method is unable to avoid 
this bias. Our conceptual system is shaped by our values and prejudices and it shows in our 
characterization of reality as it appears in our scientific theories (I will develop this line of 
thought in a later section). So objectivity as impartiality is not ensured by a method that is 
designed to make rational choices which should be unbiased. 
3.2 Objectivity as the independence between theory and data. 
`K A. Bird (1998). p 262. 
59 Sec S. Harding (1993). 
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The previous criticism of science as value laden links with a second form of argument 
against our traditional conception of objectivity in science. As I pointed out at the 
beginning of the section, science is taken to be objective in a second sense because of the 
"independence of empirical facts from the theories to which they are relevant as 
evidence. "60 If this were not the case, then the scientific community could not judge if a 
new theory is an adequate representation of the facts. Observation in science is taken to be 
theory neutral, so anybody could collect the relevant evidence to support our theories (and 
their values will not have any relevance in their decisions regarding the acceptance of 
theories). Empirical observation is the ultimate test for theories and therefore independent 
of any previous conceptions. It is therefore tacitly accepted that those who belong to the 
scientific community are able to have "a common discourse and access to a shared 
world.. "61 Without this presupposition a cross checking of theories or assertions would 
not be possible. 
Science, as I have pictured it, is a cumulative enterprise that lead us to an increasingly 
complex and complete understanding of the natural world. But this view of science as 
cumulative and conducing to truth has been criticized in relation to the history of science. 
There have been many accepted scientific theories which have been replaced by others 
which had very little in common with their predecessors. Still, it is possible to argue that 
science is cumulative at the observational level, despite its lack of cumulativeness at the 
theoretical level. And also, that there is a consistency of method that unifies the practice of 
science. '' 
However, it has been argued that science cannot be cumulative at the observational level 
because observation is theory-laden, so if there are two communities of scientists with two 
different theories, and their observations are dependent on their theories, then we cannot 
use observation as a way of arbitrating between rival theories 
because; "an appeal to 
empirical fact can only succeed where the parties to a dispute share the same `conceptual 
60 1. Schicmcr (198 ), p 252. 
(;, 1. Sciicmer (108 1), p 253. 
621. Scljemer (19ý 1). p 257. 
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organization' of their experience. "63 A very simple example provided by Hanson"' will 
illustrate this claim. Kepler believed that the sun was fixed and the earth moved around it, 
while Tycho Brahe following Ptolemy and Aristotle, claimed that the earth was fixed and 
the sun was moving around us. Did they refer to the same thing when they talked about 
the sun, and also, did they see the same object in the east at dawn? Both of them could 
refer to their observations to support their theory, but because their theories conformed to 
their observations, we cannot consider their observations as cumulative! They had the 
same visual state but different visual experiences. Their retinal reaction is a physical state, 
but their seeing is an experience, and they had different experiences because even if their 
retinal reaction was the same, they interpreted it in a different way. Interpreting means 
having independent facts that count as evidence in one way or another, the difference with 
seeing is that the interpretation is inevitably intermingled with the seeing. "Observation of 
x is shaped by prior knowledge of x. Another influence on observation rests in the 
language or notation used to express what we know, and without which there would be 
little we could recognize as knowledge". 6s 
If we have several theories that fit the evidence, the way of choosing between them would 
be to obtain more evidence to resolve our doubts, but then it has been put forward that it 
is impossible to obtain such an evidence due to the undetermination of theory by evidence. 
The thesis of the underdetermination of theory by evidence "holds that logically 
incompatible theories may fit all possible evidence. Alternatively, there may be pairs of 
empirically equivalent theories which, while not contradicting each other, use radicallti- 
different theoretical notions"' As I have already pointed out, a traditional empiricist 
account of science, would find this thesis problematic because they rely on the idea that 
beliefs about the world can be verified by looking at the state of the world that will make 
them true. If the underdetermination of theory by evidence holds, then they have to justify 
why they prefer one theory over another without having recourse to facts of the world as 
evidence. The other possibility would be to show that it is not possible to have empirically 
equivalent theories that are in competition to one another. 
63 S. Brown, J. Fauvell and R. Finnegan (1981), p 258 
64 Hanson (1981). p 249. 
65 Hanson (198 1), p270. 
66 C. Hookway (1992). p 517. 
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Taking on board the claim that the meaning of observational terms depends on the theories 
in which they appear, Khun claimed that theories are incommensurable due to meaning 
variance: if each theorist is caught in her own theory, then communication between 
theories is not possible, as neither is in disagreement. Khun argues that terms such as 
`mass' refer to different things in different theories. 67 So, in Newtonian mechanics theory 
we can say that mass can be conserved and in Relativistic mechanics that mass can be 
transformed, and we can say this without having to accept that we have contradictory 
claims about `mass', because the meaning of mass in each theory depends on the rest of 
the theory, not a common 'thing" that we call mass. If we accept, with Khun, that there is 
meaning variance when changing theories, rather than contradiction we have equivocation. 
The two theories are not logically incompatible and we do not have to chose between 
them. There is no logical incompatibility between theories, and we cannot rationally justify 
choosing one theory over another by making reference to observations. ' The choice 
between theories is done by deciding which theory is closer to a set of values that the 
scientific community consider desirable. 69 It has been argued that Khun accepts that we 
can partially translate between paradigms, and this opens up the possibility that even if 
there is a certain dependence between theories and observation, we might be able to have 
neutral observational data. It would be thus possible to decide on purely empirical grounds 
which theory is better. A variation of this would be to say not that all observations are 
n3utral, but that, given that theories are partially translatable, some observations are 
neutral. Even if we accept this move, however, theory choice is based partially on a choice 
of values that can be either local to communities or universal. 
67 A. Bird (1998) says "the first is that a theoretical term has a sense which determines its reference; the 
second is that the sense of a theoretical term depends on the whole of the theory of which it is part. 
Together these add up to the view, roughly speaking, that the theory amounts to one big description of its 
intended reference. thus two distinct competing theories, will constitute rival descriptions which could not 
refer to the same thing. This is why Einstenian mass and Newtonian mass cannot be the same thing, since 
part of the description of the later is that it is always conserved, and part of the description of the former is 
that it is not always conserved. " p 280. 
68 Kuhn argues that this meaning variance occurs only in the case of a paradigm shift. Theory change 
during normal science does not imply meaning variance. 
69 The thesis of the incommensurability of paradigms, does not imply the acceptance of the 
indetermination of translation, the indctermination of translation theory, put forward by Quine, is that am 
theory can be translated in more than one way into our language. The thesis, supported by Kuhn, that 
terms acquire their meaning within theories, would not be accepted by Quine. It is whole theories and not 
individual terms that have meanings therefore. -Einstein can cone to see what Newton means by his 
terms. " A. Bird (199S), p 157. 
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H. Longino, one of the most prominent feminist empiricists, interprets Khun's examples of 
scientists seeing different things in the following way: they do not see different thing's, the%- 
see different aspects of the same thing. "It is not, therefore necessary to sal, that the 
Aristotelian and the Galilean are seeing different things. Rather we can sale that they are 
seeing the same thing but attending to different aspects of it". 70 We can understand both 
theories if we articulate their background assumptions. And if we can do it, representatives 
of both theories could do it as well. She claims that the acceptance of theory ladeness of 
observation does not imply incommesurability. " She says that "the relation benree» 
hypothesis and evidence is determined by background assumptions operative in the 
context in which data are being assessed. "72 We have theories that are empirically 
grounded, and that attempt to describe the world as it is, but nevertheless, and due to the 
fact that observation is biased by the theory they do not apprehend exactly the same 
aspects of reality. If we want to have a complete picture of the world, we will have to find 
ways of comparing theories that seem contradictory; of finding what they have in common 
and how they complement each other. We should not forget that theory choice implies 
choice between the values and background assumptions that those theories embody, and 
that the criteria of selection is not only empirical adequacy. In a later chapter, I will offer 
two different ways of looking for a new concept of objectivity that embraces all these 
challenges: Harding's `Strong objectivity', and Longino's own theory. 
Science is a paradigmatic form of knowledge because it is believed that the application of 
the scientific method will provide us with an adequate representation of the world. One of 
the reasons why science is so well regarded is because of its ideal of objectivity that claims 
that subjective preferences and values are erased from the development of theories. I 
began by arguing that subjective values are present in science, by showing that 
interchageability does not hold. It matters who develops the scientific theories; the 
biography of the scientist can explain why she was able to put forward a new view in 
science. In order to preserve objectivity in science while acknowledging the importance of 
some biographical aspects in the creation of scientific theories, a distinction between the 
'o H. Longino (1990). p 54. 
71 H. Lonoino. (1990)" p56. 
H. Longiino (1990). P5. 
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context of discovery and the context of justification was drawn, I argued that there are 
biases (those that support the prejudices of the scientist judging the validity of the 
theories) that do not disappear in the context of justification, and furthermore, that the 
distinction between the contexts of justification and discovery does not fit either with the 
history of science nor the actual practices of scientists. Therefore, there are subjective 
factors in scientific theories that are not erased by the application of the scientific method. 
I also argued that the second pillar of the ideal of objective knowledge, the independence 
between theory and data, did not hold either. If observation is not independent of theories, 
then it cannot be used as the final test to decide between rival theories. I argued that the 
choice of theories is done by deciding which one satisfies a set of values that are held by 
the scientific community. The implications of my arguments against the ideal of objectivity 
are clear: science is not objective in the ideal sense that I defined at the beginning of the 
section; it is biased toward values at work in the choice, justification and discovery of 
theories. It is important to make those values visible and to determine if those values 
favour society as a whole or just part of it. And finally, it is necessary to give a new 
meaning to "objectivity". 
4. Gendered Science. 
In section 1, I pointed out that feminists developed feminist epistemology as a response to 
the masculinism present in our concepts of knowledge and in the practices of production 
of knowledge. Science is one of the most important types of knowledge and it has been 
analyzed in detail by feminists to disclose its sexist bias. It is evident that women have 
been excluded from science at a practical level, but is this enough to claim that science is 
masculinist? In order to prove that science is masculinist, I will explain how the exclusion 
of women from science, has affected the content of the scientific theories, and I will also 
show that there is a bias in many theories that support androcentrism. Furthermore, 
women have been symbolicaliy excluded from science, therefore, all the characteristics 
that have been linked to femininity have been excluded from science, and this has given an 
inadequate idea of how scientific knowledge actually works. As a further implication, it 
has meant that women have actually been considered inadequate to produce science so, 
even if women entered science in greater numbers, women would still be considered as 
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less reliable in their production of knowledge 
I will analyze the following senses in which science is gendered and biased towards the 
masculinist: it is conceptualized as masculine; it is men who mostly do it; their experiences 
and values are generalized and taken to be universal; it has been ideologically used to 
naturalize power relations; and finally, its metaphors have reflected and modeled 
androcentric cultural stereotypes. 
4.1. Science conceptualized as masculine. 
First of all, I would like to remark on the situatedness of this claim: to conceptualize 
science as masculine is the product of particular cultural and historical circumstances. 
Jordanova analyses the relationship between science and gender as available in our cultural 
heritage, and she claims that; "We can never take term like 'sexual', 'masculine', or 
feminine' as either stable or self-evident. The job of the historian is precisely to recover 
the fragile and fleeting significances they take on" 73 These terms are defined partly by 
their metaphorical implications, some of which I will analyze in this section to show that as 
slippery as the definition of those terms is that of their relationship to science. The alliance 
between masculinity and science is contingent. 74 In a previous section I have explained 
why theoretical knowledge is supposed to be masculine: it is linked to objectivity, and 
objectivity is defined as produced by knowers who are detached from their emotions, 
particularities, interests and values. The ideal knower is disembodied and does not belong 
to a particular place or time. As I have already claimed, science is the paradigm of 
objective knowledge, and therefore, is more readily identified with this type of impersonal 
knowledge than with those more `feminine" types of knowledge that are based on 
biographical, emotional, and personal experiences. Feminine, unscientific knowledge, is 
produced by situated, embodied subjects, and according to our traditional classifications it 
cannot be other than subjective in its nature. 
Jordanova examines western representational practices and claims that it is common in 
73 L. Jordanova (1989), p 4. 
' while, in our cultural tradition, science is considered a male realm, in other cultures it is considered to 
he a safe subject for women 
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such practices to represent nature as a female unveiling before science. -; The 
conceptualization of science as masculine is closely entangled with the characterization of 
nature as feminine. The identification of women with their bodies and the claim that they 
are closer to nature than males is another constant in our culture. These metaphorical 
representations are easily understood by members of our culture because they have been 
used so often. Occasionally, the allegory takes place in the form of a nude female corpse 
being dissected, studied or contemplated by a male scientist, anatomist, or doctor. The 
implications of this type of representation are multiple. By representing knowledge as 
something that has to be attained by `Unveiling" or `dissecting" nature (as represented by 
the female body) the idea that science is a way of exerting dominance over nature is 
reinforced. Science is male and nature female and the relations of domination between the 
sexes has a reflection in our conception of science. Jordanova underlines the relations of 
power that this representation evoke; "science and medicine, since they claimed special 
truth states for themselves, were drawn both to personifications of nature as women and 
to the image or unveiling in order to represent their privileged relationship to truth and 
to nature. They thereby become the domains strong enough, as a power nexus, to grapple 
with the complex forces that nakedness unleashed". " The body reveals naked under the 
veil and it is desired and feared at the same time, but science is strong enough to handle 
nature and to show us the truth about it. This particular type of representation of nature as 
desirable and feared at the same time is related to the birth of modern science. And rises 
parallel to the conception of science as a cohercitive force in Bacon's work: "Though 
Bacon rejected all other kinds of recognizable, established authority, he accepted and 
established male authority as integral to the practice and philosophy of science. 
Continuing a process begun at least in the 16th century (Fee chapter 3), Bacon 
elaborated the metaphors of science in sexual and gendered terms, with science as male 
and nature as females, a mystery to be unveiled and penetrated. Woman as a 
reproductive being embodied the natural, the disordered, the emotional, the irrational; 
man as a thinker epitomized objectivity, rationality, culture and Control. 
"77 
I have pointed out that the identification of masculinity and science are just the product of 
75 She Cocuses mainly on XVIII and XIX century representations 
76 L. Jordinova (1989), p 94. 
77 R. Blcicr (1986), p 6. 
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a particular culture, and the same can be said with this characterization of nature and its 
relation to the feminine. In the premodern period, nature was represented both as a 
nurturing mother and as the wild and untamable temptress. 78 As a result, there was a clear 
ambivalence in relation to nature, the identification with the motherly figure promoted 
respect towards nature while the characterization as a temptress created a desire to control 
and possess it. 79 The origin of modern science emphasizes the desire of domination over a 
nature that is taken now not to be organic and active, but passive and mechanical. 8° 
The consequences of this characterization of science are twofold. On the one hand, the 
idea that women are not naturally suited to produce scientific knowledge is reinforced, and 
therefore, women are excluded from science. On the other hand, the ideal of scientific 
knowledge wrongly establishes that the production of science has all the traits of 
`fnasculine knowledge" and none of the feminine ones. At the beginning of the section I 
claimed that these conceptual relations are contingent. Our culture does not acknowledge 
that science lacks the type of objectivity that it claims for itself, and it ignores the historical 
origin of the ideal of objectivity as detached knowledge. " I will argue for a change in the 
conceptual relations that we have established between gender, science, and knowledge. 
4.2. The predominance of male scientists. 
In section 3I claimed that the production of scientific theories is closely linked to the idea 
of interchangeability. Through this scientists are able to transcend their biases and produce 
"objective" knowledge. Therefore, it should not matter who produces the theories. This 
seems to be the ideal situation for the participation of women in science. Nevertheless, 
science is a male dominated activity. There are many different factors that contribute to 
support the exclusion of women from science, but I will argue that the fact that the 
feminine has been metaphorically linked to lesser forms of rationality, and that women 
have been attributed different forms of cognition, have had an influence in the actual 
'ý ý S. Heckman (1990), p 113. 
79 C. Merchand, (1980). 
80 S. Heckman (1990), p 114-115. 
xý R. Blcicr (1986) says that "Neutrality is believed to be an inherent and defining feature of science. It is 
an interesting paradox, however, that even the idea itself of objectivity and social neutrality as a 
characteristic or even requirement of science is not an inherently logical, internal achievement of modern 
science, but rather the product of social and political forces in the 17th century. - p 5. 
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participation of women in science. 
The scarcity of female scientists has deserved further study, and it has been explained as a 
product of biology, such that women are naturally less able to do science, or by claiming 
that they are more geared towards caring for their families and therefore not likely to 
pursue a career as scientist. The facts that women are excluded from science because the 
concept of masculinity is closely linked to that of the scientists, and because the scientific 
institutions are designed to fit the type of life style traditionally pursued by males, are 
overlooked. I will look at these two factors. 
4.2 1 The making of the modest witness. 
Haraway claims that being a modest, invisible, witness is the mark of the scientist. By being 
a `Ynodest" witness, the scientist is able to legitimize his observations; "This kind of 
modesty is one of the founding virtues of what we call modernity. This is the virtue that 
guarantees that the modest witness is the legitimate and authorized ventriloquist for the 
object word, adding nothing from his mere opinions, from his biasing embodiment. And 
so he is endowed with the remarkable power to establish the facts. He bears witness: he is 
objective, he guarantees the clarity and purity of objects. His subjectivity is his 
objectivity. "82 
Boyle is taken to be the founder of the "experimental way of life", which consists of a 
mixture of private and public witnessing. During his life time it was also established that 
even if everybody could watch (in a `laboratory" environment), not everybody could be a 
witness, because just certain types of peopie can `testify". The workers in Boyle's 
laboratory were not able to testify because they worked for him, and were not 
independent. Equally, Shapin notes how women could not be witness/scientists either 
because "subszmled under their husbands or father, women could not have the necessary 
kind (? f honor at stake". 83 Haraway points out that E. Potter explains how the making of 
the scientist, at the time, was closely linked to the making of masculinity: "Elizabeth 
82 D. Harawav (1997). p 24. 
D. Harawav (1997), p 27. 
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Potter, however, has a keen eye for hoiv men became man in 117C practice of modest 
witnessing. Men-in -the -making, not men, or women, already made, is her coiiccrn. 
Gender was at stake in the experimental way of life, she argues, not predetermined. "' 
The activities and way of life of scientists challenged the role of males in the society of the 
time. Therefore, in order to accentuate the adequacy of such an activity for males, the 
image/virtues of scientist must be remarkedly `Virile". Therefore, women were not 
inadequate to be scientists because of their inferior intellect, but rather because the 
manhood of the scientist has to be enforced with the exclusion of women from science. 
4.2.2 Contemporary reasons for exclusion. 
Nowadays the exclusion remains but, as I have already said, it is attributed to biological 
facts. It is broadly accepted that women are less naturally inclined to science, to such a 
degree that, even parents and teachers that try to encourage girls to go into science do it in 
ways that, underline the differences. 85 Patantucci points out, as a result of her empirical 
study of the situation of women in science that women have more difficulties surpassing 
the social prejudices against the alien role of women in science than actually doing the 
scientific work. Pattatuci has collaborated with women from all paths of science and has 
found that "not one woman in this group cites mastering the large body of technical 
material inherent to succeeding in science as an overwhelming task. However, a majority 
indicate that the lack of institutional support and the relentless application of social 
stereotypes about women are the least distracting and the most suffocating to their 
success in the field '. 86 
The prejudices and the structures of science are the two main problems that women have 
to face when, despite the odds, they decide to pursue a career in science. In relation to the 
84 D. Harawav (1997), p29. 
8` Parents have lover expectations for their daughters than their sons in maths (Entwisle, D. C. and 
Baker, D. P. (1983). Even when recognized, women's achievements in science are characterized as 
serendipity rather than natural ability (Frieze, Whistlev & McHugh, 1982). This attitude makes girls feel 
inadequate. E. Anderson (1995) indicates that "Teachers and counsellors discourage girls from pursuing 
mathematics and the `natural' sciences (Curran 1980,30-32). The classroom climate in mixed gender 
schools favours boys. Teachers pay more attention and offer more encoura cnient to white boys than to 
girls, solicit their participation more, and expect them to achieve more, especially in mathematics courses 
(Becker 1981. AAUWV 1992). " p 55 
'16 A. M. Pattatucci (199$), P S. 
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prejudices that they encounter, we can see how the old characterization of women as less 
able and as different epistemic agents is still accepted, so women in science are taken to 
be less capable than their males collegues and have less institutional support while they are 
in university. " Once they have finished their degrees and continue their careers despite all 
the obstacles, they will find that they "get lower pay, less research support, jobs in le. s. s 
prestigious institutions, lower-ranking positions, and positions that assign more and 
lower level teaching (Austin and Bayer 1973, Fox 1981)"$$ In general, and being faithful 
to the tradition established at Boyle's time, women as scientists encounter less respect and 
credibility than their male colleagues. 89 In relation to the second problem that women in 
science have to face, that is, the institutional obstacles, it is worth noticing that these are 
multiple, but derived mainly from the way in which the work is organized. For instance, 
women often complain that life in the laboratories is geared towards those who have not 
got any family responsibilities. If women were institutionally allowed to remain in science, 
it is very likely that we would witness important changes in the production of knowledge. 90 
A direct implication of the prejudices existent in the practice of science due to be a male 
87 "Graduate schools present women with informal barriers or cost to advancement, including sexual 
harassment and exclusion from networks of male mentors and colleagues often vital to the advancement of 
aspiring academics (Reskin 1979, Rose 1989). "E. Anderson (1995), p 59. 
88 E. Anderson (1995), p 59. 
89 See E. Anderson (1995), p 59, for examples of how the gendered division of theoretical labour implies a 
gendered structure of epistemic authority. 
90 In actual fact, women scientists have brought in values that have made them critical with the way in 
which the work is organized. Pattatucci (1998) explains how, when the career of a woman scientist 
suffered because she refused to spend all her time in the lab as the head of the project demanded, she 
argued that there are other things in life that are valuable apart from science. She complained that male 
scientists do not have to make a choice between other valuable things in life, such as families and their 
work because they rely too much on their partners to organize the rest of their lives. There is a culture in 
scientific laboratories that science is first and personal life second, so scientists have to be available at 
anti-social times. It is taken for granted that this ethos will be adopted by everybody and they do not make 
adequate arrangements to provide people with the spare time that they are entitled to have. This attitude is 
only possible because scientists have an ingrained sense of the fairness of the division of labour, so while 
they can dedicate their lives to science, their female partners take care of the private spheres of their lives. 
But, of course, this does not apply to female scientists whom, even when they work in "male 
environments", are still expected to behave as women, i. e., to be the ones taking care of the family and of 
their husbands (scientists). A consequence of which is that they cannot cope with the timetables involved 
in such a was' of doing science and give up doing science and change it for the teaching of science. 
Women scientists have also complained about other structural failures of the scientific project, for 
instance, they claim that research is done in laboratories, at the lower level of the pay scale and the 
profession, and that anybody who intends to have a job higher up needs to dedicate all their time to 
getting money for the projects, to the detriment of their own research. Given that they like doing science 
instead of being managers or find raisers, they have preferred to stay at that lower-paid professional level. 
rather than go up in the hierarchy and lose their contact with research. 
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dominated environment is signaled by Anderson who claims that scientific theories put 
forward by women have been rejected just because women are considered to be less able 
scientists. The difficulties that McClintock faced in her career due to Qender discrimination 
are used by Anderson as an example to illustrate how the "gender structure of theoretical 
labor and cognitive authority sometimes slows the progress of knowledge. "91 She claims 
that the gender of the inquirer affects the content of the theories. ' Therefore, excluding 
women from science will preclude our access to particular theories. It seems obvious then 
that women should not only promote reforms so as to include a way of evaluating research 
projects that are gender-blind; but, also, they should promote the wider participation of 
women researchers because they can provide us with different theories. She disagrees with 
those who claim that women have a different way of knowing; but she still thinks that 
women can provide us with alternative theories 
Despite the symbolic representation of women in our conceptual system, there are many 
women that decide to pursue a science degree and a career as scientists. But all along they 
feel that the fact that they are women is a hyndrance to their prospects. The symbolic 
exclusion of women from knowledge and reason has an important role in their exclusion 
from science: it is considered natural that they will not be able to fit their private lives with 
the public realm of science. We should challenge the way in which science is made, 
because the work is organized in ways that support masculinist values. Disentangling the 
concept of femininity from others that impede the access of women to all the realms of 
knowledge will be helped if we begin changing the structures of science to allow women 
to pursue their careers. Also, it will help the work of women to be recognized as produced 
by epistemic agents as valuable as their male collegues. 
4.3 The naturalization of power relations. 
91 E. Anderson (1995), p 60. 
92 "The gender of the researcner is known to make a difference to what is known in certain area of social 
science. In survey research, subjects give different answers to questions depending on the perceived 
gender of the interviewer (Sheriff 1987,47-48). The perceived race of the 
interviewer also influences 
subjects' responses. It is a highly significant variable accounting 
for subjects' responses to questions about 
race relations (Schuman and Hatchett 1974). In anthropology, 
informants vary their responses depending 
on the gender of the anthropologist. In many societies, niale anthropologists 
have less access to women's 
social worlds than female anthropologists do (Leacock 
1982). The race of the researcher affects access to 
social worlds as well. Native Americans sometimes grant 
Asian anthropologists access to religious rituals 
from which they ban whites (Pai 1985) E. Anderson 
(1995). p 61. 
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Science is masculinist because it has been used to naturalize our ways of life and to 
support current power arrangements. There are many theories that legitimize positions of 
domination based on sexual differences. 
One of the most common examples of this type of theory is the biological reductionist 
approach to gender differences. As I showed in section 2.2, where I analyzed the 
relationship between gender and rationality, there has always been a tendency to 
exaggerate the importance of the differences between the sexes and to argue that physical 
differences imply psychological differences. As early as in the Aristotelian texts the 
`natural" differences between the reason of men and women were considered to be due to 
their biological differences. To be "different" implied that that women were considered 
naturally inferior and under the protection of males. The echoes of that type of argument 
can still be found in current scientific theories that postulate that cognitive differences 
between men and women are the product of biological differences such as different sizes 
of the brain or the specialization of different parts of the brain (it is argued by some that 
those differences are the product of hormones). Behavioural differences between the sexes 
are also given a biological bases, and those naturalizing moves are supported by 
observation of animal behavior and also by drawing inferences from more `primitive" 
societies. Such reductionist theories are used to support the view that males are better at 
particular types of cognitive pursuits than women due to their biology, and that traits such 
as aggression and competitive behaviour also have their roots in biology. The gender 
division of labour has its roots in biology. 
Some of the theories used to support these views have been discarded as example of 
straightforward bad science, while others are the product of normal science, but include a 
clear ideological androcentric bias. 
An example of bad science that illustrates how sexist prejudices can bias research is that of 
Paul Broca. He measured human cranial capacity to show how women and `inferior" races 
had smaller brains and also less intellectual abilities. While collecting evidence to support 
his claims, he conveniently, `forgot"that women in general have smaller body weights, and 
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so the size of the brain should be measured with reference to the volume of the whole 
body. He also left out of his research cases of geniuses with small brains, and of `savages" 
with big brains. 93 Another common example of bad science is sociobiology. The claims 
made by sociobiology that women's gendered role as child rearers and homemakers has its 
origins in genetics has been discarded by feminist and non-feminists who "point to [its] 
faulty methodology, insufficient evidence, uninformed generalization, and [it. s] use of 
hidden assumptions". " In a classic work that critically analyses the attempt to reduce 
gender differences to genetics, Rose claim that "We will review these apparently scientific 
claims to explain the current gender division in society and will show that they represent 
a systematic selection, misrepresentation, or improper extrapolation of the evidence, 
larded with prejudice and basted in poor theory, and that, far from accounting for 
present divisions, they serve as ideologies that help to perpetuate them". " 
There are other theories that, even if they are the product of normal science, are 
unacknowledgedly biased towards certain values: scientific theories embody the values of 
those whom produce them, so if they are produced by a sexist community they will be 
biased towards sexist values. This bias will affect the results of the theory, because it will 
explain just certain aspects of reality. A good example of how facts get selected and 
misinterpreted can be found in the history of primatology, as Bleier points out; "Except for 
Japanese field workers, primatologists in the 1950s and 1960s could not see what female 
primates were doing; and even if they could see something, their hypothesis, observations 
and interpretations were clearly constrained by the cultural concepts available". 96 The 
observations of primates suggested that they reproduced our social arrangements; but with 
the entry of more women in this area of knowledge, primatologists began to be aware that 
certain social behaviours in primates were ignored, while other behaviours, that supported 
the prejudices of the observers, were given central importance. This example illustrates 
that male observers :: here focusing on particular aspects of the relations between the 
primates while female ones where focusing on others. This shows that we can have 
93 N. Lcys Stepan (1996). 
94 S. Heckman (1990), p 122. Heckplan gives a list of works that support this claim: (Bile, 1979,1984. 
Lcibow itv., 1978, Rccd 1978, Hendler, 1976, Fausto Sterling. 1985, Lowe and Hubbard. 1983, Lcwontin et 
at 1084, Gould 1986, Ditcher 1985). 
95 S. Rose, R. C. Lcw'ontin, L. G. Kamin (1984). p 135. 
96 R. Blcier (1980), p ,. 
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different descriptions of the same reality, both of them informed by the values of the 
observers. Both theories are biased towards preferred values or preconceptions, but the 
difference between the early theories produced by male primatologists and the later ones 
produced by female primatologist is that while the former thought that their observations 
were objective, the latter acknowledged both the bias in the previous theories and the bias 
in their own theories. 
In this section I have explained how there have been different types of theories that have 
tried to justify our current gender imbalances of power by relying on naturalizing moves in 
science. I have argued that these theories are either the product of bad science, and 
therefore cannot be taken seriously as scientific theories, or that when they are the product 
of normal science, they bear the mark of those who produced them, and are therefore 
biased towards masculinist values. 
4.4 The use of metaphors in science. 
One of the reasons why science has been considered sexist is due to the use of certain 
metaphors in the making of science. I will use an example taken from biology to show 
how the values ingrained in our society guide our observations. The following example 
shows how gender stereotypes have influence our biological models: our cultural 
stereotypes dictate that women are passive and males active; the biology of reproduction 
has been tainted with this image, and scientists have been describing the interrelation 
between the egg and the sperm in such terms as to fit with the above description. They 
were expecting biology to fulfill their expectations with such a force, that they were 
blinded to other readings that could fit the "facts" better. So they described the egg as 
passive and inert, and could not see it behaving in any other way until changes in our 
perception of the gender roles changed. Then other theories where developed in which the 
egg plays a much active part in reproduction. 
97 Nevertheless, even if the egg was 
accepted as playing a more active role, new cultural stereotypes took the place of the old 
ones: the egg was depicted as a femme fatale that victimized the sperm. These metaphors 
97 E. Martin (1996). 
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tainted the observations of the scientist and were used to naturalize our current gender 
arrangements. 
In this section I have argued that science is masculinist in many different ways. Does this 
imply that feminist women have to give up doing science and produce alternative types of 
theories? This is a possibility that has been supported by some, but there are many other 
feminist scientists and feminist theorists that believe that it is possible to make non- 
masculinist science. I will examine this second possibility in the next chapter. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that the conceptual relations between gender, reason, and 
knowledge have symbolically excluded women from the realms of full rationality and 
proper knowledge. In traditional epistemology knowers are supposed to be disembodied 
and interchangeable and therefore, gender considerations are taken to be irrelevant. 
Nevertheless, the symbolic characterization of women as lesser epistemic agents has had 
an influence in our actual epistemic practices. 
I analyzed in detail the ideal of science as objective knowledge to show that even in the 
production of a knowledge that is supposed to be produced without taking into account 
the biographical differences of scientists, the ideal of objectivity as detachment does not 
work. The scientific method cannot avoid the inclusion of values that will bias the choice 
of certain theories over others. Therefore women, symbolically excluded from knowledge, 
are also practically excluded from the production of science because they are considered 
to be naturally not adequate to produce this type of knowledge and so their values and 
experiences are excluded from science as well. 
The exclusion of women from science is just an example of how they get marginalized 
from any cognitive pursuit that is considered epistemologically valuable. Feminist 
epistemology was born so as to disclose the androcentric bias in our concepts of 
knowledge, reasons and science, and to provide us with alternatives. In Chapter 2I will 
explore the main tendencies in feminist epistemology, and I will explain how they try to 
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remedy the actual deficiencies in our science and epistemology. 
4: 
CHAPTER 2 
0. Introduction. 
In the first section of the previous chapter, I argued that there was a variety of feminist 
theories in the area of epistemology and I suggested different ways of classifying them. In 
this chapter I will review three of the most important tendencies in feminist epistemolog; 
empiricist femininist epistemology, feminist standpoint epistemology, and postmodern 
feminism. Most of the theories that I will mention have been influenced by the three 
strands of feminist epistemology, and some of them could be classified in more than one 
category. In this thesis I will argue for a revised type of standpoint epistemology, which 
contains influences from the other two types of feminist epistemology. 
1. Empiricist Feminist Epistemology 
When Harding introduced the term feminist empiricism in The Science Question in 
Feminism in 1986, she referred to what she called `spontaneous feminist empiricists', 
women scientists who had pointed out masculinist biases in science. They were part of the 
scientific community and believed that these particular examples of androcentric theories 
were the product of an inadequate use of the scientific method; "Feminist empiricists 
argue that sexists and androcentric biases can be eliminated by stricter adherence to 
existing methodological norms of scientific inquiry; only 'bad science' or 'bad sociology' 
is responsible for their retention in the results of the research. "' Therefore if the methods 
of science were properly followed, biases will be eliminated. Spontaneous feminist 
empiricists supported the classic ideal of scientific objectivity that I have portrayed in the 
previous chapter. 
Nowadays, feminist empiricists point out that there are many social factors that influence 
the production of theories that remain unacknowledged because the scientific method does 
not apply to the context of discovery. They also show how the context of justification is 
not value free. Furthermore, one of their main claims against traditional science is that 
even if individual biases can be eliminated by applying scientific methods, cultural based 
1 S. Harding (1991). P III- 
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biases cannot. Androcentrism does not get eliminated from adhering to the scientific 
method when it appears, for instance, in the identification of research projects. So feminist 
empiricists have explored different methods that could form part of our current scientific 
practices and would allow us to identify and to correct ideological biases in the theories. 
Feminist empiricists support the idea that all knowledge is biased, that all knowledge 
reflects the values of those who produce it but they also claim that politically motivated 
research can help the development of alternative research programs. I will illustrate this 
claim by using an example from the previous chapter. If we look at the metaphorical 
representations of the egg and the sperm, we can see how not all ideological bias should 
necessarily be avoided. A social movement such as feminism could help to discover the 
active role of the egg in reproduction earlier than it would have been discovered if the 
traditional role of women had never been challenged. We can see how feminist women 
involved in the investigation could have noticed the bias in the investigation and also could 
have introduced different metaphors in order to construct other models that would help 
the scientist to see the facts in other light, noticing behaviors that would have passed 
unseen. ' Biased knowledge "tainted" by politics becomes epistemically valuable because it 
allows the knowers to be more critical of current models and also to produce different 
alternatives. It is obvious how the production of theories that makes use of metaphors that 
are agreeable to feminism will have two outcomes; first, they will offer an alternative to 
theories with masculinist metaphors, a novel way of seeing the world, and second, they 
will help to point out the sexist biases in theories. 
If all knowledge is biased, then we cannot say that bad science is biased science. Does this 
mean that feminist empiricists are forced to accept that androcentric theories offer a valid 
alternative to feminist ones? I have claimed in a previous paragraph, that feminist 
empiricists aim to disclose and correct biases in scientific theories, but this seems to be a 
very problematic project, given that their evaluations are also biased towards their 
preferred political agenda. Feminist empiricists agree that there is not a neutral ground 
2 It is forth noting that being women is not enough by itself, it is their ideology as feminists that allows 
them to envision other alternative ways of conceptualizing human biology and to see the flaws in the 
current one. I will develop this point in more detail in the next section on feminist standpoint 
epistemology 
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from which to chose theories, but they think that there are several criteria to help us 
decide between rival theories. I will analyze them in turn. 
Feminist empiricism differs from the common description of empiricism, if we define it as 
"a doctrine that imposes a priori substantive restrictions on the kinds of entities and 
concepts that can ultimately figure in science. "3 According to Anderson, the empiricism 
that we can find in feminist theories does not make a priori decisions about the content of 
theories, and is `promiscuous in its permissible ontology and opportunistic in its methods 
and models. Any hypothesis or method is permitted that advances the goals of discovery 
and explaining more phenomena consistent with the constrain that the theories produced 
seek empirical adequacy. "' Feminist empiricism is more open than the traditional one in its 
ontological commitments, but insists, as traditional empiricism does, on the fact that 
theories have to display an empirical adequacy. This means that experience provides the 
evidence to support our theories. 
The most commonly supported type of empiricism is `modest empiricism', which is 
defined by Anderson (following Nelson and Longino) in the following way; "I shall call 
empiricism the view that experience ultimately provides all the evidence we have about 
the world (Nelson 1990), or more modestly, that observation provides the last defensible 
evidence we have about the world (Longino, 1993a): not thought procesess operating 
independently of empirical evidence can rule out any conceivable hypothesis about the 
world" s 
Therefore, the first step to decide whether or not a theory is the product of good science is 
to ponder its empirical adequacy. As an example of bad science, I could cite Broca's 
theory on the cognitive differences between sexes and races based on the measuring of 
skulls. The reason why it is bad science it is because it did not adhere to the method of 
. 
He produced a science, given that he ignored data that would have jeopardizcd is theory 
bad theory not because he was motivated by a racist and sexist agenda, but rather, because 
he ignored evidence available to him. His theory was not empirically adequate. 
E. Anderson (1995), p 51. 
E. Anderson (1995), p2 
1:. Anderson (1995), p 51. 
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Any empiricist would agree with the above claim, so what it is that distinguishes feminist 
empiricism from a minimal non-feminist empiricism? The following example will help to 
clarify that question. In the dispute that has arisen in respect to the development of tools in 
the primitive societies, two different rival theories have been given; one favors the males in 
the society, as the tool users and the other the females. Given that the use of tools had a 
great importance in human evolution, much more is at stake than it appears at first sight. 
Some feminist scholars' have accepted that both rivals use the same physical remains as 
evidence, and that both seem to be equally well supported. How do we chose between 
them? the choice seems to be more ideological than merely epistemological, but as 
Longino puts it very clearly, "men are in the world in one way, women in another; on 
what possible grounds other than gender loyalties can we decide between these 
conflicting accounts?. "' 
Feminist empiricists want to chose the feminist biased theory over the androcentric theory 
on a firmer basis than mere loyalty to their values, but is this possible? One obvious 
advantage of the theory supported by feminists is that it was developed as an alternative to 
a traditional view in a scientific area, and in doing so, it made us revise some broadly 
accepted premises. It has a critical value that helps underlie the biases of the androcentric 
theory. Also, and given the political origins of feminism, its followers are more likely to 
acknowledge the biased nature of their own theories, and according to feminist 
empiricists, it is this realization that allows their theories a better chance of being 
objective; "their central claim is that an unabashedly value-laden yet rigorous 
empiricism, informed by feminist ideology, can produce more adequate knowledge than 
standard methods ignorant of their specificity, and of their complicity in a sex/gender 
system, can produce. In short, an informed political commitment can yield a better 
empiricism. "8 
Therefore, if the first criterion for a good scientific theory was its empirical adequacy, the 
second one is its acknowledgment of the values that it encloses. In order to be able to 
6 H. Longino (1996). 
S. Harding (1986). p 137. 
8 L. Code (1992). p 13S. 
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produce good scientific theories, it is necessary to analyze the context in which knowledge 
is produced, and to revise our concept of objectivity, to account for the existence of 
values within scientific theories. Feminist empiricists have approached those challenges in 
two different ways, which I will explain in the next paragraphs and it is to these that I now 
turn. 
First, I will summarize the project of those who can be classified as `naturalized 
epistemologists', whom are mainly interested in analyzing knowledge from a sociological 
point of view. They believe that knowledge is situated and aim to disclose the ways in 
which knowledge is socially constructed. Then, I will explain how `contextual empiricism' 
also analyzes the ways in which knowledge (science in particular) is produced, and how it 
offers alternative ways of organizing the production of science in order to obtain more 
objective knowledge. I will show how both of them support the view that feminist science 
can produce better theories than androcentric science. 
Many feminist theorist have been classified under the label of `naturalized 
epistemologists'9, which has its origin in the mainstream trend towards considering 
epistemology a branch of sociology or psychology (within this trend, some feminists 
follow closely Quine's empiricism). Feminist research within this branch of epistemology 
pays special attention to gender: "Feminist epistemology can be regarded as a branch of 
social epistemology that investigates the influence of socially constructed conceptions 
and norms of gender and gender-specific interest and experiences on the production of 
knowledge. "' Nevertheless, feminist epistemology aims to more than merely describe the 
process of production of knowledge, it also has political goals that are in tension with a 
merely descriptive stance. This tension has been considered a problem because: "How can 
naturalized epistemology, which studies how knowledge claims are actually produced 
support normative views about how we ought to produce knowledge claims? "" 
9 Theorists who think of feminist epistemology as a social branch of naturalized epistemology include: 
Nelson (1990). Harding (1986). Potter (1993). Tuana (1992). Antony (1993), Duran (1991). The 
classification is made by E. Anderson (1995). 
10 E. Anderson (1995), p 54. 
11 F Anderson (1995). p 54. 
50 
It has been argued that feminist empiricism can make normati,, ve'2 claims in two ways. 
First, by looking critically at our belief formation, feminist empiricism can point out that 
some of them have been formed in an unreliable way, so that feminist epistemology can act 
in a similar way to double testing in medical experiments. " They can put forward norms 
that will help us recognize and eliminate sexist biases in science. Second they can promote 
theory formation according to feminist values 
Nevertheless, they still have to argue why a feminist theory will be desirable over an 
androcentric one. Anderson suggests that given two empirically sound theories, we should 
be able to chose between them on the bases of which one is more useful or interesting. She 
says; "empirical adequacy provides the fundamental and common standards for 
comparing all theories. But a theory can be empirically adequate without being 
interesting or useful"' But this merely postpones the question. How do we chose which 
values are going to be used to judge which theory is preferable? It is possible to think of a 
theory as useful and interesting, but that thoery can bring about the loss of rights of some 
members of a society. Should we prefer it over another which is less useful, less exciting, 
but that promotes equality?. 
The theory supported by Longino, `contextual empiricism', can offer an answer to this 
question. But before I explain how she responds to it, I will point to a couple of central 
characteristics of feminist empiricism. Apart from a commitment toward experience as the 
provider of evidence to support theories, two other theses have been considered central to 
feminist empiricism: that observations are theory laden, and that theories are 
underdetermined by empirical data. '5 Adherence to these theories allow feminist writers to 
12 E. Anderson (1995) "feminist epistemology has generally been better at identifying the ways gender is 
implicated in our knowledge practices than at explaining how these findings should affect our evaluations 
of the practices or the theories they produce (Longino 1993a). Naturalized epistemology provides a 
framework for developing such explanations. " p57. 
13 E. Anderson (1995), p 55. 
14 E. Anderson (1995), p 56. 
15 A. Tanesini (1999) "The starting point of these new forms of empiricism are two theses whose 
importance in empiricist philosophy has been highlighted by Quine: observations are theory-laden, and 
theories are underdetermined by empirical data. The first states that observations are not conceptually 
independent of theories because the latter provide those concepts which are necessary for observation. (... ) 
The second claims that theories are underdetermined by empirical data, that is, there will always be more 
than one theory which is compatible with all the available empirical evidence. This thesis has been taker 
to refute foundationalism, since it claims that experience is not enough to guide our choice of one theory 
over another. It is not clear whether this is correct, but in any case this thesis, if true, would show that 
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argue that there is more than one possible theory that can explain data, and therefore, it 
validates the claim that it is possible to offer alternatives to androcentric theories. But, if 
all observation is theory laden, how can we resort to it to chose between rival theories? By 
supporting that data is theory laden, we are forced to deny that it is possible to access a 
`view from nowhere' from which we can compare existent theories and decide among 
them. This seems to be a crucial problem for feminist theorists, who claim that feminist 
theories are more desirable than androcentric ones. This is a central area of concern for 
feminist epistemology, and to solve this difficulty, feminist epistemologists put forward 
new concepts of objectivity. 
Longino agrees with all the above claims, that theories have to be empirically adequate, 
that theories are underdetermined by data, and finally, that observation is theory laden. 
She believes that one must appeal to factors other than logic and observational and 
experimental data as grounds of hypothesis choice. 16 She argues that our choice of theory 
is biased by our contextual values, and that we should make the biases visible in the 
process of theory choice. She insists that the way in which the values that will rule our 
choice of theory are selected, has a bearing in the epistemic evaluation of the resultant 
theories. She explains how the criteria to determine theory choice are local, so it is 
possible that different epistemic communities will favour different theories when 
confronted with the same choice. So, for instance, while Khun offered five factors for 
theory choice in "Objectivity, Values and Theory Choice" she offers six alternative virtues 
taken from the works of feminists; virtues that will help us choosing theories more 
according to feminist politics. To the question of what is feminist about these virtues she 
has argued that for political reasons women might find more interesting certain virtues 
instead of others. Nevertheless, those values or virtues can be continuously revised, that is 
why she calls her theory `epistemic provisionalism'. 
Despite the differences, it is always possible to judge if a theory is empirically adequate or 
not. This is helped by the feminist support of minimal empiricism, that allows for 
ontological diversity and also, by Longino's social approach to science. This underlines 
empirical evidence is not sufficient to determine uniquely the choice of the best theory. " p 98. 
16 11. Longino (1994), p4 75. 
; 1) 
that "scientific method includes more than just the comparison of hypothesis statements 
with (reports of) experiential data, in principle and activity of individuals. Hypothesis 
testing itself consists of more than the comparison of statements but involves equal/, 
centrally the subjection of putative data, of hypotheses, and of the background 
assumptions in light of with they seem to be supported by those data to varieties of 
conceptual and evidential scrutiny and criticism. Conceptual criticism can include 
investigation into the internal and external consistency of a hypothesis and investigation 
of the factual, moral and social implications of background assumptions; evidential 
criticism includes not only investigation of the quality of the data but of its organization, 
structuring, and so on. "" 
Nevertheless, her support of local criteria for theory choice seems to weaken the feminist 
strategy, that aimed to disclose androcentrism in science and prove that it precluded the 
development of better alternatives (I will discuss this issue later). For the moment, I will 
point out that it has been suggested that giving a list of epistemic virtues is not doing 
epistemology; but she can argue that reflecting about their status and relationships is 
epistemology. 
In summary, I would say that Longino seems to offer an answer to the question that 
naturalized epistemologists left unanswered: the choice of theories will be made according 
to virtues that are publicly chosen. With respect to why feminist theories should be 
preferred to androcentric ones, she would argue that any theory that is obtained with the 
inclusion of agents belonging to different epistemic groups is preferable to one that 
excludes them. The inclusion in science of people belonging to different epistemic 
communities brings different values into research projects and favours objectivity. Feminist 
theorists have been more attuned to the incorporation of different voices, and therefore 
have a better chance than androcentric theories in producing objective knowledge. 
Nevertheless, we should not forget that Longino argues for pluralism. I will return to 
Longino's work in chapter 9, where I will analyze her theory in more detail. 
As a conclusion to this section on feminist epistemology, I will say that central to feminist 
17 H. Longino (1993), p 111. 
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epistemology is the fact that many of its proponents are mainly interested in pointing out 
the androcentric biases in science and other areas of the production of knowledge (some 
of them using the tools provided by sociology and other social sciences). All of them 
acknowledge that all knowledge is situated and aim to signal the ways in which biases in 
knowledge are supported and produced. Some feminist empiricists are also interested in 
changing our scientific method to account for the situatedness of knowledge, and to allow 
us to pursue a more adequate type of objective knowledge, one that allows for diversity. 
2. Standpoint epistemology 
In the previous section I showed how feminist empiricist philosophers claimed that all 
knowledge is biased, and how feminists could provide us with alternative theories to those 
biased towards androcentrism. The fact that women can produce theories that include a 
different perspective is taken for granted, it is not explained. Standpoint epistemology 
aims to explain how it is that women can have an alternative perspective. I will review 
feminist standpoint epistemology in this section, divided into the following subsections: 
2.1 the origins of standpoint feminism, 2.2 the division of labor as the basis for standpoint, 
2.3 abstract masculinity, 2.4 feminist standpoint. 
2.1 The origins of standpoint feminism. 
I have been taking for granted that belonging to particular groups provides those subjects 
with different views of the world. I have asserted that women will be more capable than 
men in spotting the masculinist bias in scientific theories. But why should that be so? there 
are many women that think that feminism is unattractive and that do not feel any desire to 
support any feminist view on scientific theories. There are also some men that are quick to 
point out masculinist biases and to support alternatives. '8 Standpoint feminists have been 
18 E. Martin (1996) gives examples of female biologists who endorsed the valorisation of the male 
reproductive system while at the same time diminished the importance of the female one (p 104). They 
also maintained the myth of the passivity of the egg. For instance, Gerald Schietter and Hellen Schletter 
"liken the egg's role to that of sleeping beauty"(p 106). She also points out how "one depiction of sperm 
as weak and timid, instead of strong and powerful- the only such representation in western civilisation, so 
far as I know- occurs in \\'oody Allen's movie Everything you Always Wanted to 
know about Sex** but 
were Afraid to Ask"(p 107). 
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mainly interested in developing theories that explain the genesis of that special point of 
view in women that will allow them to avoid the masculinist bias in knowledge, even if 
they clearly establish that not all women have a feminist standpoint. 
Standpoint epistemology was born in the seventies when a number of feminist women 
began to write on a cluster of topics which were closely related. They were grouped 
together for the first time by Sandra Harding in an attempt to systematize the increasing 
number of theories that were appearing in the field, but they do not consider themselves 
members of any group or school. 
The basis of standpoint epistemology was an article by Nancy Harstock in which she made 
a feminist use of the Marxist notion of standpoint. Marx claimed that our belonging to 
either the ruling class or the oppressed class influenced our representation of the world. 
He argued that the representation of reality that those who belong to the ruling class have 
is distorted but is imposed on the rest of society as if it were the only possible one. Marx 
privileges the perspective of the oppressed group, which he calls a standpoint. '9 Harstock 
gives a feminist aspect to this notion by claiming that, given that a standpoint is the 
product of a different 'material life activity', and that women's work in every society differs 
systematically from men, women as a group fulfil the necessary characteristics to be 
attributed a standpoint. 20 
19 N. Harstock (1983) claims that a standpoint is a privileged epistemic position that can be characterized 
as follows: 
"(1) Material life (class position in Marxist theory) not only structures but set limits on the understanding 
of social relations. (2) If material life is structured in fundamentally opposing ways for two different 
groups, one can expect that the vision of each will represent an inversion of the other, and in systems of 
domination the vision available to the rulers will be both partial and perverse. (3) The vision of the ruling 
class (or gender) structures the material relations in which all parties are forced to participate, and 
therefore cannot be dismissed as simply false. (4) In consequence, the vision available to the oppressed 
group must be struggled for and represents an achievement which requires both science to see beneath the 
surface of the social relations in which all are forced to participate, and the education which can only 
grow from struggle to change those relations. (5) As an engaged vision, the understanding of the 
oppressed, the adoption of a standpoint exposes the real relations among human beings as inhuman, 
points beyond the present, and carries a historically liberatory role. " p 284. 
20 The notion of standpoint that Marx offers is not, as such, useful to feminism because, as Harstock 
(1983) points out. Marxism has not taken into account the sexual division of labour. This is the move that 
she wants to make. "The sexual division of labour forms the basis for such a standpoint and will argue 
that on the basis of the structures which define women's activities as contributors to subsistence and as 
mothers, once could begin, though not complete, the construction of such an epistemological tool. " p 285. 
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2.2 The division of labour as the basis for standpoint. 
As I have already signalled, the basis for a standpoint are the differences in the way in 
which the material life is structured. Harstock argues that in all societies there is a sexual 
division of labour. She emphasises that it is not just the social dimension of women's lives 
that grounds the feminist standpoint, but that biology also plays an important role in the 
acquisition of this standpoint. 
What are the material circumstances that allow women to develop a standpoint? 
According to Harstock, they are twofold because women contribute to the subsistence of 
capitalism in two ways: Firstly producing objects when they work outside their houses 
and/or producing 'use values' in the home, and secondly, reproducing men and other 
women. In relation to the first productive activity, there are clear similarities between the 
work of women and men when they work for wages, so in this sense, women and men 
share the same material life activity. Nevertheless, and due to the fact that women also 
have to do work in the house, there can be established differences between men and 
women's work. 21 Women work longer hours, more time is devoted to produce use-values 
and their production is structured by repetition in a different way than that of men's. 22 
These differences in the productive activity result in the intensification of class 
consciousness in women and provides them with a more concrete view of reality. 
The second productive activity in which women are involved is in reproduction. This 
second kind of 'labour' is the one that produces the main differences between a male and a 
female view of the world: " the fennale experience in reproduction represents a unity with 
nature which goes beyond the proletarian experience of interchange with nature. "23 The 
21 N. Harstock (1983) claims that women's contributions to subsistence "like that of the male worker, is in 
contact with material necessity. Their contribution to subsistence, like that of the male worker, involves 
them in a world in which the relation to nature and concrete human requirements is central, both in the 
form of interaction with natural substances whose quality, rather than quantity is important to the 
production of meals, clothing, etc.., and in the form of close attention to the natural changes in these 
substances. Women's labour both for wages and even more in household production involves a unification 
of mind and body for the purpose of transforming natural substances into socially defined goods. This too 
is tnic of the labour of the male worker. " p 292 
2! N. Harstock (1983), p 292. 
22 N. Harstock (1983), "In the case of women, when they do their housekeeping this involves repetitious 
Cleanlll.. p 292. 
2i 
N. Harstuck(lß)8; ), p_9.,. 
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unity is due to the fact that "women's bodies, unlike men's, can be themselves irns! rumelits 
of production: in pregnancy, giving birth or lactation, arguments about a division of 
mental from manual labour are fundamentally foreign. 'ra Harstock points out that in the 
female body "There are a series of boundary challenges inherent in the female physiologi 
which make it impossible to maintain rigid separations from the object world. 
Menstruation, coitus, pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, all represent challenges to bodily 
boundaries. "25 In pregnancy, for instance, the experience of fuzzy boundaries is specially 
evident "Women experience others and themselves along a continuum whose dimensions 
are evidenced in Adrienne Rich's argument that the child carried for nine months can be 
defined 'neither as me or as not-me'. "26 
She also claims that the more complex relational world is reinforced by the process of 
socialisation. 27 Women acquire certain skills when mothering or being raised by other 
women that are transferable to the area of paid work. 28 The female view of the world - 
mainly relational- is characterised by: unity with nature, 29 their relations with other human 
beings are more varied and deeper than those that males form, 3° unity of mind and body. 31 
Motherhood is one of the basis for a standpoint, but given that motherhood is not 
something common to all women, then not all women can share this feminine view of the 
world. Harstock could answer that she is not talking about the 'experience' of being a 
mother, but rather about the institution of motherhood. It is the fact that all women have 
been raised by other women, and as "future" mothers, that makes women have a different 
perspective of the world. Accordingly, the fact that women are the ones in charge of child 
rearing has important consequences for the psychological make up of children. She uses 
2" N. Harstock (1983), p 298. 
25 N. Harstock (1983), p 294. 
26 N. Harstock (1983), p 298. 
27 N. Harstock (1983), p295. 
28 N. Harstock. (1983) points out how "interestingly, much of women's wage work- nursing, social work, 
and some secretarial jobs in particular- requires and depends on the relational and interpersonal skills 
women learned by being nurtured by someone of the same sex. " p 293. 
29 N. Harstock (1983) says that "The female experience in reproduction represents a unity with nature 
which goes beyond the proletarian experience of interchange with nature. " p 293. 
30 N. I3arstock (1983) "In addition, the process of producing human beings, relations with others may take 
a variety of forms with deeper significance than simple co-operation with others for common goods. " p 
294. 
31 N. Harstock (1983) "Finally. the female experience in bearing and rearing children involves a unity of 
mind and body more profound than is possible in the workers instrumental activity" p 294 
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the object relations theory to show that the process of differentiation of the child from the 
mother is different for girls and boys. This process "reinforces boundary confusion in 
female egos and boundary strengthening in males"" and it is more conflictual for boys 
than for girls because girls are very close to the model with which they have to identify, 
while boys have to identify with an abstraction (the father is not present) and so negate the 
model that is closer to them. The result is that "mother and son experience the other as a 
definite `other'. [While] The experience of oneness on the part of both mother and infant 
seems to last long with girls. "33 As a result, " the boys must identify with an abstract, 
cultural stereotype and learn abstract behaviours not attached to a well-known person. 
Masculinity is idealised for boys whereas femininity is concrete for girls. "' Therefore, 
the end result of the sexual division of labour is that women and men grow up with 
different boundary experiences, and this means that they relate in a different way to 
themselves, others, and the world. thus we have on one hand "abstract masculinityi35 and 
on the other hand feminist standpoint. 36 
2.3 Abstract masculinity. 
The object-relations school of psychoanalytic theory established that there are certain 
psychological characteristics that are typically masculine and others that are typically 
feminine. It could be argued, however, that the objects relations school of psychoanalysis 
is an example of naturalising gender differences that are taken for granted in our cultural 
tradition. The values that are symbolically linked to masculinity are those that are acquired 
inescapably by males, while those symbolically attributed to females became part of the 
32 N. Harstock (1983), p 294 
33N. Harstock (1983), p 294. 
34 N. Harstock (1983), p 295. 
3s N. Harstock (1983)characterises abstract masculinity in the following way "First, the male experience is 
characterised by the duality of concrete versus abstract. Material reality as experienced by the boy in the 
family provides no model, and is unimportant in the attainment of masculinity. Nothing of value to the 
boy occurs with the family, and masculinity becomes an abstract ideal to be achieved over the opposition 
of daily life. Masculinity must be attained by mean of opposition to the concrete world of daily life, by 
escaping from contact with the female world of the household into the masculine world of public life. This 
experience of two worlds, one valuable, if abstract and deeply unattainable, the other useless and 
demeaning, if concrete, mind/body, culture/nature, ideal/real, stasis/change. And these dualism are 
overlaid by gender: only the first of each pair is associated with the male. " p 297. 
36 "The female construction of the self in relation to others leads in an opposite direction toward 
opposition to dualism of any sort, both with other persons and with the natural world. " N. Harstock 
(1983), p283. 
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female psyche also irremediably. 
There are several problems with the objects relations theory: it universalizes a certain type 
of explanation as valid, it is historically inaccurate, and it does not acknowledge that it 
relies on a concept of masculinity that it is historically situated. 
The objects relation theory has been used to give a universal account of the formation of 
male and female psychologies. But this was not the aim of its creator, Chodorov, who 
criticises Freud for not being aware of the situadness of his theory of psychoanalysis. 37 
Chodorov's theory has been used to argue that abstract masculinity is the product of 
women being in charge of childcare instead of the product of women being in charge of 
children within a particular society. An example of this type of misinterpreation is 
offered by J. Flax who argues that philosophy bears the marks of women being primary 
carers, without taking into account that philosophers have lived in very different historical 
and social circumstances and therefore have been raised in very diverse ways. 38 Grimshaw 
argues that Flax's reliance on female child care as the bases of abstract masculinity is 
historically incorrect; "one might instance moral peasant households where the care of 
young infants often devolved on older siblings; households where children were brought 
up by slaves or wet nurses; families during the earlier phases of western industralization, 
when both parents often went to work in factories as a matter of course. In all of those 
situations, the sort of symbiosis between mother and infant assumed by many versions of 
object relation theory would have been impossible. "39 Those philosophers were also raised 
in societies with very diverse views of what constitutes being a male, for example. Thus 
the concept of masculinity in Plato's time was very different to that current nowadays. 
By supporting the view that males and females have different psychologies universally (not 
symbolically) but as a matter of fact that can be empirically proven, the differences 
between types of masculinity are erased. What counts as masculine has changed throught 
history and it even varies within the same society for different social classes" What we 
37 J. Grinisha« (1986), p 57. 
;SJ. Grimshaw (1986), p 58. 
39 J. Grinishaw (1986), p 69,70. Grimsliaw comments are directed towards Flax (1983). 
'0 J. Grimshaww, (1986) mentions how P. Willis' (1977) study on wvorkin`' , class boys showed how in their 
view masculinity as linked to sexual prowess, manual work and toughness, while middle class boys (1.. 
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would classify today as abstract masculinity is the product of particular historical, cultural 
and social circumstances that make us attribute certain characteristics to males. If we do 
not take this into account, we are naturalizing the current gender differences present in our 
own society. The formation of feminist standpoint and abstract masculinity is not 
explained by claiming that child rearing practices is the origin of both of them. It also fails 
to explain why it is women and no men that take responsibility for it. 41 
As a way of concluding this section, I would assert that the objects relations theory does 
not hold, therefore it is not possible to use it to ground the epistemological differences for 
which standpoint epistemology argues. Nevertheless, I think that Harstock's seminal 
theory can still be defended on other bases. I will argue that is it possible to argue that 
women develop a particular standpoint because there are distinctive spheres of activity 
occupied by males and females, without having to adopt the view that they produce 
different types of psychological make ups. I also want to distance myself from early 
standpoint theories by asserting that we should acknowledge that there have been, and still 
is, cultural and historical diversity about what women do and that therefore it is not 
possible to say that there is a universal female point of view. Once I have made those 
remarks, I will analyse the concept of standpoint in more detail, because I think it still has 
many workable characteristics. 
2.4 Feminist standpoint. 
The notion of feminist standpoint relies on several assumptions: the first one is that due to 
their different material conditions, women can experience the world differently from men, 
and what it is more, they can see that parts of the commonly accepted representations of 
the world are distorted. The concept of experience has a central role in the theory, as well 
as that of the possibility of developing a more accurate representation of the world. 
Second, it is worth noticing that not all women have this particular perspective. 
Standpoints are acquired, as part of a process of analysis and political awareness. The 
bases for this particular sort of knowledge are the experiences and the lives of women, but 
Hudson, 1967) believed that maleness was linked not so much to manual work as to certain types of 
intellectual activities (sciences). 
41 J. Flax (1990). p 47. 
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these have to be articulated at a later stage to form a feminist standpoint. Third, it is the 
sexual division of labour that allows women to have different experiences. 
All these assumptions are controverted, and I will make a brief comment on the main 
difficulties faced by the theory: 
The notion of experience is particularly problematic. Postmodernist writers have signaled 
how we should avoid a naive use of "experience" that implies that marginalized people 
have a direct access to the world, unmediated by their conceptual systems. It is important 
to stress that Harstock claims that a standpoint is not "natural" but rather it is adquired. 
So, at least at first sight, she does not make a naive use of "experience". Nevertheless, she 
also says that feminist standpoint reflects the "real social relations. ' 142 Her position is 
considered contradictory because, it is not clear how it is possible that women that have 
adquired a particular standpoint can see the real social relations in an unmediated manner. 
Postmodernists claim that if reality is constructed, if it is conceptually mediated 
(discursively mediated), then it is not possible to access a non-discursive reality. A further 
difficulty for standpoint theory is that it presupposes that there are experiences that are 
common to all women, without taking into account the diversity that exists between 
women from different social classes, races, sexual orientations and so on. Gender is 
naturalized by adopting this theory because it make us believe that there is a unique 
feminist viewpoint. 
It has been argued that taking labour as the bases to explain the origins of feminist 
standpoint is inadequate: "labor is still seen as the essence of history and being human. 
Such conceptions distort life in capitalist society and surely are not appropriate to all 
other cultures. "a3 J. FIax claims that taking the division of labour as the main cause of 
women's oppression is problematic because it distorts or excludes other kinds of activity 
that do not fit the definition of labour but that can also be seen as caus; s of the 
oppression. Sexuality is one of these activities. 
112 S. J. Hccknm: mn (1997). 
-" J. Flax (1990), p 47. 
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Standpoint epistemology claims that differences in the material activities produce 
epistemic differences. Heckman notices that if " activity is epistemology: women and men 
create their own realities thought their different activities and experiences. If this were 
the whole story, however, then both truth and reality would be multiple, even "relative ", 
and Harstock is very concerned to avoid this conclusions. "" This is a good point; if 
reality is constructed through experiences and activities, then all the constructions should 
have the same epistemic status, ie all of them are partial and none should be privileged. We 
cannot consider one more true than any other because there is no way of comparing both 
of them with an external, separated, unconstructed reality which stands as a criterion by 
which to judge which one is a better picture of it. 
Regarding the use of the concept of experience, I will argue in the next chapter that it is 
important to avoid a naive use of experience, one that implies that it is possible to have an 
unmediated view of the world. I will also argue that there are non-naive uses of experience 
that allow us to ground the view that marginalized groups can perceive aspects of the 
world that are not captured by our current conceptual systems. I will support the view that 
it is the involvement in alternative practices that allows them to apprehend different 
aspects of the world and/or adquire alternative epistemic abilities. 
Being in a marginalized position allows those in that situation to be critical with the 
accepted knowledge, because they are aware that it does not include aspects of the world 
that are available to them, and also allows them to put forward alternatives that are not 
within the reach of those who are at the center of the epistemic communities. So the 
knowledge of those on the margins is valuable for their critical and creative possibilities. In 
this sense, it can be judged to be more desirable than the knowledge of those at the center 
of the epistemic practices. 
In relation to the criticism put forward by Flax, maybe the division of labour is not the 
only reason why it is possible to acquire a standpoint, but I will argue that the participation 
in different practices is necessary to acquire a standpoint. The division of labour has 
implied that diverse members of society partake in different practices, so in this sense, the 
'' S. J. Heckman (1997), p 343. 
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division of labour will have as a consequence different epistemic practices. Gender is not 
the only way in which human beings get divided into different episternic groups, and 
gender is not the only axis of oppression. Therefore, given that there is a diversity of axis 
of oppression and a diversity of epistemic communities, it is necessary to accept the 
multiplication of standpoints. Nevertheless, pluralism does not imply relativism. Given that 
those at the margins have a privileged epistemic perspective in the two senses indicated 
above, their point of view will be preferible to the ones that are in the mainstream 
epistemic communities. 
Jaggar notices that, from a Marxist point of view, all knowledge is partial because its 
categories reflect the interests and values of a determinate social group. She wonders if 
this forces Marxists to adopt a relativist epistemology given that "our world view is 
necessarily linked by our class origins and truth is relative to classi45 or if rather there are 
"rational criteria capable of justifying the preference for one standpoint over another. 1146 
She favours the solution offered by Luckacs who recognises the importance of society in 
shaping the systems of thought while, at the same time, accepts that the adequacy of 
theories depends also in certain way on an "external reality". Luckacs opts for a realist 
epistemology that at the same time acknowledges the social influences that shapes 
knowledge. His view on epistemological privileging is summarised as follows: "the 
standpoint of the proletarian is epistemologically preferable to that of the bourgeois, 
because it drives the working class to denrystify the myths of bourgeois society and to 
develop a new world view that will reveal more clearly the real regularities of social life 
and the underlying causes of those realities, including the causes of its own 
domination. "47 
Harstock claims that there are similar experiences shared by women and by working class 
males, due to the similarity of some of their work load; but I have also stressed how 
women's labour ? llow them to have particular experiences as well. Harstock considers that 
there are some important differences in content in women's representation of the world. 
She does not claim that their representation is completely opposite from that of men or 
A. Jaggar (1988) 
A.. la,, g, ar (1988), p 363. 
47 : 1. Ja,, ti, ar (1988). E) Th2. 
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that it is even very different in all its detail. What she claims in that women are better off 
than men when we try to describe which are our social relations. They could share the 
same representation of certain parts of the world and differ in others. I would like to 
expand the scope of the knowledge to which women can have access. I will argue that 
women can experience aspects of the world that remain hidden to men; therefore, the 
knowledge possessed by women as a result of their activities is not just about envisioning 
more just social relations. 48 
Summarizing, in this section devoted to feminist standpoint epistemology I have argued 
against the use of objects relation theory as the bases of a feminist standpoint. I have also 
pointed at some of the problems that the classic form of standpoint has to solve. In a later 
section I will explain how standpoint theorist have tried to overcome these problems. 
3 Postmodernism and feminist epistemology. 
Postmodernism and feminism have had a difficult but productive relationship. While, on 
the one hand, it can be argued that postmodernism represents a threat to the mere 
possibility of feminism, on the other hand, its criticims have given us a different way of 
doing feminist theory. In this section, I will explore both aspects of the relation between 
postmodernism and feminism. This section will be divided in three subsections: 3.1 
Feminism versus postmodernism, 3.2 Deconstructing the category "women", 3.3 Towards 
a feminist postmodernism. 
3.1 Feminism versus postmodernism 
If we take on board the remarks of postmodernist writers against feminism, we would 
have to accept that, for about twenty years, 49 feminist theories reflected the views of 
white, middle class, western women. Women who were unable to recognize the 
. 18 I would like to follow D. Smith (1997) who claims that "The knowledge people have by virtue of their 
experience is a knowledge of the local practices of our everyday/everynight worlds. It is for the most part 
what Michael Polanyi (1967) called 'tacit knowledge'- a knowing that is the very texture of our 
daily/nightly living in what we know how to do, how we go about things, and what we can get done" p 
394. 
. 19 From the 60s to the 80s. 
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situatedness of their discourses and who had a tendency to present their knowledge as 
universal. Feminist scholars would have fallen into what has been called `God's eye view' 
attempting to produce knowledge that transcended the perspective of particular knowers. 
They would have also embarked in a project present in scholarship since the 
Enlightenment that consists in an "attempt to reveal general, all encompassing principles 
which can lay bare the basic features of nature and social reality. "50 These criticisms 
against feminism have been embraced by many postmodernist writers. 
Postmodernist philosophy is characterized by its critical attitude towards more established 
philosophical traditions. There is an ongoing debate within feminist theory on the mere 
possibility of encompassing feminism and postmodernism. As I have already said, 
postmodernism accused early feminist theories of trying to offer single cause explanations 
to explain complex phenomena such as the nature of gender relations. "It is on the 
metatheoretical level that post-modern philosophies of knowledge can contribute to a 
more accurate self-understanding of the nature of our theorising. We cannot 
simultaneously claim (1) that the mind, the self and knowledge are socially constituted 
and that what we can know depends upon our social practices and contexts and (2) that 
feminist theory can uncover the truth of the whole once and for all. Such an absolute 
truth apprehended by an empty (historic) mind and perfectly transcribed by/into a 
transparent language. The possibility of each of these conditions existing has been 
rendered extremely doubtful by the deconstructions of post-modern philosophers. "51 
Postmodernist criticisms against transcendental knowledge focus not only on the existence 
of more than one narrative able to explain particular aspects of reality, as well as in the 
situatedness of all knowledge claims, but also question the criteria of justification of 
knowledge. These criteria of justification are part of particular traditions, and do not have 
universal value. 52 Furthermore, they claim that the mere existence and imposition of these 
50 L. Nicholson (1990), p 2. 
51 J. Flax (1990), p 48. 
`` See L. Nicholson (1990), p 4. and also Nicholson and Fraser (1990), who illustrate this tendency by 
giving an example taken from J. F. Lyotard's The Postmodern Condition "For example, scientists no 
longer look to prescriptive philosophies of science to warrant their procedures of inquiry. Rather, they 
themselves problematize, modify, and warrant the constitutive norms of their won practice even as they 
engage in it. Instead of hovering above, legitimation descends to the level of practice and becomes 
immanent in it. " p 23. 
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criteria in deciding what counts as knowledge has helped developing particular "regimes of 
power" so in the name of `science', authority has become exercised in a variety of ways. " 
The postmodern challenge to many of the traditional boundaries of what counts as 
knowledge has fostered an interest in local knowledge and has also favoured the view that 
discourses that were marginalized should be revalued. As I pointed out in chapter 1 
section 2.1, feminists have showed that our current conception of knowledge is biased 
toward androcentric values, and that it unfairly marginalizes certain types of knowledge. 
This is because they do not fit their `ideal' and disclose that our current criteria of 
justification are unable to account for some of the ways in which we warrant our 
knowledge claims. So, at least in these areas, feminists are very close to the postmodern 
project. Nevertheless, and. even if feminism has always had a tendency to support 
alternative ways of knowledge, the tendency toward relativism that is clearly present in 
postmodernism has worried some feminist theorists. 
I have already showed how feminist empiricists have argued that, even within a 
multiplicity of theories, we should have criteria by which we decide which theories are 
more desirable, and some of them even argue that these theories that are biased towards 
certain values (e. g those agreeable to feminism) are of greater epistemic worth. I have also 
shown how feminist standpoint epistemologists argue that, by their own origins, some 
theories are closer to the truth than others. 
A further difference between postmodernism and feminism is that, according to the 
former, feminists, by postulating that gender difference allows women to acquire 
privileged knowledge, are sanctioning a distinction that marginalizes women: "The 
argument here is that a notion of gender as basic merely serves to reify, rather than to 
critically contest, transform and escape the imposed myth of difference, while ignores 
other crucial and as yet subjugated areas of difference. "54 Postmodernists considered 
feminism essentialist, because gender is naturalized by making us believe that there is a 
unique feminist view point. "It presupposes gendered social relations in which there is a 
53 L. Nicholson (1990). p 4. 
54 C. DiStcphano (1990). p 65. 
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category of beings who are fundamentally like each other by virtue of their sex- that is, it 
assumes the otherness mefi assign to women. "- Also, by privileging gender as the main 
site of oppression. other axes in which oppression are exercised are ignored; such as race, 
sexual orientation, or social class. 
These are two of the most important postmodernist arguments that have influenced 
feminist theory: there is more than one axis of oppression (power pervades all human 
relations), and gender should be deconstructed because it is one of the categories that 
furthers women's oppression. I will comment on the first of these points, and leave the 
second to be discussed in the next section. 
Even if feminists in general and feminist epistemologists in particular did not acknowledge 
sufficiently the differences between women to begin with, later on there have been efforts, 
both in standpoint and in empiricist epistemology, to deal with the multiplicity of 
marginalized discourses that have been made explicit by postmodernism. Feminist scholars 
have now accepted the existence of more than one axis of oppression. Nevertheless, it is 
important to notice that this move has procured further problems for their theories because 
the multiplication of standpoints makes it difficult to privilege one position over another. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to judge which are epistemically reliable. As Longino puts it 
very clearly, "On what grounds can one social location or affective orientation be judged 
epistemically superior to another? "56 The lack of a universal system for the validation of 
knowledge makes it impossible to judge which theories are better than others. 
A solution to the problem could be to attempt to encompass different voices in the 
production of theories in order to account for diversity, but this move has encountered the 
opposition of members of marginalized groups. It has been argued that the 
acknowledgment of a diversity of discourses occasionally takes the form of academic 
"tourism" in \\, hich we believe that we can transcend our own perspectives and see from 
the point of view of others. As a result members of the ruling classes have considered 
themselves fit to produce knowledge from the point of view of the other. Flax summarizes 
. 1. Flax (1990), p 
50. 
56 H. Longino (1996), p 270. 
67 
the problem when she says that the problem is "it Nether it is possible to seek and possess 
empowering knowledge without expropriating the power of others. Is seeking knowledge 
inevitably an attempt of domination? And are there criteria of knowledge other than the 
ability to control the phenomena about which one seeks knowledge? "s" A related problem 
is that of thinking that the point of view of marginalized groups is "innocent" without 
taking into account that all points of view are situated. In later chapters of the thesis I will 
explain how this difficulty can be avoided. 
In this section, I have signaled how the criticisms that postmodernism directed towards 
early forms of feminist epistemology have had a considerable influence on the area. 
Representatives of different epistemologies have tried to encompass difference within their 
theories, try to avoid essentialism and universalism, and attempt to avoid single cause 
explanations in accounting for marginality. Postmodernism has changed the rules within 
feminist theorizing, and its influence has been critical but positive. Nevertheless, in the 
next section, I will analyse one of the aspects of postmodern thinking that could 
undermine feminism as a political option. 
3.2 Deconstructing the category "women" 
The postmodern critique has been useful in making feminists aware of essentialist and 
universalist tendencies while talking of "women", but it is important to remember that this 
is still a central concept to keep if we want to maintain the political content of feminism. 
It has been claimed that failing to consider women as a collective supports the current 
patriarchal oppression, and that any intellectual project which attempts to weaken such a 
category must be embraced with caution. S. Bordo acknowledges that in early feminism 
there was a tendency to universalize claims that were only true locally, and that the 
narratives that they produced at the time are now taken to be "reductionist, totalizing, 
inadequately nuanced, valorizing of gender difference, u ncoinsciously racist and elitist. 
"Ss 
Nevertheless, she says that giving up the original aims of feminism and renouncing talking 
H. Lon`-, i no (1996), p104. 
S. Bordo (1990), p Pi 5. 
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about gender in an attempt to surpass the binary distinctions is flawed as an strategy 
because: "not only are we thus diverted from attending to the professional and 
institutional mechanisms through which the politics of exclusion operate most poii'erfully 
in intellectual communities, but we also deprive ourselves of still vital analytical tools for 
critique of those communities and the hierarchical, dualistic power structures that sustain 
them. "S9 Harstock is also deeply suspicious of the postmodern attempt to dissolve the 
categories that are useful in contesting the status quo, and she wonders "Why it is that just 
at the moment when so many of us who have been silenced begin to demand the right to 
name ourselves, to act as subjects rather than objects of history, that just then the 
concept of subjecthood becomes problematic? "60 
Harstock considers that we forget too often that postmodernism is, according to its own 
logic, just one intellectual movement among others, and as such the product of particular 
historical circumstances. Therefore, its normative recommendations should just be taken 
to be one set among many others. 6' It is not compulsory to accept their claim that the only 
alternatives are either to adhere to the enlightenment tradition or to give up the attempt to 
produce a "systematic and accurate knowledge of the world"" 
Harstock claims that this aim is particularly important for feminists, who, being aware of 
the differences between women and their experiences, still want to be able to talk about 
their commonalities, and make sense of the world as it appears to women. She says that 
"we still need to name and describe our diverse experiences. What are our 
commonalties? What are our differences? how can we transform our imposed otherness 
into a self-defined specificity? "63 According to Harstock it is possible to talk about 
women as a group without denying the differences between women. In order to do it, 
alternative ways of conceptualizing identities have been developed by marginalized 
59 S. Bordo (1990), p 139. 
60 N. Harstock (1990), p 164. 
61 I have claimed that postmodernism argues for local knowledges but, by doing that, they are prescribing 
the correct approach to knowledge claims, a normative dimension that mimics the universalist tendencies 
present in traditional epistemology, so they "represent the transcendental voice of the Enlightenment 
attempting to come to grips with the social and historical changes of the middle- to- late twentieth 
century. " N. Harstock (1990), p 164. 
62 N. Harstock (1990), p 171. 
63 N. Harstock (1990), p 171. 
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voices. 64 The mere origin of this new concept of identity, together with the fact that 
women have been a marginalized group would guarantee that feminists will be able to 
make a non-totalizing discourse. " Bordo supports the view that feminism is not a 
"totalizing" theory among others, because it was produced by those who were not located 
at the center of cultural power. In actual fact, "As an 'outsider' discourse, that is, a 
movement born out of the experience of marginality, contemporary feminism has been 
unusually attuned to issues of exclusion and invisibility. "' She believes that the danger in 
current feminism is not that of supporting totalizing theories, or of falling into essentialism 
but, rather, to be paralyzed by anxiety of doing so. 
Bordo can be taken as an example of an attempt to ground identity on the experiences of 
women. She suggests that women's reproductive role can be the material basis for a 
collective identity, even accepting the cultural and historical diversity of it. 67 Even if 
accepting that experiences of gender are shaped by multiple influences such as race, class, 
age, etc she thinks that it is possible to find many commonalities in the experiences of 
different women. She links the concept of being a woman with that of survival, she is 
interested in "the changing meanings of female otherness for women, as we attempt to 
survive, in historically unprecedented numbers, within our still largely masculinist public 
institutions. "68 She is aware of the centrality of gender in the shaping of our world, so she 
says that "in a culture that is in fact constructed by gender duality, however, one cannot 
simply be human. "69 
In the next chapter, I will analyse the viability of the project put forward by Harstock, and 
supported by Bordo: the formation of collective identities by taking into account the view 
64 S. Bordo also considers that we have to maintain our concept of women, even if we should tn- to 
account for diversity. She claims that, if we are going to take difference seriously, we have to accept the 
limits of our own embodiment. Given that we are inescapably embodied and located in particular 
situations, we will always be able to see only from our particular locations, so we Nvill always ignore some 
of the axes of oppression and select others, despite all our precautions. We should not forget. either. that 
close attention to difference does not guarantee the appropriate representation of difference because wi e 
might fall into an exaggerated underlining of difference that might result in constructing the other as "an 
exotic alien. " S. Bordo (1990), p 141. 
65N. Harstock (1990), p 171. 
66S. Bordo (1990), p 141. 
67 S. Bordo (191)0), p 146. 
S. Bordo (1990), p 148. 
69 S. Bordo (1990), p 152. 
70 
of writers from marginalized groups. I will discuss the possibility of finding women's 
common experiences, the role of the concept of survival in the formation of collective 
identities, and the centrality of gender in our culture. Postmodernists and writers from 
marginalized groups had problematized this project, but I believe that it is possible to 
reach an agreement between the need of preserving the use of "women" as a collective 
identity, as it is argued for by Harstock and Bordo, and the changes that are necessary to 
introduce in such a concept to avoid essentialism and universalism, as suggested by 
postmodernist and postcolonial writers. 
3.3 Towards a feminist postmodernism. 
Many postmodernist women have taken on board some of the difficulties that 
postmodernism posits for feminism; but, even so, they have claimed that it is possible to 
encompass both. N. Fraser and L. Nicholson argue that it is possible to develop a feminist 
and postmodernist theory. They underline the common elements in both theories, and their 
characterization of a postmodern feminism is compatible with many of the most recent 
theories in feminist empiricism and feminist standpoint epistemology: ` postmodern 
feminism need not abandon the large theoretical tools needed to address large political 
problems (.. ) theory here would be explicitly historical, attuned to the cultural specificity 
of different societies and period and to that of different groups within societies and 
periods (.. ) postmodern feminist theory would be non-universalist (.. ) it would replace 
unitary notions of 111o7man and feminine gender identity, with plural and complexly 
constructed Construction Of Social identity, treating gender as one relevant strand 
among others. (.. ) would be pragmatical and fallibilist (.. ) In short, this theory would 
look more like a tapestry composed of threads of marry different hues than one woven in a 
single color. "70 
To conclude this section, I will point out that the postmodernist critique has been useful in 
constructing better feminist theories. Nevertheless, I think that it is important to avoid the 
tendency of postmodernism to dissolve categories that are central to feminism. We can 
70 Frascr and Nicholson (1990), p 5. 
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change the content of the categories, but it is necessary to maintain them. 
4. Rethinking Feminist Standpoint Epistemology. 
There have been several attempts to develop theories that can be considered within the 
feminist standpoint tradition, but that avoid the problems that classic standpoint 
presented. " At the beginning of the chapter I claimed that, in this section, I will deal with 
some of these problems. I will argue that, even if we acknowledge that there is more than 
one axis of oppression, and that power imbalances imbue all our relationships, it is still 
possible to argue that some perspectives are epistemologically privileged over others. I 
will be putting together one of the central concerns of postmodernist thinkers 
(acknowledging diversity) with the main claim of standpoint epistemology (marginalized 
discourses are epistemically privileged). By acknowledging difference, I will accept the 
existence of a diversity of points of view, and I will argue that plurality does not imply 
relativism. I will introduce a theory that argues that the bases of objective knowledge are 
the experiences of marginalized people, and I will sketch the difficulties that obtaining 
such a knowledge has to face. 72 
At the beginning of this chapter I argued that nowadays it is difficult to classify feminist 
epistemologists under a single category within the area. In this section I will analyse the 
work of three feminist philosophers whose work is taken to be versions of standpoint 
feminism, but that shows the influence of the other two types of feminism. 
4.1 S. Harding. 
S. Harding's theory accounts for diversity, and the situatedness of knowledge and, also, it 
privileges the knowledge of those in the margins. Therefore, her work has traces of 
A summary of these problems is: As a feminist theory, it has been charged with not acknowledging that 
there are several axes of domination. Therefore, it was unaware that gender is not the only important 
variable for analysing oppression. It was guilty of universalism because it did not take difference into 
account, and it was also essentialist because it naturalized gender differences. From an epistemological 
perspective, it has been argued that their use of experience is inadequate and that it is necessary to explain 
the formation of a feminine point of view without recourse to the object relation theory. 
'' As I have already said. I will leave the question of experiences and the details of how to form collective 
identities for the next chapter. 
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postmodern and post-colonial thought and of standpoint epistemology. She has also been 
classified as a follower of naturalized epistemology, a category that it is usually included 
within feminist empiricism. Harding i-, a good example of how the different strands of 
feminist epistemology can influence each other 
Her work has been very influential, mainly for the development of a new concept of 
objectivity that she calls Strong Objectivity. Her main premise is that all knowledge is 
biased, and that the only way of obtaining proper objectivity is by becoming aware of the 
values that our knowledge supports. In order to do that, we should study the contexts in 
which knowledge is produced, to disclose the values at play in the context of discovery, 
and we should take into account the experiences of those who are at the margins. As 
Harding says, "starting from the perspective of women's lives makes strange what had 
appeared familiar, which is the beginning of any scientific inquiry. "73 Her theory is very 
valuable because she tries to encompass the existence of different discourses in order to 
produce more objective knowledge. Her concept of objectivity is very different from that 
traditionally linked to disembodied and interchangeable knowledge. 
Despite the many contributions of Harding's theory to feminist epistemology, I will argue 
against some of her presuppositions. My main argument will be directed at her claim that 
everybody can produce knowledge starting from the lives of marginalized people as well 
as they do themselves. I will argue that there are limits to the type of knowledge that we 
can obtain form the lives of others. I will support the view that there are types of 
knowledge that can be produced only by those actually living those lives. I will devote 
chapter 5 supporting my claims. In the next section, I will summarize the views of a 
feminist philosopher who supports my conclusions. 
4.2 P. Hill-Collins. 
P. Hill Collins work is close to that of early standpoint feminists, while, at the same time, 
she recognises some positive elements in the work of postmodernist, taking on 
board 
some of their criticisms against standpoint feminist epistemology, mainly 
in relation to 
S. Harding (1986). p 150. 
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concept of power. She believes race and gender are not the only aspects that oppress black 
women, there are other axes of oppression such as class, age and religion, that have an 
influence in the position that black women have in society. She also argues that 
"depending on the context, an individual may be an oppressor, a member of an oppressed 
group, or simultaneously oppressor and oppressed. X74 Therefore, we should shift from an 
"additive" model of oppression, that is from a model that sums up to how many axes of 
oppression each individual is subjected, to a model that stresses the interlocking nature of 
oppression. 
P. Hill-Collins is aware of the pervasive nature of oppression, but she also claims that there 
are epistemic positions that are privileged over others. The belonging to these epistemic 
groups is the product of marginalization. Marginalization always occurs when there are 
groups that are defined as outside the norm. Individuals who are considered to be outside 
the norm, are aware of their difference. This awareness takes place in the daily 
negotiations with themselves and others to find their own space. By doing so, they are 
made more aware than those who belong to the norm of the mechanisms of exclusion. 
The experiences that will give rise to the Black feminist consciousness are those of lack of 
fit between what they are supposed to be and their lives. They became particularly able to 
point out the way in which race structures our culture and society and, therefore, they 
develop critical skills that are very valuable if we want to obtain objective knowledge of 
the type argued for by Harding. Hill Collins points out that as well as a critical stance, 
"Like other subordinate groups, African-American women have not only 
developed a 
distinctive women standpoint but have done so by using alternative ways of producing 
and validating knowledge. "'SMarginalization provides marginalized subject with a critical 
stance, and with alternative ways of producing and validating knowledge. 
Some writers, such as bell hook claim that all Black women are 
Black feminists, because 
she considers that "living as Black it'onien provides experiences to stimulate a 
Black 
feminist consciousness. "76 In this case, the oppression that 
Black women have to confront 
'a P. Hill-Collins (1990), p 225. 
7s P. Hill-Collins (1990), p 202. 
x' P. Hill-Collins (1990), p 19. 
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is what provides them with some experiences from which a feminist consciousness arises. 
All black women have the necessary experiences to develop an special point of view, a 
particular knowledge. Hill Collins argues that these experiences are not sufficient in 
themselves "being Black and female may expose African-American w oiiwnl to certain 
common experiences, which in turn may predispose us to a distinctive group 
consciousness, but it in no way guarantees that such a consciousness u011 develop among 
all women or that it will be articulated as such by the group. "" 
As I will explain in the following paragraphs, Hill-Collins considers that black women are 
the only ones capable of producing black feminist knowledge. This is a central 
difference between Harding and Hill Collins. I agree with Hill-Collins, but by doing so, I 
have to face one of the main problems for standpoint epistemology: an epistemology that 
privileges the standpoint of the marginalized has to face the problem of diversity. There is 
more than one axis of oppression, so which is the one that should be privileged?. If we 
accept that more than one group should be privileged, then, we have to decide how to 
articulate together the different discourses that have been marginalized. 
It has been argued that the common experience of being oppressed allows the member of 
the different oppressed groups to understand better each other's situations. For instance, 
being a black woman in a racist society provides you with good grounds to develop a 
feminist interest. Apart from facilitating the recognition of other marginalized stances, the 
existence of more than one marginalized discourse is necessary for the development of 
each one of them. Hill-Collins, claims that a standpoint has to be acquired, that the 
experiences of individuals have to be articulated within a social group, but the appropriate 
conditions for this to happen do not always occur: "African-American women as a group 
may have experiences that provide us with a unique angle of vision. But expressing a 
collective, self-defined Black feminist Consciousness is problematic precisely because 
dominant groups have a vested interest in suppressing such thought. "In order for a 
black feminist thought to develop it is essential a collaboration with other groups of 
women, first, to articulate their identity as a collective, and to allow the necessary political 
77 P. Hill-Collins (1990). p 25. 
P. Hill-Collins (1990), p 25. 
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climate to develop in order to be able to express their consciusness, and second, they need 
the collaboration of other groups to became aware of the biases in their own theories. 
Hill Collins work states that black feminist knowledge can be produced only by black 
feminist women. Nevertheless, she is aware that black women as a group would benefit 
from the collaboration of other groups. Therefore, it seems that even if there is more than 
one axis of oppression, we can find common ground between the different marginalized 
groups that allows them to cooperate. In the next section, I will point out some of the 
difficulties of understanding across differences. But if we could find ways of understanding 
across differences, and of forming alliances between different groups, the production of 
feminist knowledge would benefit. I will argue in the next chapter, that the colaboration 
between different women's groups is not only desirable on epistemic grounds, but also 
necessary for the formation of "women" as a collective identity. 
4.3 D. Haraway. 
D. Haraway attempts to merge postmodernist and standpoint feminism. She argues that all 
knowledge is situated knowledge, produced from particular locations which are defined 
culturally, socially, and historically, but that also depend on particular forms of 
embodiment. In agreement with S. Harding, she claims that, if we are going to attempt to 
obtain objectivity, we cannot forget the situated nature of knowledge and we have to 
accept the existence of more than one point of view. As she puts it very clearly `feminist 
objectivity means quite simply situated knowledge 's. "9 In a later chapter I will spell out 
the consequences of the embodied nature of our knowledge, but now I will simply 
underline that it implies abandoning the ideal of objectivity as interchangeability, and also 
puts some limits on the dream of being able to see from the point of view of any other 
situated knower. 3° In this sense, there are clear differences between the work of Haraway, 
and Harding's work. 
79 1). l caraway (1988), p 581. 
SI 0 D. Harawav (1988), p 583 "all these pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility 
and intcichaiigcabilit), but of elaborate specificity and difference and the lo% ing care people might take to 
learn how to sec faithfully from another's point of view. " 
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I have already signaled that Haraway is close to the standpoint epistemology idea that 
those who have been subordinated have a more desirable epistemological perspective. She 
claims that "the subjugated have a decent chance to be on the god trick and all its 
dazzling-and therefore, blinding-illuminations. 'Subjugated' standpoints are preferr, 'd 
because they seem to promise more adequate, sustained, objective transforming accounts 
of the world. "$' Nevertheless, she stresses how their insights are not the product of a more 
natural, innocent, less constructed set of experiences, but rather, due to the 
acknowledgment of their own fragmented identity. She thinks that there are no innocent 
points of view, all our perceptions are grounded on "translations and specific ways of 
seeing, that is, ways of life. X 82 
We should privilege the perspective of the oppressed because of their critical and creative 
potential but we must be aware of two important issues, first, we should not romanticize 
these locations, they are also open to critical reassessment and second, given that it is not 
possible to see from the perspective of the "other", we cannot benefit from their epistemic 
findings unless we engage in a serious dialogue with them, with all the difficulties that this 
entails. At the center of epistemology should be the development of ways in which the 
conversation between different theories is made possible. '. ' We cannot see from the point 
of view of the other, but the communication is possible because we all belong to more 
than one group, so we can find common ground with at least some of the knowers who 
belong to o her groups. 
Regarding the question of the formation of collective identities, Haraway attempts to 
escape the essentialism present in other types of standpoint by arguing for a concept of 
identity (group identity) based on coalition, instead of claiming that belonging to groups is 
a question of being identical members. This concept of identity allows for differences 
between the group members. And it also relies, as it was the case with P. Hill-Collins, on 
the collaboration between the members of different epistemic groups. I will analyse this 
concept in detail in the next chapter. 
Rý D. Haraw'av (1988). p584. 
D. Haraw, 'y (1988), p 583. 
'83 D. Harm . iv av (1 ß)S8), p 
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Even if it is possible to find common ground between different communities and the 
theories that they develop, we still have to face the question of relativism. Do we choose 
between different theories or do we give the same value to all of them? Haraway provides 
us with an interesting answer. 
In previus sections, I have explained that if we want to obtain more objective knowledge, 
we have to rely on the theories provided by different epistemic groups, so I have focused 
my analysis mainly on the relations between the knowers. This is the type of theory 
favoured by standpoint epistemologies, who are mainly interested in disclosing the ways in 
which knowledge is mediated by power relations. Nevertheless, at the begining of the 
chapter, when I explained feminist empiricism, I underlined the importance that empirical 
adequacy has for some feminists: this type of theory is mainly interested in the relations 
between knowledge and the world, so a good theory will represent the world faithfully. 
Haraway adopts a position that diverges from both of them. 
On the one hand, she shares an interest with feminist empiricists, in the empirical 
adequacy of theories, because she claims that our discourses about the world have to be, 
in a sense, faithful to it. But on the other hand, she rejects the traditional picture that 
considers the objects of knowledge as inert and passive, so she envisions the world as an 
agent. She claims that "Situated knowledge require that the object of knowledge be 
pictured as an actor and agent, not as a screen or a ground or a resource, never finally 
as slave to the master that closes off the dialectic in his unique agency and his authorship 
of objective knowledge. "84 According to Haraway "Accounts of a 'real' world do not, 
then depend on a logic of 'discovery' but on a power-charged social relation of 
'conversation'. the world neither speaks itself nor disappears in favor of a master 
decoder. the codes of the world are not still, waiting only to be read. The world is not raw 
material for hu, nanization. " She conceives the world as a trickster with an independent 
sense of humor, so it escapes our bests efforts to conceptualize it. She claims that, from 
some perspectives, those of the subjugated, it is possible to obtain more faithful 
representations of the world, but, given that the world is an agent, it is important to 
84 D. Harawav, (1988), p 593. 
85 D. Haraw. av (1988), p 593. 
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remember that we cannot completely apprehend it once and for all, because the aspects 
that it is showing in a determinate moment might be changed later on. Therefore, from 
some positions we can see some aspects of the world, and from other positions, other 
aspects. One description can be more appropriate at a particular moment, and less 
appropriate at another. Also, if we take into account that subjugated positions are not 
innocent, we have to favour diversity, in order to be able to point out the biases in our 
own theories. 
5. Conclusion. 
In this section I have analyzed the three main tendencies in feminist epistemology. I have 
shown how the influence of other types of feminist epistemology has changed earlier forms 
of standpoint epistemology. I have also shown how, nevertheless, the bases of it feminist 
standpoint epistemology are still widely accepted, so many feminist accept that: Material 
differences produce epistemic differences and those at the margins have a privilege 
perspective. 
In this thesis I will offer epistemic arguments to support both claims. I will also try to 
solve some of the difficulties that I have highlighted in the new forms of standpoint 
epistemology: I will show how it is possible to ground knowledge on the experiences of 
marginalized groups without making a naive use of experience, I will explain how it is 
possible to have collective identities that do not further the oppression of those who 
belong to these groups. I will support my claim that it is not possible to produce 
knowledge from the point of view of marginalized people unless we are one of them, and 
finally, I will try to offer protocols to smooth the difficulties of understanding across 
differences, which is central to obtaining objective knowledge. 
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CHAPTER 3 
O. Introduction. 
In the previous chapter I summed up the three types of feminist epistemology. I focused 
mainly on standpoint epistemology and tried to support a theory that escaped the 
criticisms directed against it. I left out of it two of the main questions that standpoint 
epistemology has to face: its use of experience, and the formation of collective identities. 
Both questions are related and I will try to solve them together. 
In this chapter I will develop a concept of experience that would satisfy the requirements 
of postmodernism. I will argue for a concept of experience that does not essentialize the 
knowers, that accounts for difference and that acknowledges that human perception is 
mediated by concepts, that is, I will be talking of a non-raw concept of experience. 
Once I have defined a usable concept of experience, I will argue that it is closely knitted 
with the formation of collective identities. I will analyse diverse ways of using experiences 
as the bases for collective identities. 
Finally, I will recall the different ways in which experience has been used in feminist 
theories as the bases of knowledge to see if it is maintainable as an epistemological basis. 
1. A "naive "use of experience as the basis for marginalized knowledge 
In previous chapters I have explained how feminists and other theorists have argued that 
our scientific theories consistently use the experiences of the ruling groups as the basis for 
an objective universal view of the world. This tendency is present in the social sciences as 
well as hi :; terature, history, etc... Early feminist theories attempted to introduce the 
experiences of women in mainstream academy and culture, by writing from the point of 
view of women, or by searching for the work of women that has been undervalued and 
forgotten. They have done this reconstructive work in two ways: by analysing the 
methodolooics used in our sanctioned ways of producing knowledge to determine if they 
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could be changed to account for a more plural view of reality; and also by keeping the 
current methodologies and simply adding those different perspectives to the current body 
of knowledge. Therefore, while some feminists have explored the ways in which 
knowledge is produced and validated in order to introduce changes in the processes, 
others decided that in order to obtain a better picture of reality what was necessary was to 
produce knowledge from the lives of those that have been ignored in the past by following 
the current methodologies or by introducing slight variations. 
In this section I will refer to the work of J. W. Scott, who criticises foundationalist accounts 
of knowledge which are grounded on experience. She argues against the current rewriting 
of history by making use of the narratives of subjects that belong to marginalized groups, 
because it has been assumed that those narratives give us a glimpse to a more real way of 
looking at the world. It is easy to see how her criticisms can be used to argue against 
feminist standpoint epistemology, or against any other epistemology that uses the 
experiences of those who have been oppressed as the basis to ground a better knowledge 
of reality. Scott uses an excerpt taken from the biography of the gay artist S. Delany to 
illustrate (and criticise) the use of experience in a foundational way. 
S. Delany's account of his first visit to a bathhouse in 1963 is an example of how 
experiencing the world in a new way (in this case "seeing it"), helps the subject to make 
sense of aspects of the world that seemed incomprehensible before, given his previous 
preconceptions. In a sense, his experience precedes his conceptual organisation, because it 
is the basis of a new way of explaining the world. His experiences as a gay man are the 
material for a different narrative on the lives of homosexual people. Delany reports that in 
the 1950s he shared the common held belief that homosexuals were (in his own words) 
"isolated perverts", therefore when he saw many gay people together in the bathhouse, he 
had for the first time a sense of the political power derived from being gay. He said that 
"the first direct sense of political power comes from the apprehension of massed 
bodies "', it is this "seeing" that enables him to comprehend the relationships between his 
personal activities and his politics. Delany's description of 
how he acquired a conscience 
of the sexual politics involved in being gay, can be taken to 
be foundational because his 
Quoted by J. Scott (1991). p 775 
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account seems to imply that " Knowledge is gained through vision, vision is a direct 
apprehension of a world of transparent objects. In this conceptualisation the visible is 
privileged. Writing is then put at its service. Seeing is the origin of knowing. U citing is 
reproduction, transmission- the communication of knowledge gained through (visual, 
visceral), experience. ))2 
Scott argues that the incorporation of those experiences within history is positive because 
a point of view that has been hidden from history becomes visible and it is made obvious 
that particular groups have been marginalized, but it is negative because while historians 
accept that those experiences have an evidential value just in the light of prevalent 
discourses, the mere fact of using them at all perpetuates the discourses that excluded 
them in the first place. Furthermore, experience is mediated by our language, and the 
subject who has acquired a language is constituted by it, her vision is tainted by her 
language. So if we ground our epistemology on an "unmediated" experience we are not 
accounting for how language has structured the epistemic subject in the first place3. If we 
want to produce accounts of reality that include the experiences of those who have been 
excluded, we have to avoid taking those experiences as natural and focus in exploring the 
ways in which they have been generated as different and also the ways in which the 
language that supports them constructs the subjects as different. She claims that "The 
project of making experience visible precludes analysis of the workings of this system and 
of its historicity; instead, it reproduces its terms. "' 
The most direct consequence of taking those experiences as "raw" and the knowers as 
unmediated by discourses, is that both the knower and the experience are naturalised in 
their difference. Scott claims that , 
"the evidence of experience then becomes evidence for 
the fact of difference, rather than a way of exploring how difference is established, how it 
opcrate.,, how and in what ways it constitutes subjects who see and act in the world. "s In 
the example provided by Delany, if we take his experience as foundational, we are 
2 J. Scott (1991), p77>. 
3 J. Scott (1991) argues that "questions about the constructed nature of experience, about how subject are 
constituted as different in the first place, about how one 's vision is structured - about 
language (or 
discourse) and history- are lc ft aside "p 7 7. 
J. Scott(1991) p 779. 
5 J. Scott (1991), p777. 
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naturalising the homosexual subject as different because : "homosexual practices are seen 
as the result of desire, conceived as a natural force operating outside or in opposition to 
social regulation. (.. ) Because this kind of (homosexual desire) cannot ultimately be 
repressed-because experience is there- it inverts institutions to accommodate itseI If 16 
Scott's remarks are very reasonable. The example provided by Delany shows how the 
experience of entering a room in which gay people is the majority is enlightening just in 
the context of a preconception of what being homosexual implies (at the time, implied to 
be isolated). Delany experienced being part of a marginalized group as empowering 
because he experienced his homosexuality in that historically mediated light. This is a 
vision that it is just possible within the constraints of a discourse that portraits 
homosexuality as outside the norm. Delany's experience cannot be taken to be raw, or to 
be meaningful outside of discourses. 
Scott considers that if we acknowledge that experience is not transparent and that subjects 
are discursively constructed, we can make a positive use of "experience". She would read 
Delany's account in the following way: "Another kind of reading, (.. ) sees this event not 
as the discovery of truth (conceived as the reflection of a prediscursive reality), but as the 
substitution of one interpretation for another. Delany presents this substitution as a 
conversion experience, a clarifying moment, after which he sees (that is, understands) 
differently. But there is all the difference between subjective perceptual clarity and 
transparent vision; one does not necessarily follow from the other even if the subjective 
state is metaphorically presented as a visual experience. "' 
Her position can be summarised in the following way: experience is not transparent, 
it is 
mediated by our discourses and by the situated nature of individuals. In reporting the 
experiences of marginalized individuals we have to avoid supporting the structures of 
oppression that make them marginal in the first place, therefore we should avoid 
naturalising them. Focusing on those experiences make us 
forget that the important issue 
to clarify is how those experiences have been constituted. 
And finally, what those 
6 J. Scott (1991), p 794. 
7 J. Scott (1991), p 779 
s, 
experiences report is not a true view of the world, but rather another interpretation of the 
world. 
2. Problems with Scott's concept of experience. 
I disagree with the last two assertions. First of all, I disagree with her claim that by 
focusing on the experiences of those who are at the margins, we cannot engage with the 
causes of marginalization critically. I think that once we are aware that subjects are 
constituted discursively, we can rely on experience as the basis of knowledge claims 
without perpetuating the discursive processes that produce those experiencing subjects. In 
actual fact I will argue that the production of those claims will destabilise the ruling 
discourses. Second, even if I agree with her characterisation of experience as mediated, I 
think that some of the experiences of marginalized subjects are not adequately described as 
alternative interpretations of the world. They are not just an interpretation among others, 
but rather, I believe that they are more accurate descriptions of certain aspects of the 
world. Scott's characterisation does not capture the disruptive influence that experience 
can have in our discourses . 
In this section I will argue that it is possible to make a different use of "experience" in 
epistemology, that avoids characterising it as "raw", and also, that allows us to use it as 
disruptive of existent discourses. 
Scott accepts that even if experience and epistemic subjects are discursively mediated, and 
their relation with the world is somehow dependent on their discourses, there is still scope 
for some indeterminacy- First, she accept that the world is not completely captured by our 
language. Scott argues that even if there is a certain amount of linguistic determinism, in 
the sense that our experiences are mediated by language, there is still a realm of 
irreducibility that she calls the literary :" the 
kind of reality I haiv in mind would not 
assume a direct correspondence beht'eenn words and things, nor confine 
itself to si l)Ie 
meanings, nor aim for the resolution of contradictions. 
(.. ) rather 11 would , 
'rant to "the 
lileran " an integral, eiven irreducible status of its own. "' Second, she accept that 
8 J. Scott (1991), p 794. 
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experience can be disruptive of our preconceptions. "subjects are constituted discursively 
and experience is a linguistic event it does not happen outside established meanings) but 
neither is it confined to a fixed order of meaning. Since discourse is by defin; 'ion shared, 
experience is collective as well as individual. Experience can both confirm what is 
already known (we are what we have learned to see) and upset what has been taken for 
granted (when different meanings are in conflict) or to resolve it - that is what is meant 
by `learning from experience'. through not everyone learns the same lesson or learns it 
at the same time or in the same way). "9 
Nevertheless, even if she accepts those elements of indeterminacy, I find her concept of 
experience too dependent on language and discourse. In this thesis I will argue that even if 
there seems to be a direct correspondence between our words and the world that they 
describe, occasionally, we are able to sense that both do not fit completely, I will therefore 
support the view that our experiences are not completely determined by language. I will 
also claim that experience can upset what it is taken for granted, not because experiences 
can be subsumed under different descriptions bringing "together" different pre-existent 
meanings that create a sense of startlement in the knower, but rather because experience 
can make us aware that the existent discourse is insufficient to capture aspects of reality 
that became salient to us through our engagement with the world1°. I will offer arguments 
to support the view that marginalized subjects are more able to capture those aspects of 
reality than those belonging to non-marginalized groups. Finally I will argue that it is 
possible to use the experiences of marginalized groups without reinforcing the discourses 
that marginalized them. 
3. Experience as linguistically mediated. 
I have said that Scott acknowledges a distinction between concepts and the reality 
subjacent to them, and that she also accepts that there is a certain indeterminacy between 
our descriptions of the world and the world itself, but that nevertheless, she links the 
J. Scott (1991), p 79 3 
10 In chapter 51 Nvi11 argue that we have conceptual and non-conceptual mental content, both of them are 
linked together in our perception of the world, so even if wie are able to capture aspects of the world that 
are not completely captured by our concepts. our perception is never of "raw" data. 
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linguistic and the extralinguistic too closely together. Her account is specially 
unsatisfactory when she classifies the experiences of marginalized subjects as mere 
"interpretations". In this section I will offer some arguments to support my claim that her 
account is unsatisfactory, while still retaining some of the positive traits of her 
characterisation of experience. 
First of all, I will show how important it is to avoid collapsing experience into language. In 
order to explain the disruptive nature of experience it is necessary to keep this difference 
in perspective. 
S. Stone- Mediatore makes an important point against Scott's reading of Delany's work 
which reflects the problematic approach to experience that poststructuralists offer- 
"Delany's experience is constituted in his interpretation of experience, yet the 
interpretation is guided by his experience and reflections on these. When Scott describes 
the memoir as 'discursive production of knowledge of the seýf 'she recognises one side of 
the paradox, the constitutive role of language. But she overlooks the experience that 
enables Delany to use language in the particular way he does. The short shift that Scott 
gives to this motivating experience is evidence of her failure to explicate 'subjective 
perceptual clarity' or to explain the relation between Delany's experience and his 
writing, Scott cannot distinguish the text's value ftom other representations of the gay 
identity or the sexual revolution; it IS merely the substitution of one interpretation for 
another. "" Even if we accept that Delany's experiences as a gay male are mediated by 
the ruling discourses about homosexuality, it is important to realise that his experience in 
the bathhouse was challenging those discourses, and the challenge was not perceived as a 
logical clash between two different interpretation of the same fact, but rather it was Z-: ) 
perceived as a revelation that the preconceptions that he had about homosexuality were 
unsuitable to describe what he was experiencing. And this awareness would allow Delany 
to search for other types of Jis-ourses that would account for his experiences. When 
Delany entered the bathhouse he did not have an alternative discourse to inform those 
experiences, even if this does not mean that he had a completely unmediated experience. 
IIS. Stonc Mcdiatorc (1998), p 121. 
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What makes Delany's experience so valuable from an epistemological point of view is 
precisely that it challenges the discourse that constituted it in the first place, it shows how 
normative heterosexuality cannot account for the way in which the world can be 
experienced by non-heterosexuals. Delany's experiences show to us gaps in our 
descriptions of reality that would be unaccounted for otherwise 
Second, what it is overlooked in Scott's discourse it that Delany is constituted as the sort 
of subject that can have those experiences not just by the discourses that construct him as 
a gay male (who is also black and married), but rather he is primarily constituted by the 
material circumstances that make him the recipient of those inscriptions in the first place. 
His experiences could not be had just by anybody that happens to enter the bathhouse, 
they are the product of a particular type of embodiment in particular social and historical 
circumstances. And this implies, on the words of Stone Mediatore, that Scott fails to 
contextualize effectively the linguistic practices. "When Scott defines experience as an 
epistemological phenomenon constituted by local discursive practices, she abstracts 
knowledge practices from the broader political and economic systems in which 
knowledge circulates. To be sure, Scott intends to `situate and contextualize language', 
and she sometimes acknowledges that discursive practices sustain and are sustained by 
an extradiscursive `reality' However, she stops short of specifying what it is that we 
situate and contextualize language in relation to, or explicating all that she lumps under 
"reality ". Leaving this extradiscursive world vague, she can dismiss as positivist any 
attempt to associate experience or consciousness with a structurally determined social 
location. 
Later in the thesis I will explain how those experiences are socially constituted, even if not 
linguistically determined, and I will support my claim that their epistemological worth is 
closely dependent on the fact that they have been produced in those particular contexts. I 
think that it suffices now to say that Scott's failure to contextualize the production of the 
discourses make her unable to explain how Delany's experiences escape the hegemonic 
discourses challenging linguistical determinism. In order to do it, she will have to explain 
how they are mediated by the particular situation of Delany as a knower, which is what 
12 S. Stone Mcdiatorc (199$), p 126. 
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constitute them as particularly valuable epistemically. Unless she develops a concept of 
experience that does not collapse into language, she will be unable to explain why this 
position is epistemically valuable. And she has to explain it because she accepts that there 
is a perceptual clarity in Delany's account, which accounts better for what it is being seen 
than other possible interpretations. Mediatore points to this particular problem in Scott's 
theory :" The problem is that all readings are as good as any other, it is not possible to 
explain why Delany's experience is more clear that any other, or why it should be 
preferable. She cannot explain why Delany's description of the Turkish baths will make 
us perceive a tension between his conceptual system and his experience, or how it is 
possible to feel this tension in the first place. "13 
4. A non-naive use of experience as the grounds of marginalized 
knowledge. 
I favour a revaluation of the experiences of subjects who belong to marginalized groups. 
This experience is mediated by language, but also mediated by their embodiment, and by 
the economic and social structures of the world that they inhabit. Taking on board some of 
the points that Scott was making, I will argue that belonging to particular groups is not 
enough for the-subjects to have epistemically valuable experiences. In order to be able to 
articulate them, they must be conscious of their non-natural status. Individuals who belong 
to marginalized groups can develop this awareness of having been constructed by 
discourses due to their locations, that allow them to see the gaps in our conceptual system 
and make them deeply critical of our hegemonic descriptions of the world. The 
experiences narrated by the marginalized subject is neither transparent, nor innocent, but it 
contains the seeds of change within it. 
One of the most important criticisms that were put forward by Scott regarding the use of 
experiences of marginalized groups to ground knowledge was that it precluded an analysis 
of the process of formation of collective identities. She insisted that we should avoid 
naturalising the subjects that belong to those groups because they are constructed by 
discourses that make them marginal. In the previous section I argued that Delany's 
13 S. Stone Mcdiatorc (1995), p 12-2 
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experiences were the product of his particular embodiment and cultural and historical 
location: he had this particular experience because he was a gay male. The attribution of 
identity on the basis of material circumstances seems to fall into the naturalising move that 
was so rightly criticised by Scott. 
The first step in the search for a non-naive type of experience will be to find a definition 
for collective identities that do not reproduce the mechanisms of oppression that 
marginalized those subjects in the first place. Mohanty analyses two different ways of 
constructing identities that provide the basis for common experiences, which are offered 
by R. Morgan and by B. Jhonson Reagon. Both of them try to relocate women's 
experiences at the centre of feminist theory, while acknowledging that gender is both 
produced and uncovered by feminist discourses. 
A) Common experiences as the basis for identities.. 
R. Morgan, editor of the influential book Sisterhood is Global, presents the formation of 
groups (in her case of women as a group) as the product of sharing common experiences. 
In the book that she edited it is suggested that "universal sisterhood is produced (.. ) 
through specific assumptions about women as a cross-culturally singular, homogeneous 
group with the same interests, perspectives and goals and similar experiences. " 14 She 
considers that women have a shared world-view due to a common condition, experienced 
by all females, which is the suffering inflicted by a universal patriarchy. According to 
R. Morgan, what binds women together is their experience of oppression as females: 
"Morgan assumes universal sisterhood on the basis of women 's shared opposition to 
androcentrism, an opposition which, according to her, grows directly out of women 's 
shared status as its victims. )15 Accordingly, women have the role of truth tellers, given 
their special access to those experiences "women have some kind of privileged access to 
the 'real' the 'truth', and can elicit 'trust 'from other women purely on the basis of their 
beine, not-male. "16 
C. Talpadc- Mohandy (1998), p 257. Further arguments in C. Talpadc-Moliandy(1988). 
15 C. Talpadc-Mohandy (1998), p -100. 
16 C. Talpadc- Mohand}, (199$), p261. 
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There are a number of problems with this approach to collective identity and also with her 
account of experience. In the first place, by accepting that all women have a common 
experience of oppression, she is letting herself open to the accusation of essentialism that 
we have explored in the previous chapter. I have already said that in order to be able to 
make use of the experiences in the production of knowledge the knowers have to be aware 
of their own situation as marginalized subjects, so not all women will be aware of the 
oppression that they suffer, and therefore, not all of them will be able to make use of those 
experiences to create a different world view. R. Morgan presupposes in her work that in 
order to create a global sisterhood we have to identify with all women, and this implies 
erasing important differences, and actually implies the exclusion of those women that are 
unable to identify with the majority. Finally, as I will analyse in the next section, the 
experience of oppression is too vague and too general a concept to be useful to articulate 
any meaningful epistemological claim. 
B) Coalition identities. 
B. J. Reagon claims that feminism was born out of the awareness of the oppression that 
women suffer. Due to its origin, feminism it is able to create a 'safe place' for some 
women, while at the same time, it necessarily enforces a policy of exclusion that keeps out 
some women that are also marginalized for being females. B. J. Reagon considers that this 
is the dynamics of any group that has its origin in the acknowledgement of oppression, 
they always offer a home for some and exclude others that have a right to belong to them. 
She compares the belonging to those groups with "feeling at home". By that she means 
that being a member of those particular groups provides the members with a sense of 
safety which can be obtained by keeping outside those who are a threat. The creation of 
secure nurturing spaces allow their members to grow, producing a sense of security to the 
members, that make them feel that they can accept in their groups some of the outsiders 
that seem to have a right to belong. Those were excluded in the first place because they 
were different. The inclusion of "difference" in the safe spaces, has the 
important 
consequence that "the room does 1701 feel like the room anymore. And it ain't 
home no 
more. It is not a womb no more. And you can't feel comfortable no more. acid what 
happens at that point has to do with thing to do too much in it. You 
don 't do no coalition 
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building in a womb. (.. )Coalition work is not work done in your home. coalition work has 
to be done in the streets. "17 
In relation to the women's movement, it is clear that the acceptance of different groups of 
women have put a lot of strain in the viability of the feminist project, it seems that trying 
to make a common "home" for different groups is an almost impossible task. Reagon says 
that trying to make a "home" for all women is not the right move because it is in the 
nature of homes that others are excluded. The alternative is to make coalitions, but we 
should take into account that it is not possible to make coalitions inside homes, making 
coalitions is a dangerous business, it is radically different from the globalizing move of 
sisterhood supported by R. Morgan: "That is the nature of coalition. You have to give it 
all. It is not to feed you; you have to feed it. and it's a monster. It never gets enough. It 
always wants more. So you better be sure you got your home someplace for you to go so 
that you will not become a martyr to the coalition. , 18 Reagon depiction of coalition 
underlines the difficulties of the task, while at the same time, exposes its inevitability "you 
do not go into coalition because you just like it. the only reason you would consider 
trying to team up with somebody who could possibly kill you, is because that's the only 
way you can figure you can stay alive. "'9 Survival is the central issue for Reagon, it is not 
the experience of a common oppression, but rather the commonality of struggle that will 
allow women to form coalitions. This has interesting epistemological implications, and 
Mohandy points them out in that in relation to Reagon's suggestion "instead of 
separating experience and politics and basing the later on the former, she emphasises the 
politics that always define and inform experience. , 
20 
While in the fig st model of group identity the commonality of experience was presupposed 
and that was the basis for the grouping of women, in this model it is the sense of belonging 
to a group that permeates those experiences. The experiences are not previous to the 
coalition making, but rather are informed by it. 
17 B. J. Reagon (1998). p 245. 
18 B. J. Reagon (1998). p 246. 
19 B. J. Reagon (1998), p 242. 
20 C. Talpadc-Mohandy (1998), p 266. 
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c) Mohandy on the politics of location. 
Mohandy analyses both models and argues for the creation of what she calls a "politics of 
location". The acquisition of a particular political identity, such as being a . voman, or 
being gay, or being black, is a process that mixes experiences that are taken to be 
personal, together with the intervention of groups and theories or discourses that shape 
those. She says that " For me, a comparative reading of Morgan 's and Reagon 's 
documents of activism precipitates the recognition that experience of the self, which is 
often discontinuous and fragmented, must be historized before it can be generalised into 
a collective vision. In other words, experience must be historically interpreted and 
theorised if it is to become the basis of feminist solidarity and struggle, and it is at this 
moment that an understanding of the politics of location proves crucial. "21 
At the beginning of this section I claimed that being the member of a marginalized group is 
not enough to provide the subject with the experiences that will ground different theories, 
but rather, it is central to this possibility that the subject recognises the belonging to a 
particular group which provides the basis to make sense of those experiences. I would 
agree with Mediatore who agrees with Mohanty's view that "critical knowledge and 
political consciousness does notfollow automaticallyftom living in a marginalized social 
location: they develop only with the struggle against oppression, when this struggle 
I. ncludes the work of remembering and renarrating obscured experiences of resistance to, 
or tension with, social and cultural nornis. Such experiences are not transparent or prior 
to langitage, for they contain contradictions and take shape 717 reaction to culturally 
gh, en images and stories. Therefore, the narration of such experience is no mere 
reporiing qf spontaneous consciousness. On the contrary, it it7volves rethinking al7d 
rearliculatitig obscured, offe17 Pfflqful memories, al0forging connections bet", ee17 those 
memories and collective struggle. Mohanty's 117Sight is that this arduous and creative 
proccss of remembering, reprocessing, and reinteq, refing lived experiel7ce in a collective 
context- and tiol 117c inere substaUtiOll Of 017e I) derpretation or another- tran-sforin 
21 C. Talpadc-Molhanty (199S). p 269. 
experience, enabling one to claim subjecthood and to identify with oppositional 
-22 struggles. 
The basis for the formation of group identities is to became aware of the many axes of 
domination that cross our lives, because out of the paralysis that this realisation causes, ý, ve 
will became aware that we are constructed by the discourses that support those axes of 
domination, and out of this knowledge, and the experiences that this situation procures, 
we can begin creating common identities. The process is described by G. Anzaldua, who 
finds herself defined by different categories that seem to contradict each other. She 
inhabits different worlds, and she finds difficult to negotiate a coherent self out of all of 
them: "Petrified, she can't respond, herface caught between los intersticios, the spaces 
between the different world she inhabits"" her reaction is refusing to construct a coherent 
self that will make her decide between different possibilities therefore; "She begins to 
create herseýf as intersubjective in a space and a place in the interstices of multiple and 
simultaneous conflicting power structures in which to carry on conversations, with 
herse4f and with others, and to strategize"". Having fragmented identities means that we 
belong to more than one group, so we have commonalties and differences with the 
members of different groups. Fowles explains how Anzaldua and other post-colonial 
writers propose that we should at the same time accept the simultaneity of borders and 
also try to mingle them "Recognition of simultaneity of the conditions of oppression and 
privilege, together with mingling of imposed differences or 'borders', can be used to 
construct intersubjectivityInways that make persons available for answering the political 
calls of the Combahee River Collective, the Bridge writers, Bernice Johnson Reagon, 
A udre Lorde, and Anzaldua herseýf to link struggles with different others. Mingling, as a 
form of " layful 'world-traveling "' prepares one to venture from "home " Into the streets p 
for the putpose of engaging in coalition politics with the many "different others 
constituted by the simullancily of oppressions and privileges under complex 
donnnati -on., '2' This is the basis for group identities, that will allow us to have a feminist 
standpoint that does not rely in universalist premises "She wants us each to give an 
22 S. Stone-Mcdiatorc (1998), p 12 5. 
23 
G. Anzaldua quoted by D. Fowles (1997). 
24 D. Fowles (1997), p 117. 
25 D. Fowles (1997), p 11S. 
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account of our responsibilities in contributing to what is oppressive and privileging, to 
talk our stories of consciousness raising, all speaking and listening to one another, all 
recognizing that no one of us, not even all of us together, can have full knoit lent QQf the 
problem' or 'the solution'. Conversing in such a way would be tantamount to engaging a 
feminist materialist standpoint of intersubjectivity. "26 
Andalzua's work is used by Fowles, who argues that by using Andalzua's theory it is 
possible to build upon Harstock's standpoint feminist theory to include the different 
perspectives of women within it. By reinterpreting Marx's theory choosing gender instead 
of class as the ground of a privileged perspective, Harstock underlined the commonalties 
between women instead of the differences, in a similar line to the one taken by R. Morgan 
in section a. According to Fowles, Harstock made this mistake because she relied in 
7)27 Marx's "philosophy of the subject . Marx's philosophy of the subject has been analyzed 
by Benhabib and implies that the subject who was the center of traditional epistemology is 
substituted by a "collective singular" in which individuals are defined by what they have in 
common, erasing important differences . 
2' Benhabib's analysis of the theory of the subject 
offers us a the solution that allows us to have a collective identity that allows for 
difference, while keeping her theory grounded in Marxist theory. The key is his 
perspective of sensuous finitude that is also present in Harstock. Harstock claims that 
reality "itse4f consists of 'sensuous human activity'practice. "29This means that reality and 
the individuals are historical and socially constructed. We should apply that view about 
reality to our view about social relations, the acknowledgment of plurality that make us 
realize that there is not a single privileged perspective. Fowles reaches the same 
conclusion as Mediatore and Reagon- we have to make coalitions between different 
groups in order to obtain a collective identity. In a further chapter I will explore the 
difficulties of making those coalitions between different groups, but for now it suffices to 
signal that Andalzua gives some rules to work on those alliances 30 : first we have to make 
26 D. Fowles (1997), p 117. 
27 D Fowles (1997), p 111 
28 D. Fowles (1997), p 113. 
21) D. Fowles (1997), p 112. 
30Those 
are summarized by D. Fowles as follows "First is to remember 'that coalition work attempts to 
balance power relations and unclc)"mine and subvert the v%stcm of 
domination-subordination that alrects 
evc')l our /Host unconscious thoughts "(.. ) second is a set of related points, that the assumptions of 
Collll)1O/1 grolin(1, singular . sisterhood, and need 
fc)r unity are false. Inck'('(l, in- y ou may h, we to accept 
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sure that the coalition's main aim is to subvert the structures of domination; second, we 
should not sacrifice difference in order to get unity even if this means not getting solutions 
for the problems; and finally, women of color, and those in the margins have to lead the 
way. 
At the beginning of the section I claimed that I would argue for the existence of a non- 
naive use of experience as the basis of marginalized knowledge. One of the most important 
issues that I had to face in order to avoid Scott's criticisms was to prove that it is possible 
to avoid naturalising the subjects that belong to marginalized groups by being aware that 
group identity is partially constructed by the hegemonic discourses. I have argued that 
group identities are not natural groupings, but rather, are acquired. The basis for the 
formation of a collective identity is the awareness of fragmentation at the level of the self 
Individuals became aware that they are defined in relation to different axes of oppression 
that allow them to align with people belonging to different groups. Collective identities 
help the subject to make sense of experiences that do not seem to fit the hegemonic 
conceptual systems. By constructing those experiences within the group, the identity and 
the sense of belonging are strengthen. Both identities and experiences evolve in a 
dialectical manner. Neither are given, nor are they completely apprehended by discourses. 
One of my criticisms against Scott was that she was unable to explain the disruptive nature 
of certain types of experiences, in particular, the disruptive nature of the experiences of 
people who have been kept at the margins. Most of my thesis will be devoted to explain 
how and why this disruption happens and how it is articulated. I will begin by claiming that 
experiential knowledge has been unfairly marginalized from our accounts of knowledge, as 
a first step to explain the nature of those experiences whose epistemological value I am 
trying to justify. Another of my arguments against Scott was that she collapsed reality into 
language, in the next section I will begin to sketch a theory that will allow us to establish a 
that there may be no solutions, resolutions or even agreement ever. The terms solution, resolution and 
progressing and movingforward are Western doininant cultural concepts'(.. ) third appears to be the sel 
ofmoves that constitute feminist identity politics and thatforeclose the probabilit ,v 
of white women 
inarginali. -ing and stripping us of our individualiýv 'A 11 parties involved in coalitions need to recognise 
the necessitv that women of colour and lesbians &: fine the terms of engagement; that we be listened to. 
that we articulate who ive are, where stv have come from (racial past), how ive understand oppression to 
work, how we think we can get outfrom under, and what strategies we can use in accomplishing the 
particular task's we have chosen to peiform - D. Fowles ( 1997), p 108. 
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gap between them, without failing into the trap of believing that it is possible to have 
"raw" experiences. 
5. The use of experience in feminist epistemology. 
I have claimed that it is possible to ground epistemology in the experiences of those who 
are at the margins while avoiding the criticisms that have been leveled against it. The type 
of experience that I have in mind is not completely captured by conceptual schemes, but it 
is not "raw" experience either. It is an experience that is meaningful from particular 
perspectives, in that it is invisible from others. The concept of experience that I am 
referring to is grounded in practices that need communities to sanction them. I have 
argued that it is possible to talk about epistemic communities without naturalizing the 
subjects, and that resisting the tendency to naturalization in our theorizing, includes 
avoiding essentialist and universalist claims. 
In my review of different types of epistemology I claimed that, according to feminist 
empiricism, women can contribute to science with a particular perspective that will allow 
them to see facts that are not salient to male scientists. I explained that feminist empiricism 
presupposes this perspective, without explaining why we should have it. Standpoint 
feminist epistemology explains how this particular perspective (standpoint) is acquired. 
The basis for the knowledge produced by women is that, given that they are involved in 
particular practices, they undergo certain experiences which allow them to have some 
knowledge that others cannot. 
In my discussion of standpoint epistemology, I argued that material differences produced 
differences in experiences, and that privileged knowledge is the product of margainality. In 
the previous secticn, I have supported feminist standpoint against the criticisms labeled 
against it from postmodernism. In chapter 2,1 also claimed that, in order to produce more 
objective knowledge, it is necessary to take into account the perspective of the different 
groups that are at the margins. I accepted the multiplication of subjugated knowledges, 
but insistcd that it is not possible to see from any other perspective, apar-t from our own 
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Those at tile maroins have a privileped perspective, which it is not possible to share unIcss 
one belongs to then- community. The knowledge that this perspective pi-c-ures for thern is 
based on particular experiences, so it becomes clear that unless I knower has underoone 
these, he cannot obtain that knowledge. 
I explained how those experiences are not raw, and how the belonging to those roups g 
communities is not "natural". Both collective identities and experiences are constructed III 
an interlocking process. I argued that part of the process of the articulation of those 
experiences consists in the gaining of a consciousness by the members of those groups. 
Equally, standpoint epistemology insisted that not all women developed a feminist 
standpoint. 
I will argue, in the rest of the chapter, that in order to be able to ground a feminist 
knowledge on the experiences of women, we have to show how experiences have a dual 
aspect. On the one hand there has to be a personal implication, because in order to have 
some types of knowledge is necessary to undergone certain experiences and therefore, it is 
also necessary to partake in particular practices, and on the other hand, I will insist on tile 
importance of commtIllities to be able to articulate the experiences and just4 tile 
practices. By linking the two aspects of experience together, we will be able to avoid tile 
recourse to "naive" experience as the basis Im- knowledgeý experiences will be had and 
reconstructed within communities, and tile 1111CLI1,10011 ofthosc will bc part ofthe process 
of the fiorniation ot'collective identities or communities 
the end result is that only women can produce women's knowledge, and that not all 
women can produce feminist knowled,, eý jjIst t1jose who have undergone a process of 
political awareness, I will first examine sorne of the examples of women's exPelle"ces that 
have been usecl 'n 1'e, 11-11- ifthey Ilulfill the iec7cssary characteristics to uround II Ist texts to see I 
1ý II ILI. St NVOInen 
feminist kno,, vledge, al)(i ýjt tile end ofthe ch, 'ipter, I will assess tile dain, th, t J 
who have a political awareness can produce women's knowledge. 
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In the following sections I will look at some of the examples of women's experien. ces that 
have been used in feminist texts. First I will argue, in (5.1), that, even if some of the uses 
that standpoint epistemologies made of evperience were not adequate for grounding a 
feminist epistemology, there are some aspects of the theory that are very valuable. I will 
argue that standpoint epistemology can use a concept of experience that encompasses both 
the personal and the communal aspects of experience, and also that their reliance on 
marginalized knowledge is central to any feminist epistemology. Then I will analyze other 
two alternatives. The first one (5.2) focuses on the personal aspect of experience, on the 
relation between the knower and the experience, and takes experiences to be qualia, and 
the second possibility underlines the social aspect of experience, and argues that it is 
possible to ground women's knowledge in women's lives (5.3). 
5.1 The use of experience in classic standpoint feminism. 
I will argue that there are three aspects of experience as taken by classic standpoint 
epistemology that are valuable: In the first place, I will argue on the importance of 
centering our inquiry on marginalized knowledge, by developing further the idea put 
forward in the previous sections, that oppressed subjects, due to their marginal status are 
aware of a disjunction between reality and our descriptions of the world. In the past, I 
have relied on the experiences of Delany to illustrate this point. Now, I will use the work 
of some feminists (5.1.1). Then I will explain a further element present in early standpoint 
epistemology but one that has been commonly overlooked, is that, by focusing on the role 
of communities as the site to develop particular knowledges, feminist standpoint 
epistemology can avoid the claim that it uses experience in a "naive" way (5.1.2). Finally, 
in (5.1.3) 1 will agree with feminist standpoint epistemology, that oppression triggers the 
development of alternative knowledge, but I will argue that it is not the experience of 
oppression the one that grounds this knowledge but rather that it is the involvement in 
particular practices that produces epistemic agents with particular characteristics. 
5.1.1 The gap between experiences an our conceptual systems. 
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It has been argued that it is desirable to include women in science on the basis that, by 
bringing their experiences into science, they will be able to create new theories, and that 
they will be more able to point to masculinist biases in theories. The same reasoning could 
be applied to any other kind of knowledge. I have already pointed out that it is necessai-y 
to explain how women can use their experiences to ground new knowledge, and I hinted 
that stanpoint epistemology can help us understand the process. In this section I will 
explain my claim in more detail. I will use examples taken from feminist texts that do not 
belong to standpoint epistemology, but which can be explained from such a perspective. 
Early feminism stressed that the experiences of women have too often became invisible 
and even distorted in the eyes of the males describing our common world. Charlotte 
Perkins Gilman offers a good example of it in her biographical novel, The Yellou, 
Wallpaper 31 . This work has been interpreted as a description of the feelings of a woman 
suffering from postnatal depression in a time in which postnatal depression was not 
diagnosed as such. The author tell us about her efforts to remain sane by resisting the 
traditional cure for it. The doctor (who is also her husband) rules that she has to be in bed 
without any distractions such as books, or even paper to write. She needs to read, write 
and talk to people, but all her needs, her desires, her intuitions about how to overcome the 
temporary depression were completely ignored. 
There are a few senses in which we can say that women's experiences did not fit with the 
conceptual system of the time. First, they experienced a cluster of "symptoms" that have 
been classified under the common name of post-natal depression before they were defined 
as such, and many of them felt that the prescribed cure was not adequate for their needs. I 
am not arguing that postnatal depression is a natural kind just waiting to be discovered, 
but rather, that there were women suffering from a cluster of symptoms for which an 
adequate description or cure was not given, and who would have suggested a different 
way of treating it if asked about their opinion. Post natal depression as an experience is 
not "raw", it is socially defined, and its scope changes with time, from a time in which it 
was not properly distinguished from other types of depression, to the present, in which 
31 There arc many editions of this Nvork, but J. Bates Dock's critical edition (cited in the bibliographý) 
is 
particularly useful. 
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many males are also being diagnosed as suffering from it. Nevertheless, the fact that its 
definition and treatment change does not mean that it did not have a short of existence 
before it was diagnosed at such, and that women suffering from it were aware of the fact 
that they were undergoing a process that was unlike any other "disease" that was 
recognized at the time. 
The second sense in which her experience did not fit with the common apprehension of 
reality was the frustration that she experienced when she was denied the possibility of 
doing those things that she felt were more adequate to help her out of that situation, the 
feeling of impotence when trying to confront or resist the well established ways of 
subordinating women (whatever the intentions of those in charge, who would claim that 
they were only trying to protect them). She felt that she knew what she needed, but her 
opinion was discounted as that of a person unable to take charge of her own life. She 
resisted the doctor's advice and devised ways of keeping herself busy, and realized that 
this was the proper way of getting over her state. Her opinion was not taken into account 
because she was not valued as an episternic agent. The sort of knowledge that she got, 
experiential, was considered to be inferior to the theoretical knowledge that the doctor 
had. 
If we compare Gilman's experiences with that of Delany, we can see that there are some 
factors in common. In the first place, both of them experienced particular situations in a 
way that did not fit their expectations, given that the conceptual systems that they were 
using were too limited. In the second place, they handled the situations that they were 
facing in a way that was not in the "script", in a novel way, and in both cases there is a 
resistance to the established ways. 
At the beginning of the section I claimed that standpoint epistemology could help us to 
understand how women can use their experiences to create new theories and to point out 
rnasculinist biases in current theories. The example used in this section has showed how 
the accepted treatment and description of postnatal depression in Gilman's time was 
challenged by the way in which the episode was lived by women. Because of the way in 
which society was organized, women's opinions on the matter were not taken into 
100 
account, so their experiences did not fit the accepted description of the world. According 
to standpoint epistemology, this disjunction is the first step to being able to produce 
alternative ways of perceiving the world. Note that it is just a first step. We cannot claim 
that Gilman was putting for-ward an alternative theory. 
Harstock claimed that, due to their particular place in society, women were able to 
apprehend the real nature of social relations, and because of it she has been accused of 
supporting the idea that women can experience the world as if it were "transparent", 
without acknowledging that all our experiences are mediated by our conceptual systemS32 . 
Nevertheless, we should not forget that according to Harstock, standpoints are acquired, 
which means that subjects do not "directly" experience alternative ways of conceptualizing 
the world, but rather, they are first aware that there is a disjunction between their accepted 
conceptual systems and the world as it is presented to them in their everyday lives, and 
then, by the means of belonging to a community, they make sense of their experiences. I 
will analyze this process in detain in the next section. 
5.1.2 The role of communities. 
In the previous examples, both Gilman and Delany have experiences that challenge the 
common descriptions of the world. The "content" of their experiences clashes with the 
expected content. But, in other occasions, the experience that feminists have described is 
more vague. It is similar to a feeling of alienation, or estrangement. They have talked 
about the feeling that there is a gap between the world as it is represented by most of the 
people around us and the way in which we perceive it. Instead of trying to challenge the 
common representation of the world, a usual response to this kind of feeling is that of 
personal inadequacy, so it is common when people feel that their view of reality does not 
33 "fit", to pretend that everything is OK (making a more or less conscious effort). 11 
The feeling that there are aspects of the world that are not captured by our current 
descriptions of it is something that people find difficult to communicate to others. But 
3 32 See S. Heckman (1997). 
33 This pretence can be maintained to a certain degree, but not complocly, because It nught surface M (fie 
form of out of character behavlours, such as the ones cited by B. Friedan In The Feminine. 1fi-stique. 
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even if it is not possible to tell others how it feels, there are other ways in which it is 
possible to express this inadequacy. An example of it is offered by N. Scheman who 
describes the process that Alice, a housewife who joins a consciousness-raising group, 
goes through. Before she joined it, she found her life satisfying, but there were certain 
aspects of it that she could not understand, and that make her feel guilty. When she joins 
the group, things begin to make sense, she is able to point out where those oddities lie, 
and why she is feeling what she is feeling. She just becomes "gradually more aware of 
those times when she felt depressed, or pressured and hurried, as though her time ivere 
not her own. However, she didn't believe her time ought to be her own, so in addition, she 
felt guilty. She would sometimes snap at her husband or children, or cry without quite 
knowing why(.. ) She didn't think she had any reason to feel this way; she never took the 
badJeelings as justified of reasonable. 04 Later on, she finds out that "the guilt and the 
depression are a response to and a cover for those other feelings, notably feelings of 
anger. Alice is urged to recognize her anger as legitimate and justifiable in this 
situation. 05 Before, Alice thought that nothing in her situation could account for her 
feeling of anger. Therefore, she would not call it anger, she would just feel unsatisfied and 
guilty. Scheman points out to what degree emotions depend on society. They are not 
merely inner states of persons and that "what is Primarily keeping us as women ftom 
acknowledging our anger is an inability to interpret our feelings and behavior in the 
proper political perspective. 06 When Alice finds herself in the appropriate political 
environment, ther, she becomes able to see how angry she was feeling, and how 
appropriate her feelings were. 
It is important to notice that the group of women is the right environment because "In the 
group, women she has grown to know and to like confess to similarfeelings. , 37 Women 
have had the same experiences, have had the same feelings, and have experienced the 
inadequacy of our concepts for expressing it. They recognize that we must challenge the 
accepted use of anger if it is going to be useful for expressing how those women were 
feeling. This validation of the conceptual change can only be done within a group, which 0 
'4 N. Schcman (1993), p 25. 
,sN. Schcman (1993), p25. 
ý6 N. Schcman (1993). p25. 
37 N. Schcman (1993). p29. 
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provides us the reassurance tliat a single person lacks when she has to confront her 
"inadequate" feehns with the insufficient vocabulary with which we classify our feeliný(s 
and behaviours 
I have tried to show, in the light of Schenian's , vork, how tile feeling that therc 'is a gap 
between the world and our own experiences can be productive If It is approachcd w, t)IM "I 
sympathetic community, It can help us to validate the feeling that we get, of seeing tile 
world from another angle, and assure us that we are seeing things that outsiders to tile 
group cannot access. It is clear now that the type of experiences that are being referred to 
are not "raw" or unmediated. Alice's experiences were mediated by an inadequate 
conceptual system, and that is precisely why she felt that she did not "fit". Therefore, her 
response to her environment was one of frustration, of anger, and she felt that her feelln0s 
where inadequate. The belonging to a group of women persuaded her that anger was tile 
appropriate response, and that the concept "anger" had to be enlarged to account for what 
she was experiencing. The articulation of Alice's feelings is not comparable to the naming 
of a "private" feeling, but rather, an example of the way in which communities lielp to 
make sense of the world as it is lived by their members, Alice's experiences combine 
clearly the two elements that I considered valuable in experience as the basis of new 
knowledgei they have an element of personal involvement, and they are articulated within 
a community, 
I want to brjn,, -, 1 attelItIC)II to 111ý' pl-eVIOUS (IISCLIS"On Of experience and 
the niakin, - of 
collective identities. Alice's material cli-cumsuinces were Oared witli a nunihei of'otheis. 
This is the basis for their experience., I, lle I-01-111,11joil ()f Nvomen as a political collect, \, c 
identity is -loscly linked %vith the cvaltiation/naining Of the exl)el-lcllccs t1lat "I'le" "'c' c 
having. Equally, those experiences were partly shaped by the political process 
5.1.3 Marginalization (is the basis for privileged A, iowledge. 
I have been arguing that jjajizýjt oil 11lows episteillic agents to occupy I privilcoed 
perspective because it allow tficin to sellse between concepts and the world as it is 
hved by them, which makes ilicin mole Critical alld ", -SO Pl'ovidc"ý t1l", \Vftll tile 
b"Isis 1,01, 
I 0i 
new knowledge. This might look like a contradiction with my arguments in section 4, 
where I claimed that oppression was not adequate as the basis of feminist epistemology. I 
said that the experience of oppression lacks any epistemological content that can be useful 
for grounding new knowledge, and that, given that there are many axes of oppression, 
most social actors can be said to be oppressed in one way or another and therefore, to be 
privileged epistemic agents. 
I will solve the apparent contradiction by claiming that, even if the feeling of oppression in 
itself is not the basis of privileged knowledge, oppression and marginalization are at the 
basis of experiences, practices and alliances that provide knowers with epistemological 
advantages. 
I have already claimed that one of the reasons why the point of view of the oppressed is 
valuable is because of its critical edge. It provides the knowers with a feeling of 
inadequacy between practices and discourses that can produce a change in the 
representation of the world. It is this context in which feminist standpoint epistemology 
claims that there are certain groups that have a privileged epistemic position. But there are 
also alternative contents that only those who belong to particular groups can access, 
given that some of the experiences that ground knowledge are the product of special 
practices in the lives of particular groups. Those practices are sanctioned and justified 
within those groups, and this implies that standpoints are acquired as part of a process of 
belonging to groups, having particular experiences and making sense of them in the 
community. 
As brief summary of section 5.1,1 would say that it is possible to argue on the line of 
standpoint epistemology, that women's experiences can be the basis of a privileged 
knowledge, and that those experiences are not natural kinds, so they are not there just 
waiting to be "perceived". Women can perceivo aspects of reality that make them realize 
that our common conceptual system is limited, and some of the practices in which women 
are involved are the basis for alternative knowledge claims. Those experiences are not 0 
raw. They do not offer a direct access to the world, but rather, they need to be made sense 
of within a community. Those experiences are not due to biology or are taken to be 
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C( natural", they are experienced by constructed subjects, and they are themselves also 
mediated by practices and discourses. I think that it has been made sufficlentlý, clear how 
the personal and the communal aspects of experience link together in standpoint 
epistemology. This will be even more obvious when I explain some other alternative uses 
of experience that will illustrate purely "personal" or "social" ways of conceptualizing 
experience. 
5.2. Experiences as qualia. 
There is a second interpretation of experiences as the ground of knowledge, and it 
amounts to the claim that those experiences are due to the fact that women can have first 
person knowledge of certain events, which is unavailable from other points of view. 
Among those experiences, we can mention those of giving birth to a child, premenstrual 
syndrome, and menopause. Given that, traditionally, the experiences of women have not 
been taken into account when approaching those issues from a medical perspective, it is 
legitimate to argue that, if we want to understand all those phenomena properly, we 
should include the insight that women could offer into them. Obviously, this analysis is 
very close to the one that I made in the previous section, where I argued for the existence 
of those experiences. Nevertheless, there are different ways of characterizing those 
experiences, and some of those support the view that those experiences are "qualia", a 
view that I want to oppose. 
Therefore, there are at least two different ways of characterizing this type of first person 
experience. The first one is by focusing on its qualitative character, and the second one 
underlines its perspectival character. To underline the qualitative character of experience 
implies that there is a certain content that is neither accessible nor apprehensible from a 
third person perspective. This means not just that those undergoing certain experiences, 
whatever those experiences are, have an insider information that is not available otherwise, 
but also, that the knower has a privileged and uncontestable knowledge. Subjects have an 
unmediated access to their experiences and they have authority over their content, 
because, given that they are the only ones capable of accessing them, their testimony 
cannot be challenged. I will ar(gue that we cannot use this type of experience to ground II 
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collective knowledge, because given its necessarily private character, it is not possible to 
claim that women have common experiences 
I will, instead, favour the characterization of those experiences as bearing perspecti%, al 
knowledge. This will allow us to argue that women can apprehend aspects of the world 
that remain opaque to those who do not belong to this particular epistemic group, but also 
that those experiences are not private, nor that individuals have an uncontestable authority 
about their content. In the next chapter I offer arguments to support perspectival 
knowledge (I will also argue in detail against a position supported by some feminist 
philosophers who have argued that perspectival knowledge consists in the apprehension of 
subjective facts. )"' 
In the next chapter, I will argue in detail that the use of qualia is highly problematic. I have 
argued for a concept of experience that is closely linked to the belonging to particular 
communities and practices. I have remarked that even if those experiences have to be 
acquired practically, i. e., by being a participant, and this implies a personal implication in 
the acquisition of knowledge, this does not amount to saying that they are private in the 
sense which is inevitably linked with "qualia". By using qualia as the basis of feminist 
knowledge, we are open to the criticisms labeled by Scott: experiences became raw 
private, and dangerously close to being the product of essential beings. 
5.3 Women's Lives. 
As I showed at the beginning of this chapter, taking experience as foundational for 
knowledge encounters many difficulties. I have suggested that, if we avoid taking 
women's experiences as qualia and we take on board the criticisms that postmodernism 
has made of some uses of experience, then, by arguing for the collective nature of 
experience, we can make productive use of experience as the basis for knowledge. I have 
claimed that experiences have to be articulated by communities, and that they are based on 
practices. This concept of experience, as grounded in communities, is very different from a 
more classic one that takes experience to be an unmediated content in the mind of an 
L. Alcoffand V. Dahnk, a (1993). 
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individual knower, the basis ofelassic epistemology. ']'he grounds Im- know1cdoe Illat 1 1111 
arguing for are diffierent from those of the fioundational episteniologdsts. My concel)t of' 
experience is also different from those who do not pay enough attention to the personal 
implication in the apprehension ofknowled, -e. 
Some theorists have argued that we should begin our research from tile lives of' wornell, 
instead of searching for particular experiences as the grounds of knowledge. Given that 
my definition of experience takes into account practices, it looks like if this will be a 
congenial move to make. There are two main ways in which this has been argued forý III 
the first part of the section, I will refer to the work of L. Stanley, who has offered all 
example of how a particular writer can use her own life as the source or knowledge 11or 
her theories (5.3.1). In the second part of this section I will put forward the work of' 
Harding who argues for using the lives of women and other marginalized groups as tile 
origin for feminist research (5-33.2). In the last part of this section I will put forward some 
difficulties for this theory(5.3,3). 
5.3.1 Liz Stanley argues that the source of feminist knowledge is women's lives. There are 
different ways of interpreting this claim within her work, but I will focus here on the one 
that she develops in her article "The knowing because experiencing subject"'9She kept a 
research diary to record her thoughts and feelings during her mother's illness and use It as 
a way of criticizing certain theories on autobiography defended by postmodernist thinkers 
and also as a vehicle to reflect aboLit the nature of the self. Her attempt is interesting 
because it sliows how a feminist wornan critically approaches lier own fifie and uses her 
conclusions as a source of evidence against otlier f'eniinist theories. This is a process that 
only a woman with knowledge of feminist theories Could accomplish. I remark- LJJ)011 the 
importance of this point because, being a wonian it is necessary, but not suflicicrit, for 
producing this kind of knowledge. What is needed in order to produce this kind of' 
knowledge is to be a woman, with an awareness, of' certain theoretical issues, looking at 
her own life in order to test the theories or to look for the answers, The I-eSLjltS 01' this 
search have to be open to criticisms and dialogue froin other positions, that is, tliev have 
to be made public. III a sense, thi's use of experience is similar to the one that I liave 
ý' L. Stanicv' (1994). 
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pointed out before, when talking about the experiences of women who suffered from 
postnatal depression, but with the difference that L. Stanley is in command of the 
theoretical apparatus that would allow her to interpret her experiences within a particular 
framework. In this sense, her experiences are more mediated by discourses than those of 
other women. But those other experiences have to be justified and sactioned to the same 
degree, within a larger community. This use of women's lives as the grounds of 
knowledge, is very close to the concept of experience that I support. It has elements of 
personal involvement (L. Stanley is talking about her own life) and of the articulation of 
those experiences within a larger community. 
5.3.2. Harding argues that the source of feminist knowledge should be the lives of 
marginalized people. There are two possibilities within this option: (i) It does not seem 
necessary to say that you must be a member of those groups to produce knowledge from 
other people's lives. We can ground our knowledge on their lives without getting involved 
in their lives. (ii) It is necessary to belong to a determinate group in order to produce 
knowledge. 
It is important to notice that the type of knowledge that Harding aims to develop is a 
highly reflective type of knowledge that does not amount to a description of the lives of 
others from "nowhere". Her interest in using the lives of others as the grounds for 
in a more objective view of reality. I will offer a knowledge is part of a process to obta. 
detailed account of this aspect of Harding's theory in chapter 7, where I will also argue in 
detail why I do not agree with possibility (i). For now I will just offer some examples to 
illustrate my position 
5.3.3 1 believe that possibility (i) does not pay enough attention to the personal 
involvement that is necessary in order to access certain types of knowledge. Getting 
involved in the lives of others is the only way of acquiring such knowledge. Talking to 
others is inadequate for capturing those experiences that are so episternically valuable, as 
well as being a delicate process. The work of A. Sellers illustrates those difficulties. She is 
a feminist philosopher who used to believe that having her own point of view, and getting 
engaged in a dialogue with others that belong to different groups, was a good starting 
Ws 
point for evaluating her feminist theories and for obtaining a more objective knowledge. In Z- 
the course of a visit to India, it became apparent to her that the project was more difficult 
to achieve than she thought, which drove her to the conclusion that it is not possible to 
engage in those sort of dialogues between systems of thought. She discovered that: having 
a dialogue of the sort that she was aiming for is only possible between those who share a 
way of living, and that getting engaged in other people's ways of life is something that 
implies existing power relations. This implies that it is not possible to have a usable 
knowledge of the lives of others unless you engage in their ways of living. 
Even if we are willing to engage in the ways of living of others, the knowledge that we can 
acquire is limited. P. Hill-CollinS40 makes clear that material circumstances limit the 
experiences that we can have. As I explained in the previous chapter, she claims that it is 
necessary to be a black woman in order to produce black feminist knowledge. The 
experiences of black women ground knowledge when they are articulated into discourses, 
and this is why she underlines the importance of the black feminist scholars in the 
production of black feminist knowledge. Scholars are skilled in the use of the discourse of 
the "ruling" class, and are able to interpret the findings of the black women's community, 
whose members are not able to articulate their own knowledge in a traditionally accepted 
way (in a propositional way, for instance). Nevertheless, it is important to notice that the 
scholars belong to the group whose experiences they are making sense of The perspective 
of outsid, ýrs is useful, but their knowledge is not comparable to those who are engaged in 
the practices and that belong to the communities. 
In summary, I will say that, due to the practical nature of certain knowledges, it is not 
possible to capture them merely by engaging in conversations, or by observing the lives of 
others. It is necessary to share the practices in order to acquire the knowledge. Given that, 
in order to engage in practices it is necessary to belong, to particular communities, and that 
the belonging is sometimes precluded by material circumstances, the knowledge that an 
outsider can acquire is different from the one acquired by the "members" of the 
community. Given the composite nature of the concept of experience that I support, it 
makes sense to argue that women's lives are a SOUFce of feminist knowledge, because it 
40 P. Hill-Collins (1990). 
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supports the idea that experience is not taken to be a direct access to the world, that it is 
not raw, and that it is only meaningful within epistemic communities and in reference to 
practices. Nevertheless, it is important to realize that even if merely getting into dialogue 
with others or observing their practices, it is possible to acquire some knowledge. Other 
types of knowledge cannot be apprehended unless there is a direct personal involvement in 
the practices. The insistence on this personal aspect of knowledge is due to the fact that I 
want to revalue types of knowledge that are practical, and which cannot be expressed 
propositionally. This is part of a general project of reconceptualizing what should count as 
knowledge and who should count as reliable epistemic agents. 
6. Introducing Practical Knowledge. 
In the last section of the chapter I have insisted on the composite nature of experience, and 
have claimed that a personal involvement in communal practices is necessary to acquire 
certain types of knowledge. I have also claimed that this move will allow me to reevaluate 
practical knowledge and to review the ways of evaluating who is a reliable epistemic 
agent. In this section I will signal why this project is congenial to feminism. 
L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya assert that "modern epistemology hasforgotten the lessonftom 
Aristotle that knowledge can come in two forms: propositional and practical , 
41 
According to their description of epistemology, the only sort of knowledge that has been 
considered knowledge is the one that can be expressed in a propositional form, and they 
think that this is the reason why traditional women's knowledge has not been taken to be 
knowledge. This sort of knowledge is obtained by observation and practice, of which 
soothing a newborn baby or baking an omelet are examples. 
Those are things that you cannot learn in books, and that cannot be completely recounted 
in a propositional form. The acquisition of those types of knowiig how are 
inseparable 
from practice, the knower must do them herself in order to learn how to do them and also 
in order to be attributed knowledge of how to do them. As well as 
being acquired in a 
practical way, the acquisition necessitates the apprehension of practices, the understanding 
41 L Alcoff and V. DaInuva (1993), p 220. 
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of the communal dimension of the knowledge. For instance, when I learn how to make an 
omelet, I do acquire certain skills that allow me to whisk the eggs properly, recognize 
when the oil is hot enough to cook the omelet, etc ... some of those skills are physical 
(learning how to make certain movements), other are recognitional, and others are to do 
with knowing what counts as making an omelet properly. The normative dimensions of 
practical knowledge are constitutive of the acquisition of it and consist in being able to 
apprehend a practice. Neither the acquisition of the skills nor the apprehension of the 
practice, are types of knowledge that can be reduced to the learning of propositions. By 
redefining knowledge to include practical knowledge, and by showing how the normative 
dimension of knowledge is apprehensible only by getting involved in practices, I will be 
changing the perception of what counts both as knowledge and as reliable knowers, 
opening up a space for women as reliable knowers. 
7. Practical Knowledge and the acquisition of a political consciousness. 
In this chapter I have argued that women's experiences can be the basis for feminist 
knowledge. In order to show that they are not raw experiences, I have underlined the need 
of a social community to help in making sense of them, and in order to support the claim 
that only women can produce feminist knowledge, I have suggested that, in the production 
of knowledge, there is a personal element that cannot be captured unless the knower has 
undergone certain experiences. I have used examples of experiential knowledge to support 
the production of feminist knowledge. 
In the previous section, I have given examples of practical knowledge, and I have 
indicated that I will revalue practical knowledge in order to be able to open a space for 
women as reliable knowers, and I have also maintained that this is a feminist task. 
Nevertheless, it is still undecided if the practical knowledge acquired by women can 
ground feminist knowledge in the same way in which experiential knowledge does. 
have claimed that women can experienCe that there is a gap between the world as it is 
experienced by thern, and our conceptual system, and this experiential knowledge could be 
the basis fior the development of alternatives. Their experiential knowledge provides thern I 
with a negative, critical edge, and with a positive, creative one, that enable them to put 
forward of alternative theories. I also maintained that women have to develop a 
consciousness as members of a community of women in order to produce feminist 
knowledge. Are these characteristics present in practical knowledge?. 
If they are not present in practical knowledge, then I could conclude that practical 
knowledge cannot ground feminist knowledge, but that its revaluation can advance the 
position of women as epistemic agents. Nevertheless, in the next chapter, I will support a 
different conclusion. I will show how practical knowledge, as well as advancing the 
position of women as epistemic agents in a general way, can be the basis of feminist 
knowledge in the same way as experiential knowledge can. 
8. Conclusion 
In chapter 21 argued that later forms of standpoint epistemology, which were influenced 
by postmodern and empiricist feminist epistemology were valuable epistemological 
theories that could overcome the criticisms that were leveled against them. In this chapter 
I have argued that it is possible to use the experiences of marginalised groups to ground 
knowledge without naturalizing the subject belonging to those groups, and without falling 
into essentialism or universalism. I have argued for a concept of group identity that is 
based in coalition, and that does not erase difference. Experiences are not the unifying 
basis for group identity but, rather, are explained and expressed within the group, partly 
constructed by the group and partly challenging the criteria for belonging to the groups. 
The epistemic value of the experiences of those that are in the margin is twofold. On the 
one hand it allows knowers to be critical of the current conceptual systems and, on the 
other hand, it opens up interesting alternative ways of representing the world. The 
revaluation of women's knowledge will allow us to have a critical view of theories that 
have an androcentric bias and also to develop alternatives. In the final sections of the 
chapter I have supported standpoint epistemology as a theory that 
helps us articulate 
women's experiences. I argued that standpoint epistemology can ground a composite 
account of experience that gives equal weight to personal involvement in the production of 
knowledgc and to the role of communities. 
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In chapter II explained that there was a symbolic identification of the feminine with 
particular types of knowledge that were consequently undervalued. I will argue that 
practical knowledge is at the core of any epistemological project, because it is the 
engagement with the world that allows us to develop our knowledge further, because 
there are aspects of the world that cannot be apprehended otherwise, and because the 
normative dimension of knowledge is apprehended by being involved in practices. So the 
implications of my above defense of standpoint epistemology are the following: first, it will 
allow us to give a better status to marginalized epistemic agents; and second, it will entail 
the redefinition of knowledge in general, and, therefore, it will change the conceptual 
implications of gender, knowledge and normativity (and therefore, also of rationality). 
I 1) 
CHAPTER 4 
0. Introduction. 
At the end of the previous chapter I indicated that propositional knov"Iedge is the current 
paradigm of knowledge. My aim is to reevaluate practical and experiential knowledge and 
to show how both can ground episternically privileged knowledge. In order to support 
their epistemic value, I will show how they are irreducible to propositional (and 
theoretical) types of knowledge. Given my support of practical knowledge, I will reveal 
the importance of practices in the acquisition and justification of knowledge, therefore 
showing how they underlie the normative aspect of knowledge. In chapter 51 will explain 
the way in which normativity is present in practical knowledge, and in chapter 61 will 
explain how this influences our concept of rationality. Therefore, the conclusions that I 
will reach at the end of this chapter will have an important bearing on the rest of the thesis 
I have already explained how, in our epistemological tradition, there has been a symbolic 
identification of the female with particular types of concepts that were in opposition to the 
more valuable, masculine ones. The symbolic identification of women with less rational 
and less valuable types of knowledge has had a reflection on the way in which women as 
cognitive agents have actually been treated. As E. Anderson claims, "Western societies 
have labelled this kind of knoit, ledge (inipersonal theoretical and scientific lalolvledge) 
it masculine " andprevented ivonienftoni acquiring andproducing it, often on the pretext 
that it ivould divert their vital energies ftoin their natural reproductliv labour 
(Hubbard1990; Schiebinger 1989) "' In a clear intermingling of what it is symbolically 
feminine and what women are actuall capable of doing, philosophers and scientists, alike, y Z. ) 
have made a distinction between masculine and fenunine ways of knowing. Women are 
identified with practical knowledge and men with theoretical knowledge. As I underlined 
in chapter 1, the ideal of objective knowledge that has been pervasive in epistemology has Z: -) 
been that of a detached knowledge that fits better an ideal theoretical knowledge than 
practical knowledgle. There are several consequences that follow from that distinction- 
E. Andcrson (199). P5O. 
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a) Our epistemology privileges the type of knowledge that can be expressed in 
propositions. Theoretical knowledge is privileged over practical knowledge, which is 
marginalized, partly because it cannot be expressed propositionally. There -s a \,, ery clear 
tendency to reduce practical knowledge to propositional knowledge in order to give some 
epistemic legitimacy to it. 
b) Given that propositional knowledge is favoured, the important role that of other types 
of knowledge and contents play in the rational explanation of our actions has been 
forgotten. I will argue that the model of rationality that follows from an exclusive use of 
propositional knowledge is less complete than an alternative model that includes different 
types of knowledge. 
c) The practical knowledge acquired by different groups, such as women, has been 
ignored when theories have been postulated. This links with my assertion, in the previous 
chapter, that the experiences of women have been largely ignored in our cultural and 
scientific tradition. 
d) Given the gap between the symbolic organisation of our concepts and its real 
implications, women have often been considered inferior epistemic agents, unable to 
engage in proper epistemological pursuits, and those types of knowledge that they have 
traditionally acquired and changed have been marginalized. 
At the end of the previous chapter, I referred to the work of Alcoff and Dalmiya who 
claim that modern epistemology has forgotten the lessons present in Aristotles's work that 
2 knowledge can come in two forms; propositional and practical. and, therefore, only those I 
types of knowledge that can be constrained into the "S knows that p" formula are 
considered to be epistemically important. A clear implication is that traditional women's 
knowledge has been excluded because it is a knowledge that is mainly based on practices 
that cannot necessarily be put into a propositional form. An example of this 
maramalization is the exclusion of midwifery in the western world in favour of a medical 
approach, which is explained as "a friumph of proposlitoi,,. 71 knoit, ledge oi)er practical 
knoit Iet4ix-3. Midwives \vere replaced by doctors because they were considered to be 
ignOFant oriven that their knowledge was not codified or written into books but, rather, it 0 1-. -) 
L. AlcolT. end \'. 1)almiva (19)_; ), 1) 220. 
3 L. Alcof and V. D, ºImiya (199, ), p22_,. 
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was based on practical experience. But the decisive fact for the marginalization of 
midwives was not that their knowledge was not codified but, rather, the fact that it could 
not be codified, so the problemiS "170t so much the contingent one that 101owledge of 
midwives wasnOt recorded in books but that it could not be. Midývifery as a skill was not 
and could not be a matter offollowing rules codified in conditionalprOPOSitiOnS. Jýyle 
has persuasively argued that to reduce skills to a two-step process of apprehending rules 
and criteria and then acting in accordance with them ends in infinite regress or a vicious 
circle . 
))4 1 will be arguing in this chapter that the fact that midwives did not have 
propositional knowledge of their trade does not amount to the fact that they did not have 
knowledge at all. In actual fact they might have more reliable knowledge than doctors, 
even if it was acquired differently. 
In the previous chapter, I developed a concept of experience that avoided the criticism of 
postmodernism. I argued that women's experiences, due to particular practices, will allow 
us to ground knowledge that could not be acquired otherwise. In this chapter I will 
challenge the current tendencies in epistemology that diminishes experiential and practical 
knowledge and tries to reduce it to propositional knowledge that fits better in "theories". I 
want to obtain a more comprehensive definition of knowledge that includes forms of 
knowledge that have been marginalized. My aim is twofold: in the first place, I want to 
change our epistemological structures; and in the second place, I want to challenge the 
conceptual implications that practical knowledge has, mainly because being identified with 
feminine ways of knowledge, its revaluation will allow us to change the place of women as 
knowers, and also because it will allow us to give more epistemic value to the knowledge 
of groups that have been marginalized. 
In the next section I will argue that it is not possible to reduce all practical knowledge to a 
propositional form and that, if we want to have a usable concept of knowledge, we have 
to acknowledge that there are different types of knowledge that are irreducib! e to one Z- 
another and are all equally valuable. 
L. AIcoffannd V. Dalnniva (199_, ), p 224. 
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1. Reductive moves: knowing that as the paradiam of knowledge tn tn 
In the introduction to the chapter I explained how, in our tradition, practical and 
experiential knowledge has been excluded from our definition of knowledge. Practical 
knowledge has been opposed to theoretical knowledge and considered a minor form of 
knowledge, and has been symbolically linked to the feminine. Consequently, women have 
been considered to be lesser epistemic agents, not as well endowed as males to pursue 
theoretical knowledge. By implication, when traditional women's practices were put to the 
test of theory and there were disagreements, the theory was supported and the practice 
considered unscientific. In epistemology, any kind of knowledge worth the name has to 
submit to the model of theoretical knowledge, whose best representative is the knowing- 
that form. I will be looking at some of the arguments that have been produced to support 
the idea that practical knowledge can be reduced to a knowing-that form. 
In this section I will analyse two different types of reductionist arguments that appear in 
the work of P. Snowdon, whose main set of arguments are directed towards proving that 
practical knowledge, of the knowing-how type do not involve the possessing of an ability 
or capacity, and therefore, it is possible to reduce knowing how to knowing that. He 
argues that having the ability is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to know how 
to do x. In 1.1 1 will explore the different ways in which he uses the expression "practical 
knowledge", in order to ground my argument that his reduction does not work in all cases. 
In 1.2,1 will examine the examples that he uses to support his claim that having an ability 
is neither sufficient nor necessary in order to attribute practical knowledge. I will argue 
that his arguments are insufficient to support his thesis and, in 1.3,1 will analyse a second 
set of arguments that he uses to support his reduction and that can be summarised as: 
within any type of knowledge, the cognitive burden falls into its propositional content. I 
will introduce some general criticisms in section 1.3. against this type of argument, but my 
n1ain arguments will be developed in section 2. 
1.1 Three uses of "practical knowledge" 
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Paul Snowdon challenges the distinction between knowing-how and knoxving-that by 
arguing against what he calls "the standard view" on the subject. One of the central theses 
of this standard view is what he calls the capacity thesis- "Knoiving holl, to G (.. ) con-, ýIsf 
in being able to G, in having the capacity to G. Knoit, ing hoit- is a matter of possessing 
the ability oi, capacity to do the action specified". Paul Snowdon does not agree with that 
thesis. He claims that knowing-how is 'practical knowledge' but that this does not imply 
that knowing-how consists in the presence of a practical ability. 
If he is correct and knowing-how is not a practical ability then what does it consist in? 
Following Snowdon, knowing how to do x, i. e. having practical knowledge of x, consists 
in having knowledge of a practice. That is to say, consists in being able to give a detailed 
description of the actions that an agent should perform in order to do x. So, if I want to 
learn how to swim, I will get an instructor who could give me the pertinent instructions 
and I will put them into practice. The instructor could give me a list of propositions to this 
effect and this will count as him having practical knowledge on the subject of how to 
swim. He does not need to swim himself to prove that he has practical knowledge on the 
subject. I will express this use of the expression 'practical knowledge' in the following 
way6: 
(1) We will attribute practical knowledge -knowledge of how to do x- to a subject on the 
basis of his description (which includes propositions and also gestures) of the actions that 
we have to perform in order to do x. 
Is this the only sense of 'practical knowledge'? I think that it is not. A person knows how 
to swim if he swims, even if he is not able to give a description of the actions that he 
performs when he swims, he has practical knowledge of swimming. There is a second way 
in which 'practical knowledge'can be used: 
5 P. Snowdon (199-5), p 2. 
6 This distinctions are based on E. Craig (1990), section XVII. 
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(2) We will attribute practical knowledge- knowledge of how to do x- to a subject ývhen 
he performs x or has performed x, even if he cannot/does not give a description of his 
actions. 
I can also think of a third case which combines (1) and (2). There are people who s%\-im 
and who can also explain how they do it. They have practical knowledge in the two senses 
that we have accepted already 
(3) We will attribute practical knowledge- knowledge of how to do x- to a subject who 
does/has done x and also gives a description of his actions. 
Having distinguished three different uses of "practical knowledge", I come back to discuss 
Snowdon's proposal. He gives several examples to prove that having the capacity/ability to 
do x is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition to know how to do x, i. e., in order to 
have practical knowledge. On the one hand, his strategy works because we can use 
practical knowledge or knowing how in sense (1) which does not imply that the knower 
can put his knowledge into practice. But on the other hand knowing how is often used to 
express (2) and (3), that the knower puts his knowledge into practice or that his 
knowledge is his practice and, therefore, he must have the capacity and the ability to do x. 
In a number of occasions all that having practical knowledge of x or knowing how to do x 
means is that the knower has done x successffilly(2). So when we use knowing how in its 
second sense the doing/having done x is both a necessary and a sufficient condition to 
claim that someone knows how to do x. Given that Snowdon is only correct when we 
refer to the first use of knowing-how, it is necessary to determine what is the scope of this 
use in order to decide if it is paradigmatic in explaining the nature of knowing-how. 
In order to prove that it is not 17ecessary or sufficiew to have the capacity to x for 
'knowing-how' to x. I will discuss some of the examples that Snowdon gives to illustrate 
his claims. 
1.2 Is having the ability/capacity to do xa necessary or/and sufficient condition to tn' 
do x? 
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1.2.1) It is not necessary because there are instances of knoxvinga-hovv in w1ilch you can Z- 
give a description of how to do the action but you are not able to do it, therefore you 
know how to do it but do not have the capacity to do it. 
"Raymond Blanc, the world's greatest chef knows how to make and excellent omelette. 
he lost his arms in a car accident; he retains his knowledge how to make omelettes, but is 
no longer able to make them"' 
1.2.2)To show that it is not sufficient to have the capacity in order to know how to do 
something, he uses the following example: 
"Compare Pollini and me as trill performers. The truth is that I know as much as anyone 
about baroque trills; I certainly know how to perform them. So of course does Pollini. 
Ihe difference is that as a result ofpractice he can perform them; I alas cannot' '' 
(I-Z I) Is having the capacitylability to do xa necessary condition in order to know 
how to do x? 
I will argue against Snowdon, that having the capacity to do x is a necessary condition in 
order to know how to do x, at least in senses (2) and (3). It is not a necessary condition in 
sense (1) but, as I wil', also try to prove, this sense is not paradigmatic of knowing how. 
I want to introduce the distinction between having the capacity and having the ability. The 
capacity to make an omelette is prior to the ability to do it. In the example of making 
omelettes, this capacity consists in having a body able enough to perform certain actions 
(grabbing saucepans and eggs, for instance). Without some requirements such as the ones 
described, without those capacities, the chef in the example would not have been able to 
learn how to make good omelettes. He would not have acquired the ability which he 
possess now. Once this distinction is made I will introduce some variations in the example 
7 P. Snowdon (1995). p10- 
8 P. Snowdon (1995). p10 
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put forward by Snowdon, which will illustrate the importance of distinguishing between 
abilities and capacities: 
Both Raymond Blanc and his brother Mark have or have had the capacity to cook an 
omelette. They also have practical knowledge(l) about it, which we attribute to them on 
the same basis: they can give instructions to others on how to cook omelettes. They have 
practical knowledge of how to cook omelette in sense (1) and therefore, in this restricted 
sense, they know how to cook an omelette. But Raymond Blanc has had the ability to 
cook omelettes and Mark has never had it. I will attempt to prove that lacking this ability 
means that he lacks some practical knowledge that Raymond has. 
First of all it is important to explain how Raymond Blanc acquired his ability. We can tell 
the history of the way in which he did. We can imagine that both Raymond and Mark 
learned together how to do it. First they read the instructions in a cookery book, and then 
went to college and observed a chef cooking omelettes. Up to this point their learning 
process is exactly the same. But then Raymond, being more adventurous, tried to cook an 
omelette being corrected in the process by the master chef We can admit that all this was 
witnessed by Mark. We can say that Raymond knows how to cook an omelette, because 
he has done it properly and this is something that we cannot say about Mark. There is a 
sense (2) in which Raymond can be attributed a practical knowledge that Mark lacks. If 
Mark tries to cook an omelette he will not do it as well as Raymond does because he has 
not trained himself to do it. It is very likely that he will cook a shapeless omelette. 
Raymond has an ability which Mark has not c,, ot. I 
In the past Raymond knew how to cook and omelette and he could demonstrate it by 
giving a verbal description of his actions and also by doing it, therefore he could be 
attributed to know how to cook an omelette in the three senses mentioned above, even if 
now he can only show his mastery in sense (1). Mark knows how to describe tile Crocess 
of cooking an omelette, knowing-how in sense (1). Having accepted that Raymond has an 
ability that Mark lacks, does this imply that there is a difference in their knowled! Dýe of how 
to cook an omelette? According to Snowdon, there is no difference, because we can say of 
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both of them that they know how to cook an omelette, but I think that there is a 
difference. I will drawn on another example to explain why. 
Let's imagine that A is a professional pilot who has flown thousands of hours and who 
knows all the theory about flying. He is unable to fly now because he has lost his arms in a 
car accident. He is thinking of getting some prosthetic arms so he could go back to his old 
career. B knows all the theory about how to fly a plane, but has never done it himself 
A and B have both the capacity to fly a plane, even if A has lost it for a certain time, and 
both have the practical knowledge (1), but A is the only one with the necessary ability to 
do it. So, on the one hand, and even if they know-how to fly a plane in sense (1), 1 think 
that it would be wrong to say that B really knows how to fly a plane, and I would not 
want him to pilot the one in which I am going to be travelling. On the other hand, I will 
accept that A knows how to do it, even if he cannot do it right now. The attribution of 
knowing how to fly a plane cannot be done just on the basis of being able to give a 
description of it. We ask for hands-on experience when we are going to attribute that type 
of expertise to others. In the previous example, we could feel inclined to affirm that both 
Raymond and Mark know how to make an omelette because, after all, if Mark cooks a 
shapeless omelette there is not too much at stake, but when the attribution of knowledge 
can have more serious consequences, the criterion of attribution is restricted to those who 
have acquired certain abilities. 
Snowdon's argument was based on a reductive move, so it makes sense to question 
whether the acquisition of those abilities implies that A has some extra knowledge that B 
lacks. I think that the answer is positive because, in the first place, pilot A actually knows 
how to fly a plane, while pilot B does not, which implies that A has some knowledge that 
B has not got. What is more, I even think that pilot A will be able to give a more detailed 
account of the process because he has had experiences that B has not had. Even if both 
have always flown together, so B has witnessed all the actions of A, it is only A who can 
explain why, in that particular difficult moment he reacted as he did, how he felt, how he 
overcame the fear. So pilot A will have more information of the knowing-that type than 
pilot B. Finally, we must also take into account that flying a plane involves movements 
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which become reflexes with practice, as in driving a car or playing an instrument, and 
which can only be acquired by performing an action repeatedly. Someone who has 
acquired the skill is better at recognising the skill in others than someone who does not 
possess it himself so, in this sense also, pilot A has more knowledge than pilot B. Finally, 
instructors that have the ability to do x can also show how to do x. This is an advantage 
because some people are able to learn something easily when they are shown how to do it. 
And indeed, it is the only way of learning some trades. Summarising, being able to 
describe how to fly a plane, does not amount to knowing how to fly one, and this would 
be made obvious if we had to choose between A or B as flight instructors, or as the pilots 
of a flight: we will always prefer the one that has the ability to do it over the one that can 
only give a description of the process. 
Traditionally, knowing-that has been considered the paradigm of knowledge, but in this 
section I have supported that knowing-how is irreducible to knowing-that, and also that it 
can be more valuable than knowing-that. In the examples that I have used I have mainly 
compared the knowledge of someone who knows how to describe an activity with 
someone who is able to give the description and also to take part in it, so I have been 
assessing knowing-how in sense (3) in relating to the two others. I have not yet considered 
the knower who is not able to give a description of his activity but who is able to do it. 
This possibility will be illustrated by the following example: we have an instructor with 
practical knowledge in sense (1) and another one with practical knowledge in sense (2). 
One will tell you how to do it, and the other will let you see how to do it, but will not be 
able to give you any verbal instructions. Which instructor should we prefer? I do not think 
that there is a standard answer in this case. It depends on what it is being learned and who 
is learning. There are some people, like myself, who, when they have to do a new routine 
in gymnastics, need to learn the propositional description of it in order to be able to 
reproduce it. This is because my visual memory is not good enough, but will a 
propositional description of it be enough it in order to show me how to do it? As I said 
before, I think this is to be decided case by case. There are some things that we can not 
learn just by sight, while there are others that we cannot learn just by their descriptions. In 
any case, an instructor with practical knowledge(3) will obviously be more useful than any 
of the others. Furthermore, I think that he will be so even if he cannot put his ability into 
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practice at this moment, as in the case of Raymond Blanc, because, as I have already 
argued, he will still retain some extra knowledge 
In summary, having the ability to do x provides the agent with knowledge which a person 
who lacks the ability cannot access. If he is able to put this infon-nation into words an 
agent with the ability to do x will be a better teacher than someone who lacks the ability 
because he will be able to pass more information to the subject. There are some things that 
can only be taught by showing others how to do them and in those cases, a person with 
the ability to do x is the only one who can teach us how to do x. There are other cases in 
which knowing how to do x can be attributed to someone who lacks the ability to do x. 
Therefore having the ability to do x is not necessary in order to know how to do x, but it 
is sufficient. In order to have the ability to do x, you must have the capacity to do it, but 
having the capacity does not imply that you have developed it. Therefore having the 
capacity is not sufficient to know how to do x, and it is necessary only in the cases which 
imply having the ability to do x. 
In relation to Snowdon's main argument, I agree that having the capacity to do something 
does not imply that you know how to do it. I have defended the view that having the 
capacity is necessary in order to develop the ability to do x and that having both, you 
know how to do x (sense 2 and 3). 1 have also agreed that having the capacity is not 
enough to attribute knowing how in those two senses, and it is not even necessary to 
attribute knowing how in sense (1). But I have tried to show now that sense 
(1) has very 
limited uses, and that it is the only sense for which having the capacity to 
do x is not 
necessary, and which does not imply having the ability. It is a correct use of 
knowing-how 
but, being so limited, it should not be taken as paradigmatic in the way in which 
Snowdon 
takes it. 
1.2.2) Is having the capacitylability a sufficient condition for attributing practical 
knowledge? 
I will now examine Snowdon's arguments to prove that 
having the capacity/ability is not 
enough to attribute to someone knowledge of how to 
do x. I have agreed with Snowdon 
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that having the capacity is not enough to attribute to someone knowledge of how to do x, 
but I disagree with Snowdon in that I believe that having the ability is enough to attribute 
to a subject knowledge of how to do x. 
Let's remember the example that he uses to illustrate his claim: "Compare Pollim and me 
as trill performers. Yhe truth is that I know as much as anyone about baroque trills; I 
certainly know how to perform them. So of course does Pollini. Ihe difference is that as a 
result ofpractice he can perform them; I alas cannot. "9 
On the one hand we could accept that both Snowdon and Pollini know how to perform 
baroque trills (knowing how in sense (1)), on the other hand only Pollini has the ability to 
do it, due to practice, while Snowdon has not. Therefore I feel inclined to say that, being 
fair, only Pollini knows how to do it because this is one of the cases in which practice 
makes all the difference. Having the capacity does not imply in all cases that you know 
how to do something, but having the ability does. The capacity thesis is correct if 
rephrased in this way: knowing-how involves practical knowledge in the sense that you 
have to be able to perform certain actions, and therefore you must have the capacity to do 
them, or at least have had the capacity to do them, plus the ability to do them, which is 
acquired through practice. I want to underline that practice becomes central to the 
acquisition of knowing-how. Snowdon tries to undermine the importance of practice in 
relation to know-how, and he claims that: "We i)ery often come to 'Iaiow-how' (.. ) 
Without any practice. Just a glance in the room was enough for me to learn how to reach 
this chair. Icertainl didt7oli7eedtopracticereachitigit. "lo Ina sense Snowdon is right, Y 11. ) 
and in normal circumstances you do not have to practice to know how to reach a chair in a 
room full of chairs or obstacles. It is enough to locate the one that you want in order to be 
able to negotiate your way to it, but in another, more general sense, he is wrong because 
you can not learn how to reach a chair just by a glance. Learning how to reach objects is a 
complex process of trial, error, miscalculations, etc ... that we 
begin to practice as soon as 
we are born, and it is an ability acquired through practice. Of course, once we have 
mastered the process, we do not 'learn' how to do it by a glance but, rather, we just do it. 
9 P. Snowdon (1995), plO 
10 P. Snowdon (1995). p19. 
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In these two sections I have insisted that practice is an important element in order to be 
able to learn how to do something, I have claimed that, by doin x repeated]%', a knower 9 
can acquire abilities that she would not possess otherwise, and those are central to OLJI_ 
criteria for attributing knowing-how. I have argued that, in some occasions, we can accept 
that someone knows how to do x in sense (1) when he is able to give a description of the 
practice, and that that knower will obviously know more than another who does not 
know in what the practice consist. Nevertheless, this is a limited use of knowing-how, and 
there are many other times in which we would only attribute knowledge to those who are 
able or have been able to do x. We consider that those knowers are more reliable, have 
more information, and are more able to recognise and teach the correct way of performing 
the activity than others who do not have the ability to do it. This implies that most types of 
knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, because they involve the acquisition of 
abilities and the performance of practices that are not summed up by a mere description of 
the knowing-that type. 
1.3 A further argument to support the reduction. 
I have argued that people who have certain types of practical knowledge, who possess the 
ability to do x, might know things that they cannot put into words. This does not mean 
that, in all cases, it is not possible to do it, but only that they might not have the linguistic 
resources to do it. A stronger claim is to say that those are things that are known and that 
cannot be expressed propositionally, and this would support further the claim that 
knowing-how cannot be reduced to knowing-that, because they are different types of 
knowledue. 0 
Snowdon accepts that there is a type of "content" which can be known even if there is not 
a propositional description for it and can be included in "knowing -that" constructions, but 
he considers that this content has no cognitive relevance, given that the reason ýý, 'hy we 
attribute knowledge is due to its propositional content. If it is necessary that the subject 
knows a proposition in order to be able to make those ascriptions of knowledge with 
truth, then it is due to this propositional content that we can claim that knowing Xvli\. or 1. - 
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where are forms of knowledge, and therefore that it is why they have a cognitive valL. e 
Snowdon is proposing that whenever the knower knows a , hidden" proposition as an 
answer to a knowing 'x' assertion presented as a question, then it is legitimate to saN, that C 
the subject knows. In relation to knowing where, why and what it is like- he says that 
"although these other forms of knowledge ascription are not explicitly ascrIP17017S Of 
knowledge-that, they require, if they are to be ascribed with truth to a subject S, Mal 
there is some proposition or other such that S knows that it, that propOSi17017 is true. "I I 
For instance "to know where to put an object amounts to knowing that a certain place is 
were to put the object. 
Let's consider a two year old boy who knows that he has to put the glass in the sink after 
it has been used. We can ascribe truly to the boy that he knows where to put the glass 
even if he does not know what the proposition "the glass must be put in the washer" 
means. The fact that we attribute knowledge to the subjects of those knowledge assertions 
does not imply that the subject's mental make up has any proposition that describes what 
we are attributing when we say S knows where, why, what it is like or how. Rather, the 
criterion for attribution of knowledge in those cases is based on their actions. I will 
develop the arguments against this type of reductionist move in detail in the next section. 
But for now, the above suffices to signal my point of view. 
Snowdon not only denies the cognitive significance of this non-propositional content, but 
also denies that there is a further knoNfledge of a content different from the one that can 
be described in a propositional form. But I think that he cannot deny that, in some of the 
examples that he uses, some of the knowledge is not captured by propositions. For 
instance, in the playing of musical instruments, where it is obvious that an accomplished 
player will know things that someone who only knows the musical theory does not. It is 
impossible to take seriously his example, in which he claims that in the case of the baroque 
trills performance both Pollini and himself know as much about playing baroque trills. 
tt1,. Snow'don (1995). P 5. 
12 P. Snowdon (1995), p 
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I have argued that there are things that can be known, but not expressed, in a knowing- 
that form. The inability to express knowledge propositionally will be occasionally due to 
the incapacity of the knowers to do so, which does not necessarily imply that a mo-. 2 
articulate knower would not be able to put the practice into a knowing-that form. 
Nevertheless, I have also said that the acquisition of knowing-how very often implies the 
acquisition of abilities, which is not identical with the description of those abilities, so 
there is an aspect of knowing-how that is not reducible to a mere knowing-that form. I 
have signalled that, by being able to participate in those practices, the knowers develop 
some cognitive abilities that allow them to be aware of aspects of the world that remain 
opaque to those that are outside the practice. I have accepted that those who know-how in 
sense (1), that is, who can describe the practice and have witnessed it, have more 
knowledge than those for whom the practice is completely opaque, but I have also made 
clear that those who take part in a practice have more knowledge than those who know- 
how in sense (1). 1 argued that, in some occasions, those who know-how in sense (2), that 
is, who know-how to do something but are not able to articulate their practice 
propositionally, can be more able knowers than those who, despite being able to articulate 
the practice, are unable to practice it. In the next section, I will analyse an argument 
against this last thesis and argue against it. 
2. Second reductivist move: all knowledge should be expressed 
propositionally. 
In this section I will analyse the proposal put forward by Alcoff and Dalmiya, who claim 
that there are differences between knowing-that and knowing-how that make it impossible 
to reduce one to the other, but they claim that all types of knowledge should be 
expressible in a propositional way. They establish the difference between the two ways of 
knowledge by saying that the knower adopts different attitudes towards the propositions 
involved: "When S knoics hoii, to do x, S is still required to grasp p, bill this is not 
expressed in a cotisequenljustýfied belief thalp bill rather in a use ofpfor achieving the 
desired goal. 17nis the grasp of propositions ivould ll'c at the heart oýf a broadened 
episi('117010KV 117W WOUN, 1101veivr, C017cede that siich a grasp dOeS1101 17ecessarily issue 
I. n slawineWs (? f 1170"M-111 'S knoij'., ý 111al p' A jV()j)OSi11O17 177CI-ell' 
'graspe(l' can be (q) 
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I assented to' as a fidl-blooded helieffor a case of 'knowing-that' or can be (b) 'pul to 
use'for an instance of 'knowing-how'. And a proposition can be used this wav 117117011t 
being explicitly assented to. "' 
They claim that this will have important implications for the notion of truth because, in the 
case of knowing how, the relation between the propositions involved and the world is not 
one of correspondence. Nevertheless, they claim that what it is epistemologically relevant 
is the normative dimension of truth, and this relevance is retained in knowinc, how. "Plere 
11) 
clearly is some content to the notion of a correct way of using propositions or rules to 
achieve success, which could parallel the idea of a true proposition correctly picturing 
the world. "la 
Accordingly, they would challenge my assertions in the previous section, where I argued 
that having the ability to do x is sufficient to attribute to someone that she knows how to 
do x. Alcoff and Dalmiya distinguish between having a skill (which will account for my 
"having the ability") and knowing-how: in order to "know-how" the knower must be able 
to recognise as true the propositions that underlie her practice (as rules) when they are 
presented to her. Therefore, according to their theory, my definition of knowing-how 
would be too broad because it includes types of knowledge that are not knowledge but 
skills. Even if I agree with their distinction between different kinds of knowledge, I 
disagree with their differentiation between skills and knowing-how. 
Let's see first how they establish a distinction between skills and knowing how. The 
following example illustrates their position: "I an7 completely at a loss when I confront 
someotie'S forniulatioti of the 'rules' of sivininfing. But a michvife practices trade wilh 
knoivledge because, i-Meti confrowed ivith a nial7ual (.. ) she can react ivith agreement or 
disag7-eenietit. "" So swimming is a skill but a midwife is not just skilled, but rather, she 
knows -how. As they say, "to capt, -re a genuine 'Iaioi4)hig-hoiv' u, e need to add 
13 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993), p238. 
14 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmlya (1993), 1)238-9. 
15 L Alcoffand V. Dalml. va (1993)ý p 237. 
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something to a n7ereskill. This element, which is meant to bear all the cognilive burden, 
is (.. ) some reference to trite propositions. 
7116 
I will argue against their distinction between skills and knowing how, because their theory 
will not allow me to include knowing how in sense (2). 1 will also challenge their 
assumption that it is propositional content the one that bears the coornitive burden. But I I=) 
will retain their claim that what is epistemologically important regarding the notion of 
truth is its normative character, and that we need to preserve it when we include new 
forms of knowledge as paradigmatic (I develop this issue in detail in chapter 5) 
Skills are forms of knowing how because we commonly attribute knowing how to agents 
that are not able to assent to the rules that underlie their behaviour, therefore the usage of 
knowing-how allows us to say that what Alcoff and Dalmiya call "skills" are actually 
instances of knowledge. What we usually mean when we say that S knows how to swim is 
that he can do it even if he does not know the rules that underlie his performance. We 
attribute knowledge of knowing-how to deliver a baby to a midwife when she does it 
successfully, without taking into account whether she is able to recognise certain rules. 
Similarly, most speakers will not be able to assent to the rules of grammar when they 
confront them, because they will not understand the linguistic jargon, but this does not 
imply that they do not know-how to speak in a grammatically correct way. I think that it is 
right to say that, even if you are not able to recognise the rules, you know-how. The same 
is true for other types of knowledge, as will be clear if we remember the example, that I 
offered before, of a two year old child who drinks a glass of orange and then leave the 
glass in the sink. The child knows where to leave the glass but not because he knows that 
there is a place where he has to leave it, because he has knowledge of a proposition, but 
rather because he has seen others doing it, or he has done it before, or both. He has 
undergone a certain training and shows the correct behaviour and that is why we will 
attribute to ýim that he knows where to put the glass, not because he will recognise a 
proposition as the source of his knowledge. 
16 L. Alcoffand V. Dalmiya (1993), p 236. 
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I pointed out in the previous section that there is a sense of knowing-how (1) in which we 
can say that someone knows-how to do x when he could give a description of the practice, 
but that this is only a very limited use of the expression. What we usually mean v"hen we 
attribute knowing-how to someone is that he or she knows how to perform the practice, 
and that they can recognise the normativity of it. By this I mean that they know which 
instances are correct or incorrect examples of the practice. Our attribution does not rely 
on their ability to describe the practice explicitly, or to put forward the "rules" that make a 
practice correct or incorrect. It does not even imply that they have to be able to recognise 
the rules when confronted with them. If the procedure for determining knowing-how were 
the one described by Alcoff and Dalmiya we could encounter the following situation: 
In the morning, we observe a swimmer swimming and a midwife helping to deliver a baby, 
and both of them are unable to recognise a propositional description of the rules of their 
practices. We will have to say that they are skilled, but that they do not know-how. We 
spend the afternoon with both of them making them recognise the rules put in a 
propositional form as the core of their practices, then, once they are able to do it, we can 
claim that they know-how. Of course, this process bears no resemblance to our actual 
practices for the attribution of knowing-how. Recognising the subjacent propositional 
description of a trade, or its rules is not a necessary condition to know-how to do x. In my 
next chapter I will argue that, as long as agents are able to recognise the normativity in 
their knowing-how practices, we will be justified in attributing to them knowing-how, 
even if they are not able to express the normativity propositionally. I want to remark that I 
agree with the necessity of recognising the normativity of the practices, even if this 
recognition is merely implicit in the performance of them. 
I will support my claim further by arguing that there is a kind of content which can be 
known but not expressed propositionally, and that this is at the basis of any kind of 
knowledge. Peacocke defends the existence of a non conceptual content of perceptual 
experience. Some examples of which could be the perception of an object as containing 
some symmetrical features when the subject has not got a concept for symmetry, or the 
perception of irregular shapes for Nvhich we do not have a name for. He defends the 
necessity of accept1w, this kind of content in order to understand how we get to form 
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concepts as basic as the concept of self. This sort of content cannot be expressed in a 
propositional form because it cannot be conceptualised, but nevertheless it is invaluable 
from a cognitive perspective. In the next chapter I will argue in detail for this sort of 
content and I will explain its connection to practical knowledge. 
I have shown in section (1) that when learning how to do x it is preferable to have a 
teacher who is skilled in the trade as well as able to explain how to do it. I also claimed 
that having to choose between a teacher able to explain it but unable to do it and another, 
who is skilled but cannot explain how to do it, the choice is not immediate, it is a question 
of pondering what we are learning and for what reason. So it is not obvious to me that the 
most valuable form of knowing is that which can be put into a propositional form. I cannot 
agree with Alcoff and Dalmiya that the cognitive burden in knowing-how is bome by the 
"subjacent propositions" of the practices. One of the main reasons why they had to defend 
the new status of knowing how as a form of knowledge is because they wanted to change 
the current perceptions about who has epistemic authority. I think that, by defending the 
view that the episternic burden is carried by propositions, they are just supporting the 
current prejudices. Therefore, those who are more articulate, who are more in command 
of knowledge expressed propositionally will be given more epistemic authority than those 
who are unable to articulate clearly the rules of their trades, but are only able to assent to 
those when presented to them. I think that the real challenge to our current model of 
knowledge will be to accept the expertise of those who know how oii the basis of their 
command of their trades, on the basis of their practical expertise. 
Summarising, I have argued that it is not possible to reduce knowing-how to knowing 
that, that the attribution of knowing-how is usually done by recognising that the subject 
has acquired certain abilities by partaking in practices. The correct performance of a 
practice implies that the agent is able to recognise what makes the performance correct, 
even if she is not able to articulate in a propositional way the rules that are implicit in the 
practice. I have suggested that there is a content that can be known even if it cannot be 
Put into a propositional form, and I will expand on it in the next chapter. 
3. Reducing knoNN ing what it is like. tlý L-1) 
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In this section I am going to analyse different reductionist attempts. First, I Nvill assess the 
plausibility of the reduction made by Snowdon who wants to convert all knowing what it 
is like claims into a knowing-that form, second f will look at Mellor's suggestion that 
knowing what it is like is just a form of knowing-how and, finally, I will consider Alcoff 
and Dalmiya's project, which supports the view that knowing what it is like can be 
expressed propositionally. I will resist those reductions for different reasons. One of them 
is that, if those reductionist attempts are correct and it is possible to completely capture 
completely the content of experiences in a propositional form, then anybody who is able to 
understand those sentences will share the same content as those who have had the 
experiences. This has an important consequence in relation to my main thesis, the use of 
experience to ground the knowledge of marginalized groups, for which it is important to 
maintain that there is an irreducibility in claims of the knowing what it is like form. For 
instance, it is central to be able to claim that women can access some knowledge that men 
cannot have access to. The irreducibility option has to face some problems that are mainly 
ontological in nature. I will argue for a form of irreducibility that does not imply the 
existence of elusive "qualia". In this section I will first argue against two attempts of 
reduction, by Snowdon and Mellor (3.1), and then I will argue against Alcofrs and 
Dalmiya's theory (3.2). 
3.1 Snowdon's reductionist attempt. 
P. Snowdon claims that knowing what it is like is a form of knowing-that because those 
sort of claims can be rephrased in the following way: "I knoiv that that ivas the smell of 
her peifume" or "I Imow that that was how Schnabel played the chord. " 
But how would you reduce a phrase like A know what it is like to be in labour" to a 
knowing-that form? "I know that that is to be in labour" is not equivalent to "I know what 
it is like to be in labOLIF". Most adults would recognise a woman in labour if theN, see one, 
but only those who have undergone the experience can clain-i that they know what it is 
like. So the reduction is not applicable in all cases. 
Furthermore, I have already argued, while talking about knowing-ho"v, that, even if "'OU 
can rephrase those statements to fit into a knowing-that form, we are still talking about 
different kinds of knowledge. I argued that there were differences between knowing-ho%ý! 
in sense (1) and knowing-how in senses (2) and (3). The same distinction applies in 
knowing what it is like. There are subjects who have never given birth, but who have 
accumulated information about it by reading, talking to women who have undergone the 
experience, having witnessed many births, etc... that can say that they know what it is like 
to give birth. They know more about it than other people who do not have that 
information. But they will not have the same type of knowledge as those who have given 
birth. 
The way in which we attribute knowledge to a subject of how to do x in sense (2) is by 
having seen him perform the action concerned, i. e., making sure that they have (or have 
had) the ability to do it. The subject has acquired the ability by performing the action a 
number of times. Even if this has provided the subject with some factual knowledge, there 
is no amount of factual knowledge that can replace his ability to do x. The same is true 
about knowing what it is like, the acquisition of knowledge of facts about an experience 
does not entail the knowledge of what it is like having that experience. 
A defender of the reduction thesis could argue that, even if a verbal account of what an 
experience is like does not amount to having had the experience, this is the usual way in 
which we decide if someone knows what x is like, simply by exchanging information about 
x. But, then, does this mean that a cunning person who has not undergone the experience 
can witness enough exchanges of information to be able to fool people into the belief that 
he knows what x is like without really having experienced x? In some cases it is possible to 
attribute this type of knowledge to someone mistakenly but, even if this is the case, it has 
been claimed that, usually, if I am talking to someone who has undergone the same 
experience as I have, I can be aware of it by means of the quality of our verbal exchanges 
about the experience. Mcoff and Dalmiya claim that "the cotwersation betvi, een peol)le 
i4)ho have shared a type of experience has a richer quality to it that niqi, not be 
17 
obsei-vable by a sinil)le i, ecounfing of theit- solements. " 'They accept that there is 
17 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993), p240. 
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something above the recounting of their statements which makes the quality of their 
communications better. It is possible to be aware of the special quality of the exchange, 
even as external observers. I do not think that this special quality is of any mysterious kiný 
but, rather, that even if it is perceived, it cannot be pinned down to statements used. 
Sometimes the recognition that the other person has acquired common abilities is one of 
the signals to know if she knows what the experience is like. For instance, the recognition 
of particular metaphors as significant in describing the experience is one of those. People 
who have not undergone certain experiences, pain, for instance, might be able to use the 
concept of pain in a very varied way and in many different contexts, but many of the 
usages will be opaque to them. Equally, those who have undergone particular experiences 
might be more able to understand the reactions and feelings of others that have also 
undergone them. They will be more able to explain their behaviours by picking clues that 
are not apprehensible by others. 
In the previous sections I argued that being involved in certain practices allow the 
knowers to acquire particular abilities, in the rest of the chapter I will argue that knowing 
what it is like also procure the knowers with cognitive abilities that cannot be acquired 
otherwise, therefore resisting the reduction suggested by Snowdon 
3.2. Mellor's reductionist attempt. 
I have just drawn an analogy between knowing-how and knowing what it is like. Mellor 
has argued that it is possible to reduce knowing what an experience is like to knowing 
how to imagine the experience. I think that there is a similarity between those types of 
knowledge, but that to claim that one amounts to the other is incorrect. Knowing what x is 
like does not imply being able to imagine what it is like. It is possible to know what x it is 
like, and to be a very unimaginative type of person, and therefore to be unable to imagine 
'; v I what the experience is like. It is also possible to be a very imaginaL. e ind vidual and, I 
relying on the descriptions of those who have undergone the experience, to be able to 
imagine very vividly what something is like. Nevertheless, this does not entail either that 
the imaginative subject knows what the experience is like. It is possible that, if he I 
underwent it himself, lie would have a different experience from the one that lie 
has 
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imagined. Nor it does entail that the unimaginative person does not know what the 
experience is like. 
In this section I have resisted Mellor's attempt to reduce what it is like to knowina how to Z7 
imagine, which is enough to show that Mellor's reduction does not work, 
3.3. Alcoff and Dalmiya reduction. 
In the previous sections I have argued against two philosophers who want to erase the 
differences between knowing what it is like and other types of knowledge. In this section I 
have a different task. Alcoff and Dalmiya accept that there are differences between 
knowing that and knowing what it is like. Their position is clearly stated in their 
explanation of the differences between the knowledge of doctors and midwives. The 
knowledge of midwives was both practical and experiential, and it was different from that 
acquired by doctors because: 
I)their knowledge was unrecorded. 
2)was acquired through practice. 
3)was gained from their own embodied experience of childbirth. 
4)It was empathic "this empathy was produced partly by a subjective or first-person 
knowledge of what it IS like (for example) to be a woman going through labour, whereas 
the Imoi, i4edge ofphysicians wasfounded in a seýf-conscious questfor objectivity. ", 8 
Any doctor that has theoretical knowledge of giving birth, needs to be involved in the birth 
ofmany babies inOFder to be able to claim that he is qualified to help in deliverinLy babies. 1: ) 
In this sense, both midwives and doctors acquire practical knowledge through experience 
that cannot be acquired otherwise. The main difference between the traditional midwife 
and a male doctor or a female doctor who has not given birth is that they also gained 
I knowledge by their own experience of b*rth giving. Any man can have access to I and 2, 
but not ') OF 4, therefore, even if they have a lot of know-that type of information about it, 
and also they knoN\, '-ho\\, - in sense ( 1), they still do not know what it is like to give birth. 
is L. Alcoffand V. Dallill. va (199"). 
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Alcoff and Dalmiya argue for a distinction between several types of knoWledges so why 
am I classifying their theory as reductionIst? They claim that m1d%vIves have more 
knowledge than doctors because they have undergone the experience of giving birth 
themselves, which is an anti-reductionist claim, but they also claim that these experiences 
can be expressed propositionally, because they think that the cognitive burden resides in 
the propositions that underlie those experiences. While analysing knowing-how, I argued 
that this is an unnecessary reduction. I will take the same line or argument with respect to 
this move. 
Alcoff and Dalmiya claim that midwives have apprehended some subjective facts that are 
not accessible from a third person perspective. Midwives, as women who have given birth, 
have undergone certain experiences that allow them to have a better understanding of the 
process. These are only accessible from a first person perspective, because if they were 
accessible otherwise, then doctors will be able to access them as well. In this section I will 
discuss whether these subjective facts amount to raw experiences of the kind argued 
against by Scott in the previous chapter. On the one hand, they want to resist the idea that 
these experiences are qualia which are private to individuals but, on the other hand, they 
are looking for a restricted access to those "subjective facts", so they postulate the 
existence of what they call "collective privacy". I will argue that this approach is very 
problematic and I will support an alternative. 
I will support the view that those who have given birth share a knowing what it is like type 
of knowledae that is not apprehensible by those who have not undergone the experience, 117) 
but that does not imply the existence of subjective facts or a collective privacy. I will argue 
that knowing what it is like is close to knowin -how in the sense that its content miGht not 1) 9 -13 
be propositionally expressible, but that it is nevertheless tied to normativity and, in this 
sense, is fully accountable to the communities that include the individuals who have 
undergone the experiences. I will argue that knowing what it is like allows us to 
apprehend aspects of the world (but not facts) that would be unaccounted for otherwise. 
I will devote most of the section to analyse Alcofrs and Dalmiva position (3.3.1), and then 
xvill cxplain in some detail mv alternatIvc('i. 3.2). 
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3.3.1 Alcoff and Dalmiya claim that knowing what it is like is a form of knowledge that 
consists in the apprehension of subjective facts. My first criticism of their theory is that 
they presuppose the existence of those subjective facts, without supporting their claim 
sufficiently. They consider that their existence is beyond doubt: "Just as there is afact of 
the matter as to what it is like to be a bat, a Martian or Aomas Angel experiencing e, so 
also there is a fact of the matter as to what it is like to be a woman experiencing 
childbirth, or pregnancy, or patriarchal marriage. "'90ne of the reasons that they offer for 
the existence of those subjective facts is that the communication between people who have 
undergone the experiences (who are acquainted with those "facts") is more informative 
than between those who have not. I will argue in section 3.2.2 that it is not necessary to 
postulate the existence of those facts in order to explain this. 
My second criticism is that, in order to support their general theory that all that is known 
must be expressed propositionally, they have to postulate the existence of an idiolect that 
is used to record these subjective facts. I disagree with both presuppositions, with their 
ontological claim that subjective facts exist and with the supposition that all knowledge 
has to be propositionally expressible. According to their own theory, if we are going to 
accept the apprehension of these facts as knowledge, they have to be expressible in 
propositions, but if they are so, then anybody can access them. To explain why not 
everybody can access this content by means of our shared language, Alcoff and Dalmiya 
claim that our current language cannot express gender specific experiences because it is 
gender-biased. To support the assertion that this type of knowledge is knowledge, even if 
inexpressible, Alcoff and Daliniya say that these experiences are potentially expressible by 
means of a specific idiolect. "The introduction of a gender-specific point of Welt, and 
gender-specific facts seenis to suggest the COIICIIISIO17 that the truth of some propositiolLy 
/. s not expressible in a gender-neutral Ionguage. Along these lines one could say, that G- 
experiential knoit, ledge is propositional, but these propositions are peculiar in being 
,, 20 expressible only in a get idei --specific idiolect. . So women who have given 
birth, share 
19 L. Alcoffand V. Dalmlya (199-3)), p 229 
20 L. Alcoffand V. Dilmlya (1993), p 2310 
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knowledge of facts that are not expressible in our current language but that are 
intrinsically expressible in an idiolect 
Let us have a closer view at their general argument- they postulate the existence of this 
idiolect because, if knowing what it is like is a type of knowledge, then it must be 
somehow expressible, but this move begs the argument, given that, until we can show that 
it is expressible prop o sitionally, it is not knowledge according to their theory. If we can 
prove that knowing what it is like is a form of knowledge by using other means, then it 
could follow that it has to be somehow expressible propositionally but, in order for this to 
follow, the claim that all knowledge must be expressible propositionally must be proven to 
be true independently. 
For the sake of the argument, let's accept that all knowledge must be expressed 
propositionally. They infer the existence of the idiolect from the fact that knowing what it 
is like is knowledge, and they reach this conclusion because they consider that knowing 
what it is like consists in the apprehension of subjective facts. Therefore, the main reason 
to support the view that knowing what it is like is knowledge is the reliance on a 
parallelism between knowing-that as knowledge of facts and knowing what it is like as 
knowledge of subjective facts: "If there is afact of the matter as to what it is like to give 
birth, then apprehension of this fact in a gender specific experience could count as 
knowledge as much as apprehending the objective fact about the cat being on the mat. " 
21 
. In our epistemological tradition the 
knowledge of facts has been closely linked with 
their representation in propositions and therefore, to move from the knowledge of 
subjective facts to the existence of an idiolect that represents them might seem to be a 
justifiable step. Nevertheless, I see think that this project does not hold. In the rest of the 
section I will argue that there are no such things as "subjective facts" and that it is not 
possible to have a private idiolect between women. 
My first step in arguing against the existence of subjective facts will be to analyse the two 
different senses in which Mcoff and Dalmiya characterise subjective facts, and to show 
how with neither of thern can they account for the diversity and the commonalties in 
21 3), p239. L. Alcoff and V. Dalmlya (1991 
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women's experiences. The concept of women's experiences that could ground a feminist 
epistemology is not captured by their characterisation of them as subjective facts. There is 
more than one characterisation of subjective facts in Alcoff and Dalmiý, a's article, which I 
will illustrate with two different quotations (I have underlined the important sections). 
a) "If there is the apprehension of 
this fact in a gender specific experience could count as knowledge as much as 
apprehending the objective fact about the cat being on the mat. 1122 
b) "Just as there is a fact of the matter as to what it is like to be a bat, a Martian or 
Thomas Angel experiencing e, so also there is a fiact of the matter as to what it is like to 
be a woman e2ýperienciLig childbirth or pregnancy, or patriarchal marriage. "23 
While in the first quotation, the subjective fact is what it is like to give birth, in the second 
quotation, the subjective fact is what it is like to be a woman experiencing childbirth. Both 
are very different claims and I will analyse them in turn 
In the first quotation, by using giving birth as an example of subjective facts, Alcoff and 
Dalmiya are suggesting that there is some knowledge that is accessible only to those who 
can experience giving birth from a first person perspective. In the previous chapter I 
claimed that they should be included in our accounts of knowledge and I mentioned post- 
natal depression as an example -,. f such a knowledge and, therefore, my position is that 
those experiences can ground knowledge. My disagreement with Alcoff and Dalmiya 
resides in the characterisation of those experiences. I claimed that we should not take 
those experiences to be natural and unmediated by cultural factors, a question that seems 
to be overlooked if, following Alcoff and Dalmiya, we consider that there is a common 
subjective fact that it is apprehended when women give birth, because we seem to be 
ignoring the many different ways in which women experience childbirth in different 
cultures, societies, or even due to individual idiosyncrasies. In the previous chapter, and 
following the teachings of postmodern and postcolonial philosophers, I argued that it is 
incorrect to assume that all women will have the same experiences just because they are 
))L. Alcoff and V. Dallilly'l (199") p 2"'). 
23 L. Alcoffand V. Dalmiya (1993)). p 229. 
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women, and that it is necessary to allow for diversity. This is a fact that is acknowledged 
in the second characterisation offered by Alcoff and Dalmiya, in which, instead of 
postulating that there are facts that are common to all women, and that therefore could 
not be mediated by different practices or discourses, they claim that there is a common 
quality that women feel when they experience x, so they allow for diversity while 
attempting to account for a certain commonality. 
They say that : "All that is necessary to meanineully speak of a 'woman's specific point 
of view' is that there be a determinable qualioý to the fiact of a woman haviiig ey erience p 
e, under which we may subsume different determinate characteristic feelings of varying 
generality that are dependent, for example, on more specific circumstances like the 
cultural background of the woman in question down to the unique 'subjective fact' 
associated with a particular woman experiencing e. r). 24 The "subjective facts" that they 
postulated before implied that, even if they were only apprehensible from a particular 
perspective, they were, somehow, public, a perception that was supported by their 
comparison between those facts and an objective fact (in their words) such as the cat is on 
the mat. But, with their new characterisation of subjective facts as felt qualities, it is 
inevitable to think that they are moving into the realm of the private, a suggestion that they 
want to resist. They claim that there is a subjective fact for each woman experiencing e, 
but given that this type of "qualia" cannot be the basis for a woman's perspective, they 
als-- suggest that there is a "determinable quality to the fact of a woman having experience 
e", that is, when women have experiences, there is a common quality shared by all women, 
and this, I suppose, amounts to women having a common perspective that mediates their 
experiences. But having a common quality and sharing a perspective are different issues. 
And while I will accept toat women can share a perspective, I will deny that women share 
a determinable quality when having particular experiences. 
According to Alcoff and Dalmiya, what it is common to all women is a determinable 
quality to the fact of woman having, experience e, so the common ground is a particular 
quality. That quality must be universal, given tliat it is there despite the cultural and 
24 L. Alcoffand V. Dalill'N, ", p 229. 
individual variations in the experience. To argue that women have a common quale that 
permeates their experiences has several problems: 
First, coming back to the example of childbirth, we see how, with their new 
characterisation of experience, they can acknowledge diversity, because it allows for 
individual and cultural variations in the experience, while at the same time accepting that 
there is a common quale. Nevertheless, there is still a universalist claim in this analysis, 
because that common feminine quale has to be necessarily independent of the different 
practices that might inform what being a woman is in diverse communities. In the previous 
chapter I argued against theories that considered that women are a community because 
they share their experiences universally. 
Second, I have already noted how by talking about qualia, they are moving into the realm 
of the private, and this is exactly the sort of move that they wanted to avoid. By 
introducing subjective facts, they wanted to make the content of knowing what it is like 
claims propositionally expressible, but the nature of the quality postulated is inexpressible. 
We cannot rely on the existence of qualia in order to ground a common perspective for 
women, neither in the apprehension of quale as they are present in particular experiences 
(quotation 1) nor as quale accompanying the experiences of women (quotation 2). 
Nevertheless, Alcoff and Dalmiya are aware that the reliance on qualia might present a 
problem in their theory, and they try to avoid it by claiming that, even if the content of 
knowing what it is like claims is not expressible because our language is gender biased, 
and unable to account for gender-specific experiences, it is, nevertheless, expressible in an 
idiolect common to women. This move would allow them to hold at the same time that 
there is privacy, due to the first person aspect of the acquisition of knowledge and, 
therefore, men will be excluded, and also, at the same time, that there is a collectivity that 
shares the privacy, and therefore the qualla become expressl'ole. I will argue that, despite 
this new element, their project does not hold. 
This move has several problems. If we are talking, about qualia, then it is not possible to 
know that all the members have the same quale, as Wittgenstein showed with his beetle in 
14? 
the box example. If the criteria for recognising those "qualia" are public criteria then the%, 
include more than private labelling with an idiolect, they include the sharing of practices, 
which implies that, even if males cannot have the experiences, they are able to understand 
the practices of attribution and, therefore, they can be part of the common conceptual 
system. If we want to keep Alcoffs and Dalmiya's original project, in order to obtain an 
exclusive gender specific knowledge, the knowledge obtained by apprehending those 
gender specific facts has to remain private and, given that collective privacy is not 
possible, it has to remain inexpressible and, therefore, it does not fulfil their own definition 
of what counts as knowledge. 
Nevertheless, I think that it is possible to argue that women can have experiences that are 
not captured in our common conceptual systems, while at the same time claiming that 
those experiences do not remain in the realm of the private. But the solution that I offer 
implies leaving out any reference to qualia. In the previous chapter I argued that women 
can have experiences for which we do not have a name, but that can be named within the 
current language after a process of collective awareness. Once this has been done the new 
usages of terms/ new words can be available to the general population. Dale Spender gives 
examples of a few of them in Man Made Language 25 . In a way, it is possible to escape (by 
enlarging it) the language that we possess "being aware of the limitations that are 
inherent in the language we possess, being sensitive to itsfalseness and its distortions is, 
however, a beginning, and a beginning ftom which we can develop women's meani . ngs 
(.. ) in a new direction. 1126 1 was particularly interested in pointing out that this move does 
not presuppose that experiences are prior to, and independent from, our naming them. I 
suggested that the process of naming those experiences and the belonging to particular 
groups informed the experiences. I underlined the fact that those experiences were neither 
raw experiences, nor "qualia". I argued that, within the appropriate communities, women 
could talk about those experiences, name them, and let others know about them. They 
might need to stretch the meaning of some words in order to account for their 
experiences, and the task to explain to others what they mean when they refer to those 
experiences implies more than just giving them a name, implies changing their perceptions 
25 D. Spciider (1990). p182, -90 26 
D. Spcndcr (1990). p 183. 
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and presuppositions but, in any case, I claimed that this process takes place N'. 'Ithin L'r-e 
boundaries of shared languages. Given my insistence on the fact that expressing the 
content of those experiences does not amount to having them, and that the experiences 
might provide the knowers with abilities and skills that they could not have acquired 
otherwise, I could still argue that women can apprehend certain aspects of reality than men 
cannot access in the same way, that is, they can be different kinds of epistemic agents. 
Nevertheless, this move is not open to Alcoff and Dalmiya, because they argue that all 
knowledge must be put into a propositional form ( in the next section, I will argue against 
that claim). 
Surnmarising, I agreed with Alcoff and Dalmiya's suggestion that women are the only 
ones who can have a first person view of certain experiences. I also agree with them that 
this perspective allows them to access certain aspects of the experience that are not 
accessible otherwise. But I disagreed with their claim that, by undergoing the experiences, 
women are apprehending subjective facts. In the former paragraphs, I have argued that 
their two different characterisations of subjective facts collapse into qualia, a position that 
is full of difficulties and that does not allow them to reach their final objective: the 
expressibility of all known content in a propositional form. In the next section I will 
support the view that, even if it is undeniable that women who experience childbirth have a 
different perspective in the process to that of doctors, they do not need either to be 
attributed the apprehension of subjective facts in order to be attributed knowledge, nor to 
be able to express the content of their knowledge propositionally in order to make it count 
as knowledge. 
3.3.2 In the previous section I have argued that the characterisation of subjective facts that 
Alcoff and Dalmiya put forward is unsatisfactory for ground a feminist epistemology and, 
also, that it has problems internal to their own theory. In this section I will argue that, if 
even there is always a content in knowledge and, therefore, also in knowing-what it is like, 
nevertheless, not all contents are facts. I will quote D. H. Meflor to support my view. He 
says --P'/ýY cati I tiol state thefact that I laimi, when I luiow i4, hat it's like tofeel warni? 
Pic obiious aiisirci- J. S that thei-e is no s-itchfact. Kiwiring ithatfeeling ij, arin is like is not 
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knowing 
anyJact, because it is not knowing that an 1,27 y proposition is true. . 
In the first 
part of the chapter I argued that we can attribute knowing how to subjects who were 
unable to express their knowledge propositionally, either because they did not have the 
necessary linguistic resources, or because their knowledge involved the showing of their 
skill instead of describing it. If we consider that facts are those items of knowledge that 
can be captured by propositions, it is clear that there are at least some instances of 
knowledge that are not about knowing facts. The same reasoning can be applied to 
knowing what it is like, we can attribute it to people who are unable to express 
propositionally the content of their knowledge. Mellor supports the symmetry of both 
types of knowledge when he claims that knowing what it is like to feel warm in this 
respect is: " like knowing how to ride a bicycle. I cannot state the fact I know then either, 
because there is no such fact to state. I must of course know some facts about bicycles to 
know how to ride one, but having this ability is obviously neither constituted nor entailed 
b my knowing those facts. And that is why no one thinks it mysterious that I cannot say Y 
whatfact my knowing how to ride a bicycle is knowledge of. - it is too obvious that there is 
not such afact. , 28 1 have already argued that the analogy goes further because, in the same 
way that knowing-how provides us with some abilities that could neither be acquired by 
recounting them propositionally, nor attributed to others by the mere description of those 
abilities, knowing what it is like might also provide us with certain recognitional abilities 
that someone who has not undergone the experience does not possess, and that we could 
not acquire from a simple recounting of factual knowledge. 
At the end of the previous section I claimed that I would explain how it is possible that 
women who have undergone childbirth are attributed a knowledge that doctors do not 
possess. I have suggested, in this section, that, by undergoing some experiences, the 
subjects are able to acquire certain recognitional abilities, which amounts to saying that 
doctors who have not had fiisi hand experience of giving birth would not possess such 
abilities. In the rest of the section I will expand on this issue. 
27 D. H. McIlor (1993), pS. 
28 D. H. Nlcllor (1993), p, ',. 
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While Alcoff and Dalmiya described the "subjective facts" acquired in knowing what it is 
like as Lockean subjective qualities: "their being IS a dimension of the subjects' 
experiencing something. ý)29 1 prefer to say that by knowing what something is like we do 
not get to know a subjective fact but, rather, we just become aware of some aspects of the 
world that are apprehensible from particular perspectives and not from others, and whose 
apprehension gives us reasons for acting in certain ways and not in others. I follow 
P. Gilbert who claims that "The subjective character of experience simply consists in Its 
reason giving role, that to have an experience consists in coming to have a reason for 
desire andlor belief in a particular non-inferential kind of way. "'0 Therefore it is not that 
you have to "capture" a subjective fact and then you know what it is like but, rather, 
having an experience, for instance, feeling pain when you are pficked by a thorn, gives you 
reasons to display avoidance behaviour. This characterisation of knowing what it is like 
does not necessitate that the subject can put his knowledge in a propositional form but, 
rather, this characterisation gives us a closer link between what is being apprehended and 
the subject as an embodied agent P-Gilbert says that "The subject's knowledge of what 
reasons his experience gives him (.. ) is a recognitional capacity which consists in 
forming his desires and beliefs (-) Now knowledge of this sort is immediate- it requires 
attention only to the experience, not to other evidence. "" Having experienced pain once, 
we acquire, in a non-inferential way, a reason for avoiding touching thorns in the future. 
We exercise a recognitional capacity and acquire an ability. The involvement of the subject 
with the world as the means of acquiring this knowltdge is central to this theory, which 
implies that, in order to attribute knowledge to the subject, he does not have to express his 
beliefs in a propositional form. As K. Lennon affirms "If providing reasons consists it, 
displaying the appropriateness of an agent's response, given her other perceptions and 
32 
attitudes, then this n7ay not alivays be capturable in propositionalform. ". I have already 
argued that, in order to attribute knowing what it is like to a subject, it is necessary that 
the knower responds appropriately to the environment. Occasionally this criterion will 
imply that the subject has to give particular propositional information about her 
experiences. For instance, there are differences in the uses of a concept such as "pain" 
29 L. Alcoff and V. Daliniva (1993), p240. 
30 P. Gilbert (1992), p 243. 
31 P. Gilbert (1992), p 245 
32 K. Lennon (1995), p 532. 
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between those who are unable to feel pain, and those who can feel pain. But this does not 
imply that this is the only test to determine if someone knows -'-hat something is like. 
There are other types of behaviour that count as responding appropiately. And it is the 
recognition of the normative aspect that regulates our attribution of knowledge that makes 
knowing what it is like a form of knowledge. 
Summarising, in the first part of this section I argued against Snowdon's claim that 
knowing what it is like is reducible to knowing-that. in the second section I argued that 
knowing what it is like is not reducible to knowing how to imagine. In the last part of the 
section I claimed that the content of knowing what it is like cannot be apprehended 
propositionally, but that the impossibility is not due to the existence of qualia but, rather, 
to the fact that it is a type of practical knowledge that equips the knower with 
recognitional abilities that cannot be captured propositionally. I have insisted that knowing 
what it is like necessitates that the knower undergoes certain experiences, but I have also 
underlined that those experiences are not raw but, rather, they are shaped by societies and 
regulated by them. Finally, I have claimed that being expressible as a proposition is not the 
criterion for determining what is knowledge, and I have signalled that the normative aspect 
of knowledge attribution is what determines which practices are knowledge and which are 
not. 
5. On Knowing others. 
In the previous sections I stated that the content of knowing how or knowing what It Is 
like does not have to be expressed in propositions to count as knowledge. I argued that 
having knowledge does not always amount (or only amount) to having propositional 
information about x. On many occasions it also means having the capacity to act in certain 
ways, or being able to relate to what is known in an appropriate manner. In this section I 
will argue that knowing others cannot be reduced to propositions either. For instance, 
what someone means when they claim that they know Mozart is that they are experts on 
his work, but what someone meant by it while he was alive was that they have met him. 
This second sense of knowing Mozart implies that, even if you have some propositional 
1 f7 
information about him, you also have, due to your acquaintance ý'k'ith Mozart, the capacity 
for relating to him in particular ways. 
When we let other people get to know us we express our feelings to them, and they 
understand us. In this process we are not just delivering propositional information about 
ourselves, as P. Gilbert points out, we are creating a relationship, something that includes 
the sharing of propositions and also of attitudes in relation to them and to ourselves. That 
we do not just share propositional information is proven by the fact that sometimes we do 
not know what our feelings are until the other points them out to us- gives us the 
propositional content- " For though I can sometimes say to anotherjust what I think and 
feel, I commonly cannot. 
And then, I may need afriend to help me tofind out. Another can tell me ftom the way I 
express myfeelings what these feelings are- give me propositional knowledge of them. Or 
it may not matter if they cannot, since at least I have given expression to them, and this 
expression has been understood. And it is also proven by the fact that we might choose 
to deliver information about ourselves to people who we do not know "the mere sharing 
q information about ourselves, however, does nothing to create personal relationships. ?f 
We tell intimate things to our doctors, priests or strangers we meet in trains and know we 
will never see again 1134 So the amount of propositional information shared is not what 
builds a relationship of understanding between two people but, rather, it is the hope that 
they will have the appropriate attitude towards them "I trust others with myfeelings only 
if they would thereb be committed to an appropri . ate attitude towards them. They would Y 
not, other things being equal, scoff or sneer or take advantage of me. , 3' The sort of 
knowledge that I have described here is valuable, not because of its relation to truth, if we 
define truth in torms of propositions picturing the world in the right way, given that 
propositions are not always involved but, rather, it is desirable because "my knowledge of 
another III a close relationship still constitutes an mcareness of what they are really like, 
though ni. ), reliability about thein coMeS 01tt In 117_1, behavior rather than in mjJudgtnc: its. 
P. Gilbcrt (199 1), p 96. 
34 P. Gilbci-t (1991). P98- 
5 P. Gilbcrt (1991). P 98- 
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It 1.5 simply befter to get such things right about people in this it ay than to gel thein 
wrong. We cannot unagi . ne ourselves 1701 regarding it as especially desirable to do So. )iM 
In a close relationship we expect others to show the appropriate attitude towards 
ourselves. This is what it will constitute the proof that they understand us and therefore, in 
order to know if they do, we have to take into account not just the sort of things that they 
know about us but, also, we have to take into account their behavior. Their knowledge is 
shown by other means than the utterance of the right propositions, even if these will 
certainly be necessary sometimes. But it clearly implies something else because we will not 
trust them if their actions contradict their words. This knowledge is acquired through a 
process that is socially instituted. It has many variables, but it includes negotiation, trust, 
and the capacity of understanding body language, signs, gestures and social rituals. It 
implies making sense of particular forms of life. 
In a previous chapter I put forward a concept of experience that was not raw, but was not 
completely mediated conceptually either. In this chapter I have signaled types of 
knowledge in which experience has a bearing. I have claimed that there are some types of 
content that can be apprehended by knowers, but that it cannot be transmitted or even 
expressed in propositions. Therefore, they are not captured by concepts. In the next 
chapter I will explain how we can apprehend certain epistemic contents for which we do 
not have words, without implying that we experience them as being completely 
unmediated. I will argue that the way in which humans apprehend non-conceptual content, 
is mediated by the practices in which the apprehension takes place. 
6. Experiential/ practical knowledges and their relation to privileged 
feminist knowledge. tn 
In my account of knoNving how, knowing what it is like and knowing others, I have 
insisted that these are different types of knowledge and that they are not reducible to 
knowina-that, or propositional knowledge. But given that knowing that has been g 
36 P. Gilbcrt (1991). p 101- 
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considered the paradigm of knowledge in our epistemic tradition, and that justification is 
linked to propositional knowledge, I still have to argue that those other types of 
knowledge are knowledge. My aim is not just to show that practical and experiential 
knowledge are legitimate forms of knowledge, but also to prove that they can be the 
grounds for privileged knowledge. 
I have characterised practical and experiential knowledge as having both personal and 
social aspects. Therefore, on the one hand, they can only be acquired by individuals 
undergoing certain experiences or partaking in particular practices but, on the other hand, 
they are socially sanctioned. While my insistence on the first characteristic will allow me to 
claim that only certain knowers can produce particular types of knowledge, the second 
characteristic will help me to argue for the status of "proper" knowledge for experiential 
and practical knowledge. I will devote the next chapter to proving this last point, but in 
the following paragraphs I will begin to sketch the basis for my arguments. 
In relation to experiential knowledge, I concluded chapter 3 by saying that experiences 
are not raw, that they are mediated by conceptual systems, but I also claimed that, by 
having particular experiences, there are aspects of the world that are apprehended despite 
the conceptual systems that we are embedded in. This apprehension takes place by 
engaging with the world in particular ways. This means that these aspects of the world 
cannot be apprehended but from particular perspectives and are opaque from others, and 
that they are not captured by merely sharing a conceptual system. At the same time, I also 
claimed that they are not "natural" kinds waiting to be experienced, but that they are the 
product of social practices. 
In the previous chapter I followed N. Schemann who showed how, although some women 
were unable to understand their own reactions and behaviour because they lacked the right 
j context in which to m9ke sense of their feelings, when they 'o ned a CR group, they were 
able to articulate them, and to reallse that they were feeling angry, and acting angry. They 
had to challenge the traditional use of the term in order to account for their anger, and 
they could only do it by relying on a community of others in similar circumstances. The 
experience that those women had could not be completely captured by O'Cir conceptual 
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system. They shared a similar social situation, they partook in common practices, and their 
particular location allowed them to experience their lives in a determinate way that was 
not the expected one. I will argue, in the rest of the thesis, that it is their shar-ing of 
practices that allowed them to capture particular aspects of the world that \\'ere opaque to 
others. Being part of a group that occupies a determinate location, they all shared a 
common feeling of not fitting the role that they were expected to play. They knew what it 
is like to be in their situation, but they were unable individually to understand their 
feelings, those were not immediately transparent, or they might immediately have known 
that they felt anger. Instead, their feelings had to be articulated by engaging in an exchange 
with a group of people with similar experiences, occupying the same location that they 
were occupying. 
In relation to practical knowledge, I showed how there are knowers who are able to do 
what is required of them, but unable to explain to others how to do it. This knowledge can 
take the form of engaging directly with the world, such as swimming, or by apprehending 
aspects of the world and taking practical decisions regarding them, as it is the case of 
knowing when some bread is ready to be baked. In these cases, the knowers are able to 
engage successfully with the world without having to be able to put into propositions the 
content of their knowledge. Obviously this type of practical knowledge has some elements 
in common with experiential knowledge, because as well as the latter, it is acquired in and 
sanctioned by the communities wherein the knower belongs. I will use the normative 
nature of experiential and practical knowledge to support my claim that they are proper 
types of knowledge. 
But what about my claim that those are the grounds of epistemically privileged 
knowledge?. I have insisted on the epistemic value of the epistemic content that it is 
apprehended by knowers yet is non propositional. I will argue, in the next chapter, that 
non-propositional content can help us to enlarge our current conceptual systems. That 
content is more readily acquired by those who are at the margins, and who are able to 
sense a gap between the world as it is experienced by them and the way in which it is 
conceptualised. 
iH 
I have already pointed out that experiential knowledge seems to be the natural source IOr 
that privileged knowledge, and I want to point out now that practical knowledge is equally 
valid for grounding marginalized knowledge. If we review the example of midývifery, for 
instance, we can see how the medicalization of childbirth would have marginalized many 
instances of good practice and sound knowledge regarding traditional ways of deliver)'. 
Those who have delivered many children following those traditions could have seen how 
medical science was overlooking important facts about giving birth. Midwives would be 
an important source of criticism and improvement to a more theoretical approach to their 
trade, as well as being a source of inspiration for improvements. Their knowledge has both 
the critical edge and the creativity that are the mark of marginalized knowledges. 
I have established the basis for arguing that experiential and practical knowledge can be 
considered "proper" knowledge and, furthermore, that they can be the ground of 
privileged knowledge. Therefore, I have already tackled two issues that I mentioned in the 
first paragraph of this section. Now I want to introduce a further question: are both types 
of knowledge equally capable of grounding feminist knowledge?. Despite the similitudes, 
there is still an important difference between both types of examples. In the case of 
experiential knowledge it seems necessary that the knowers develop a feminist identity, in 
order to produce feminist knowledge, but in the case of practical knowledge this does not 
seem necessary. I pointed out this difference in the previous chapter (section 7). 
In order to support the view that both types of knowledge have need of knowers who 
have developed a political consciousness, I will argue that we should not forget that an 
individual midwife who is being relegated from her trade by a more fashionable medical 
approach to delivery is in the same position as the housewife who is unable to make sense 
of her feelings. Both of them need the support of a community in order to validate and 
justify their knowledge. Furthermore, unless they are able to argue their case on a political 
basis, and change our current perceptions of who is a reliable episternic agent, their 
knowledge will not be recognised as such. I have already claimed that the supporting of 
practical knowledges will have feminist implications, but the point at 
dispute now is 
whether practical knowers produce fcminist knowledge or not. 
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I believe that women with practical knowledge, can produce feminist knowledge when 
they develop a feminist consciousness. Nevertheless, I have to admit that this seems a 
counterintuitive move, because it seems obvious that knowers who have acquired their 
knowledge practically, in the form of skills, will retain their knowledge even if they do not 
develop an identity as marginal knowers. Therefore the step that I am suggestinog, the 
acquisition of a political consciousness, does not seem necessary in all cases. 
Knowledge is a social activity. For a practice to be considered knowledge, it has to 
present a normative aspect, and it needs to be recognised as such by a relevant community. 
Therefore, to have a skill is not simply to be able to do x, or y but, rather, it consists in 
knowing what will count as having done x or y correctly or incorrectly. This does not 
seem to imply that the community to which the subject belongs, a community of women, 
for instance, has to be a feminist community, one with a political consciousness, because it 
can be argued that the mere fact that there is a community suffices to fulfil the need of 
sanctioning the knowledge. Nevertheless, I think that we should not forget that in order 
for women to be considered an epistemic community, a certain awareness of politics is 
necessary. We should not forget that women is not a "natural" grouping, and that the 
practices within communities are entangled with the political identity of the communities. I 
think that women belonging to particular epistemic communities are knowers even if they 
do not have a feminist consciousness, but that the development of this consciusness 
improves their situation as knowers. Furthel-more, even if we can claim that women 
belonging to these communities are knowers, we cannot claim that their knowledge is 
feminist knowledge until they develop the appropriate political consciousness. 
In the next chapter I will analyse the role of tacit knowledge in our epistemic practices. 
This type of knowledge implies that we possess epistemic skills of which we are not aware 
of as well as those other of which we are aware. These skills are very valuable in theory 
making, because they can provide us with the resources to propose new theories as well as 
with a critical edge which allows us to see weaknesses in the current theories. In our 
present paradigm of knowledge, we do not recognise the value of knowers x0io possess 
these epistemic skills, a trend that should be changed. I will argue for new paradigms of 
knowledge that take advantage of epistemic diversity, and that acknowled-ges that ts 
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necessary to include different epistemic a ents who bring in particular cognitive skills 9 1-: ) (some of which are unacknowledged by them). I believe that this process is facilitated by 
the development of a political consciousness (this is the reason why I believe that 
epistemic communities of women benefit from the development of a political awareness as 
feminist). 
The political articulation of knowers who belong to marginalized epistemic groups is 
necessary for them to became aware that their practices are effective ways of 
apprehending and responding to the world, in a world, that their practical knowledge is 
"proper" knowledge. By becoming aware of the validity of their knowledge, and of the 
fact that their knowledge is marginalized for political, and not for epistemic reasons, they 
can be better prepared to support their knowledge claims, in opposition to those of the 
mainstream. Finally, it will also help those belonging to the mainstream to became aware 
of the existence of valid practices that are alien to them and of the need to attribute 
epistemic expertise to the members of those epistemic communities. 
Summarising, I have argued that there are types of content that ground knowledge even 
when we cannot put them in a propositional form. In my account of experience, I have 
insisted in the value of those types of content that cannot be put into words, because they 
allow us to enlarge our conceptual systems, allowing us to apprehend aspects of the world 
that would remain opaque otherwise. Furthermore, I will re-evaluate the role of those 
knowers who can allow us access to that content that it is only apprehensible through 
practices, and also to the types of knowledge that capture those types of content. I have 
argued that a political awareness is necessary to be able to produce feminist knowledge 
based both in the practical and experiet-. tial knowledge of women. In a later chapter I will 
also argue that it is conducive to feminist goals to argue for a form of evaluating 
knowledge that takes into account different types of expertise, and does not focus just on 
theoretical expertise. 
7 Conclusion 
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At the beginning of the chapter I claimed that I would argue for a re%, aluation of forms of 
knowledge that have been marginalized, in our epistemological tradition. I have succeeded 
in showing that these are not reducible to knowing that, that not all the content of what it 
is known can be put into propositions and that it is not straightforward that the most 
valuable form of knowledge is propositional knowledge. Nevertheless, opening up the 
definition of knowledge, means that I have to provide criteria to decide what will count as 
a knower having a correct knowledge of the world and what will not so count. According 
to the traditional view, a subject knows if he has a justified true belief but, with the 
inclusion of non-propositional types of knowledge, it is necessary to apply different 
criteria. In this chapter I have signalled that normativity is the criterion for knowledge. In 
the next chapter I will revise the concept of justification and also that of normativity. 
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CHAPTER-S 
0. Introduction. 
At the end of chapter 4,1 claimed that we should not take 'knowing that' as the only form 
of knowledge. I argued that there are other types of knowledge that are as valuable as 
'knowing that', and that cannot be reduced to it. I accepted that our current concept of 
knowledge as justified true belief should be revised in order to account for non- 
propositional knowledge, and its acceptance requires me to offer another definition of 
justification. In this chapter I will spell out what I mean by normativity and how this 
concept help us to justify different types of knowledge. My account of normativity W111 
lead me to discuss my concept of rationality, an issue that I will review in the next chapter. 
There are a number of philosophers who claim that all our mental content has to be 
conceptual. They make a close link between "being conceptual" and "being expressible in 
words". This amounts to saying that all our mental content should be expressible in words. 
I am going to argue for the existence of a non-conceptual mental content. I will claim that 
we cannot have an accurate representation of the world unless we accept the existence of 
this content. An example of the sort of content which might plausibly stand as a candidate 
for non-conceptual content is the following. we can perceive shades of colour for which 
we do not have names. Having established the existence of non-conceptual content I will 
then go on to use it to support the claim that we know things that we cannot express 
propositionally. 
My insistence on the representational character of knowledge does not imply 
cc representationalism". Representationalist theories assume that we have mental states that 
represent the world and that one role of epistemology is to dictate which of those are 
justified and can count as knowledge. There is at least one suggested alternative to 
reprentationalism that even if it does not deny Lhat we have representations of the external 
environment, -sug,! ýesis that ire do not slai-I thitikitig aboul Imou, ledge fi-om 
i-el*csetilatiolis. "i This alternatIN, 'e, which follows closely Heidegger's account of 
I A. Taticsill, (1999), PI 
I ýo 
knowledge in Being and Time, is characterised by A. Tanessini2 as being able to account I 
for practical knowledge, as accepting that value is constitutive of knowledge and, finally, 
as supporting the idea that knowledge is mainly a social activity. All these characteristics 
are very congenial to the projects supported by feminist epistemologists, and also to my 
own thesis. By not grounding knowledge on representation, this alternative is able to focus 
on different types of knowledge, being mainly " concerned with the kind of lalowledge we 
manifest in our everyday dealings with the world. This is practical mastery. "3 
I intend to redefine representation to broaden what counts as representing the world and, 
in doing so, I will also challenge some concepts of justification. I will argue that the 
apprehension of the world is necessary to knowledge because, in order to relate to the 
world in an appropriate manner, subjects have to be able to apprehend the world, to locate 
themselves within it, and to react to it adequately. But I will argue that apprehension does 
not need to consist in having a mental 'picture' of a particular aspect of the world, or a 
concept, or a word to describe it but, rather, it is attributed on the basis of the subject 
being able to relate to the world in an efficient manner. This approach to representation is 
coherent with my argument against the widespread idea that human beings capture the 
world solely by means of their conceptual apparatus, and that the only type of mental 
content is conceptual content. 
In this chapter I will first examine a theory put forward by McDowell, who denies the 
existence of non-conceptual content for human cognitive agents. He argues that all 
content must be conceptual if it is to enter into rational justificatory explanations. I will 
argue for a broader understanding of what should count as rational justification in order to 
accommodate non-conceptual content into McDowell's Picture of human knowledge and 
its relation with the world. 
In the next section I will explain what non-conceptual content is and how the 
apprehension of this content by humans is different from the apprehension of non- 
conceptual content by animals. This distinction is important because I have argued that the 
2 A. Tancsmi (I 999), J) 11-12. 
]-; Illcsllll (1999), p12. 
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attribution of knowledge claims is sometimes done on the basis of an appropriate 
behaviour or response to the environment, but this is something that is also attributable to 
animals. I want to argue that, while humans can be attributed knowledge on this basis 
because they inhabit the space of reasons, animals are not entitled to the same attributions. 
1. Sensibility and spontaneity: two ways of representing reality. 
McDowell considers that all animals posses sensibility, which means that all animals have 
perceptual sensitivity to their environment by means of their senses. Human beings, have 
sensibility, as all animals do but, at the same time, they also possess spontaneity. 4 The 
faculty of spontaneity allows humans to acquire concepts. 5 McDowell thinks that once we 
have acquired concepts our representation of the world changes, we do not perceive the 
world "innocently" any longer, but rather due to our spontaneity, we perceive the world as 
mediated by our conceptual repertoire. Therefore, pre-linguistic babies and animals 
represent the environment at a non-conceptual level, but for humans who have acquired a 
language, all the content in our perceptual representations became conceptual. 
I will explain why, for McDowell, the acquisition of concepts makes such a big change to 
our perception of the world and some of its consequences in relation to knowledge 
We acquire concepts by acquiring a language and, in the process, we learn to recognise 
the rational relations between the concepts. This means, in McDowells terms, that we 
come into the realm of reasons. 6 For McDowell, the "space of reasons" is a normative 
space, created as an abstraction from concrete practices of giving and asking for reasons. ' 
In order to enter the space of reasons, the knower has to enter the space of concepts, that 
is, learn a language. Once a language is acquired, the subject is then able to see the 
4 j. McDowell (1994), "We have what mere animals have, perceptual sensitivity to features of our 
environment, but we have it in a special form. Our perceptual sensitlvitN, to our environment is taken up 
into the ambit of the faculty of spontaneity. which is what distinguishes us from them. " p 64. 
5 Actually, I am not sure that this is a correct characterisation of spontaneity. J. McDoNN-ell (1994) equates 
spontancitN, with understanding and endorses Kant's definition of it- "The facultv, on the other hand, 
which enables us to think the object of sensible intuition is the understanding. " p 4. 
6 j. McDowell (1994). "In being initiated into a language., a human being is introduced into sonictlung th; it 
already embodies putatively rational linkages betivecii concepts, putatively constitutive of the layout of the 
space of reasons, before she conics on the scene. " p 125. 
'R. Brandon ( 1995), p 896. 
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relations in the space of reasons, and then she can make kno-'xIed(ge claims or claims that 
express knowledge. I will give an example to illustrate this. A twelve month old babN. 
shouting "the house is on fire" does not understand the implications of such a claim, but 
his seven year old sister does because she realises how it stands in the space of reasons. 
Standing in the space of reasons means standing in the space of concepts, ' given that" 
concepts are places in the space of reasons. "' McDowell is offering a procedure to justify 
knowledge: making the appropriate moves in the space of reasons counts as having 
knowledge. " There is a clear link between being in the space of reasons and counting as a 
knower. Those who cannot stand in the space of reasons, cannot know. 
But what happens when someone who is not considered to be a knower, an animal for 
instance, utters the appropiate words at the fight moment? Brandon proposes an 
interesting example to question this point: "what is the difference between a parrot who is 
disposed reliably to respond differentially to the presence of red things by saying 'kwak, 
that's red' and a human reporter who makes the same noise under the same 
circumstances?. "" He answers that the parrot does not possess the concept of red and, 
therefore, it does not have understanding. A human being is a knower because she has a 
concept of red and this is evident because she "can tell whatfollowsftom them and what 
would be evidence for these. "" The first consequence of distinguishing between 
spontaneity and sensibility is that only human beings who possess a language are to count 
as knowers. 
The second consequence of the possession of spontaneity is that our dealings with the 
-Four freedom, in the sense that we can choose whether or external world are the product o. 
not we take the deliverances of our senses as adequate pictures of reality. This freedom is 
one that will influence our dealings with the world in a way that cannot be attributed to 
animals. McDowell says that "niwinially, it must be possible to decide iihether or flot to 
judge that 117iiigs are as one's cxperietice represetits them to be. Hoic otic 's experience 
8J. McDowell (199 5), "The space of reasons is the space NN Ithin NN hich thought moves, and its topography 
is that of the rational interconnection between conceptual contents: we nught equally speak of the space of 
concepts. " p 888. 
9R. Brandon (1995). 1) 894. 
1 (, 11. Brandon (1995). p 894. 
''R. Brindon (199-5). 1) 895 
12R. Brandon (1995). 1) 895 
1 1719 
represents thitigs to be is tiot wider olh? 'S C017trol, but it i's up to one it'hether one accelts 
the appearatice or rejects it. "13 Experience means what is delivered by the senses and, 
according to McDowell, experience in human beings is already saddled with concepts, a 
use of the term that it is clearly different from the use of experience as raw data. This 
concept of experience is not applicable to animals in the same way as to humans because 
animals cannot judge whether or not the world it is as it is presented to them by their 
senses. 
McDowell expresses the distinction in a Gadamerian fashion when he claims that there is a 
"difference between a merely animal mode of life, in an environment, and a human mode 
of Iýfe, in the world"". For McDowell, living in an environment implies that animals are 
biologically determined in their behaviour "A merely animal life is shaped by goals whose 
control of the animal's behaviour at a given moment is an outcome of biological forces. 
A mere animal does not weigh reasons and decide what to do. "" This important 
distinction establishes that animals cannot choose how to behave, while humans 
cam" When we acquire conceptual powers, our lives come to embrace not just coping with 
problems and exploiting opportunities, constituted as such by immediate biological 
imperatives, but exercising spontaneity, deciding what to think and do. "" We can chose 
what to think and what to do. Therefore possessing spontaneity means not just that we can 
decide freely how to act but also that we are responsible for our representations, in a way 
that animals are not. 
In the opening paragraph of the section, I quoted McDowell where he said that humans, as 
animals, have perceptual sensitivity to features of the environment. Humans perceive and 
represent the environment by using their spontaneity, that is, their picture of reality is 
mediated by concepts, while animals, not possessing concepts, must have other forms of 
perception and representation. McDowel grants that animals perceive the environment and 
take decisions; fie says, "itýe iieed to appeal to ati aninial's seiisiliiiýy to features of its 
etwirownent ýf ive are to understand its alert and se4f-moving life, the precise waj, in 
Nlc. Do\\-cll (1994). p 11. 
J. McDo\N cl I (1994), pI 15. 
J. T\IcDo\N-cil (1994). pI 15. 
J. r\jcj)(ý\vcjl (1994). 1) 115. 
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it, hich it col)e. y competently ivith its environment. " This description of how we cannot 
understand the behaviour of animals unless we take into account that they are awaFe of 
their environment, and that this qllows them to act competently within it, brings the mode 
of representation of animals closer to the human model. 
In relation to the determinism of the behaviour of animals, he denies that animals have 
spontaneity and, therefore, freedom in a Kantian sense; but he claims that this does not 
imply that he considers animals automata. Animals can be "In their ways, clever, 
resource 1, inquisitive, ftiendly and so forth. "" Animals cannot have a world but "if : fu 
someone wants to word out a conception of orientation towards the world that is 
detachedfrom spontaneity in the Kantian sense, with a view to making the language of 
world-directness available for talking about the mentality of brutes, that is, so far, 
perfectly all right by my lights. 1119 What we have now, in McDowell's theory, is an 
acceptance that the mental content of animals is non-conceptual but it is, in a way, 
representational. Animals have to apprehend the world in order to be able to respond to it 
in an appropiate way, and they do respond to the world in an appropriate manner. 
Even if McDowell has moderated the differences between animals and humans, he still 
insists on the dramatic changes that learning a language makes to our view of the world: 
once we acquire concepts there is no way "out". McDowell wants to avoid the theory that 
the animal way of representing the world forms the basis of our own representation of the 
world because he believes that non-conceptual content cannot be the basis of our 
conceptual content. The reason why this is not possible, according to McDowell, is 
because, if it were the case, we could not justify our knowledge claims. I will devote 
section 5 to an analysis of this last claim. 
2. Spontaneity and representational content in humans. 
McDowell considers that spontaneity is natural, and by natural he means second nature, 
following closely the Aristotelian model- "Exercises (? f spowaneity belong to our mode of 
" J. McDowell ( 1994), p 117. 
18 J. McDowell (1994), p 182. 
19.1. McDowell (1994), p 18',. 
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living. And our mode of living is our ivay of actualising ourselves as animals. So we can 
rephrase the thought by saying: exercises of spontaneity belong to our way of actualising 
ourselves as animals. Once we have acquired an Understanding of concepts, through 
spontaneity, this becomes second nature for us, and We Cannot perceive nature 10thout 
it. "2" I agree with him on that point, but I do not agree with one of the implications that 
McDowell draws from this claim, viz., that the only representational content that humans 
can have is conceptual content. 
McDowell offers the following arguments to support this claim: 
a. He claims that, unless we take experiences to be the deliverance of conceptual 
capacities, that is, as the result of operations of spontaneity, we cannot attribute any 
representational content to them. If experiences have non-conceptual content then they are 
intuitions without content, and therefore, they are blind2l. 
b. He says that all our perceptual content has to be conceptual because, in all our claims 
about what we receive from our senses, we take inductive steps and we cannot take 
inductive steps unless we can put our knowledge into propositions. 22 He gives the 
following example of this "colour experiences being testimony of the senses depends on 
the subject's already knowing a great deal about, for instance, the effect of different sorts 
of illumination on colour appearances; and a subject could not A770W that without 
knowing a great deal, outside the immediate deliverances of the senses, about the 
objecli vc world and our cognith)e access to it. "23 
c. He claims that unless experiences are the product of spontaneity, they could not be 
subject to revision. If we could not revise them, then we would have to take them as they 
appear, and we would not be able to see the relations among them as reason constituting. 
All this implies that, unless experiences are the product of spontaneity, we are only 
exculpated to believe, and not justified to believe, in our judgernents. 
I will argue that content can be representational at different levels. For instance, we have 
seen how, even if animals do not have conceptual capacities, they are able to represent 
20 J. McDowell (1994) P'8ý2- 
21 J. McDowell (1994). p 522. 
22 J. McDowell (1994). " This is so ewil with the concepts that are most iinmcdiatclv linked to the 
subjcclive clmi,, Iý: Ici of cxpericiice itself, the concepts of secondary qualities. 
" p 11. 
21 J. McDowell (1995), p", "91, 
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their environments, a condition sine qua non for their survival. I have already agreed that, 
being in the space of reasons, the way in which humans represent the world is not the way 
in which animals do. Despite the differences, I believe that there is some mental content 
that it is representational and non-conceptual at the same time (it is non-conceptual, but 
this does not Imply that It is blind). 
I will argue against the idea expressed in (b) while supporting the existence of non- 
conceptual content. I will argue that, even if a subject needs to have concepts in order to 
relate to the world, this does not imply that all its content is necessarily conceptual. I will 
analyse at length the example, used by McDowell, regarding colours. I VAII prove that, 
from the fact that colour experiences require that the knower must have certain 
presuppositions, we cannot infer that all the content in that experience has to be 
conceptual. I will support the existence of non-conceptual content that can accompany 
conceptual content in colour experiences. 
Finally, I will explain how McDowell wants to avoid non-conceptual content because he 
thinks that non-conceptual content cannot be justified, being something not suitable to 
enter the realm of reasons. I will argue that humans who have entered the realm of reasons 
can have non-conceptual content (accompanying their conceptual content) and that this 
non-conceptual content can enter the realm of reasons and can, therefore, be justified. I 
want to emphasise that I do not claim that non-conceptual content justifies knowledge 
claims by itself, as the Myth of the Given makes us believe. I also do not claim that it is the 
raw data coming from our senses what justifies our claims of knowledge in a causal way. 
Rather, I believe that the justification for non-conceptual content comes from its place in 
the realm of reasons. Later in the chapter I will argue that McDowell has to expand what 
counts as justifying knowledge, suggesting that reasons for actions are also part of the ID 1= > -=) 
make up of the space of reasons, and I will also claim that justification is not simply a case 
of producing propositions to back up knowledge claims. 1. ) 1 
On being exculpated and being justified to believe 
3.1 On being exculpated to believe 
We have seen how McDowell24 thinks that representational content cannot be non- 
conceptual. I have already pointed out how his characterisation of representational content 
is too restrictive: if we accept it, then we cannot understand how animals can apprehend 
their environments in an adequate way in order to survive in it. My aim in this section is to 
weaken further his conception of content as uniquely conceptual25. 
I will begin by distinguishing my position from two others that are criticised by McDowell- 
The Myth of the Given and a particular application of it, Evan's theory on content. Both 
of them make use of non-conceptual content in a way from which I differ. I agree with 
McDowell that, in both theories, the subject is not justified to believe, but rather, 
exculpated to believe. 
3.1.1. The Myth of the Given. 
What stands against the conceptual scheme is the Given. The Given stands for the 
information that reaches our senses without being changed by our conceptual capacities: 
raw data coming from the environment. 
McDowell's main criticism regarding the existence of this raw data is that, if it constitutes 
the base for our judgements, we have ýo think of a way to guarantee that our "exercises of 
concepts can constitute warranted judgements about the world. "" If we distinguish 
between our perceptions of the world and our concepts, then there has to be "an external 
constraint on ourfteedom to deploy our empirical concepts. "" So, if we have to ground 
our belief that a judgement is a true judgement, we must have to point out the object 
which provides us with the experience (composed by the given or raw data) in the first 
place "pointing to something that is simply received in experi . ence. "2' This schema 
2" J. McDowell (1994), "Representational content cannot be dualistically set over against the 
conceptual. ( ... 
) that is obviously so, however hospitable wc are to the idea that some representational 
content is non-conceptual. " p3. 
25 Having made this remark, I will also say that what I NN-111 be talking about in this section is content for 
humans and I have already agreed with J. McDoNA-cil that once humans step In the realm of reasons their 
content is then vcrý, different from that of animals'. 
2t, J. McDowell (1994). p 5. 
27 J. McDowel I( 1994). p 6. 
211 j. McDowell (1994). p 7. 
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requires the existence of observational concepts, "conceps suited tofigure injudgetnents 
that are directly responsive to experience. "" These observational concepts have been 
formed 'from cotifrol7tatIOIIS with stfitable bits of the Given. "" The problem is that "in 
any ordinary impingement on our sensibility, it would hcn)e to be a manifold Given that it 
I. s presented to US. if 
31 
In this theory "the space of reasons, the space ofjustifications or warrants, extends more 
widely than the conceptual sphere. The extra extent of the space of reasons is supposed to 
allow it to incorporate non-conceptual impactsfrom outside the realm of thought. But we 
cannot really understand the relations in virtue of which ajudgement is warranted except 
as relations within the space of concepts: relations Mich as implication or 
probabilification, which hold between potential exercises of conceptual capacities. ne 
attempt to extend the scope ofjustificatory relations outside the conceptual sphere cannot 
do what is supposed to do. "' If the Justification for our beliefs come from non-conceptual 
content, then McDowell argues that we cannot be justified to believe, but rather 
exculpated to believe x. We are exculpated because the relation is simply brutally causal, 
rather than justificatory. 
It is clear that the model of reason that McDowell is presenting is that of reason as a 
process of reasoning, which includes sets of propositions that have relations of implication 
and prcbabilification. 
3.1.2 Evan's Modd 
McDowell argues that an example of the Myth of the Given that has to face the above 
difficulties is the model offered by Evans, who claims that non-conceptual content is 
representational. According to Evans, we receive the information from our senses 
unmediated by concepts. Both human beings and animals apprehend the world at this basic 
level. Human beings process this information at a second stage, by using conceptual 
29 j McDowell (1994). p7. 
30 j. McDowell (1994), p 7. 
" J. McDoNN, Cll (1994), p 7. 
32.1. McDoNN-cil (1994), p7 
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abilitieS. 33 
McDowell claims that it is not possible to transform a non-conceptual representati2n of 
the world into a conceptual one. According to McDowell, Evans's position implies that 
we cannot see the relations that exists among our perceptions, given that those relations 
are given within the space of reasons, and that we cannot recognise those relations as 
reason constituting. If this were the case, we would be in the same situation as animals are 
when perceiving their environment, we could not form judgements, and we could not 
justify our claims. 34 
I agree with McDowell's criticisms of both theories. I think that he successfully proves 
that non-conceptual content (if we characterise it as raw data) cannot be the basis for our 
conceptual content. But there is a second possibility that he overlooked and for which I 
will argue: non-conceptual content, as part of our content, unified with conceptual 
content. 
3.2 On being j ustified to believe. 
In this section I will explain and criticise what McDowell considers as justification for 
knowledge. McDowell uses experience to justify our beliefs, but claims that this 
experience is already saddled with concepts, so his use of experience does not include 
non-conceptual content. If our experiences are saddled with concepts, this implies that 
spontaneity is in operation in experience. And McDowell points out most vehemently that, 
even if there is this active element in our experience, we are also passive recipients of it. " 
Passivity in our acquisition of experiences ensures that the world has a say in our 
perceptions and that, therefore, we are having a glimpse at the world while experiencing it. 
33 J. McDowell points out that for Evans, experience is not the same in animals and humans. 
34 J. McDowell (1994), "The putatively rational relations between experiences which this position does 
not conceive as opcrations of spontancity, cannot themselves be within the scope of spontaneity, liable to 
revision, if that Nvcrc to be what the self-scrutiny of activc thinking recommends. And that means that we 
cannot genuinely recognise the relation as potentially reason-constituting" p. 52. 
35 j. I McDoNvcIl ( 1994), "In order to escape the oscillation, Nve need a conception of experiences as states or 
occurrences that are passive but reflect conceptual capacities, capacities that 
belong to spontancity, in 
opcra(ion. - p 2,. 
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" We know that our mental content represents the world because we are passive recipients 
of intuitions that affect our sensory system. Therefore there is a relation between the world 
and our representation of it. That relation is mediated by our conceptual apparatus, so we 
are not receiving stimuli from the environment without making any contributions to it but, 
rather, we perceive our environment as already organised by our concepts, so we are 
partially responsible for our mental content. Our perceptions of the world constrain what 
we can think of it but, also, what we can think of constrains our perception of the world. 
This guarantees that we can justify our assertions about the world as knowledge about the 
world, 37 but at the same time it means that all our mental content has to be conceptual and 
that we cannot justify any claims of knowledge that have a non-conceptual content. 
So far, I have offered an exposition of McDowell's thought. I will now offer some of its 
consequences and some criticisms against it. 
3.2.1 If we cannot justify any claims of knowledge that have a non-conceptual content, 
then it seems that certain types of knowing-how will not count as knowledge. I have 
argued that there are types of knowledge that cannot be expressed propositionally. If we 
equate conceptual knowledge with knowledge expressed propositionally, then it is clear 
that knowing-how will not be justifiable in those cases in which its content cannot be 
specified propositionally. I will argue, later in the thesis, that knowledge that cannot be 
expressed propositionally is both justifiable and, also, plays an important role in the 
justification of knowledge that is expressible propositionally. 
3.2.2 McDowell claims that the conceptual order that our language encompasses is a 
rational order that is present in reality, whether we are able to see it or not. The passivity 
of our experiences, which I have mentioned in a previous section, that plays such an 
36 j. McDowell (1994), "The fact that exper-., -ýnce is passive, a matter of receptivity in operation should 
assure us that we have all the external constrain we can reasonably want. The constrain comes from 
outside thinking, but not from outside what is thinkable. " p 28. 
37 J. McDowell (1994). "In a particular experience in which one is not misled, what onc takes that things 
are thus and so. That things are thus and so is the content of experience, and it can also be the content of a 
judgement: it becomes the content of a judgement if the subject decides to take the experience at face 
value. So it is conceptual content. But that things are thus and so is also, if one is not misled, and aspect of 
the 1, wout of the world. is how things are. Thus the idea of conceptually structured operations of 
rccepfivity puts us into a position to speak of experience as openness to the layout of reality. Experience 
enables the layout of reality itself to exert a rational influence on what a subject thinks. " p26. 
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important part in McDowell's system is further enhanced by the idea that the space of 
concepts captures the world as it is. This is clearly expressed in the following quotation 
"In experience One find oneseýf saddled with content. One's conceptual capacities hmv 
already been brought into play, in the content's being available to one before one has 
any choice in the matter. The content is not something one has put together oneseýf, as 
when one decides what to say about something. "' 
If the rational order is already in nature and we acquire a certain way of looking at the 
world, a standpoint, which we inherit when learning a language, then it seems that we 
represent the world in a way that does not allow much freedom or choice. This seems to 
contradict McDowell's theory that we have the power of deciding if the world is as it is 
presented to us via our spontaneity. This was one of the main differences between a 
human and an animal way of apprehending the world. 
The way of escaping this contradiction is to claim that the capacities that we exercise 
when we acquire that content are conceptual and this means that "Minimally, it must be 
possible to decide whether or not tojudge that things are as one's experience represents 
them to be. How one's experience represents things to be is not under one's control, but it 
is up to one whether one accepts the appearance or rejects it. "" Therefore, even if we are 
given a seemingly closed conceptual system, we still have to reflect upon it in a critical 
way. McDowell claims that "weaknesses that reflection discloses can dictate the 
. 
formation of new concepts and conceptions. " 40 
Our conceptual system is never closed, because even those thoughts that we accept after 
critical reflection can still be the product of "parochialism, or reliatice or bad 
prejudice. "" This idea links nicely with the assertion that we have an obligation to reflect 
on "the credewials of the putam, cly rallot7al lhikages that, at atiy time, otie takes to 
govert, the active busitiess of adjuslitig otie's world view m respotise to experi . etice iW 
because "there is tioguaratifee that the world is completeiýi lt'I'117111 the reach of a, ývslem 
's ' lmlicsmc mine. I McDowell (1994), p 10. 
-19 . 1. NJ, -I)k)N\cll 
(1994). 1) 11. 
-10 J. McDowell (1994), p 81. 
41 j. Mcl)ON\. el I (1994), 1) 8 1. 
4 2.1. Nl,: I)()\\Cll (1994), 1) 40ý 
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of Concepts and conceptions as it stands at some para . cular moment in its historical 
development. 1143 
On the one hand, McDowell claims that our conceptual system reflects theWOFId rellablv. 
He also claims that we acquire it through the acquisition of language, and I ha-ve claimed 
that this seems to be like the acquisition of a rigidly pre-formed structure. But on the other 
hand, McDowell allows changes in our conceptual system (the ways in which we represent 
the world can change) so, even if we acquire a worldview already structured, it admits 
further changes. What is even more interesting is that he also says that we can adjust our 
world view in response to experience. The question now is that, given that experience is 
already loaded by concepts, how is it possible that experience enables us to change 
precisely those concepts that it encloses? 
I have put forward an important problem for McDowell: he has to explain how we can 
make changes in our view of reality that is rigidly enclosed in our conceptual system. He 
cannot resort to unmediated experience to explain the changes, given that the knowledge 
that we obtain in this way will be outside of the realm of reasons, that is, we could not 
justify it. Is there any solution to this problem?. 
My answer to this problem is that McDowell has to enlarge his concept of justification and 
allow for non-conceptual content in his theory but, before I develop this argument, I will 
explore an answer to thepFoblem more in tune with McDowell's theory 
4. Gadamer on the fusion of horizons. 
McDowell has to explain how it is possible to exercise a critical approach to the 
deliverances of spontaneity when our sensory experience is already saddled with concepts. 
McDowell resorts to saying that sometimes experience will make us realise that our 
judgement is wrong; but I have already pointed out that this move is not allowed by 
NlcDowell's theory. 
43 J. McDowell (1994), p 40. 
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A second resource of criticism for our conceptual system is that of getting to understand 
another thinker, who is, in principle, opaque to us. " This second possibility does not, in 
pfinciple, imply that we have to get outside of our conceptual system, but it presents its 
own problems. 
McDowell considers that we can get to share conceptual systems that are, in principle, 
opaque to us. This means that there are parts of the world that are not wholly captured by 
our acquired language and conceptual system. This seems to fit with his project, given that 
he accepts that our conceptual systems are always incomplete. The problem is that, if 
those conceptual systems enclose experiences to which we cannot have access via our 
conceptual apparatus, then how is it possible that we can make the jump into that new 
and different conceptual system? How is it possible that we understand what the other 
person means by concepts that are opaque to us? We cannot even resort to asking them to 
point to us what it is what they mean, given that the deliverances of our senses are already 
saddled with our own concepts. A related problem is that it does not seem to be possible 
that, sharing a rationality that is based in our spontaneity, there can be thinkers who are 
opaque to us. 
There are some answers to the problem that I am creating for McDowell. Those answers 
can be found in the work of Gadamer, to whom McDowell's theory is greatly indebted. 
There are striking parallels in the work of both philosopher6, so I think I am entitled to try 
to use Gadamer's work to help McDowell out of some of these difficulties. 
Gadamer, as McDowell has done, claims that experience is preformed by language, but 
that, even so, there are critical possibilities within it. One of the most important sources of 
criticisms against our own experiences of the world come from conversations with others 
when they are ( in Gadamer's own words) opposed thinkers. They can provide us with 
new critical tests and with new experiences. 45 
44 j. McDowell (1994) "When the specific character of her thinking starts to come into view for us we are 
not filling in blank in a pre-existing sideways-on picture of how her thought bears on the world, but 
join coming to share with her a standpoint within a system of concepts, a standpoint from which we can 
her in directing a shared attention at the world without needing to break out thought a boundary that 
encloses the system of concepts. " p 36. 
45 H. Gadamer (1975) "The fact that we move in a linguistic world and grow up into the world though an 
experience preformed by language does not at all remove the possibilities of critique. On the contrarý,. the 
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It is important to note that any experience has to be preformed by language if it is goina to 
be understood at all, so that, if the conversation with the other is going to provide us with 
new experiences, they have to be expressed in words that we can understand. According 
to Gadamer, a condition sine qua non for any conversation to take place is that there has 
to be a shared language. 46 But then, if we have in our vocabulary the resources to 
understand the experiences, it seems that they are not new experiences for us. The 
parallels between McDowell's problem and this one are clear. The difficulty that I have 
just pointed out appears to me as an important difficulty that Gadamer has to solve, and I 
think that Gadamer has a good answer to it. 
Gadamer says that understanding is a creative exercise. When we are involved in a 
conversation with another person, we become aware that that person has a different view 
on the subject. In order to reach an understanding of that person , we must be open to 
changing our own view, 47 and the end result will be a position that will not look like any 
of the two previously held. Gadamer calls this a fusion of horizons. 48 This is a very 
interesting answer to the problem that I have posited: when we understand another 
person, out of the process of understanding a new content is created, which is different 
from those that the two people involved in conversation had previous to their exchange of 
ideas. Gadamer thinks that, in order to understand another person, or a book, or a 
historical situation, we have to have prejudices, that is, we have to be able to relate to 
them closely. For instance, if we are going to understand others, we have to share a 
language, that is, a way of life. 49 If we are going to understand a particular historical 
possibility of going beyond our conventions and beyond all those experiences that we schematized in 
advance opens up before us once we find ourselves, in our conversation with others, faced with opposed 
thinkers, with new critical tests, with new experiences. " p 546. 
46 H. Gadamer (1975) "Mastering the language is a necessary precondition for coming to an 
understanding in a conversation. Evciý, conversation obviously presupposes that the two speakers speak 
the same language. " p 385. 
47 H. Gadamer (1975) "Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes that both parIners are 
ready for it and are tiý, Ing got recognize the full value of what is alien and opposed to them. If this 
happens mutually, and each of the partners while simultaneously holding on to his own arguments, 
weights the counter-arguments, it is finally possible to achieve- in an imperceptible but not arbitrirN, 
reciprocal translation of the other's position (we call this an example of vic%vs)- a common diction and a 
common dicturn. " p 387. 
48 H. Gadanicr (1975) "The horizon is the range of vision that includes cN crý, thing that can be sccii from 
a particular vantage point". p 268. 
49 H. Gadamcr (1975) "For you understand a language by living in it. " p 385. 
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situation this has to be part of our past, of our Inheritance. 
The weakness that I perceive in the system is one which Gadamer is aware of, if Nve need 
to be filled with a knowledge of the past already in order to attempt its understanding, 
then it seems that we will not gain a new point of view from this exercise. And this 
familiarity is a necessary condition of understanding because, unless we are acquainted 
with the ways of the past, with that particular horizon of the past, we cannot understand 
it. 50 
The similitude with the problem encountered by McDowell is evident. We need a 
conceptual system in order to make sense of the conceptual system of an opaque thinker, 
but unless there is a common ground, we cannot understand each other 
Nevertheless, there is a very valuable contribution made by Gadamer, when he says that 
ccevery encounter with tradition that takes place within historical consciousness involves 
the experience of the tension between the text and the present. "51 It is possible to sense a 
tension between conceptual systems, as it is possible to sense a tension between a 
historical text of the past and the present. 
An example that illustrates even more clearly the feeling of tension between a conceptual 
system and the world is that which takes place in translation. When we try to translate 
between two languages we have mastered, we became acutely aware that words seem to 
fit the world so perfectly that it is not possible to find equivalents in the other language. 52 
It is then that we became experientially aware that language appropriates the world in an 
inadequate way. And, also, it becomes clear that, when we translate, we interpret, and that 
make us see the world in a different way. 
The translator has the possibility of seeing the world in two different ways, an experience 
that is not open to two people involved in a conversation and who share a language. The 
50 H. Gadarner (1975) "if lioNvuer. there is no such thing as these horizons that are distinguished from 
one another, why do NN-C speak of the fusion horizons and not simply of the formation of the one horizon, 
whose bounds arc set in the depths of tradition'. 1- p 273, 
51 H. Gadarncr (1975). p27ý. 
52 H. Gadainer (1975). p402. 
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understanding that they reach would be truly innovative if they were translating each other 
but, as Gadamer makes very clear, two people v,, ho speak the same language do not 
translate each other. 53 They do not interpret one another, the), simply speak to one 
another. 
The conceptual tension that we can find in the conversation between two people who 
speak the same language is based on differences that can be understood and sorted by 
producing convincing arguments, 54 but the sort of tension that I am highlighting, and that 
is really creative, is that which translation produces and this cannot be explained by 
producing good arguments but, rather, by getting involved in different ways of life and, 
therefore, acquiring whole new languages. 
There is an instance of a situation close to translation, which takes place between two 
people who share the same language but who does not share the same culture. In this case, 
the meanings of the words are not symmetrical, and the process of understanding 
necessitates that at least one of the persons involved in the conversation gets involved in 
the way of life of the other. 
Although I believe that understanding another person in conversation in a shared language 
(when there is a shared culture) can successfully change part of our preformed views on 
the world ,I think that 
its innovative powers are very limited. The conditions under which 
understanding can be reached (sharing a common language, for instance) imposes very 
severe limits on what can be changed. 
Therefore, I think that both Gadamer and McDowell need a more radical approach to the 
question of engaging in conversation with others if this exercise is going to enlarge our C) 
conceptual system. I have favoured the view that what is needed is a more radical change 
in our "horizon", one that implies changes in Dur ways of life in order to properly 
51 
-) Fi. 
Gadarner (1975) "When there is understanding. there is no translation, but speech" p 384. 
54 H. Gadamer (1975) "Reaching an understanding in conversation presupposes that both partners are 
rcady for it and arc trying to recognize the full value of what is alien and opposed to them. If this happens 
nititualtv, and each of the partners. while simultaneously holdin- on to his own arguments, \\cl, -, hts tile 
countcr-argunient. it is firially possible to achieve in an imperceptible but non arbitrary reciprocal 
(ranslation ofthe other's position (we call this an exchange of \*ic\\*s)- a common diction and a common 
dictuni. - p 387. 
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understand others (I will develop this possibility in more detail in the next chaptcr 
Summarising, the argument that I analysed in section 3 was the difference between being 
justified to believe and being exculpated to believe. One of the main dIfferences X, ý, -as that 
we are justified to believe when we can reflect critically about our representation of reality 
and revise our conceptual system to decide if it fits the world adequately. Given the close 
relation between experience and spontaneity, that is between our conceptual system and 
our perception of the world, it seemed impossible to get a glimpse of the world 
unmediated by concepts. My question was how to became aware of the tension between 
our conceptual system and the world in order to be able to think critically about it? This 
question is of central relevance for McDowell given that what is at stake is whether our 
conceptual apparatus, our spontaneity, allows us enough space to receive clues from the 
world that will make us enlarge and cfiticise our conceptual apparatus. I have pointed out 
the severe restrictions that McDowell's system imposes over our attempt to appraise 
critically our conceptual systems. I have signalled that a way of becoming aware of the 
tension between conceptual systems and the world is by translation, by mastering another 
language and, therefore, by being involved in more than one way of life. 
How does this link with my defence of the existence of non-conceptual content? The 
awareness that there is a gap between the world and our conceptual systems is not 
expressible propositionally, and it cannot be acquired by an exchange of arguments, it is 
experiential. I have argued that mastering a new language is not the only way to became 
aware of this gap- as I have already said, getting involved in particular practices within 
communities is another. The involvement in those ways of life or practices will allow us to 
make explicit certain conterils that are usually at the fringes of our consciousness and 
remain untold. This tacit knowledge (which again, is not propositional or conceptual) will 
allow us to make important changes in our conceptual system. 
5. The firnits of conceptual content: shades of colours. 
So far I havc used two different arguments to support the existence of non-conceptual ID 
content. First, I pointed out how animals have a content that is non-conccptual but that 
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allows them to respond appropriately to the world, which implies that they have, 
somehow, apprehended the world. This opens up the possibility of the same sort of 
content in humans. Second, I have argued that it is necessary to experience the tension 
between our conceptual systems and the world as it appears to us if we are goInC, ' to 
exercise our spontaneity critically. A good way of apprehending the tension is by learning 
another language, which implies getting involved in a different way of life. Another is 
getting involved with different communities, which, again, implies the acquisition of 
interpretational skills that cannot be expressed propositionally. At any rate, I have argued 
that a simple conversation between people who have different points of view that can be 
shared, by arguing for or against them, is not enough to produce a tension between the 
world and our conceptual system. 
Gadamer himself, points out that language is very ill suited for expressing what we fee155. 
If this is the case, why should we accept that we can experience the world solely by means 
of our linguistic resources? One of the arguments used most often to support the non- 
conceptual representational concept of experience is that our concepts cannot capture the 
richness of the content of experience. One of the most common examples to illustrate this 
point is the number of shades of colours that we can perceive but for which we do not 
have names. This fact suggests that there are some contents of experience that are not 
completely captured by our concepts. 
McDowell considers that we can capture completely the content of fine-grain experience 
like the shades of colours by using expressions such as "that shade". He believes that "If 
ive hai)e theCO17cept of a shade, ourCO17cepIua1poi, t, ers are fully adequate to capture our 
colour ex1mrience in all its determinate detail. "' Therefore, we do not need to refer to a 
non-conceptual content of experience. 
do not find McDowell's answer satisfactory, so I will put for-ward a number of 
ai-", Linients to support the viexv that in our perception of shades of colours there is a non- 
conceptual element that it is not captured by expressions such as "that shade". 
55 14. (3adamcr ( 1975), p 40 1. 
56 J. NlcDoNN, cll (1994). p 58. 
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The first argument against McDowell is the following- attributing the possession of 
concepts to speakers is a process that necessitates that the speaker uses the concept in 
more than a single occasion of utterance. Claiming that when the subject says "that shade" 
is exercising a conceptual capacity, McDowell let himself open to the criticism that this 
cannot be a conceptual capacity because it "contains an expression of a colour concept 
that it is restricted to this occasion of utterance. "" 
In order to support his view against that criticism, McDowell argues that "the very same 
capacity to embrace a colour in mind can in principle persist beyond the duration of the 
experience itseýf "" He says that when you see the shade, i. e., have the experience of that 
shade, there is a conceptual content in this perception that produces in the perceiver the 
acquisition of a recognitional capacity. If, later in life, the shade is present again, the 
recognitional capacity acquired the first time you saw the shade allows you to recognise it 
again: -It is the conceptual content of such a recognitional capacity that it is guaranteed to be 
available at the time of the experience with which the capacity sets in. Later in the life of the 
capacity it can be given linguistic expression again, if the course of experience is favourable: 
that is, if experience again, or still, presents one with a suitable sample. But even in the absence 
of a sample, the capacity goes on being exploitable as long as it lasts, in thoughts based on 
memory: thoughts that are not necessarily capable of receiving an overt expression that fully 
determines their content. "" He says that we keep the capacity of recognising the shad-- as 
long as we remember the shade, but he admits that this implies admitting the existence of 
thoughts that are not necessarily capable of receiving an overt expression that fully 
determines their content, which means that they cannot be expressed by appropriate 
words, and this is exactly the point that it is at stake. 
Given the close link between concepts and words that he establishes, he is rather 
contradicting himself when he claims that there is a content that cannot be fully expressible 
and that it is conceptual or, rather, he is accepting that there is some content that can enter 
in rational relations with other mental content even if it is not completely captured by our 
57 j McDoNN, cll (1994). p 57 
5 7. J McDowell (1994). p- 
j McDowell (1994). p 58. 
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linguistic repertoire. If this last alternative is correct, then conceptual content is not as 
tightly linked to the resources of our language as he seems to postulate elseýý'here. It 
seems to open up the possibility of having a content that can enter the space of reasons, 
but that is not completely capturable by words. Either ways, he cannot use the above claim 
to support the view that the persistence of the shade in memory, and its later application, 
count as the knower being in possession of a the concept of that particular shade. 
McDowell considers that, given that our language about colours includes the term 
"shade", this is what will allow a subject who has seen a shade on one occasion to 
recognise the shade if he sees it again. Nevertheless, in the rest of the section, I will argue 
against the claim that merely understanding what "that shade" means allows a subject to 
recognise the shade again. If I am right, then McDowell cannot argue that "that shade" is 
to count as a concept. 
We should distinguish between capacities and abilities. Having a capacity is a precondition 
of having an ability. For instance, in order to acquire the ability to make good omelettes 
you have to have the capacity of grabbing saucepans. In relation to the example of shades, 
in order to acquire the ability to recognise shades, you must have the capacity of seeing it. 
But having the capacity of seeing a shade is not a guarantee that you will be able to 
recognise it again. 
I think that, in his example, McDowell is confiising recognitional capacities with 
recognitional abilities. Anybody who can see a shade and has a normal functioning I 
memory has the capacity to recognise a shade. But to have the ability to recognise shades 
is different from having the capacity to do so. If the subject recognises the shade again in 
the appropriate circumstances, then he can be attributed the ability to recognise shades. 
But in the example given by McDowell, he has not yet shown that he is able to recognise 
it, therefore we cannot attribute to him the ability to recognise shades. 
Recognising a shade is an ability that must be developed by training. It is an essential part 
of tile training of painters or printers, It is difficult to acquire and can be developed by 
looking at a sample and trying to reproduce it without looking at the sample, that is, by I=) 
memory. This is a very difficult task to perform even when one has just seen the shade. In 
actual fact, even when one has been specially trained, it is not possible to reproduce the 
sample or discriminate among similar ones when a period of time has passed 
What I think is wrong with the theory offered by McDowell is that he claims that, simply 
by having the concept of shade, this will be enough to see a shade, place it in our memory, 
and recognise the shade the next time we see it. I think that you do not acquire the ability 
simply by saying "that shade". This ability requires training and a social way of deciding if 
one has acquired the ability or not. 
The necessity of public criteria is made evident because the subject might think that he is 
recognising a shade that he saw before, when, in actual fact, he is confusing it with a fairly 
similar one. If we have to test his ability, we have to develop a system in which we will 
have to name the shades somehow and agree that this is an example of the same shade. 
Given that we should have to undergo this process of social naming and recognising, 
which most of us are not currently undergoing, we still have to face the objection posited 
by Evans: our current language does not possess enough reresources to capture the 
richness of experience. We would have to develop the highly impractical system that I 
have suggested in order to make our linguistic resources adequate for expressing the 
richness of experience. 
In my view, McDowell's reductionist attempt fails to prove that all our colour experience 
can be contained by the concept of shade. I also think that, to resort to the claim that 
what it is missing in detail is captured by the expression "that shade", is not enough to 
prove that the content that the speaker is referring to is conceptual. 
6. Is the recognition of shades an ability based on non-conceptual 
content? 
Is the lack of words to describe the myriad of shades of each colour a proof that the 
recognitional ability of those who possess it is non-conceptual? McDowell could ar, _ 
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a. That the process of naming the shades is possible and, therefore, this content of 
experience should be considered, in principle, to be conceptual. 
b. It is our possession of the concept of shade that allows to us to capture an example of 
it. Therefore, unless we possess this conceptual power we could not see it in the first 
place. Seeing shades must be a conceptual ability. 
It might be true that, in having the conceptual capacity of saying "that shade", we are 
enabled to capture the colour experience in all its detail, but it is not true that this alone 
enables us to recognise the shade later on, when the sample is not present. In order truly 
to recognise shades successfully we will need further training, in order to develop that 
recognitional capacity into a recognitional ability. This fact alone is not a counter- 
argument against McDowell, given that, in order to acquire the recognitional ability we 
must first have a content of experience that we could not possess unless we had a 
conceptual capacity. Therefore the recognitional ability either is also conceptual, or 
dependent on a conceptual capacity. For my overall argument I do not need to argue 
against the second possibility, given that I argue that non-conceptual and conceptual 
content appear together. 
I will use two arguments against McDowell: first to develop the skills needed to recognise 
shades is not sufficient for having the concept of shade and, second, recognitional 
capacities have a non-conceptual element. 
A recognitional ability such as the one mentioned above is a kind of knowing how. In 
chapter 41 have supported the view that there are types of knowing how for which it Is 
not necessary to be able to express the skill in a propositional form (which is relevant to 
the current debate) and that these skills are not acquired by learning propositions. It is not 
enough to have the concept of shade (the recognitional capacity) in order to have the 
ability to recognise shades. I have supported the view that the subject could show that she 
knows how, i. e., that she possesses a skill, without having to possess any conceptual 
capacity related to the subject. McDowell will not accept that non-conceptual content is 
the foundation of conceptual content. I suppose that he Nvill not accept, either, that non- 
conceptual abilities are needed to ground conceptual ones. n 
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My claim is not that the perception of the shade is a non-conceptual content of experience 
that needs to be processed later on in order to reach higher cognitive state-, (i. e., it Will not 
be converted into conceptual content later on in order to have a representational status). 
What I claim is that this content of experience is representational in its own right. %Vhen 
the subject is trained to that effect, she will be able to recognise the shade again, to 
reproduce it, match it, or show any other relevant behaviour that will prove that she 
recognises the shade. I have argued that the possession of the concept "shade" is not 
enough to capture all the content of experience, given that not all of those who possess it 
will be able to recognise the shades. I claimed before that not all kinds of knowledge, or of 
mental content, need to be propositional, or conceptual, and I think that this is a good 
illustration of my point. 
7. The rational justification of knowledge based on non-conceptual 
content. 
McDowell does not accept the existence of non-conceptual content because claims of 
knowledge based on it cannot justify our beliefs, only exculpate them. If experiences are 
going to be reasons for judging how reality is, then they must be expressible in a 
propositional way. 
The possibility that I embrace is a mixed one. It is a view previously put forward by 
Peacocke, in which the conceptual and the non-conceptual content of experience appear 
together and neither of them is prior to the other. We do not have experiences which are 
non-conceptual and that are processed afterwards, in order to be fit to constitute reasons 
for judgements but, rather, in the experiences are entangled both types of content and in J 't, 
which non-conceptual content can offer justifications for our beliefs. 
McDowell points OLIt that Peacoke "takes ccrianijudgements al7d beliefs to be rallonally 
g7, ()j, j, de4j 11,11011-conceptual content possessed by experl . ences. (.. )he defend,; the claim 
that the lot 1-conceptual content he attributes to nperl . ences can afford 'not merely 
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reasons but good reasons'forjudgements and beliefs. "' 
McDowell claims that this non-conceptual content cannot provide the subject with reasons 
to believe because there is not a rational linkage between experiences of this sort and 
judgements. He gives the example of a cyclist who adjusts his bodily movements to keep 
his balance without realising what he is doing. There is not a rational linkage between his 
actions to keep balance and what is required in order to keep one's balance because, if 
something is to count as a reason for an action, the subject must be able to express it 
propositionally. "Reasons that the subject can give, in sofar as they are articulable, must 
be within the space of concepts. "" We have here a dispute regarding what are reasons for 
actions and what is a rational linkage between experiences and judgements. The type of 
rationality that McDowell is embracing is one in which reason is linked with reasoning, as 
in giving a list of premises from which we can reach a conclusion. If this is the only model 
applicable to reason, giving the example of the cyclist excludes him from actually invoking 
an instance of knowing. 
If we take the example of the cyclist offered by McDowell we feel inclined to accept that, 
given that the cyclist is not fully aware if his actions (which are mere mechanical 
reactions), then we cannot really say that his experiences lead him to make judgements 
that guide his behaviour. Even if the cyclist was paying attention to his actions, he would 
not be able to explain why he makes the movements that he does. It just seems right for 
him to do so. 
Nevertheless, by looking at a very similar example we also feel tempted to argue the 
opposite. An experienced baker is preparing the dough in order to cook some bread. He 
measures the flour and the water and begins to work on the dough and then adds some 0 
more water until the consistency of the dough "feels right". He cannot tell you beforehand 
how much water, if any, he will have to add, and he is not able to explain, either, why it is 
now and not before that the dough is just right. This time his experience, which cannot put 
into a propositional form, is the reason for his actions. He has done it, as the cyclist, 
60 
. 
1. McDoNN, cll (1994). 1) 162-,. 
(, ] J. McDoiNcIl, (1994). 1) 165. 
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because it felt right, so I am inclined to argue that, in both cases, there is a rational linkage 
between experience and Judgements. The Judgements do not take a llnguistlc form because 
we cannot reconstruct their reasoning in propositions and then make the necessary 
inferences but, that does not mean that they cannot be justified to believe, but merely 
exculpated to believe. 
This way of arguing is not too different from the one adopted by McDowell, who claims 
that if we ask a subject why she thinks that some object in her visual field is a square, she 
can say: "Because it looks that way" and this will count as giving a reason for holding a 
belief " If we ask the baker in the previous example why he thinks that the dough needs 
some flour he could answer that "It feels like it", then this could count as a reason for his 
belief 
The fact that human beings stand in the space of reasons, and that this is acquired in 
learning a language, does not mean that we have to be able to articulate propositionally 
the reasons for all our beliefs. Brandon pointed out "something that can use concepts and 
have beliefs, something, that is, that can find its way round the space of reasons- can 
count as having knowledge in particular cases in which is has a true belief that it is not in 
a position to give reasonsfor. " 
Taking the argument a step further, I would like to point out that Brandon claims that 
knowing what relations there are in the realm of reasons is a type of knowing-how. He 
says that animals do not posses this skill and, therefore, they do not know what will count 
as evidence for their claims, they do not master the realm of reasons. " Brandon argues 
that our standing in the realm of reasons is reducible to a type of knowing-how, which 
allows us to have dispositions to apply concepts following certain patterns. Brandon's 
argument leaves us with the claim that knowing how is not reducible to knowing-that and, 
in actual fact, is prior to it and necessary in order to be able to justify any knowledge 
62 j. McDowell (1994), p 167. 
63 R. Brandon (1995). p 895. 
64 R. Brandon (199 This practical know-how - being able to tell what dicy would be reasons for and C, 
what would be reasons for that - is as nitich a part of their understanding of 'red' and '70 dcgrees' as their 
reliable differential responsive dispositions. And this inferential articulation of those responses, the role 
they pav in reasoning. that makcs those responsive dispositions to apply conccpts"p895. 
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claims. If being in the realm of reason is a form of knowing-how, the process of 
justification as it is understood by McDowell ( i. e., justification within the realm of 
concepts) relies on an ability that cannot be expressed propositionally. I think this supports 
further rný claim that both conceptual and non-conceptual content must be linked together 
if we want to be able to justify knowledge. Before I move on and analyse one of the 
implications of my claims, the need for a different model of reason (section 9), 1 would 
like to clarify my position in relation to the primacy of practical knowledge. 
8. The primacy of knowing how. 
Is all knowledge practical knowledge? In this section I will argue that, in a sense, all 
knowledge is practical knowledge, because knowledge is a practice but, on the other hand, 
there are also asymmetries between different types of knowledge that are worth taking 
into account. The debate has traditionally taken the form of a distinction between 
knowing-that, or theoretical knowledge, and knowing-how, or practical knowledge. It has 
been argued that there are asymmetries between these two different types of knowledge, 
which preclude the reduction: 
-First, Ryle claimed that, while knowing-how can be a question of degree, knowing that is 
not so "we never speak of a person having practical knowledge of a body of facts or 
truths, (.. )On the other hand, it is proper and normal to speak of a person knowing in 
part how to do something. "65 
-Second, he also said that "learning how or improving an ability is not like learning that 
or acqUil-ing information. Truths can be imparted, procedures can only be inculcated, 
and irlide inculcation is a gradual process, imparting is relatively hidden. It makes sense 
to ask at what moment someone became apprised of a truth, but not to ask at what 
moment someone acquired a skill. "66 
-Third, a further difference between the two types of knowledge was put forward by 
Craig, who asserted that " Of the niany, t1pes of action which one might wish to have 
done, or see demonstrated, the vast majority virtually nei, cr happen by accident. That 
ineans that asingle peýforinance gi vci i to order often has, de facto, the force of a proof 
65 G. R), Ic (19SO), P 57-58. 
6(ý G. RvIc, (19', SM), P 58- 
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that the performer canperform reliably. In contrast, there are many questions that can 
be answered correctl by accident, so that getting the answer right, Once only rarely y 
establishes much likelihood that the informant will be right in future on that 11 pe of 
question. "67 
-Finally, Craig also said that "Someone who cannot himseýf do A may have no difficultyin 
recognising just by observing his performance that someone else is doing A; whereas 
someone who does not yet know whether p cannot telljustfrom hearing it affirmed that p 
(or not-p, as the case may be) that he has been told the truth. "68 
I agree with the distinctions made in 1,2, and 3, but I disagree with 4. A subject might be 
unable to do x, and still being able to recognise if someone else knows how to do x, but 
this is not true on all occasions. In order for a subject to be able to judge whether or not 
another subject knows how to do x, the first person has to be able to recognise the 
practice. In a way, he has to know-how in sense (1). For instance, if someone claims that 
he practices a particular style of martial art, and performs a few movements in front of me 
to prove it, I will be unable to determine if this is true or if he is pretending. Knowing-how 
is not self evident in the way that it is suggested by Craig, it involves being familiar with 
particular practices, and being able to recognise the normativity in them. In this sense, 
knowing-how and knowing-that are closer than it is implied. I think this is an important 
point, given that I am arguing that normativity is the mark of knowledge. 
Being able to recognise knowledge practices is a form of knowing-how, so in this sense, 
all knowledge is practical knowledge, but it is interesting to note that, in our attribution of 
knowledge, there are different criteria at play. I have already explained how Alcoff and 
Dalmiya say that the difference between knowing-that and knowing how is that the 
knower has "differew allitudes to propositions that hai)e been grasped. "69 In the case of 
knowing-that, to grasp a proposition is to assent to it, while the case of knowing-how 
consists in putting it to use. 70 I have already said that the difference that they suggest is 
better characterised as having different attitudes towards the contents grasped, given that 
67 E. Craig, (1990). p 160. 
68 E. Crug, (1990), p 160. 
69 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993), p 238. 
70L. Alcoffand V. Dalniiy; 1(199)), p2,8, 
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there are no propositions involved in a lot of cases. Knowing-how to do x implies a 
capacity to do the action x, plus the ability to do x, which have been acquired by 
repetition/training. Knowing what it is like consists in having certain recognitional abilities. 
You must undergo certain experiences in order to have them, and they give you reasons 
for acting in a particular way in the future. The case of knowing someone is different, 
what is important to us in a close personal relation is that the other shows the appropriate 
attitudes towards ourselves, and this is only possible if they have apprehended a great 
many things about us and share many social practices with us. All along this chapter I have 
insisted on the fact that there is a non-propositional content in experiences, which can be 
known while keeping its non-conceptual character. 71 The apprehension of that type of 
content is also normative, it is apprehended by being involved in particular practices, and 
in a sense is a form of knowing-how that cannot be captured in propositions. But, on the 
other hand, we are only able to justify that type of content because we have entered the 
space of reasons, which is closely linked with the acquisition of a language, a question that 
should not be overlooked, and that seems to lose importance with the general claim that 
all knowledge is practical knowledge. Nevertheless, this does not imply that reason and 
language are interchangeable. In the next section I will argue for a model of reason that 
respects normativity but that does not make it dependent on language. 
9. Towards a Different Model of Reason. 
One of the consequences of the theory that I support is a further disagreement with 
McDowell and Gadamer about the relation between reason and language. Gadamer says 
that "language is the language of reason ifSeýf'72 and this is closely related to 
McDowell's assertion that the realm of reason is the realm of concepts. Given my defence 
of non-conceptual content, I find their link between reason and language too restrictive. 
Gadamer notices that, if the link between reason and language is as close as he presumes, 
then "this makes lanquage so close to reason - which means, to the things I. I names- that 
71 C. Pcacockc (1992) and Piagct (see Nelkin entr) on "Sub . 
jectivity" in S. Gutternian, 1995) explain the 
importance of tills ilon- conceptual content in the formation Of COIICCPts as important as "self'. 
7-1 1-1. Gada mer ( 1975), p 40 1. 
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one may ask why there should be different languages at all. "73 The fact is that there are 
different languages, which points to a gap in our ontologies, and this implies that reason 
and language cannot be that close after all. Gadamer defends his theory against this 
observation by saying that these are limitations to the languages we use, but that these 
should not amount to a critique of the priority of language and of its closeness to reason. 
He says: " behind all the relativities of language and convention there is something it/ 
common which is no longer language, but which looks to an ever-possible verballsation, 
andfor which the well-tried word reason is, perhaps, not the worst. "74 So, for Gadamer, 
reason is linguistic in potential. Our languages are not finely tuned enough to express all 
the possibilities of our reason, but this does not mean that they are not verbalizable after 
all. I do not agree with this characterisation of reason. 
I have already argued that we can apprehend relations in the space of reasons that we 
cannot express in words, as is the case in many instances of knowing how. The model of 
reason that I support has to be broad enough to account for justificatory moves that do 
not necessitate being put into a propositional form. I have discussed Brandon's claim that 
being able to make moves in the space of reasons is nothing other than a form of knowing- 
how. Finally, I have argued that, within a model of rationality that links too closely 
language and experience, it is not possible to explain how we can make changes in our 
conceptual system and, therefore, it is difficult to see how spontaneity can work. 
In the model that I am supporting, the feelincg, that our conceptual system does not fit with 
reality must come from experience, but this means that experience cannot be completely 
constrained by our conceptual abilities. I think that a non-conceptual content that can 
enter into iational relations with the rest of our mental content is necessary in order to 
understand changes in our conceptual system, and that this is a necessary addition to 
McDowell's theory. 
10. The advantages of accepting non-conceptual content. tl) L_ý 
73,11. Gadanier (1975). p 40 1. 
74 li. Gadanici (1975), 1) 547. 
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In this chapter I have agreed with the distinction made by N4cDowell, between human 
beings and animals, one that allows us to claim that attribUting knowledge to humans 
implies that they are in the space of reasons, as McDowell's proj--Ct also implies that all 
knowledge has to be expressed propositionally. I argued that his system , vill benefit frorn 
the inclusion of non-conceptual content. 
I have agreed with McDowell that it is not possible to consider non-conceptual content as 
the basis of conceptual content, because this will mean falling back on the Myth of the 
Given. I have argued for a mixed account of content that does not necessitate basing 
conceptual content on non-conceptual content. 
In doing so, we can have representational content for things for which we do not have 
exact words and which, in McDowell's system, did not seem to fit. 75 This also implies that 
justified knowledge is not necessarily knowledge for which we can give a complete 
propositional account. We can make moves in the space of reasons that justify our 
knowledge claims even when we cannot give reasons for them in a linguistic form. 
Sometimes showing the appropriate behaviour and successffilly completing certain actions 
can be enough in order to be attributed knowledge, and to be justified to believe. The 
inclusion of non-conceptual content and of knowing how as a form of knowledge, 
together with the acceptance of the role of intuition in reasoning (in next chapter), will 
allow us to explain how it is possible to make changes in our conceptual systems, a feature 
that McDowell has problems in explaining. Finally, I have promoted a more 
comprehensive conception of reason that the one offered by McDowell, which I will 
develop in more detail in the next section. 
75 In the discussion of the shades of colour, McDoNN-cll (1994) clainis "Now it is true that fine-grain 
capacitics I have appealed to have a special cliaractcr. which is marked by how dmonstrative expressions 
would havc to fi,., urc in linguistic expressions of them. But why should that prc\-cnt us from recognizing 
Iliciii zj"' rationaliv 1111Cgratcd into spontaneity in their own way. so that they can simply take their place in 
111N. jýcjjcjýjl framework? " 1) 58. 
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CHAPTER 6 
0. Introduction. 
In this chapter I will argue for a concept of rationality that is not defined in opposition to 
intuition. In the previous chapter I explained how McDowell argues for a view of 
rationality that relies on a close relation between our language and the world. I have 
qualified his concept of rationality as too narrow. I argued against the idea that the rational 
order of the world can be completely and adequately captured by our linguistic 
representations. By arguing that intuition is an essential part of reason instead of its 
opposite, and that its content is not analysable into a set of propositions, I want to support 
further my claims against McDowell's thesis, and to develop a different concept of 
rationality. 
This new concept of rationality, that includes intuition, allows me to revalue practical 
knowledge. I argue for a model of intuition intimately linked to practices and characterised 
as a skill. Characterising intuition as part of reason instead as its opposite, and also as 
linked with practices, allows me to show, once more, the importance of the bodily 
involvement in knowledge and the central role of knowing how in any epistemological 
model. Finally, I will argue that taking intuition to be part of reason allows us to have a 
more complete pictureOf reality. 
In the following sections I will define tacit knowledge, by relying on Polanyi's work on the 
subject. My interest in this type of knowledge is due to the fact that I will argue that 
intuition is a form of tacit knowledge, based on experience. 
1. Polanyi on tacif knowledge 
The terms "tacit knowledge" are currently used both in psychology and in philosophy of 
mind to refer to a number of different things, but I am only interested in the concept as it 
Nvas used by Polanyi. What lie calls tacit knowledge can 
be illustrated NýIth an example of 
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subception based on the experiments of the psychologists Lazarus and -McCleary- ''These 
authors presented a person with a large number of nonsense syllables, and after shoii, ing 
certain of the syllables, they administered an electric shock. Presently tile person sholved 
symptoms of anticipating the shock at the sight of "shock syllables"; yet, on questioning 
he could not identify them. He had come to know when to expect a shock, bill he could 
not fell what made him expect it. He had acquired a knowledge similar to that vihich lve 
have when we know a person by signs which we cannot tell. "' 
In that quotation there are two examples of tacit knowledge: the first one, the recognition 
of shock syllables by a subject, who has developed a recognitional skill for which he 
cannot give an explanation; and the second is that by which we are able to recognize a 
person, while being unable to point out which are the clues that allow us to perform the 
recognition. Polanyi stresses that, in all instances of tacit knowledge, we can always 
distinguish two terms: proximal and distal. In the first example the shock syllables are the 
proximal term and the electric shock the distal term. He explains how any instance of tacit 
knowledge encompasses the explicit knowledge of the proximal term and the implicit 
knowledge of the distal term': the subject learned that there was a connection between 
both of the terms, which remained tacit, given that he was only attending to the electric 
shock. If we learn how to recognize the shock-syllables attending from the distal term to 
the proximal one, then, we acquire tacit knowledge of the proximal term. ' 
In tacit knowledge, we are aware of the particulars only in relation to the whole, as the 
recognition of a physiognomy exemplifies. In actual fact, we are aware of the features of a 
4 
physiognomy only in terms of the physiognomy we are attending. , For instance, we 
recognize a mood by attending to the whole expression of the face or, as the previous 
' M. Polarivi (1966), p7-8. 
2- \Vc know the electric shock forming the second term, by attending to it, and hence, the subject is 
specifiably known. But %N, c know the shock producing particulars only by relying on our own awareness of 
them for attending to something else, namely the electric shock, and hence our knowledge of them 
remains tacit. This is how Nve come to know these particulars without becoming able to ldcntifv them. 
Such is the functional relation between the two terms of tacit knowing: Nvc know the first tcrin only by 
relving on our awareness of it for attending to the second. " M. Polaný 1 (1966), p 10. 
3 M. Polaný 1 (1 966)ý p 10. 
, In the exercise of a skill. Nvc are aware ol- its several muscular moves in terms of the performance to 
which our attention is directed. \Vc may saý, in general, that Nvc arc aware of that from which Nve are 
attendin, " to 111001c" th"T. "I the appearance of that thing" NI, Polanyl (1966). p 11. 
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example of the recognition of the shock syllables shows, these are recognized as such only 
because they are in a relation with the electric shock, as Polanyi puts it "they sip7i6- the 
approach of a shock. ,5 The particulars are meaningfUl only in relation to the whole, 
because "If we discredit the usefulness of a tool its meaning as tool is gone. All 
particulars become meaningless if we lose sight of the pattern which they jointly 
constitute. 
Polanyi claims not only that particulars are meaningless if taken out of a pattern but, also, 
that we cannot attend to them in the same way that we attend to the whole. If we try to do 
it, we are apt to feel something similar to "stage fright. 117 To explain why this is the case, 
Polanyi distinguishes between two types of awareness: focal and subsidiary. I introduce, 
this distinction here because it will be very valuable in the later sections: 
"When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in a 
different way. We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the hammer 
so as to hit the nail most effectively. When we bring down the hammer we do notfeel that 
its handle has struck our palm but that its head has struck the nail. Yet in a sense, we are 
certainly alert to the feelings in our palm and the fingers that hold the hammer. They 
guide us in handling effectively, and the degree of attention that we give to the nail is 
given to the same extent lit a different way to these feelings. 7-he difference may be stated 
b saying that the latter are not, like the nail, objects of our attention, but instruments of Y 
I. 1. They are not watched in themselves; we watch something else while keeping intensely 
mi, are of them. I have a subsidiag cm)areness of thefeeling in the palm of nly hand lvhich 
I. s merged into n7yfocal mtareness of n7y diving the nall. "' 
According to Polanyi, we are subsidiarily aware of the proximal term and focally a%vare of 
the distal object, and acquiring knowledge consists in going from one to the other and 
being able to apprehend them as a whole. This apprehension can be an apprehension 
involving practical skills or theoretical ones, it is a paradigm for all kinds of knowledge. 
And it is due to a skill that is acquired without us being able to explain how we learned it. 
5 M. Polanyi (1966). pII 
6 M. Polanvi (1998). p 57. 
7 Ni. PojjjjN, i (1998). p 56, 
M. Polanvi (1998). p 55. 
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Polanyi considers that, in being skilled, we change not just our intellectual capacities but, 
rather, our whole self At this point, I will explain the role played by our embodiment in 
the acquisition of knowledge. 
2. Knowledge as Dwelling. 
In the process of knowledge, our bodies are proximal terms for us, and are only accessible 
through the mediation of the distal objects. Polanyi illustrates this point with the following 
example: when we use a stick for feeling our way, we "became aware of the feelings in 
our hand in terms of the meaning located at the tip of the probe or stick to which we are 
attending. "9. This example shows that our own body is a proximal term in relation to the 
distal term, which is the object being perceived. Our perception of objects always includes 
information of its relation to our bodies that remains undetected by us, " In all instances of 
our explicit knowledge of the distal objects, in all our perceptions of the world, there is 
always an element that remains implicit, our corporeality, which is captured in our 
awareness of the objects, but which remains untold. " 
As I have already noted, Polanyi points out that our body is always a proximal term in 
relation to the distal terms that are the objects of perception. But, as we have seen in my 
previous examples, there are also times in which we have objects that act as proximal 
terms, so, in those cases, what is the role of our body when both the distal and the 
proximal terms are objects other than our own bodies? Polanyi says that "VI'lien we n7ake a 
thingfunction as the proximal term of tacit knowing, we incorporate it ill our body- or 
extend our body to include Jt-so that we come to dwell in it"I 2. and he adds that "we pill 
ourseNes out into them and assimilate them as parts of our own existence. we accept 
9 M. Polanyl (1966), p 13. 
'0 "Physiologists long ago established that the way we see an object is determined by our awareness of 
certain efforts inside our body, efforts which we cannot feel in themselves. We are aware of these things 
going on inside our body in terms of the position, size, shape, and motion of an object, to which we are 
attending. In other words, we are attending from these internal processes to the qualities of the things 
outside. These qualities are what these internal processes mean to us. The transposition of bodily 
experiences into the perception of things outside may now appear, therefore, as an instance of the 
transposition of meaning away from us, which we have found to be present to some extent in all tacit 
knowing. " M. Polanyi (1966). p 13-14. 
'' The reasons N%, hv it cannot be told are explained in section 3. 
12M. Polanyi (1966). p16- 
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them existeldially by divelling in them. 
All knowledge is an action that requires skill, therefore knowing consists in being able to 
perceive and put together certain clues in order to illuminate a particular situation. The 
process of perception and selection of what will count as a clue is done in a knowing how 
way, that is, we do it without being able to explain how we have acquired such a skill to 
produce the fight answer. We pay attention to particulars, we are focally aware of them, 
but we are not aware of the process that we are using to pick up those particular clues, we 
do not know what make us to consider them meaningffil, we are just subsidiarily aware of 
it. Polanyi generalizes his analysis of knowledge as dwelling to all types of knowledge, 
including our linguistic skills that are also an example of tacit knowledge. 
Knowledge as dwelling can be exemplified by moral teachings. We internalize those 
teachings and use them as the proximal term in our m oral judgments. It is important to 
notice that those moral teachings are not acquired as maxims but, rather, by exemplars. 
The distinction between exemplars and maxims is made clear when Polanyi describes how 
mathematical knowledge is acquired. We learn how to solve mathematical problems by 
learning to see that they are instances of a particular type. When we have grasped the 
similarities, then we can follow the routine and solve them. Accordingly learning to see the 
similarities in particular situations is how we acquired a moral code that allows us to make 
moral judgments. This picture of knowledge is also applicable to our scientific knowledge, 1: ) 
therefore we are able to understand a theory only by seeing things in its light, by using it'. 
"To rely on a theoiyfor understanding nature is to inicriorize it. For we are atiending 
firom the themy to thit7gs seen In its light, and are aivare of the theory, iihile thus using it, 
I. ii fernis of the sl)ectacle that 71seri, cs to explain. This is iihy mathematical theory can be 
learneci only by practicit7g its applicatiOl V its frite laioH, Iedge lies in our ability to use i. t. it 
14 
Polanyl insists tat we can only learn mathematical theory by practicing, by learning to 
recognize that a particular puzzle is just an instance of a more general tvpc This 
NJ pol, -Il, N, l (1998), p 59. 
N1 Pol. 1 ny I( 1966), p 17. 
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description of how the mathematician works is very close to that of how an experienced 
baker is able to tell that the dough is ready. Both of them have to undergo a certain 
training that allows them to develop certain skills that make them able to see things th:! t 
would not be meaningful to a less trained eye. As I have pointed out already, neither of 
them has to be capable of explaining how they have been able to see the clues that make 
them choose those particular conclusions, as is the case in many cases of knowing how 
(see chapter 4). In the following sections I will explain what are the implications, for our 
general theory of knowledge and for our definition of rationality, of considering 
knowledge to be the acquisition of practical skills. 
3 The nature of Subsidiary Awareness 
It is important to realize that, by subsidiary awareness, Polanyi does not mean 
subconscious or preconscious awareness. He says that "what makes an awareness 
subsidiary is thefunction itfuýfllls; it can have any degree of consciousness, so long as it 
functions as a clue to the object of our focal attention. "" What we are subsidiarily aware 
of can be brought into our focal attention, so we can formulate it in form of maxims, for 
instance, but he claims that such specification will not be exhaustive. There remains an 
ineffable element in their knowledge. " But why is there this element of ineffability? It 
depends on the case. In some occasions we are not able to point out the relevant 
particulars. In other cases, we are not able to point out the relation between those 
particulars. 17 Nevertheless, saying that there is an element of ineffability does not mean 
that we cannot talk about it at all, merely that we cannot adequately capture it entirely 
with words. " 
15M. Polanyi (1966), p96. 
16 "Although the expert diagnostician, taxonomist and cotton dresser can indicate 'heir clues and 
formulate their maxims. they know man), more things that they can tell, knowing them only in practice, as 
instrumental particulars, and not explicitly, as objects. The knowledge of such particulars is therefore 
ineffable, and the pondering of a judgment in terms of such particulars is an ineffable process of thought. " 
M. Polanyl ( 1998), p 88. 
17 , When I am riding a bicycle or picking out im, Macintosh, I do not know the particulars of my 
knowledge and therefore cannot tell what they are-I when on the other hand I know the topography of a 
conipIcN, three dimensional aggregate, I know and could describe the particulars, but cannot describe their 
spatial interrelations. " N1. Polanyi (1998). p90. 
18 M. Polanyi (1998), 1) 91. 
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In my opinion, it is important to separate subsidiary awareness from subconscious or 
preconscious awareness. The content that we are subsidiarily aware of is not correctly 
characterized as subconscious because Polanyi's tacit knowledge is the product of skills 
and, as such, involves a degree of corporeality that is misrepresented if we label it as 
subconscious. I will illustrate my point with an example, which I have used in a previous 
chapter. An expert baker is able to tell whether the dough for mak-ing bread needs more 
water by picking different clues from it, maybe by the way it feels, or looks, or smells, or 
by a whole cluster of these characteristics. But it is very likely that, if she tries to explain 
exactly what are the reasons why she knows that to be the case, she cannot tell. As I have 
argued in chapter 4, even if she cannot tell why she knows that the dough is fight, this still 
counts as knowledge. It counts as knowledge even if she cannot reproduce her thought 
processes propositionally. In order to reach her conclusion, she does not make inferences, 
neither conscious nor subconscious, (of the type: if we have 200grms of flour we have to 
add an x amount of water) but, rather, she reaches her conclusion because she has learned 
to recognize certain clues and to act accordingly. There are certain patterns that are 
meaningful for her, which she has been trained to recognize and to react to accordingly. 
That process of recognition and of providing the appropriate answer, of acting 
appropriately, counts as knowledge. She has acquired a tacit knowledge, born from 
experience. As I argued in the previous chapter, it is possible to have perceptual 
experiences that are not conceptual, so it is perfectly possible that the baker is perceiving 
the clues without being able to conceptualize them, and this supports my claim that her 
knowledge is not propositional. 
Therefore, the reason why a subject cannot tell how he has acquired a particular skill, for 
instance, the reason why he cannot know how he knows that a syllable is a shock syllable, 
is not because subsidiary awareness is either subconscious or preconscious but, rather, 
because it involves a certain training of his whole body that cannot be accounted for 
propositionally. To support this claim, I will quote Gelwick, who explains that Polanyi 
argues that linking the focal target and the subsidiary clues is not simply a mental exercise, 
but rather, that the whole person is involved in the process. He says " the operations in 
11,171-ch ), "' 17101, C. /bl-171 0111- clues to theot-ijoint meaning ai-e an achievement qf the pet-son. 
It is a In-ocess (? f 'life'-c"Ce. It is a pi-ocess done within out- boqi,. A nd it is done within our 
194 
body. And it is one that cannot befocally observed by us. If'e cannot simultaneously rell, 
upon cluesfor allet7ding to a problem or task al7d observe them it 7 themselves. In this 
sense, there will always be a tacit dimension in our knowledge that IS held together by the 
person. f/19 
As I have already said, in all acts of knowledge there will always be a content that we will 
not be able to make explicit because our bodies always play the part of the proximal object 
which means that they always remain in the realm of our subsidiary awareness and that, 
therefore, we cannot get to know them other than tacitly. We cannot know in which ways 
our embodied nature taints our cognitive actions because we cannot access the world in a 
disembodied way and because we cannot perceive our body unless in relation to the world. 
This approach to knowledge implies that we know more than we can tell, in the sense that 
a part of our cognitive content will always remain tacit. This supports ffirther the model of 
knowledge as not merely propositional for which I argued in a previous chapter, as well as 
my thesis that not all mental content is neither conceptual nor conceptualizable. I also 
want to move a step further and argue that the acceptance of tacit knowledge should make 
us change our model of rationality, but this is a task that I will perform in section 5. 
4. Changing our conceptual frameworks. 
I argued, in a previous chapter, that most of our mental content was shaped by our 
concepts and acquired by our learning a language, but that there are cases in which we 
experience a gap between what we are apprehending and our conceptual apparatus. 
Polanyi supports the view that not all our mental content has a possible linguistic C, 
representation, and that this content is sometimes in conflict with our linguistic 
representations . 
20 To illustrate the gap between these two types of knowledge, he refers to 
some of Piaget's observations, which showed how children who could solve certain 
practical problems were unable to solve them when put into a verbal form, even if they had 
19 R. GcINvick (1977), p64. 
2() "\Vc ire refcrriii,,, in both these cases to a state of mental uneasiness due to the feeling that our tacit 
thoughts do not ýwrcc NN ith our symbolic rcpresen tat ions, so that NNc have to decide on which of the two NN c 
should rcly and which N\c should coi rcý: I in tile 11ý, Jlt of the other. 
" M. Polanyt (1998), p 93. 
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known for a long time before how to solve them. 21 
In a changing world, these conceptual changes must occur very often, therefore we must 
have mastered ways of adapting our language to these changes. Polany' offers different 
instances of these types of change in language 22 and following Piaget explains the two 
different types of changes that those can promote: assimilation occurs when we change 
slightly the use of words in order to fit our experiences, or when we ignore certain aspects 
of the experience to make it fit with other similar ones under a common denomination, and 
adaptation consists in changing our interpretative framework to include the new 
experience. While assimilation is directed by rules, adaptation cannot be the product of 
rules, given that it challenges the current uses of the concepts. Adaptation occurs in the 
realm of intuition. 
5. Intuition. 
Intuition, as it is used in our everyday language, has traditionally been considered by 
philosophers as not playing any important role in knowledge. While it has been granted 
that it exists as a form of experience, it has been denied its value as a claim of knowledge. 
The attitude of J. Hospers in relation to this issue can be taken to be paradigmatic: "if a 
composer has a "sudden intuilion"for his next symphony, no doubts need be raised as 
long as he is not claiming to know anything by means of this intuition; a bit of inspiration 
has sinij)ly come to him in a flash. But if someone claims to knoiv by intuition that a 
proj)osition is true, then wc i, t)ould do ivell to ask afeit, questions concerning ii. It 7S not 
IN occurrence of this experience that we question but that -which he claims to know by 
21 M. Polanyl (1998), p 93. 
22 "The first represents the ideal of using lan, page impersonally, according to strict rules, the second 
relics on a personal intervention of the speaker, for changing the rules of language to fit new occasions. 
The first is a routine performance. the second is and heuristic act. A paradigm of the firs is counting, 
which leaves its interpretative framework- the numbers use in counting- quite unchanged, the ideal of the 
second is I-ound in the originality of poctic phrasing or of new mathematical notations covering new 
conceptions. Ideally the first is strictly revcrsible, while the second is essentially irreversible. For to 
modify our idiom is to modify the frame of reference within which Nve shall henceforth interpret our 
expericiicc, it is to modify ourselves. In contrast to a formal procedure which Nve can rccapitulate at NN-111 
strict and tracc back to its premises. it entails a conversion to new premises not accessible by aný 
; Irguinclit form those prcviousIv held. It is a decision, originating in our own personal 'ud-inent. to inodiR. j 
(he prenuscs of ourJudgment. and thus to modify our intellectual existence, so ýis to become more 
to oursclves. - N1 Polany' (1998), p 105. 
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means of the experience. (The intuition must be propositional before we are concerned 
with it in a discussion of knowledge) 1123 
When intuition is accepted as playing a certain role in relation to knowledge, then is 
supposed to be a sort of inspiration, that is, it is an experience that accompanies new 
ideas, but it does not justify knowledge. But, even within this very restricted view on the 
worth of intuition, there is a use of intuition that could be the basis of knowledge claims- 
"many people are quick to notice "minimal cues" in the behavior of other persons and 
are able to "gather the sense of a meeting" or conclude correctly that the audience is 
becoming tired or bored; they arrive at this estimate on the basis of rapid but precise 
observation (sense-experience) and not by intuition, as they claim. Let us be careful, 
then, that we do not confuse claims to know by intuition with knowledge by other 
means. tiN . When there is knowledge as a product of this sort of intuition it is not due to its 
inspirational content but, rather, to the fact that it is based on observation. Consequently, 
intuition is explained away, it is not considered to be the basis of knowledge. 
M. Fricker attempts to give a more sophisticated explanation of intuition which even if it 
based on what Hospers calls "sense experience", it does not reduce intuition to it. 
Following Polanyi very closely, she considers that intuition is a reliable source for 
knowledge claims based on previous experiences. Undergoing certain experiences has the 
effect of training on the knower, who is able to resolve new situations by observing its 
similitude to previously confronted ones. Fricker claims that "sclentlSts are able to have 
intuitions about hoit, to solve neit, scientific puzzles by virtue of a stockpile of lessons 
learned from past experience. These lessons do not take the form of conscloush, held 
beliefs, but rather they amount to a capacity for increasingly educated hunches 
(regarding a particular subject n7after) so internah. ed that the process by 11, hich "ve 
arrive at them is usitall subconscious, so that the subject will not knoit, quite by uhat y 
train of though shc arrived at the intuited proposition. This is of course not to say that 
the intuitive processes are J. rretrievabýi- subconscious, since there is no reason to think i/ 
impossible refrospecthvýi, to rctrace subjective associations or triggers for idcas. "" 
23 J. Hospers (1978), p136-137. 
24 J. Hospcrs (1978). pl 37. 
2s M. Fi ickcr (1995). p 217. 
197 
According to Fricker, intuition is, effectively, a form of tacIt knowledge 
She gives the example of a car mechanic who suspects "that without knowing wlýv, the 
peculiar starting problems with a given car might not beCOnnected to the electrics after 
all, but maybe to the carburetor. -26 His suspicion is grounded on his previous experiences 
in similar situations. Intuition cannot be ruled out by saying that it is just based on 
memories. Memories are not enough to explain his hunch, given that we are presupposing 
that he has never encountered the same situation before. The car mechanic has developed 
intuitional skills (using Fricker's terminology) in his many years working as a mechanic, 
which enable him to see a problem as similar to another one that he has seen previoUSlY. 27 
Feminine intuition is another good example: due to their experiences in child caring, 
women can acquire a'relevant range of intuitive capacities'. 2'For instance, "when 'mother 
knows'what's making baby cry or she foresees an independent accident and answers it in 
the nick of time. , P29 Mothers have been in the same situation many times before, so they 
can pick up little cues that will help them to know what will happen next. These clues 
would not have any significance to someone with less experience. 
6. Intuition and reason. 
We are now in a position to say that intuition and reason are not in a relation of 
opposition. We should adopt a concept of reason that illustrates how intuition is 
constitutive of it. 
Fricker thinks that intuition is the origin of new scientific hypothesis. This is a traditional 
role for intuition, if we take it to be a form of inspiration, which is compatible with 
thinking of intuition as the opposite from reason. But Fricker maintains that, even in this 
26 N 1. Fricker (1 995)ý p 24 1. 
27 M. Fricker maintains that the car nieclianic lias arrived at the conclusion by a subconscious process. I 
think that Nvc should take intuition to be a form of tacit kno%N ledge, in Polanyi's scwc, and this Nvill alloNN 
us to explain it without reliance on the subconsciolis. 
28 ' M. Frickcr ( 199 5), p240. 
29 M. Frickcr ( 1995). p24 1. 
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role, we should realize how intuition exhibits the sanic niechanisms as reason. She argues 
for a conception of intuition that "must have some internal capaci . iY of its oun. This 
means that intuition does not work in a random way but, rather, that it is able to discern 
between different possibilities and offer a solution (in the form of a hunch, for instance) 
appropriate to the problem that the epistemic subject is considering. Fricker seems to be 
pointing in the direction of some rational form of decision taking by subconsciously 
weighting alternatives. Nevertheless, M. Fricker remarks that intuition is not to be 
confused with subconscious inference . 
31 Intuition is a non-inferential, subconscious way of 
belief formation, based on past experiences, which is rational because it is relational: there 
is an evidential relation between past experiences and the resultant intuition 32 , The intuition 
that allows the scientist to make a new hypothesis in order to solve a particular problem is 
reached by a subconscious process that does not consist in making inferences. Fricker 
shows that the inferential model is not attractive, because it will imply cases as counter 
intuitive as the following "when a tennis player hits the ball she must be subconsciously 
making calculations about where to move and when to hit the ball, using split second 
estimates of its velocity. Y, 33 In Fricker's model, the tennis player does not make 
subconscious calculations to decide where to hit the ball but, nevertheless, she takes 
decisions in a subconscious way. I will discuss later whether this is sufficient explanation. 
The first argument in support of the rationality of intuition is that both intuition and reason 
exhibit the same mechanisms, that is, adequate responses to particular problems. There is a 
further attribute of intuition that links it with reason instead of putting them in opposition- 
Intuition also acts as a tester of hypotheses, as happens in the case of moral intuitions. 
For instance, if we follow the strict rules of utilitarianism in order to decide what to do in 
a certain situation, we can reach conclusions that are in opposition to our moral 
intuitions" In this example, moral intuitions are seen as "the internaliZed lessons learned 
firom the past experiences that are taught by anappropriate moral upbringing. 
30 M. Fricker (1995). P243. 
31 M. Frickcr (1995). p'-", 7. 
32 M. Fricker (1995) claims that -intuition is properly described as rational in virtue of the facts that the 
relation between a set of past experiences and any resultant Intuition is 
fundamentally an evidential 
reason, albeit undcr-detcimined and subconscious. - p 240. 
33 NI. Ricker (1995). p 2,7. 
3-1 Ni. Ricker (1995). 1) 243. 
'5 M. Fricker ( 1995). 1) 24,. 
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I will take this chance to point out that Fricker's vie%v on intuitions is very similar to 
Polanyi's tacit knowledge, and also to signal how they differ. She supports view that 
intuition is based on experience, it is not innate or due to nature but, rather, the result of 
social training, a second nature. It is easy to see a similarity between her proposal and that 
of Polanyi which I explained before. The similarity between them is made obvious in their 
explanation for the existence of moral intuitions. He also claimed that moral intuitions are 
internalized moral lessons, but then he differed in its classification as subconscious. As I 
have explained in section 3, for Polanyi, these moral lessons will be proximal objects in a 
moral judgment, which means that they will be present but we will not attend to them in a 
focal way but, rather, we will be aware of them in a subsidiary way. They will be part of 
ourselves in the same way in which any other skill becomes part of ourselves. They will 
inform our decision making but we will not be aware of it. Nevertheless, as Polanyi points 
out, this does not mean that these moral lessons became subconscious. 
Summarizing the state of the argument regarding the relation between intuition and 
reason.: intuitions play the part traditionally attributed to reason when it tests hypotheses 
and when it has an internal capacity to decide, between different possibilities, which is the 
right one. 
Nevertheless, there is a difficulty in considering intuition as functioning in the same way as 
reason, and this is that the subject cannot explain how he reached a particular conclusion. 
It is interesting to recall Hospers here- "117c Himilion must be propositional before we are 
concerned with 11 117 a discussion of laiowledge". Hospers argued that this is one of the 
biggest obstacles to maintaining that intuition is the source of knowledge "All the 
reference to "intiation" enable its to conclude is "He doesn't Icnow how he knows (if he 
knows)". As an exl)lanafion it is qui . le empty. (.. ) The word intuition is simply a coi)er-ul) 
fernifor our ignorance, revealing onh, that we do not knoi, t, how he was able to do this. ýf 
asked to explam wc would be at a 
IOSY. 06 
"' I iosl)crs ( 1978). pl IS. 
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7. Justification 
If I am going to argue that intuition is within the i-ealm of reason, I have to explain why it 
is a mark of rationality to have certain intuitions. I will argue that, even if the subject does 
not know how he knows, intuitions are to be considered both as rational responses to 
problems and as a form of knowledge. In order to prove it, I will tackle the question of 
justification. 
I will approach the issue of justification by offering different examples in which intuition is 
at play. I will then show how, in these cases, the intuitions arise from the engagement of 
the subjects with practices that allow them to obtain knowledge of which they are not 
aware, and which is present to them in the form of hunches or intuitions. I want to draw a 
parallel between hunches or intuitions in the cases of mothers, car mechanics, the 
recognition of moods in peoples faces and the understanding of metaphors. 
It is a matter of fact that we can recognize moods in the semblances of people, but we 
cannot explain how we do it. We see connections between the expression of sadness in a 
particular face and the same mood in another person, even if their features are completely 
different. We are trained since we are born to interpret other people's faces, therefore we 
are able to pick up clues that make us see the dlffCFent faces as expressing the same thing, 
despite the enormous differences between them. The same is true of the car mechanic to 
whom I have already alluded, his response is the appropriate one to a particular situation 
even if he has never seen this particular model of car before, due to his experience he is 
able to link the current situation with others previously lived. 
Once again, this process is very similar to the apparently more intellectual one that we 
undergo when creating or understanding a metaphor. we pick up similarities between the 1- 0 1. ) 
t\\, -o terms of the metaphor that N\, ere not obvious beforehand but that, once we have 
understood the metaphor became salient to us. Understanding metaphors, even if it looks 
like a purely intellectual achievement, needs often to rely on shared experiences. For 
instance, when a child claims that she has a frizzy foot it is obvious, for someone A'Iio has 
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had the experience that she means, that she has pins and needles, but if you have never had 
the experience it is not obvious. By understanding a metaphor we realize that there are 
similitudes between two very different things, and this is the same process as the one that 
is undergone when we recognize moods in faces or when a mechanic has a hunch in 
relation to a car. 
The links that we establish are the result of a particular training that allows us to acquire 
certain recognitional skills, which can be present to us in the form of intuitions. As I have 
already argued, when we pick up similarities that allow us to see a situation in the same 
way as a previous one, we engage in a process that involves entities as a whole, and that 
cannot be analyzed it in terms of propositionally inferring the right answer. 
These examples illustrate that the subjects involved are able to give the appropriate 
response in a given set of circumstances, by relying on their previous experiences and 
training. I think that this is to be taken as a sign of rationality, even when the subject is not 
able to give a detailed reasoning of why she is so sure that this is the fight thing to do. 
This assertion has clear echoes of the arguments that I offered in chapter 5, in which I 
argued that once a subject enters the space of reasons, she can justify her practical or 
experiential knowledges, even when she cannot offer a propositional account to justify her 
knowledge. 
I also argued that a reason characterized as merely based on propositions is unable to 
account for all those actions that are suitable responses to the circumstances (that denote 
knowledge) given by subjects who have entered the space of reason. Nor can it explain 
how it is possible to make discoveries in science, or how we can enlarge our conceptual 
systems. In this chapter I have supported the broadening of the concept of reason because 
a reason narrowly characterized cannot explain why intuitions guide us to obtain the right 
answers. 
Oil these grounds, I want to argue that intuitions are cases of tacit knowledge, and that 
, what their intuitions indicate to them. Tacit knowled-e subjects are Justified in belic,,, in-, 
has to facc the same difficulties as practical and experiential knowledge regarding 
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justification, given that, in most cases, knowers are unable to provide us NvIth a list of 
propositions suitably linked with logical connectives in order to account for their hunches. 
The difference is that the arguments offered to support that practical and experiential 
knowledge are justified forms of knowledge do not seem to apply to tacit knowledge 
because, in the case of tacit knowledge, the knowers are not aware of the normativity 
involved in their practices. 
In order to show how tacit knowledge is knowledge because it can be justified, I will insist 
that we make a distinction between being able to justify a belief and being justified in 
believing. This distinction will allow me to claim that, even when a knower cannot justify 
her belief, she might be justified in believing. This distinction is illustrated by the example 
of the physiognomies: subjects learn to recognize facial expressions as embodied with 
meanings, but if asked, they might not be able to point out how they do it. Nevertheless 
this does not mean that they do not know how to do it. They cannot justify their 
knowledge by giving a list of propositions that describe their skill, but they are justified in 
believing that a particular person is in this or that mood. In this case, the justification arises 
from the fact that they are able to take part in determinate types of social interactions that 
imply the ability to recognize moods by attending to facial expressions. The knowledge is 
justified by the fact that the subjects are also able to recognize good and bad examples of 
the practice, which means that their attributions of moods are not arbitrary 
The example of the car mechanic supports ffirther my distinction because it shows that we 
can say that he is justified in believing that the fault is in the carburetor, and we could 
attribute to him a tacit knowledge that grounds his intuition. Again, I want to remark that 
our attribution of knowledge is not based on the soundness of a propositional argument 
but, rather it is based on the perception that he has acquired a certain expertise due to his 
many similar experiences. Taking into account his training, his previous experiences and 
the certainty that he has of the source of the failure, we can say that he has sufficient 
elements to justify his belief By pointing out where the faulty piece is, and by repairing it, 
he x\,, Ill prove that his hunch was correct. The justification for his claim will be a series of 
actions and practices that we will recognize as supporting his claim. We xvill recognize 
that lie has a grasp of certain aspects of the world that some of us do not have. I want to 
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underline that he is "getting things right" because he grasps certain patterns that are 
significant to him due his experiences, but also because he is able to recognize what counts 
as solving the problem or not solving it. He is able to appreciate the normative aspects of 
his knowledge. 
I think the same type of reasoning can be applied to the other two cases that I mentioned 
at the beginning of the section, the intuitions of mothers regarding their babies or the 
understanding or creation of metaphors. In the first instance, the mother becomes aware of 
certain patterns of behaviour that allow her to foresee what it is going to happen, while in 
the second case, we learn to capture relations between concepts that are meaningful not 
only to ourselves, but also to the rest of speakers. The tacit knowledge displayed in these 
examples is the product of experience and it involves the apprehension of a certain 
normativity. Therefore, even if at first sight, we could not argue for the justification of 
tacit knowledge by its underlying normativity, a more detailed analysis of some examples 
points in the opposite direction. 
Nevertheless, in the first section of the chapter I offered an example to illustrate the nature 
of tacit knowledge that seems to jeopardize my claims regarding the justification of tacit 
knowledge. I am referring to the example of the electric shock and the random syllables 
proposed by Polanyi, in which a subject is presented with a number of syllables, some of 
which were preceded by an electric shock. Subsequently, the subject becomes able to 
recognize a sequence in the apparently random arrangement, which enables him to 
anticipate the shock- syl labl es. Even if the subject can anticipate the shock syllables, lie is 
not able to point out the sequence. 
In the above example, the subject seems to have acquired the knowledge in an almost 
brutal causal way, which seems to indicate that this is just a case of conditioned behavior 
that does not really count as knowledge. It is tempting to say that the subject has not 
apprehended any nori-nativity in the process of learning and that, therefore, the 
conditioning cannot count as knowledge. Nevertheless, I think that this judgment displays 
a clear misunderstanding of the role of training in the acquisition of certain types of D In I 
practic, il and tacit knowledge i`xen it', very often, we learn hoN\, - to respond appropriately 
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to some situations in this seemingly mechanical manner, this does not imply that we do not 
acquire knowledge. 
I can support my claim by referring to the training of astronauts, or soldiers, which 
involves the use of technology that necessitates quick reactions, and which necessitates 
that they are trained to react in a "mechanical" way, such that they are able to pick up 
information displayed in front of them and react to it immediately. The above example 
illustrates how knowers can engage in practices that entail the recognition of patterns, 
without being able to express which is the subjacent pattern, but this does not imply that 
their knowledge cannot be justified. I think that, in these cases, their knowledge is justified 
by having undergone training, because it has made them able to engage satisfactorily in 
certain practices, which implies the apprehension of a certain normativity. Nevertheless, it 
still can be argued that there is no apprehension of normativity in being trained to 
recognize shock syllables via receiving electric shocks, because animals can also be trained 
in this fashion. 
While in the case of the car mechanic and physiognomy recognition it is clear that the 
knowers are partaking in socially sanctioned practices, and that their intuitions consist in 
making the appropriate moves within the space of reason, which makes their intuitions 
count as knowledge; in the case of the electric shocks this is not so obvious. Nevertheless, 
I believe that, even when human beings are trained to react "without thinking", and even 
when the training involves purely mechanical reactions, there is still a difference between 
animals and humans, because humans can apprehend the whole process of knowledge 
acquisition and take responsibility for their ! earning. This implies that, even if the end 
result of their training is that they have learned to recognize a random pattern of syllables, 
in the process they have agreed that there are good and bad answers, that there is a trainer 
Nvho knows the correct , N, ay of responding, that there are permissible and non-permissible 
ways of respondin! ý to the training and that, at the end of the training, there will be skillea 11ý1 I-D 
knowers and others who have not got the knowledge. Human beings capture the 
normativity of their knowledge, even in the cases Nvhen the norms are arbitrary, or wlien 
they cannot explain NvIiy they know what they know. 
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8. Intuition and Creative imagination. 
In a previous chapter I argued that a picture of rationality that implies that all our mental 
content is conceptual is inadequate to capture the complex nature of our mental 
representations, and I argued for the recognition of a content that is non-conceptual but 
able to enter into our rational deliberations. In the previous sections I have argued that a 
model of rationality based merely on propositions is insufficient for several reasons. 
Among them, I mentioned that it is unable to account for radical changes in our 
conceptual apparatus, or to explain the gap that we can sometimes expefience between 
our conceptual framework and our apprehension of reality. 
In section 31 explained that Polanyi believed that individuals could make contributions 
toward closing the gap between their apprehended reality and their conceptual framework. 
These contributions are mainly individual, but are the product of a certain training. He 
adopts the same attitude in respect to scientific discoveries: Scientists are able to solve 
puzzles or see the solution to new questions by making coherent a group of data that, at 
first sight, might appear unrelated. In scientific discovery, " the researcher is engaged in 
the problem of trying to find the coherence of various pieces of information. (.. )Polanyi 
added that the seeing of a pattern is the outcome of an intentional effort of the person to 
find order in reality This characterization of knowledge as the action of putting ZD 
seemingly unrelated information together into a coherent picture is an activity for which 
rules cannot be given. "These [scientificiudgment] arejudgmel7ts that demand insight 
and understanding, nvo scientists could have a peifectly identical understanding of 
scienlific 1mvs and theories, but one may make a great discovery and the other spend his 
or her 1ýfe doing ordinar. v research ivhich confornis to current knowledge. The difference 
lies In the personaliudgment (ýf the scientist. , 38 
Discovery in science reSUItS from the handling of theoretical information in different ways 
by equally well trained scientists, and this is explained by Polanyl as the product of 
creativc ima, ination, a faculty that Nvill enable the scientist to see the Nvorld in a new way, 
R. GeiNvick (1977), p 27. 
R. GcIN% ick (1977), 1) 26. 
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by making a coherent picture out of a set of data that do not seem to be related. I maintain 
that creative imagination is nothing other than intuitions based on skills acquired by being 
trained in particular ways of living and which allow the scientist to organize the perceived 
reality in a completely different way. 
I will give more weight to the role of communities in the acquisition of these skills and less 
to the role of the individual. As Polanyi does, adopting this view, I increase the importance 
of belonging to more than one epistemic group, which will provide us with diverse skills, 
which in turn will provide us with richer conceptual frameworks. I will expand on this idea 
in the following chapter, while in the next section I will attend to some objections to my 
project. 
9. Kuhn on intuition and the change of paradigm. 
I am supporting the view that, as a product of particular cognitive skills, the knower is 
occasionally able to apprehend reality in a way that does not capture her conceptual 
framework. I will even argue that this could be the case with respect not to single words 
but to complicated webs of concepts, such as the ones that we can find in scientific 
theories. What I am suggesting is close to the idea of a change of paradigm propitiated by 
non-conceptual intuitions. 
There are obvious arguments against this model, for instance, the work of Kuhn on 
paradigm change seems to challenge the possibility that I envision. He argues that the 
change of paradigm necessitates that the scientist is already perceiving the world by the 
means of a previous paradigm. Even if I do not deny that this is the case, I will argue that 
it is possible to apprehend the world in ways that are not completely mediated by the 
concepts enclosed in that paradigm. Nevertheless, this does not mean that the knower has 
an Lininediated relation \\, 'ith the world, I think it is mediated at least in two sensesý 
-First, knowers are those x\, ho are in the realm of reason and, therefore, most of their 
mental content is conceptual. NIN, main argument in chapter 5 was that conceptual and 
non-coriccptual content appear closely related, even if I argued that there is a certaiii 
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amount of non-conceptual content that will allow the to make changes in the accepted 
view on the world. 
-Second, as I have also already argued, I agree with Polanyi, who claims that our 
embodied nature is always tacitly present in all our knowledge claims, therefore there is an 
ineffable element in our perceptions, which mediates them. 
I do not believe that our perception of the world is unmediated. With this premise in mind, 
I will argue that scientists are able to transcend the current theories and the concepts that 
they enclose, to see and organize reality in different ways. In this section I will argue 
against Kuhn by showing that unless scientists are able to apprehend aspects of the world 
outside the conceptual system provided by their theories, they would not be able to change 
paradigms. In a later section I will spell out the consequences of my claims for a feminist 
epistemology. 
Now, I will explain Kuhn's theory on how scientists are able to change paradigms. He 
points out that the changes of paradigm are not identical to a Gestalt switch", but he 
nevertheless accepts that the transition between paradigms "like the Gestalt switch, it 
Y 
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must occur all at once (though not necessarily in an instant) or not at all. 
Kuhn also supports the idea that intuition is the origin of a new paradigm "Scientists then 
o et7 speak of the 'scalesfallingftom their eyes'or the 'lightningflash' that 'inundates' 
a pre viously obscure pu, Ile, ei iab les its components to be seen in a neit, ivay thatfor the 
. 
first lime permilS its S011111011. On other occasions the relevant illumination comes in 
sleep. No ordinary sense (? f the term 'interpretation'fits theseflashes of intuition through 
i chich a neit, paradigm is b01-17. Though such intuitions depend upon the experience, both 
anomalous and congruent, gained ivith the old paradigm, they are 1701 logically or 
piecemeal 1117ked to particular items of thal experience as an interpretation 1vould be. 
Instead, theY gather up large portions of that experience and transfol-171 them to the 
rather c4ffereni bundle of experience that wd/ thereafter be linkedpiecemeal to the neit, 
39 T. Kulin (1996)ý p85,114. 
"' T Kulin ( 1996). p 150. 
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paradigni but not to the old . 
ý, 41 
In the above quotation Kuhn claims that scientist can see the problem which he tries to 
solve in a new way through intuition, which is prior to the new paradigm. So, up until this 
point, there seems to be a coincidence between the role that Kuhn attributes to intuition 
and the description that Polanyi made of how creative imagination works. The difference 
between the two accounts is that Kuhn claims that "Surveying the rich experimental 
literature ftom which these examples are drawn makes one suspect that something like a 
paradigm is prerequisite to perception itsetf What a man sees dependý both upon what 
he looks at and also u on what his previous visual-conceptual experience has taught him 
to see. "42 This is an important problem for the model that I am supporting. In my defense, I 
will argue that Kuhn himself has to confront a problem: he has to explain how it is 
possible to have a perceptual change, i. e., to have the intuition that will change the view of 
the scientist, without first changing the paradigm. I will argue that the tension in his model 
cannot be solved unless we accept a non-propositional account of scientific intuition: 
according to Kuhn, we need a new paradigm already in place to have the change of vision 
but at the same time it seems that we need intuition, that will propitiate a Gelstat switch in 
order to have a new paradigm. 
Looking at a particular example of a change of paradigm in Kuhn's model will help us to 
understand the difficulty. We will look at his explanation of how Galileo introduced 
important changes in physics with the development of the theory of the pendulum. The 
Aristotelian paradigm (previous to Galileo) maintained that "a heaq body is moved by its 
moi nature fi-om a higher position to a state of natural rest at a loli, er one. r t, 4 3 Therefore, 
if looking at a pendulum in movement, they would have interpreted the movement of the 
pendulum as ', ' fling iilfh dýfficulty. 1144 Galileo was trained to analyze motions in terms of , 
fa II 
impetus theory, which was developed in the late part of the fourteenth century and 
allowed him to approach the movement of the pendulum in a new way, refuting the 
prevalent Aristotelian paradigm. Galileo saw the pendulum "as a body that almost 
41T. Kuhn (1996), p 123. 
42 T. Kuhn (1996), pI33). 
43 T. Kuhn (1996), p 119. 
. 1.1 T. Kuhn (1996), p 119. 
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succeeds in repealing the same motion over and over agal .n ad infinimm. "" So the 
conceptual possibilities opened by the medieval paradigm shift allowed Galileo to have 
different perceptual experiences from those who followed the Aristotelian theory 
Kuhn's describes the change of paradigm as a change in our perceptions propitiated by a 
change of theory (paradigm). For instance, he thinks that it is wrong to claim that both 
Galileo and the followers of the previous paradigm, the Aristotelian, saw the same thing 
while looking at a weight attached to a string in motion. Following Kuhn, the Aristotelian 
saw a swinging stone and Galileo saw a pendulum. He does not accept that both are 
seeing the same thing and interpreting it in a different way but, rather, that their different 
paradigms make them see different objects. He says that "rather than being an interpreter, 
the scientist who embraces a new paradigm is like the mail wearing inverted glasses. 
Confronting the same constellations of objects as before and knowing that he does so, he 
neverthelessfinds them transformed through and through in many of their details. "4' 
As I said before, it seems paradoxical that you need to have the new paradigm in order to 
see the world as ordered according to it, and to claim at the same time that seeing it as 
such it is what propitiates the change in the paradigm!. Kuhn acknowledges, in his 
postscript, that his liberal use of 'paradigm' makes his text inaccurate. I think that his 
position in the postscript will help us to make sense of this paradox. 
In the postscript he calls paradigm a disciplinary matrix. In a disciplinary matrix we find- 
symbolic generalizations, heuristic models, values and exemplars. A disciplinary matrix 
includes exemplars as a part of it. And an exemplar is what Kuhn was also calling 
paradigm in his previous text. By paradigm, lie meant the particular way of looking at the 
world that a group of scientists acquired while being trained as scientists. The use and 
understanding of the same exemplars is what produces the learning of scientific theories. I 
Students do not became scientists by learning a theory and a few rules and then using it to I 
solve problems. A scientist -grasps a 
theory by solving problems. This is ver-N, cleark, 
45 T. Kulin (1996), p 119. 
46 T. Kulin (1996), p 122. 
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illustrated by an example provided by Kuhn. It is common that students get to the end of a 
lesson and try to solve the problems that they encounter in the text book and feel unable to 
do them. This is commonly reported and it ends when " The student discoi, ers, with or 
without the assistance of the instructor, a way to see his problem as like a problem he haS 
already encountered Having seen the resemblance, grasped the analoa between two 01' 
more distinct problems, he can interrelate symbols and attach them to nature in the U, M -ýý 
that have proved effective before. 47 This is the way in which students learn to see the 
world as the other trained scientists do. Science consists in acquiring a particular way of 
viewing the world. Kuhn himself makes a connection with Polanyi's tacit knowledge. 48 
Let's come back now to the paradox that we were trying to solve. Changes of paradigm 
are like Gestalt changes because they occur at once. Does this mean changes in the 
disciplinary matrix or changes in the exemplars? A change of the disciplinary matrix cannot 
be sudden, it has to be built step by step. But a trained scientist can have a sudden change 
in his vision similar to that which he undergoes when learning to solve the problems by 
seeing them as similar to others he has encountered previously. A scientist trying to solve 
a particular problem in a theory realizes that it is not explained by seeing it as similar to 
others that he has previously solved but, rather, he sees it as similar to some other types of 
problems he has solved somewhere else. If we accept that paradigm changes necessitate 
just this sort of glimpse into what it could be like for the old theory if we see a current 
problem in a new light, then it seems that the paradox that Kuhn was facing can begin to 
be explained. First the scientist has an intuition, based on previous experiences, which 
shows her the data arranged in a completely new way. She feels it is a good way of 
ordering them and begins to foresee the enormous implications that this particular mo%, e 
can have for the existing theory. She does not need to be able to explain just now the new 
theory in detail, but she feels justified to believe that this is a more correct way of solving, 
the problem. 
" T. Kulin (1996), p189. 
48 "That sort of learning is not acquired by exclusiveh, vcrbal nicans. Ratlicr it conics as one is given 
words together with concrete cxamples of how they function in use,, nature and words are learlicd togctlicr 
To borrow once more Michael Polanyi's useful phrase, what rcstilts from this process is lacit knowledge' 
which is Icarned bv doino science rather than by acquirino rules for doing it. " 1'. Kulin (1996)ý pl9l. 
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Polanyl claims that we can have tacit knowledge of undiscovered things: "This is indccd 
the kind of foreknowledge the Copernicans must have meant to affirm when theY 
passionately maintained, against heavy pressure, during one hundred andforty years 
before Newton proved theP0717t, that the heliocentric theory was not merely a convenient 
way of computing the paths of planets, but was really true. "49Regarding the justification 
of this knowledge, he says "Since we have no explicit knowledge of these unknOWn things, 
there can also be no explicit justification of a scientific truth. But as we can k7loll, a 
problem, andfeel sure that it is pointing to something hidden behind it, we can be aware 
also of the hidden implications of a scientific discovery, andfeel confident that they will 
prove right. We feel sure of this, because in contemplating the discovery we are looking 
at it not only in itseýf but, more significantly, as a clue to reality at which our clues are 
pointing. "50 
I find this explanation appropriate for solving the difficulty that Kuhn has to face but, 
accepting it, I seem to be granting the possibility that the scientist can somehow escape the 
conceptual system that underlines his view of the world and confront some aspects that 
are not captured by the theory that he embraces. This seems to put into question Kuhn's 
denial of a sharp distinction between observation and theory, given that he claims that 
observation is theory laden. Interestingly, in a later article, Kuhn explains how the change 
in paradigm is due to anomalies provided by experimentation giving unexpected results 
that do not fit the theory at hand. These anomalies are called "unassinfilated obseriation" 
or "incongruous experience"" and they refer to the observation of facts or phenomena 
that resist conceptual izati on. "the data requisite for rei)ohition have existed before at the 
firinge of scientific C017SCIOUS17CSS, the emergence of crisis brings them to the center of 
attention, * and the rciýohaionai-), reconceptualization permits than to be seen in a neii, 
"52 This seems to imply that It is possible to encounter experience that does not fit the 
conceptual system and which provokes changes, as Kuhn says "Typically, that crisis ends I 
011ý, V When some particularly imaginative indiOdital, or a group (? f them, weai)e, ý a neii, 
ftibric of laws, theOrieS, and concepts, one which can assimilate the preWous 
49 M. Polanvi (1966). p23 
so Ni. Polanvi (1966). p 24. 
1'. Kuhn 1964), p 25. 
T. Kuhn (1964). 1) 25. 
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I- ncotigruous experietwe wid most or all of the previous assimilated experience as 
well. "". Nevertheless, I would like to underline precisely that this experience is not 
encountered as raw experience, completely out of the conceptual system. If we look at the 
examples offered by Kuhn, we realize that the experiences almost fitted the conceptual 
apparatus, and that it was the growing uneasiness about the possibility of a serious misfit 
that provided the impulse for the change of theory. 
It is easier to understand the process described above, if we recall one of Piaget's 
experiments designed to teach children about the concept of speed, which, incidentally, is 
used by Kuhn to illustrate the relation between experience and thought experiments in 
change of theories. Children tend to think that, given two toy cars, the one that arrives 
first at the end of a set circuit is the faster, even if it has left before the others. They hold 
this belief until they see how a car that left later accelerates visibly during the race to arrive 
54 at the same time as the one that left first . The children transform their concept of 
speed when they realize that brings them into contradictions. The change is only 
possible because they can understand the second situation with their existing concept of 
speed, even if, when made to think about it, they admit that it was insufficient and that it 
distorted what was really happening. The same happens with scientists, they have to be 
able to see the data that will change the theory via their old theory: 
"For SOMetime before ive encountered them, our subjects had in their transactions with 
nature, successfully employed a conceptual fabric different ftom the one we use 
ourselves. Thalfiabric was time tested; it had not yet encounlered them, they had at last 
acquired a varieýv of experience which could not be assimilated by their traditional mode 
of dealing with 117C world. At this point they had at hand all the experience requisite to a 
. 
/unckinicnial recasting of their concepts, but there was something about that experience 
that IhcY hadnOf 
. 
)VIseen. Because they had not, they were subject to confusion and were 
perhaps ah-eac& uneasy. Full confusion, however, came only in the thought-experimental 
SiIII(ItiOn, (Ind 117C17 it came as prelude to its cure. By transforming felt anomaly to 
concrete contradiction, ihe thought experiment it? forlned our subject what was wrong. 
53 T. Kuhn (1964), p 25. 
5" T. Kuhn (1964). p 8-10. 
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Thatfirst clear view of the misfit between experience and implicit expectation provided 
the clues necessary to set the situation right. 1155 
I began this section by saying that some knowers are able to apprehend reality in a ývay 
that is not captured by their conceptual framework. I have assessed Kuhn's idea that it is 
necessary to have a paradigm in mind, in order to be able to see the world in a new light. 
According to Kuhn, scientists' intuitions are the grounds for a change in paradigms, which 
are propitiated by their encounter with data that are not explained by the theories. I have 
analyzed his theory because, even if, on the first instance, it seems to challenge my 
suggestion that it is possible to have non-conceptual content, I think that, in actual fact, it 
helps me to show the importance of such a content in the change of paradigms. 
I have argued that knowers are in the realm of reasons by means of having learned a 
language, so once they have been enculturated, and are able to see the world via their 
conceptual system, then , they are able to push the 
limits of their language by 
acknowledging that there are aspects of the world that are not included within it. Because 
they are in the realm of reasons, they are able to recognize rational relations between 
contents that have not been put prop o sitionally. I claimed that knowers can apprehend 
non-conceptual content that it is not identical with 'raw experience'. I think that the same 
situation is encountered by scientists when they became aware that there are data that 
cannot be assimilated by their theories. They are able to sense a tension between their 
theories and some aspects of the world and they are able to do it because they can see the 
relation between those data and their theories, which means that their perceptions are 
mediated by their training. Clearly, someone who is not trained as a scientist would not be 
able to see those data as unassimilated by the theory. So, on the one hand, their 
perceptions are mediated by their theory but, on the other hand, the theory does not allow 
them to apprehend the world completely. Even if this is not enough to propitiate a change 
of paradigm, it is enojg!, to show how scientists can begin to feel uncomfortable with their ID 
cLirrent theories before they have another one in sight. In the next section I will explain 
how this sense of inadeqUacy links with my general argument regarding intuition. 
1'. Kuhn (1964), 1) ? 0. 
214 
10. Epistemological implications. 
In the p. ---vious section I claimed that the first step towards enlarging our existent 
conceptual systems is to be aware of the tension between them and the world. The next 
step is to be able to foresee, or apprehend, what it is obscured by our actual concepts. I 
have argued that this realization often takes the form of intuitions that allow particular 
subjects to engage, in an appropriate way, with the world without being able to explain 
how they know that this was the appropriate behavior. But while this seems to be a good 
way to explain how a car mechanic knows that the problem in the car is the carburetor and 
not the electrical system, it does not seem so obvious when we refer to scientific theories. 
Nevertheless, I have already explained how scientists make discoveries in science by 
making coherent pictures of aspects of the world that had previously remained unrelated 
by existing theories. This is made clear when Polanyi points out that, given that all 
scientists receive the same training, then all of them should be able to make the data 
cohere in the same way, once they are confronted with them, but in actual fact, we can 
take two scientists with the same theoretical knowledge of a subject, and see that one of 
them will develop a new theory and the other one will be unable to do it. Polanyi 
attributed a central role to the imagination of particular scientists, who where able to make 
the transition, but I would like to give more weight to its social aspects. 
I would like to point out that a factor with influence in scientific discoveries is the degree 
of marginality and novelty of the scientist involved in the investigation. Investigators who 
are trained in a field, but who are not at the center of it, are more likely to perceive "data" 
that do not fit the current theories. Kuhn mentions psychological experiments that 
illustrate how we all have a tendency to make the information that we gather into coherent 
pictures, and explains that people who expect certain results in their research might be 
blind to the results of those experiments that do not fit well. Therefore, on one hand, only 
those who are able to discriminate the results will be able to perceive subtle differences 
that might make all the difference. 56 But, on the other hand, Kuhn insists that the 
So T. Klihn (1996), 1) 62-65. 
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investigators involved in the origin of new paradigms are almost always very young 
scientists or very new to the paradigm that they want to change and, therefore, "these men 
are men who, being little committed by prior practice to the traditional rules of normal 
science, are particularly likely to see that those rules 170 longer define a playable game 
and to conceive another set that can replace them. , 57 Being at the margins of particular 
knowledge practices might offer a privileged perspective to the knowers. They are more 
likely to notice tensions between the theory and the data and also to have intuitions to 
produce alternatives. 
I pointed out, in a previous section, that intuition relies on practices, that it is a skill that is 
acquired by experience and practice and, therefore it is socially learned and validated. I 
explained how we learned to solve mathematical problems by being able to see a problem 
as similar to another one that we already know how to solve. I want to claim now that 
skills acquired in particular knowledge practices might be useful in establishing new ways 
of solving problems in another area of knowledge. I think that this might explain why 
certain individuals can organize experience in a novel way, while others are unable to 
make the appropriate connections. 
I will argue, in the next chapter, that epistemic marginality is desirable and that plurality in 
epistemic communities is more productive than uniformity. I will also argue that, in order 
to get objective knowledge, it is necessary to take the contributions of those at the 
margins of the epistemic communities seriously. 17, 
11. A New Paradigm of Reason. 
In this chapter I have argued for a concept of reason that does not rely closely on the 
relation between our language and the world. By supporting the view that intuition is a 
rational response to the world, I have showed how we are able to apprehend aspects of 
the world that escape our conceptual systems, but that are part of the realm of reason. 
57 T. Kuhn (1996), p 90. He also offers the example of Dalton who changed the paradigm In ClIcillistry. 
partly becausc his training Nvas in a different speciality and pirtly because of his own Nvork in that 
speciality, lie approached those problems Nvith a paradigin different froin that of contcrnporarý, chernists. " 
p L, 3 
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It is one of the main aims of this thesis to show how we can change some of the links 
between reason and other concepts such as gender and knowledge. In order to further this 
aim, I have supported a concept of reason which is not linked to theoretical or 
propositional knowledge, and which is not opposed to intuition, therefore introducing into 
the equation concepts that were excluded because they were linked to the realm of the 
feminine. One obvious implication from this move is that women became more likely to be 
considered rational. Nevertheless, and even if I intended to promote the inclusion of 
women in the realm of reason, my strategy has not consisted in "weakening" the concept 
of reason in order to allow women to enter it. Rather, I have showed how the concept of 
reason at play in many theories, which exclude women, is also inappropriate for covering 
the activities of males. To this effect, I have claimed that it is not possible to have a 
concept of reason that is too close to language, because it impedes our accounting for 
changes in our conceptual systems. I have argued that, unless we accept the role of non- 
conceptual content, and of intuition, in our cognitive practices, we will not be able to 
explain how we can enlarge our conceptual systems, nor how we can understand opaque 
thinkers. 
I have also suggested that some groups are more likely to apprehend these aspects of the 
world than others, because their involvement in some activities might provide them with 
abilities that allow them to see the world in a different way. In the next chapter I will argue 
that women, by engaging in particular practices, can apprehend aspects of the world that 
remain opaque to those who do not partake in these practices, which, added to their 
marginal status as knowers, provide them with a privileged perspective in some matters. I 
will also rely on some of my conclusions in this, and previous chapters, to analyze the 
centrality of embodiment in our acquisition of knowledge, avoiding esentialism, but 
claiming that having, particular types of bodies has a bearing in our production of II 
knowledge. 
2 17 
CHAPTER 7 
0. Introduction 
In the introductory chapters I pointed out that the traditional form of feminist standpoint 
epistemology, as supported by Harstock, had many valuable features but, also, was 
subjected to some deserved criticism. I claimed that I would argue for a revised version of 
feminist standpoint epistemology and, in this chapter I will make my project explicit 
In previous chapters of the thesis I have offered arguments to counteract some of the 
criticisms put forward by postmodernist and postcolonial thinkers. To this effect, I claimed 
that, if we want to ground knowledge on the experiences of those who belong to 
marginalized groups, the concept of experience needs to be altered and, also, that the 
notion of group identity should be challenged in order to encompass diversity and avoid 
essentialism and universalism. Nevertheless, there are still some issues that have to be 
solved, such as the impossibility of grounding feminist standpoint epistemology on the 
basis of the object relation theory, and the need to solve the problems posited by the 
multiplication of standpoints. 
I will begin by arguing that it is not necessary to rely on the object relation theory in order 
to explain the formation of a feminist standpoint. In previous chapters I have offered 
diverse arguments to support the view that the members of particular groups can access 
certain aspects of the world that remain opaque to offiers, who do not belong to the same 
epistemic communities. I will argue that the central role given by traditional standpoint to 
communities in the production of knowledge gives us the basis for explaining how women 
develop a feminist standpoint. Belonging to particular communities, taken together with 
the fact that there is epistemic marginalization of certain groups, can explain why there are 
some knowers who can apprehend aspects of the world that are opaque to others and, 
also, how they develop critical views on mainstream knowledge. Both facts will allow me 
to argue that there are some knowers with a privileged epistemic perspective. 
Situated knowled, -, e is at the center at this chapter, and I will argue that all knowledge is 
SItUated because it is mediated by pai-ticular types of embodiment, and hv the communities 
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wherein it is produced. In the former chapter, I argued for an ideal of knowledge firmly 
based on practices. I underlined that it is personal in the sense that it has been acquired by 
undergoing experiences that enable the subject to develop certain epistemic skills and to 
access contents that cannot be acquired otherwise. I have argued that the content of these 
experiences might not be expressible in a propositional form, because it is a form of 
knowing how, or because the current conceptual system has not got enough resources for 
it. Equally, I will underline the importance of embodiment in the acquisition of knowledge, 
given that particular types of embodiment are necessary in order to acquire knowledge. 
Nevertheless, this knowledge is sanctioned and justified within communities. As I have 
already indicated, in this chapter. I will stress that the communities to which the knowing 
subject belong, are the grounds for knowledge, and are central to being able to make sense 
of his personal experiences and to justifying his knowledge. 
The second question that I will consider is how the multiplication of standpoints seems to 
imply that we cannot have objective knowledge. I will analyse Harding's Strong 
Objectivity theory, which is an attempt to overcome the difficulties posited by the 
multiplication of standpoints, while preserving some of the central features of feminist 
standpoint epistemology. 
1. The social nature of Knowledge. 
One of the factors that makes standpoint epistemology useful to feminism is that it 
acknowledges the importance of epistemic communities in the production of knowledge. 
Standpoint epistemology attempts to explain how the social location of an individual 
mediaL--s her knowledge. In order to understand the importance of this claim, I will 
contrast standpoint epistemology with traditional epistemology and with other types of 
feminist epistemology. 
In traditional epistemology, knowledge is produced by individuals. Feminists have argued I=) In 
against \vhat has been called epistemological individualism, both to show the I 
1 lýor a stlinman, of diffei-cilt positions. sec L. 11ý"lk-, "SO" NCISO" (1993», p122, 
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implausibility of a solipsistic knower' and, also, in order to underline the importance of our 
locations in the production of knowledge. In traditional epistemology, groups of 
individuals can be at the center of the production of knowlcige when they are taken to be 
members of professional bodies, because when epistemic expertise is discussed, it is 
always in relation to these bodies. But the fact that, within these communities, there are 
other possible groupings, such as by gender, race, age, etc... has remained 
unacknowledged. Feminists have argued for the importance of other epistemological 
communities. In particular, they have argued that women, as a group, might make 
important contributions to the future development of science. 
What makes standpoint epistemology different from other types of epistemology in 
relation to this issue is that it aims to explain why belonging to certain communities allows 
you to have a particular perspective on the world. In the opening chapters of the thesis I 
explained how empiricist feminist epistemology assumes that there is a difference of 
perspective between male and female scientists, but does not attempt to explain why this is 
so. Postmodern thinkers argue that it is the multiplication of the axes of power that 
multiplies the possible standpoints, but they cannot explain why one should be preferable 
to others. I believe that standpoint epistemology can offer good reasons to explain why 
some groups acquire a perspective that is different from the mainstream one, that there is 
more than one group that can do it, and why their perspective is preferable to the one held 
by those who are not in the margins. In the next sections I will offer some arguments to 
support my claim, so, in (L 1), 1 will show how taking communities as the basis for 
kriowledge allows us to explain the formation of standpoints and the development of 
theories that are alternative to the ones commonly accepted, while in sections (1.2) and 
(1.3) 1 will explain the mechanisms that allow some marginal knowers to develop critical 
views on mainstream theories. 
1.1 Coninitinities as the basis of knowledge- 
In a clear allusion to the multiplication of axes of power argued for by postmodernists, I 
will accept that there is a diversity of epistemic communities. Each of us belongs to more 
2 See L. Hankinson Nelson (19931). 
220 
than one of them. Some of themwe choose, but others we are "born" into. I am a member 
of several epistemic communities: I am a Spanish-speaker, and this implies that I share a 
common way of looking at the world with those who speak Spanish. I am also a 
philosopher, this time a community of my own choice, and then I am a feminist woman, a 
community that is half chosen, half born into. 
According to traditional standpoint epistemology, I can develop a feminist standpoint due 
to the sexual division of labour, and biology also plays an important role in its formation. 
In this section I will show how it is possible to acquire a standpoint without relying on 
biology, and without using the object relation theory. The basis for the argument, in classic 
standpoint epistemology, was that women have privileged knowledge because there are 
material circumstances that allow them to undergoparticular experiences, which get 
articulated by belonging to a marginalized episternic group. I think that the argument is 
basically correct, that the reason why people belonging to certain communities develop 
certain epistemic skills has to be related to their engagement with the world. I will argue 
that it is the development of these skills that allows marginalized subjects to have a more 
creative role in the production of knowledge, and a more critical attitude towards 
commonly accepted theories. 
In Chapter 51 explained how McDowell claimed that entering the space of concepts is 
entering the space of reasons. Those who speak a language and, therefore, share a certain 
culture, stand in the same place in relation to the space of reasons. We are able to grasp 
different aspects of reality by means of our conceptual system, acquired by sharing a way 
of life, by belonging to particular societies. I have already said that we need to 
acknowledge the existence of a non-conceptual content in order to be able to explain how 
it is possible to envision aspects of the world that are not currently accessible via our 
conceptual system. By acknowledging the existence of different communities, whose 
tdcntity is supported by their engagement in particular practices, I am grounding the 
possibility of having knowers who have developed different epistemic skills, which allow 
flicni to apprehend aspects of the world that remain unacknowledged by the mainstream. 
In the pI-c%, jous chapter I argued that this theory Is also appficable to the development of 
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our scientific theories, that it allows us to explain how scientists, ývho have been trained to 
"see" the world according to the ruling theories in their particular realm of science, are 
able to escape the paradigm imposed on them and to foresee other possibilities. For 
instance, Polanyi shows how Einstein developed a theory that contradicted the 
observational data that supported the current theory at the time, by following a hunch. ' He 
suspected that his model would be better, without being able to explain why, and 
accordingly, even the scientific community was persuaded by Einstein's theory before it 
4 was verified . In this particular example there is a stress on individual genius, the product 
of Polanyi's approach to the subject of creative imagination in science. But I have argued 
that, even if imagination plays an important role, the changes that the scientist envisions 
should be taken to be the product of cognitive abilities acquired by belonging to 
particular communities. We can pick up new aspects of the world by relying on the 
epistemic skills that we develop by belonging to particular communities, and we can do it 
even when the current theories do not have resources to accommodate those experiences. 
Scientists acquire skills that remain unknown to them while being trained in their 
particular topics of research. But they also acquire certain epistemic skills in their everyday 
lives that can transfer to their scientific work. 
These skills are social in nature because they are acquired socially, the practices that allow 
us to acquire the skills are validated socially, and the knowledge that they produce is 
justified socially'. Given that skill acquisition is necessarily linked to practices in 
communities, the belonging of the scientist to these particular groups has a bearing on the 
possibility of their making discoveries. The sort of picture that emerges from my theory is 
that of scientists firmly located in communities as the ground of new theories. This 
would have traditionally been considered as a highly subjective kind of knowledge, given 
that the traditional picture of objective knowledge is based on the idea that equally well 
trained scientists who have to confront a particular cluster of data will reach the same 
conclusions. In this new model, particular scientists can bring to the research new 
co, niltive skills that will allow them to make new discoveries. They might not be aware 1. ) 
3 He &N-cloped the tileory of relativity by being prompted by the observations made by the Michelson- 
Mor1c), experiment. but he believes. and has the testimony of Einstein to support it, that Einstein has the 
111111ch of tile tlicorN, much earlier in life. M. Polanyi (1998), p 11. 
N1 poll IN I( 1991,, 1), p 14. 
This particular aspect is developed in the previous chapter. 
')') I 
that they are bringing them in, because they have been acquired and put into use tacitly 
At this point I want to remark on the personal aspect of the acquisition of knowledge, 
because the scientist gets trained and acquires particular cognitive abilities that are not 
transferable unless one undergoes a particular training, which is made even more obvious 
if we remember that the acquisition of these abilities is not merely intellectual, it 
necessitates the involvement of whole embodied persons and of participation in ways of 
life. Linking the epistemic abilities of knowers with the communities where they have been 
trained, and the possibility of exporting skills acquired in one realm to others, explains why 
people whose provenance is diverse will make different contributions even when trained 
identically in a single trade. This type of argument can be adopted by standpoint 
epistemologists in order to explain why women will develop particular episternic abilities 
and, therefore, why it is desirable to have diverse epistemic communities represented in the 
institutions that validate and produce knowledge. 
In this section I have claimed that epistemic communities are important because they allow 
us to develop epistemic skills, which are acquired by taking part in particular practices that 
are regulated socially, an idea that it is supported by the arguments developed in previous 
chapters in order to show that the knowledge produced is justified socially. I have also 
showed how belonging to these communities allows the knowers to contribute with 
original theories that challenge the received views. In the next two sections I will argue 
that those belonging to marginal communities have the possibility of developing more 
critical views and, in this sense, have a privileged epistemic perspective over those who do 
not belong to those groups. 
1.2. Privileged perspective of a particular group: On making strange what appeared 
familiar. 
"Punking from the perspective of womens lives makes strange what had appeared 
finniliar, WhiCh is the begintling of any scientific inquity 
6 S. Hardim, (1991). p 150. I" 
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Harstock has argued that women take responsibility for certain areas of productive 
activity and this shapes their view of the world, providing them with a privileged 
standpoint. The product of this division of labor is that women are able to see that the 
social relations, as they are described by our common patriarchal discourses, are falsely 
represented. Women can see that the resources provided by our conceptual system are 
insufficient to describe an aspect of reality of which they became aware. The current 
description of particular parts of the world became unusable. This has been described as 
women 7 having the capacity for making strange what appeared familiar. I agree with the 
attribution of this capacity, and I will explain why this happens. 
We all share a world by sharing a language and a way of life, we are equipped to deal with 
the world mediated by our conceptual systems. Occasionally, our language is insufficient 
to account for our experiences, because the conceptual system that encloses us is the 
reflection of a way of life that makes part of the world partially inaccessible to us. T. Elliot 
offers some good examples to illustrate how the experiences of some people make strange 
for them what appears familiar for the rest of their community, basically because they are 
excluded from accessing parts of the "common world": "Person A approaches a building 
and enters it unproblematically. As she approaches she sees something perfectly familiar 
which, if asked, she might call the Entrance. Person X approaches the same building and 
sees a great stack of stairs and the glaring lack of a ramp for his wheelchair. (.. ) Person 
C attends an Interesting colloquiun, in the philosophy of religion in vvhich he hears 
theorizing about the creative powers of That-than-ivhich tiothit7g-greater-cat7-be-thoiigh. 
1'erson Z hears a ii, hirring buzz of all-foo-jamiliar worlds 'he and him and 'his nature' 
and 'hisfireedom and 'hispovver ,, 8 
She explains why persons A and C experienced the world as strange, by recalling 
Heidegger's Dasein, ' according to which we get to know characteristics of the world by 
7 Evcii women who do not partake in those activities. can share a ferninist standpoint because they have 
been raised as women " Whether or not all of us [contribute to subsistence and child bearing] women as a 
sex are institutionalýv responsiblefor producing both goods and himian beings and all women areforced 
to became the kinds ofpeople who can do both. " N. Harstock (1983), p 29 1, 
11 1% T. Elliot (1994), p 426. 
9 This is how Elliot explains it. "When Nvc concern ourselves with sonictluri-, tile entities which are illore 
closclN rcady-to-hand may be inet as something unusable. not properly adapted for the use Nvc have 
decided upon. The tool turns out to be damaged, or the material unsuitable. In each of the cases equipment 
is here, read\-- to -hand. We discover its unusability, however. not 
by looking at it and cst. iblishim-, its 
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engaging with it. When we cannot get engaged with the world, then it is present to us 
under a new aspect, accordingly: "Aspects of the social order are conspicuous for 
oppressedpeople because they are unusable for them. They discover this unusability as a 
result of their engagement with the world. This is a sense in which a standpoint is earned 
rather than had 'simply by 'opening one's eyes'. We discover its unusability, however, 
not by looking at it and establishing its properties, but rather, by the circumspection of 
the dealings in which we use it. "" 
I can link this with previous chapters of the thesis, so that, when our language (which 
encloses our current theories about the world) cannot be used as a tool to represent the, 
world, then there are aspects of both language and the world that became conspicuous to 
us, and this is something that can be perceived only in particular forms of engagement 
with the world. We share a world that is shaped by the view of the ruling classes, and 
only those who do not belong to these can perceive some aspects of the world as 
unusable. 
Nevertheless, as I have already pointed out, it is not enough to experience the world as 
unusable in order to develop a standpoint. It is important to remark that standpoints are 
acquired, they are achieved. To achieve a standpoint it is necessary to belong to a 
community, in order to make sense of these experiences of strangeness" T. Elliot 
illustratcs this point with an example, wherein she explains how little she en oyed biking 
until she was lent a bike that was right for her size, and makes an analogy with her lack of 
enjoyment of philosophy until she found out about feminist epistemology. 12 She points 
properties but, rather, by the circums. pection of the dealings in which we use it. When its unusability is 
thus discovered, equipment becomes conspicuous. This conspicuousness presents the ready-to-hand. But 
this implies that what cannot be used just lies there; it shows itself as an equipment Thing which looks so 
and so, and which, in its readiness-to-hand as looking that way, has constantly been present-at-hand too. 
Pure presence-at-hand announces itself in such equipment. " T. Elliot (1994), p 428. 
10 T. Elliot claims that "women, for example, develop a shared vocabulary and understanding as a result of 
the similar ways in which we are engaged with the world. Beyond that, because the standpoint is a 
I mediated rather than a mediate understanding' Nve must tn, to rely on networks of others who see the 
world as Nve do in certain crucial aspects" (1994). p 429. 
11 T. Elliot (1994). p 432. 
12 , Ive inherited an old onc-speed Schwinn fi-om in , vfather: 
it has one bent rim, the tires are lou, on air, 
and the seat's too highfor me. But it's in. yfirst bike. I balance precariously, I struggle up hills, I think to 
nt. vseýf, 'so th is is b iking, h uh? A fa , i-he roller skating ivould 
be morefun'. Then afriend of lhefamiýV visits 
ivith a beautiful neiv fen-speed that'siust mY size. She let's ine try it, and Im amazed howfast I can go- 
so effortlessh). Justso, I read the historv o ýf Philosophýv, thinking, 'so this is philosophýv, huh? 'then 
stuinble into afeminist philosoplýv cla. ss. " T. Elliot (1994), p 43 1. 
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out that this is similar to the discomfort experienced by individuals when they have to 
confront the world with theories that are inadequate to fit it. She explains flow she needed 
other people to realize that her intuitions about the unusitability of both the bike aO tile 
theory were right and also to find out why it was that she did not enjoy riding or doing 
philosophy; she remarks how Marilyn Frye discusses the importance of consciousness 
raising for pattern recognition: "As long as a woman thinks that her experience alone is 
thus discrepant, she tends to trust the received wisdom and distrust her own senses and 
judgment. We need to communicate, Fryes argues, in order to start making meanings that 
make sense of our experience(s) of the world. We need each other to say, "No, you're not 
bad at biking. Look at that thing: the rim is bent! Here-try my ten-speed You " see what I 
" 13 mean. 
By belonging to particular communities we are able to see as strange what appeared 
familiar, which makes clear that the world is shown to us as not being completely captured 
by our conceptual systems. I have already supported this claim with arguments in previous 
chapters, as well as arguing that we need a community in order to be able to give 
meanings to our experiences, and to be able to validate our knowledge claims based on 
our intuitions. I would like to concentrate, now, on another aspect of this process: just 
those who belong to those communities can experience the world as strange. By being 
able bodied, the world presents itself to me as usable. I do not have the type of 
involvement with the world that will allow me to experience some aspects of the world as 
strange. In my view, this implies that if we are going to begin our research from the lives 
of those at the margins, they have to be at the center of the production of knowledge, and 
those who are in non-marginal positions have to rely on their intuitions. I think that these 
dainis are at the center of any standpoint epistemology. 
1.3 The outsider within: the critical nature of the privileged perspective. 
An outsider within is someone who belongs to a particular group, within which she has a 
subjugated status. This position enables the agent to have a unique perspective with 
respect to tile oroup. 
13 T. Elliot (1994). 1) 432. 
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P. Hill Collins claims that black women are outsiders within in relation to the ýý,, omen's 
movement in general, and that black people are outsiders, within in relation to societN, as a 
whole. The role of the outsider within is especially important in producing criticisms about 
biases in the system. In this sense, the outsider within is a privileged epistemic agent. For 
instance: most feminist theories have been developed by white women who have not given 
enough thought to questions of race. This fact was clear to black women because there are 
not "usable" theories to explain their expefiences, which has allowed black feminist 
intellectuals to point out the bias in mainstream feminist theory. 
in a more general context, the epistemic privilege of black women living in a racist society 
is made even more clear. Black women are treated as if they were invisible, almost like 
objects, so they can witness situations that will not happen in the presence of white 
people. One of the most common examples is that of the black woman who works as a 
cleaner in a private house or in an office environment. 14 She is present all the time but not 
acknowledged as important, which gives her the chance to see without being seen. 
Therefore, the way in which society is structured, gives Black women the opportunity to 
be "there" without being noticed, to be an outsider within. Their experiences provide them 
with a sort of knowledge, which is unavailable to other groups, therefore Black women's 
thought cannot be generated without Black women- 
15 
In my introductory chapter I explained how postmodern thinkers have argued that there 
are no innocent positions, therefore the knowledge produced by Black women can also 
benefit frorn a critical approach. P. Hill Collins thinks that the relation between Black 
feminist thought and other groups should be one of collaboration "Bj, adiocatitig, 
refitoig, atid dissenill7atit7g Blackfeniiiiist thought, othei, gi-oups-such as Black n7eii, 
while i4, onieii, ii, hife n7eii, alid othei- people of color- fiu-thei- its deiWopmew. Black 
11'olneti cati pi-oduce at7 atteintated ivi-sk, i7 of BlackfeniMist thought separatedfi-oni othei- 
W6 This collaboration is beneficial for black women, as well as for the rest of the 
A good examplc of this attitude toNN; ird black working women and of tile advantages that this 
invisibility' gives them, by allowino them to be unseen witnesses, is portrayed in the film Rouohl cI 
. 111fict 
P. Hill-Collins ( 1990), p 33. 
P. IiIII-Collins (1990), p ', 6. 
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spectrum of epistemic groups, because all epistemic locations have to be critically 
examined. 
Summarizing section 1: Communities are necessary in order to make sense of experiences 
of strangeness. They are also necessary to justify claims of knowledge based on the 
experiences of particular communities. This knowledge can help us to realize the sections 
of our common theories that need to be changed. Given the critical value of marginalized 
knowledge, it is necessary to listen to the claims of these communities that have been 
marginalized if we want to obtain a fuller picture of the world. I have also claimed that 
marginalized knowledge benefits from the critical examination of their theories by other 
epistemic communities. 
2. Standpoint feminism and the question of objectivity. 
In chapter 21 explained how classic standpoint epistemology establishes that our social 
location biases our knowledge. Harstock has argued that those belonging to marginalized 
groups have a standpoint, or epistemic perspective, that is different from those who belong 
to the ruling classes. The origin of the difference was the sexual division of labour. Due to 
the influence of postcolonial and postmodern theories, we found out that accepting the 
existence of more than one marginalized group means accepting that there are other 
differences apart from the sexual division of labour that structure people's lives as 
different, given that it is central for the logic of the standpoint that there are material 
differences between the lives of people that allow some to get a better epistemic 
perspective. I think that the best way of describing the surge of privileged knowledge is to 
clairn that it is situated knowledge, and that it is the product of particular social locations 
and particular bodies. What follows from the logic of standpoint is that the knowledge 
that we produce is always linked to our position in the world and we cannot transcend it, 
so, even if, from a theoretical stance it might be desirable to look at the world from a 
different standpoint, this is not possible. This opens up the problem of how to conjugate 
tile know, ledge clairns made by people belonging to different epistemic groups. Introducing 
a diversity of privileged perspectives seems to imply the acceptance of relativism. t) I 
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S. Harding argues that it is possible to encompass different views of reality in order to 
create more objective theories, and the way of doing it is by : applying the method of 
science to the context of discovery as well as to the context of justification in order to 
make visible the values ingrained in the making of science, by starting our research from 
the lives of marginalized people, and by approaching all productions of knowledge 
critically, accepting the criticisms that arise from different episten* groups. 
If we follow Harding's suggestion we will make visible those values in scientific theories 
that are invisible to those involved in the process, because we will bring people who 
belong to marginalized groups into the process of testing theories, and we will also be able 
to include the points of view of different groups by beginning our research from their lives. 
It is possible to apprehend these and to incorporate them in our theories. In the rest of the 
chapter I will offer arguments to support most of Harding's points, but I will also argue 
against the possibility of beginning the research from the lives of others in the sense 
suggested by Harding. But, before I analyse Harding's theory in detail, I will expand on 
the idea that situated knowledge is produced by particular bodies, because it will be 
central in my critique of Harding's theory. 
3. Excluding the view from everywhere. 
In our cultural tradition, our descriptions of objective knowledge have been pervaded with 
metaphors of vision. Visual metaphors characterize the subject as a passive recipient of 
knowledg, e, which implies that her involvement in the perception of the world would not 
taint her theories with subjectivity. Also, visual metaphors, by distancing the subject from 
the object of study guaranteed that everybody would see the world in the same way when 
adopting the scientific stance. This is particularly important because the validity of 
scientific theories relies on the possibility of reproducing the process of testing, despite the 
particularities of the scientist. In relation to knowledge in general, the shared ideal of 
knowledge as justified true belief relies on the intuition that the process of justification has 
to be somehow universal, and therefore any reference to particular situations should be 
regarded as irrelcvant. 
229 
On the one hand, feminist philosophers have criticized the use of vision as a metaphor for 
knowledge 17 for its implications for our conception of objectivity- it supports the belief 
that objective knowledge is a view from nowhere. But on the other hand, other feminists 
(such as D. Haraway") 'nave reappropiated the metaphor and given it new meanings. 
Haraway stresses that all vision is a view from somewhere, necessarily mediated by the 
materiality of the location and, also, as in the case of human vision, by our discursive 
constructions of the body. Taking this into account, I will argue that, despite the 
appearances, situated knowledge does not amount to relativism, and that it is possible to 
have a commitment towards objectivity while privileging certain epistemic perspectives. '9. 
Before I explain my position regarding objectivity, I will explain how the above does not 
imply that in order to obtain it, we should attempt to see the world from every other 
perspective. I will argue that the embodied nature of knowledge precludes us from seeing 
from everywhere. I will develop my arguments in three different sections: (3.1) embodied 
knowledge (3.2) the personal involvement of the knower in science, and (3.3) embodied 
experiences. 
3.1 Embodied Knowledge. 
I will offer my first set of reasons in support of the importance of our embodiment in 
knowledge by recounting some of the points that I have already developed- I have ar ued 11-7) 9 
that, inOFder to acquire some types of knowledge, the knower has undergone a training, 
for which particular types of embodiment are needed. I showed how, unless you have 
some capacities, you cannot develop certain abilities, and some of these capacities are 
directly dependent on bodily charactcristics. I generalized my claim in a later chapter, 
where I showed how participation in practices is not a characteristic of particular types of 
knowledge, such as knowing-how, but rather, it permeates all knowledge. In a sense, all 
knowledge is a practice, and therefore, knowers have to be trained in order to be able to 
17 See for instance "The Mind's ENV' By E. F. Keller and C. R. Grontkowski (1983) 
18 D. Haraway (1988). 
19 In the first chapter, I explained that not all ferninist episteniologics agree with the NNay in which 
stindpoint feminist epistemology privilcges the female paspective. Nevertheless, feminist ciiipiricists 
, ciencc would bcriefit from the inclusion of women, NN ho would be able to point out cc I argue that our ; rta n 
biases in theories. For my argument, the accepta"ce that this could be the case, is enough to privilcgc one 
perspective ovci another, at least re, -, ýirding particular aspects of rcahtv. 
participate in it. I explained that you can see certain aspects of the world only by beloneing 
to particular groups with particular practices, which implies that only those who are 
perceived to be members of the group will be able to access certain knowledge. To be 
perceived as the member of a group is often related to the type of embodiment that one 
has so, in this very specific sense, the body of the knower matters. My picture of 
knowledge supports the idea that knowledge acquisition is not the product of minds at 
work, but rather, it implies the belonging to ways of life, a training of the whole person. 
This idea is supported further by the fact that, by partaking in practices knowers acquire 
skills that can pass unrecognized to them. I used the work of Polanyi to show how some 
of the knowledge acquired by using those skills can also remain unacknowledged, and how 
it can present itself in the form of hunches. 
In my insistence on locating knowledge in particular bodies, I agree with Bordo that we 
should avoid considering knowers as able to see from any possible point of view, because 
20 this makes the locatedness of the knower irrelevant for the production of knowledge . 
The reason why we cannot shift location at will is because of the limitations of our 
embodiment, as she points out when she wonders "what sort of body IS it that isfree to 
change its shape and location at will, that can become anyone and travel eve"here? "21 
Taking difference seriously implies that we have to accept the limits of our own 
embodiment. 
3.2 The personal involvement of the knower in science 
In the introductory chapters, I anallysed the use of "objectivity" in our ideal of scientific 
knowle6ge. I showed that objective knowledge is detached knowledge in the sense that 
any personal preference of the scientist is erased by the application of the scientific 
method. Polanyi claims that is unattainable because in all forms of knowledge, the knower 
is mcwilcab4y litiked it-ah hei- la7011ledge. I will offer here some of the exarnples that he 
uses in order to show how the personal history of the scientist influences her decisions 
while making science. He notices that, while doing science by applying the scientific 
20 1 ýwrec with her iýciici-iiirgiiiiiciitigiiiist the view from cN-crywhere, even if I disagree with her 
cliaracterization of postniodcriiist as holdin- this view. 21 S. Bordo ( 1990), p 14S. 
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method, a knower is personally involved in the search for knowledge in different ways 
First, Polanyi shows how the supposedly impersonal methods of measurement always have 
an element of decision making that is up to the scientist. He said that, even if science is 
supposed to establish control over experience by establishing precise rules, which can be 
formally set out and empirically tested, supposedly leaving out the element of personal 
judgment involved in applying the formulae to the facts of experience "Even the most 
strictly mechanized procedures leave something to personal skill in the exercise of with 
an individual bias may enter". 22 
Second, he says that, in the process of verifying hypotheses, the scientist has to decide 
whether the results that do not fit the facts can be considered an anomaly or whether they 
render the theory false. Also the scientist develops a skill that makes her choose those 
hypotheses for verification that have at least a chance of being true . 
2' The choice of 
hypothesis or questions to pursue is very similar to the recognition of patterns. The 
scientist, trained in a determinate way, develops the skill to recognize possible ways to 
follow in investigation. The training of the scientist precludes the many ways in which the 
scientist coould go on making new discoveries in science. 
Third, there also other personal factors that influence the choice of questions in research. 
For instance, he claims that even if it is not clear how scientific discoveries begin, there are 
some facts that are well stated- when approaching a scientific inquiry, the scientist is 
already committed to certain projects and has been trained for years in particular 
methods of research. Both factors bias the choice of a scientific problem on which to 
work. And the choice of problem has a direct influence in the discovery of new theories. 
Gelwick explains how Polanyi will agree that "the choice of a problem affects dirccily the 
chances of discoi)eiy. Significant discoveries can only come ftom sigifificant problems. 
Yet signýficant problems are tiot alii, ays c1cir unfil significant discoiýeries hai)e follou, ed 
firom 1hem. " 24 Scientific discovery is highly influenced by who is doing the research, in the 
sense that the scientist will commit herself to work in a particular area according to her 
22 NI. P01,111). 1 (199s), P 19. 21 M. PolmiN, I (1998), p 30. 
24 R. GeINvick (1977). p ? 5. 
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personal loyalties. In a sense this is highly subjective, given that the choice of problems is 
relevant to the discovery. By choosing a particular problem the scientist is taking a risk 
based on little more than a hunch. In the early stages of her research, the scientist will 
probably be unable to explain, by using sound rational arguments, why she thinks that 
following a particular path will provide her with the answers that she is looking for. From 
the beginning of the research, the scientist is not detached from her knowledge, but rather 
she is very personally involved. 
Finally, we should not forget that, according to Polanyi, tacit knowledge is acquired by 
individuals through training. As I argued in the previous chapter, the embodied nature of 
the scientist biases all her findings. 
Summarizing, Polanyi claims that all knowledge, including science, which is supposed to 
be the paradigm of detached impersonal knowledge, is personal and this implies that our 
personal judgments, loyalties and the skills acquired while being trained for our cognitive 
practices all have an influence on our theoretical constructions of the world. 
3.3 The embodied nature of experiences. 
In my explanation of how experience is appropriate for grounding marginalized 
knowledge, I alluded to the analysis that Scott offered of Delany's description of his visit 
to a bathhouse. I argued that she did not pay enough attention to the fact that Delany 
could have these experiences only because of his particular material circumstances. I 
quoted Stone Mediatore to support the point that, by focusing on the power of discourse 
to mediate reality, Scott was forgetting that there is a "reality" that is inscribed and 
apprehended by those discourses. I argued that Delany is constituted as the sort of subject 
N\,, ho can have these experiences not just by the discourses that construct him as a 
black 
married gay male but, also, by the material circumstances that make him the recipient of 
these inscriptions in the first place. It is vital that we do not lose sight of the importance of 
his embodiment in the mediation of these experiences, because it is due to this that he 
has 
been able to have them. If we lose sight of it, then Nve cannot explain how he could 
percelve a tension between his perceptual system and his experiences. 
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As a conclusion for this section, and in contrast with both the "view from everywhere" and 
the view from nowhere, I suggest that, in order to obtain objective knowledge, we have to 
take into account that there is a diversity of points of view and that we should take those 
into account when constructing our representations of the world, but that "All these 
pictures of the world should not be allegories of infinite mobility and interchangeability 
but of elaborate specificity and difference. "2-' All perspectives are the product of 
particular material circumstances, and are mediated by different discourses, which 
construct those who hold them. Therefore it is necessary to accept that they are not 
interchangeable. Haraway illustrates this very clearly when she says that "A commitment to 
mobile positioning and to passionate detachment is dependent on the impossibility of 
entertaining innocent "identity" politics and epistemologies as strategies for seeing ftom 
the standpoints of the subjugated in order to see well. One cannot 'be' either a cell or 
molecule- or a woman, colonizedperson, laborer, and so on- if one intends to see and see 
ftom these positions critically. "Being" is much more problematic and contingent. iiM 
I have argued, following standpoint epistemology, that some epistemic perspectives are 
more desirable than others, but I would like to point out that, even if subjugated 
knowledges are considered to be privileged in a certain sense, this does not imply that they 
should be embraced uncritically. Being at the margins involves particular problems in the 
production of knowledge that I will analyse later, but which are suggested by Haraway in 
the following quotation: "To see fi-oni belo-ýt) IS neither easily learned not 1117proble"latic, 
ei, en if N)e" "naturally" inhabit the great underground terrain of subjugated 
knoi i4edges. (.. ) hoi, i) to see fi-oni beloýt) is a problem requiring at least as much skill )vith 
bodies and language, with the mediations of vision, as the "highest" technoscientific 
W'sitalizations. 07 
In the following sections I will explain a theory that attempts to encompass different I 
standpoints, while approaching their findings cntically in order to attain more objective I=) I-) 
knowledge. 
25 D. flaraway (1988). p 5'83. 
26 D. Hai-mvziy (1988). p 5,85. 
2' D. Harm,, tv (1988). p 584. 
234 
4. In Search of a New Objectivity: Against objectivism. 
Up until now I have argued that all knowledge is situated, and that marginalized groups 
can provide us with critical insights on common theories and with the apprehension of 
parts of the world that would be inaccessible otherwise. I have underlined the positive 
aspects of accepting the claims of standpoint feminism. Now I want to face one of the 
most important problems for this theory. According to the logic of standpoint, there is 
more than one oppressed community, so does this mean that there is a cluster of theories 
and that all of them are pfivileged? What if they contradict with one another? Could we 
solve the difficulty by saying that they have a common content? 
T. Elliot puts this last question in the following form: " Consider the difference between 
the activities of a poor black man working in a mine and an upper class woman working 
in her child's nursery. Is there any way of thinking about epistemic privilege of different 
marginalized people which discloses the common core of this privilege? t, 28 On the one 
hand, both of them have the possibility of seeing as strange what appeared familiar, but on 
the other hand, they are not interchangeable, because they have different ways of being 
engaged with the world. So it seems that we have to face the difficulty of having different 
theories whose content is not common. The goal is to produce a workable, coherent view 
of the world, while keeping the multiplicity and diversity that we find desirable. 
There are two standard ways of answering the question in the current state of feminist 
epistemology. One is Harding's work on strong objectivity and the other has been put 
forward by Longino. I will explore Harding's theory first and approach Longino's in the 
next chapter. 
Harding suggests that we have to aim to obtain a strong objectivity, which is different to 
objectivity as it is commonly used in our philosophical tradition. This latter type of 
objectivity, traditionally aimed at by empiricist epistemology is renamed by her as weak 
objectivity or objectivism. Objectivism considers that objective knowledge is value free, 
2' T. Elliot (1994). 
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impartial and dispassionate. I have already looked at a number of feminist philosophers 
who argue that it is impossible to obtain that sort of knowledge. Harding focuses mainly 
on scientific knowledge and its biases regarding value in order to support her criticisms. 
Harding questions our traditional concept of objectivity as value-neutral on the grounds 
that politically guided scientific projects have produced beliefs that are less partial and 
distorted than those guided by the ideal of value-neutrality. 29 Politically motivated groups 
are especially sensitive to the existence of certain values in science, and therefore they can 
make a very positive contribution to science from a merely critical point of view. For 
instance, feminist researchers have been able to disclose the androcentfic values enclosed 
in many of our biological theories. Nevertheless, according to the objectivist theory, the 
goal of the scientific method was to purge science of values and, in actual fact, science has 
made some values disappear from its theories. Therefore, the role that feminist researchers 
have had in disclosing androcentric values should have been done by the scientific method 
as traditionally defined. However, it is interesting to note how the only values and interests 
that have disappeared from research are those that dissent from the ones held by the 
dominant scientific community. " This lack of parsimony is not necessarily due to a 
conscious effort to erase just some values and keep others but, rather, it is because there 
are certain values that became invisible when being shared by all the members in the 
community. Accepting that scientific theories are value laden and accepting the inputs 
from groups with different values wi! I. have the positive effect of making explicit the values 
that remain hidden in our current theories. So if we cannot have value neutral theories, at 
least, we will be aware of the values that we are embracing. This is one of the goals of 
strong objectivity that cannot be fulfilled by objectivism. 
Harding's strong objectivity aims not only to make the current values ingrained in our 
scientific theories visible but, also, she tries to include the views of those who are on the 
inargins. She claims that there are certain social positions from which we can produce a 
inore obýiectlve knowledge. She says that breaching one of the "dogmas" of objectivity, 
i. e., being motivated by a political agenda, can produce less biased knowledge than if we 
29 S. Ha rd I ng 1993), p 49. 
10 S. Ila rd iiig 19 91), p4" 
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try to make a value-free science. The reason being that it is a myth to believe that value- 
free science is possible, and acknowledging that all knowledge is biased opens the 
possibility of claiming that some epistemic positions are better than others, which will 
imply that it is possible to obtain more objective knowledge when researching from 
politically motivated positions. These positions are also biased, they also include values 
that pass unacknowledged to the knowers, so we have to approach them critically. The 
method, that Harding suggests of producing more objective knowledge, includes all these 
ingredients: 
1. Scientists should also be the objects of knowledge, we should apply the method of 
science to the context of discovery in order to make the values visible. 
2. The bearers of certain values are more likely to produce objective knowledge, and these 
are the people who live at the margins. We should start our research from the lives of 
marginalized people. 
3. We should approach all productions of knowledge critically, accepting the criticisms 
that arise from different epistemic groups. Harding calls this critical exercise reflexivity. 
According to Harding, in order to maximize our critical outlook on our scientific theories, 
we have to apply the method of science, not only to the hypotheses once they have been 
formulated, but also to the context of discovery, the context in which these hypotheses 
have bt-en formulated. Looking at the context of discovery will help us to determine 
which values are included in the process of discovery and why certain conceptual systems 
have been favoured. 
The values are so ingrained n the way of thinking of the scientific community, that the 
researchers are not aware of them and, therefore, an effective scientific method should 
include strategies for making these values stand oUt. 3' The values that scientists are able to Z- 
see are those that disagree with their own set of values, which can be the values that other 
groups of people would embrace if they were doing science. If we want to obtain a 
knowledý, e that is objective in a strong, sense, then we have also to admit the possibility 
31 S. Kirding clainis that " Scientific method must be understood to begin back in the context of 
discovety, in which scientific 'problems'are identified and bold hypotheses conjectured " (1993), p 73. 
32 S. llardijjjý (199 1)ý p 146-147, 
that theories embracing a different set of values can be a valuable addition to our current 
ones. But addition is not always possible if we want to have a coherent vision of reality, 
we could have rival theones that are contradictory with one another. Therefore, orce the 
diversity has been admitted, then we will have to arbitrate a process to decide if there are 
theories whose values are more desirable than others embodied in different theories. For 
Harding, the choice is obvious: These who live at the margins have a better critical 
perspective. 
According to Harding, the alternative to objectivism is not epistemological relativism. She 
claims that enough attention must be paid to different values and interests, given that this 
can expand our vision and correct ethnocentrism, but that there are some social situations 
that produce more reliable knowledge than others. She thinks that we have both rational 
and scientific grounds" for deciding between two rival theories. She offers a good 
intuitive example to support that claim: "women do not have the problem of how to 
accommodate intellectually both the sexist claim that women are inferior in some way or 
another and the feminist claim that they are not. , 34 
5. The reflexivity of Strong Objectivity 
Our intellectual tradition has paid a lot of attention to the study of the formation of false 
believes within the scientific community, mainly by analysing their social origins. Harding 
requires that science should account for how all beliefs, " and not just those that are 
considered to be false, are socially formed. She shares this project with the followers of 
the Strong Program in the Sociology of Knowledge. However, there are differences C) Z: ) It) 1-1) 
between strong objectivity and the Strong Program in the Sociology of Knowledge- 
fiarding points out that they do not provide an account of the sociological causes of their 
own production of knowledge. She claims that it is not possible to obtain objective 
knowledge without this element of reflexivity being present. I- 
33 S. Harding (199 1). p 152. 
11 S. Harding (199 1), p 154. 
3S S. Harding explains how the weak prograrn ofthe sociology of knowledge is dIfferent to that put 
forward bv her and by the strong pro., _, FIlll ill tile sociology of 
knowledge because they did not think that it 
Nvis neccs sary to an. flysc the beliefs that were accepted, for illst, "'ce. why Copernican astronomy or 
NcNýioni, m Illeclianics N%, crc takcn to be truc. (199 1), p 166. 
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Reflexivity is a central feature in Harding's account of objectivity. When she insists on the 
analysis of the context of discovery as a condition siie qua non for objectivity, she is also 
aiming at taking the subject of knowledge as an object of scientific analysis. She says that 
"The notion of , strong objectivityconceptualizes the value ofputting the subject or agent 
of knowledge in the same critical, causal plane as the object of her or his inquiry. It 
permits us to see the scientific as well as the moral and political advantages of this way 
of trying to achieve a reciprocal relationship between the agent and object of 
knoWl d .,, 
36 e ge 
The scientist, as bearer of values, must be aware or must be made aware of how she is 
influencing her picture of science with background beliefs. Given that these values are 
invisible to her, it is necessary that someone who does not share these values points them 
out to her. The same holds for scientific theories. But how can we detect these biases or 
background beliefs in scientific theories? By looking at how and by whom they have been 
developed. For instance, given that most science has been produced by males, there is a 
fair chance that some gender bias is present in it. According to Harding, the best way of 
detecting the sexist biases in science is to start from women's lives. 
If we listen to the testimonies of women who have to live their lives by trying to match 
their perceptions of reality with theories that do not always fit, we will be aware that there 
are biases in these theories. As Harding says, "startingfrom the perspective of 1vonlen's 
hiv., ý make,,; strange ichat had appearedfam /liar, iMich is the beginning of any scientific 
inqn1i),. By exploring why these theories do not seem to fit with the experiences of 
women, we will problematize our current theories, which is the beginning of any serious 
scientific inquiry. As I have already argued, we should pay attention to the perspective of 
others in order to see the bias in our own perspective, and in order to focus our inquiries 
iii the right directions. We have to take into account two things when we become involved 
I, ' this exercise, the first one is that we have to take the view of the other critically, given 
that all points of view are biased, we should not just accept what it is said uncritically. 
S. Hardim, (1991). p 161. 
37 S. Ha rdi ng ( 199 1p 150. 
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Second, in this exercise, we have to be aware of how their way of being in the ývorld 
relates to our own way of being in the world. 38 
I agree with Harding's claim that the first condition for aiming at a strong objectivity is to 
take into account the point of view of others, without forgetting to take it critically, that 
is, I agree that strong objectivity necessitates reflectivity. I even agree with Harding when 
she goes a bit further and claims that, in order to obtain a more objective, non sexist 
science, we should begin our research from the lives of others. I agree with her because 
we know that there are sexist values present in science and, if we want to make those 
values visible, then everybody, even those who are not women, have to take into account 
the testimonies of women in order to get more objective theofies. 
Nevertheless, this is not the only reading of her "beginning from the lives of women". 
There is a stronger interpretation of Harding's theory with which I disagree: Harding 
claims that everybody can produce knowledge from the lives of women as well as women 
themselves do. I will argue that there are limits to the type of knowledge that we can 
obtain from the lives of others and that there are types of knowledge that can only be 
produced by those actually living those lives. 
6. Grounding Knowledge on Women's lives 
It is difficult to know how can we begin the research from the lives of the others. At first 
Sight, researching from the lives of the others seems to present at least two important 
problems. First, we have not had their experiences, we have not lived their lives and, 
second, we look at them with distorted perceptions of what they are, we bring into our 
\'ic\\ý of them our own preconception of what they are. 
Hard; nL, says that the subject of feminist liberatory knowledge must be the subject of every 
other liberatory knowledge. Among other things, this implies that feminist women can 
produce knowledge from the perspective of other marginal groups, but also that "n7en in 
Ihose inoivinews be able to generate origil7alftn7lnisf knou, ledgefi-oin the per, sjýcclhv of 
S. lbrdlnýý, (199 1). p 15 1. 
'41, 
women s lives as, for example, J S-Mill, Marx and Engels, Frederick Douglas, and later 
malefeminists have done. ))39 It is not just that they can generate knowledge by takiný(, into 
account the lives of women but, rather, that they can produce feminist knowledge from 
women's lives- "Men, too, must contribute distinctive forms of specifically feminist 
knowledgeftom theirparticular social situation. Men's thought, too, will beginfirstfrom 
women's lives in all the ways that feminist theory, with its rich and contradictory 
tendencies, has helped us all- women as well as men- to understand how to do. 3140 
The fact that men have not had women's experiences is not a problem for Harding. She 
claims that all women have women's experiences but not all women produce feminist 
knowledge out of them, some historical conditions have to be met in order to produce that 
sort of knowledge. Women's experiences are not sufficient for producing feminist 
knowledge and, in Harding view, are not necessary either "it is not necessary to have any 
particular form of human experience in order to learn how to generate less partial and 
distorted belieffrom the perspective of women's lives. It is 'only' necessary to learn how 
to overcome- to get a critical, objective perspective on- the 'spontaneous consciousness' 
created by thought that begins in one's dominant social location. PP41 
Therefore, it is not necessary to have had the same experiences that women have had in 
order to be able to generate knowledge from the lives of women. Still, it seems to me that 
it is difficult to understand how to generate knowledge from the lives of others. I think 
that there are at least two different ways in which this could be interpreted: 
1. The first sense is that I can change my own perceptions about, for instance, being 
coloured, by engaging in a dialogue about race with a person from a different race. Or we 
can be enlightened by reading the testimonies and arguments of women who belon to 117ý 
9 
ditTerent racial groups. For instance, reading an article by Helen (charles), '2 a black 
feminist woman, I realized that I- a white woman- am also coloured, something that 
semantically sounds incorrect in Spanish, but that it is correct once you think about it. I 
'9 S. I lardin- (1993), p 66. 
S. Harding (1993), p 67. 
S. liarditn,, (1991), p 286-7. 
R(charles) (1992). 
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have changed some beliefs by reading the arguments of another feminist woman and bv 
thinking critically about my own beliefs. In a sense, I have generated some knowledge 
about belonging to a particular race by confronting two different sets of beliefs. 
The work of Dorothy Smith illustrates this first interpretation of "starting form the lives of 
women". She explains how, starting from the experiences of women, we can ask new 
critical questions about "not only those women's lives, but also about men's lil, es and, 
most importantly, the causal relations between them. )A3 If we begin thinking from 
women's lives "we (anyone) can see that women are assigned the work that men do not 
want to dofor themselves. 1)44 Looking at the lives of women, we can begin to question our 
current institutions and the accounts that we give of them, and this questioning will lead to 
less partial and distorting accounts of reality, 45 which can benefit not only women, but also 
the rest of society. 
In that limited sense, I agree with Harding when she says that "it is starting ftom a 
contradictory socialposition that generatesfeminist knowledge. "4' From this assertion we 
can infer that " The lives that provide the starting pointsfor Aftican A merican thought ivill 
then also be providing the starting pointsforfeminist, socialist, gay ad lesbian, and other 
emancipatory thought. , 41 1 have an obligation to look at the lives of those who have been 
marginalized if I want to have a more objective knowledge about what being coloured is, 
or what being a woman in a patriarchal society is, for instaace. In chapter 31 examined the 
relation between the development of individual and collective identities. In addition, in 
section 81 will support the idea that our identity is formed in relation to the ldentitý' of 
others, with whom we develop relationships, This implies that I cannot understand what it 
entails to be a white south European woman unless I know what being a black norlhern 
woman entails. Also, Harding, thinks that having experienced any form of oppression helps 
in producing knowledge from the lives of other oppressed people, even if the reasons of 
oppression are different. As an example, she says that oppressed groups "are parl of the 
niulliple suNect or agent of ei7ciy en7ancipaloty thought. Thus it is not only African 
43 S. Harding (1993), p 55. 
S. Hardim, (1993), p 55. 1 45 S. Harding (1993), p 55. 
46 S. Harding (1993), p 66. 
4- S. Harding (1991). p 287 
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Americans who must have the obligation to generate knowledge fi-om the perspective oj- 
African American lives. PY48 In this sense, I agree with Harding when she claims that even 
those who have always been privileged can take responsibility for their historical ident1tv 
and learn how to generate knowledge from the lives of others. This is a painful and 
difficult task of critical reflection, because is not sufficient to repeat the words of a 
feminist in order to be considered one. 49 
2, There is a second, stronger, interpretation of Harding's claim that it is possible to 
produce knowledge from the lives of others. Harding thinks that thinking from the lives of 
others amounts to producing knowledge from their perspectives: "Some men have clearly 
been able to think- at least occasionally- ftom the perspective of women's lives rather 
thanfrom the immediately available understanding of their own lives. "50 1 disagree with 
this stronger interpretation, I think that thinking from the lives of women has clear 
limitations. First of all, nobody can see from the perspective of another. Second, even if 
this were possible, the one that is parasitic, will bring his own perspective into the new 
perspective, because you cannot become unlocated and disembodied and put yourself, 
with virgin eyes, in the perspective of the other. You cannot escape the "immediately 
available understanding" of your own life and make your knowledge claims frorn the 
perspective of women's lives if you are a man. From the point of view of strong 
objectivity this is not even conceivable, given that one of the theses that underlies 
Harding's position is that all knowledge is inescapably located. Also, occupying certain 
positions, people have epistemic advantages that are not available unless you actually live 
the lives of others. 
Harding herself admits that feminist standpoint will allow us to see the gap between tile 
current conceptualization of the world and the world as it is lived by oppressed people. " I 
have already argued that, unless you have a particular way of living, you cannot be aware 
" S. Harding (199 1), p 287. 
'9 S. Harding claims that "A fiinctioning antiracist- one who can pass 'competenc ,v 
tests' as an 
antii, acist- must be an activc4v thinking antii-acist, notjust a white i-obot 'progi-annned' to i-cpeat it-hat 
blacks sal). " (199 1), p291. 
50 S. Harding (1991), p 252. 
51 "FeIniniSt StaIRIPOint epistem o logi, focuses on the scientific ancl cpistelnolqgical importance of the gap 
benveen the un(lei-standing of the world available if one startsfrom lives ofpeople in the e. xploilcd, 
ana' cloininatedgi-oups an(I thC un(lei-stantling provitIM by the (Iontinant conceptuaIscheines 
S Hardi ng ( 199 1), p 276. 
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of that sort of gap. To a certain extent, you can be made aware of the gap by being given 
information in a propositional way. Nevertheless, if there is a gap between the conceptual 
scheme widely accepted and the world as it is understood by people belonging to 
oppressed groups, the oppressed group has to make the pertinent transformations in the 
conceptual system in order to be able to transmit their perceptions! Someone who does 
not belong to the group will not be able to see the gap, rather, he will have to be told. 
On the one hand I agree that trying to understand the point of view of other, you can see 
the flaws in your own perspective, you can have a partial criticism of your own theory. On 
the other hand, you cannot create new metaphors or models to reflect the new order, you 
need to live the lives of marginalized people in order to do that. Being a man, you can 
produce the sort of knowledge claims that come from understanding propositions about 
women's lives, but you will not be able to produce the kind of knowledge that is grounded 
in living as a woman. 
Harding supports further her assertion that those from the centre can generate knowledge 
as if they were in the margins, by claiming that men can be outsiders within. The role of 
the outsider within is central for Harding, and she considers that it is an epistemic role that 
can be learned, so men can became outsiders within in relation to women's lives if they 
develop a critical attitude towards their own claims of knowledge. The problem with this 
claim is that, in order to be an outsider within, you have to be a member of the community 
in the first place. So black women are outsiders within the broader women's community, 
and they can be so because they have been marcrinalized members of the women's 
movement, but men have not been in the same position, therefore they cannot be outsiders 
within. 
Summarizing, we cannot produce knowledge from a perspective that is not our own but, 
given that any knowledge claims should be the product of critical self-reflection, ii, 
want them to be objective we have to be able to enter into a dialogue with different 
epistemic communities. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we can produce knowledge 
from the lives of others in the same way in which they do it. The situation is clearly 
expressed by an example used in section 4.2: According to Hill-Collins, a white woman 
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cannot produce black feminist thought but, taking the assertions made by black women on 
the subject seriously, she can produce a non-racist knowledge from her own standpoint. 
At the same time, black feminist knowledge also has need of this dialogue in order to be 
fully developed. This should not make us forget that, in order to produce black feminist 
thought, black women have to be at the centre of its production. 52 Therefore I think, in 
disagreement with Harding, that men can produce non-sexist knowledge, but only from 
their own perspective. 
7. Starting from the lives of others. 
I have disagreed with a strong interpretation of what it means to ground knowledge on the 
lives of others, i. e., seeing from their perspectives, but I agree with a weaker interpretation 
of Harding's claim: the collaboration with other epistemic groups is necessary in order to 
have a reflective point of view and, therefore, a strong objectivity. Still, there are two 
different ways in which this weak interpretation can be implemented, both valuable, but I 
will argue that one of them is more productive than the other. 
Harding advocates (as Hill Collins and Haraway also do) that a responsible engagement 
with others must produce changes in our outlook on the world. Unless we take into 
account the views of others about the reasons for their domination, we will never be able 
to understand how oppression works. Harding insists that all axes of domination are 
related and that one cannot be eliminated without eliminating the others. So, when she 
claims that the subject of a liberatory group must also be the subject for all the others, 
what she is arguing for is that a feminist woman cannot produce liberatory knowledge 
unless she has engaged with other liberatory sorts of knowledge and critically reassessed 
her own position. We will find support for this position in the works that I will analyse in 
the following sections. The importance of making visible the unacknowledged relations 
between different communities will be underlined, in th. - s,! ýnse that, unless we are made 
aware of how these relations of exclusion affect everybody (not only those marginalized 
'2 "Other groups cannot produce Blackfeminist thouizht withoutAfrican -. -, I merican wonlen. Such groups 
can, hoicei, cr, tlevclop seýfldefiined knowlecCize reflecting their own standpoints. But the full actualizotion 
of Blackftininisi thought requires o collaborative enterprise with Black women at the center qa ýf 
community based on coalitions among autonomous groups "P. Hill-Collins (1990). p 36. 
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by society) we will not be able to make sense either of other communities or of our own 
In the following sections I will have a close look at the problems that we have to solve 
when we intend to get into a dialogue or exchange between the members of different 
epistemic communities with the aim of obtaining a more reliable epistemic stance. I VAII 
explore different ways of establishing and developing the exchange. Let us keep in mind 
that I agree with Harding on the general point that we need a critical perspective of our 
own theories that is only available with the help of others, but that I disagree with Harding 
on the means to obtain it. I will argue for a strong objectivity based on reflexivity but not 
grounded on starting from the lives of others, in Harding's stronger sense. 
How should this engagement between different groups take place to get the best results? 
How can we start from the lives of others? There are several models that can illustrate 
how we can start from the lives of others, and I am going to analyse some of them. My 
aim will be to develop a model in which we can respect difference while trying to find a 
coherent voice. I have argued that we cannot live the life of the other, that we cannot see 
from their perspective but, still, I want to be able to develop a relationship with the other 
that brings me as close as possible to her, in an effort to understand her perspective and in 
order to assess my own. Developing my project, I will also expose the many problems that 
understanding others implies and try to give a solution to at least some of them. 
8. Lugones on world traveling. 
The work of Lugones has been very influential in the latest productions of feminist 
epistemologists, particularly her notion of world traveling. She thinks that we can all I 
inhabit more than one world and, also, that we can travel to the world of others. Inhabiting 
a N\,, orld is very similar to belonging to a particular epistemic community. I will explain the I=) IIIII 
t\\, o senses of world traveli, -g i-)y using Lugones' own examples. 1. 
Lu,, ones is aNvare that she can be defined as playful or serious by people who know 
lier in different "worlds". She felt puzzled by those contradictory definitions of hcrsclt' 
t)CC, ILI, SC she thought she could really be both, depending on the situation. When she travels 
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form one world to another, she adapts to the circumstances and shows different aspects of 
herself This is an experience common to all of us, but she claims that is particularly acute 
for those who are outsiders to the mainstream because " the outsider has necessarily 
acquired flexibility in shifting from the mainstream construction of life where she is 
constructed as an outsider to the other constructions of life where she is more or less 'at 
home'. Y, 53 A clear example of this world traveling is the way in which one relates to 
stereotypes of race. For instance, she explains how latinos are expected to be "Intense", 
and how in her case, this is a trait of her own character. Therefore, when she characterizes 
herself as intense, she knows that she is not intense because she is latina but, rather, 
because she is Maria Lugones. When she describes herself as fitting the stereotype she is, 
at the same time, distancing herself of it, making an ironic use of the description. 
1.2. Her ambiguity is described as survival rich. The continuous world traveling as a 
survival strategy (this practice becomes compulsory sometimes) allows those who live 
outside the mainstream to acquire skills that pass unacknowledged. The traveler has to 
became aware of how she is perceived by others, in order to survive. World traveling is 
compulsory for those on the margins, is born out of necessity, but it can be done by those 
at the centre as well. 
This type of world traveling that I have described includes others, but it is mainly oriented 
towards oneself Lugones was aware that she looked different to different groups of 
people, and became conscious of traveling between different worlds. The second type of 0 
traveling that she talks about is traveling to the world of others. 
2. Lugones' second example is how she traveled to her mother's world. Lugones ID 
considers that, for many years, she did not love her mother properly. Given the conception 
of love that she was taught to embrace by a patriarchal society, to be loved by her own 
niother implied that her mother had to be enslaved by her, that her mother had to renounce 
to herself to satisfy the needs of her daughter. Lugones resented the role model and, 
tlierefore, thought that, by loving her mother as such, she was accepting this role for 
lierself in the ftiture. She felt that her relation with her mother was wrong because "I 11'as 
Ought to I)i-aciicc eiishmement (? f n7y mother and to leat-n to became a slaiv through this 
53 NI. Luooncs (1987), p 
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practice. 1)54 Lugones realized that she was being unfair to her mother, that she was 
looking at her from the point of view that a patriarchal society imposed but, also, XvIth the 
restrictions that her rejection of that type of society imposes. She reconstructed their 
relationship in a new loving way, by trying to see the world in the way in v., hich her mother 
was seeing it. She says that "loving my mother also required that I see with her eyes, that 
I go into my mother's world. "" 
This looking through her mother eyes meant 
2.1 that Lugones had to try to separate her mother from the stereotypes of motherhood 
imposed on her by the society in which she lived. She had to see her mother in different 
worlds, just as her mother perceives herself, where she is not defined as a mother. Then 
Lugones discovered that "she was notfoldable andpliable, that she is not exhausted by 
the mainstream Argentinian patriarchal construction of her. I came to realize that there 
are "worlds " in which she shines as a creative being. 7156 Lugones sees her mother as 
playing different roles in different worlds, she breaks the rigid pattern that her mother was 
playing in her eyes. Her mother is not just a mother any longer. Lugones has traveled to 
her mother's world by loving her in a proper way, by looking at her without the 
constructions imposed by what she calls "arrogant perceivers" . 
5' Lugones is able to make 
this change in her perspective because she loves her mother and because her motivation 
was not epistemological but, rather, essentially sentimental. 
2.2 Lugones also discovered that her own self perception is different from that which her 
mother has of her. She says that "see, *ng niyseýf in her through trai, eling to her iiorld has 
meant seeing hoi, t, differentfi-om her I am in her ýi, orld. "8 This new view of herself allows 
her to be critical about her own values and see how those affect others. 
2.3 She is also made existentially aware that their relation to each other is at the centre of 
their selves and that they are not intelligible without one another. In this sense, she is able 
5.1 M. Lugones (1987), p 6. 
55 N1. Lugones (1987), p 8. 
56 M. Lugoncs (1987), p 18. 
57 N1. bigoncs ( 1987), p IS. 
38 N1. Ltigoncs (1987). p 18. 
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to see through her mother's eyes, simply because they share the same standpoint by having 
this particular relationship. '9 
Which are the teachings of this world traveling in our relation to other women in general? 
I think that there are two useful discoveries, first we have to realize how we are all defined 
in relation to each other, we cannot pretend that we are self contained'o and, second, that 
traveling to their worlds is done by getting involved in their ways of life and implies 
getting to know them and, therefore, loving them. 61 1 want to underline that when 
Lugones says that you can see through the eyes of the others, this does not mean that we 
can see from their perspective, rather, her position can be summarized by the following 
quotation: "The reason why I think that traveling to someone's worlds is a wal, of 
identifying with them is because by traveling to their world we can understand what it is 
to be theni and what it is to be ourselves in their eyes. , 12 
9. World traveling in an academic context. 
Fowles' interpretation of Lugones' work is a paradigm of how to use the strategy of 
world traveling within an academic context. She says that: "Speaking with and to others 
across historically and socially constructed barriers enters into the spirit of what 
Lugones (1987) has called playful "world "-traveling. Speaking with and to entalls 
trai, eling to the "worlds" of those dif . 
ýerent from the trai)eler, e*ther hteralljl or 
figuratWely, through cotwersing or reading, as "a way of identifying ivith then7 [in order 
59 She sivs that "loving mv mother also required that I see with her eyes, that I go to iiýy mother's world, 
ýffi that I see both oj'us as we are constructed in her world, that I witness her own sens,, of hersel roin within 
her world Onl 
,v 
through this traveling to her 'ivorld'could I identify with her because only then could I 
cease to ignor her and to be excluded and separated ftom her. (.. ) We arefidly dependent on each 
otherfor the possibilit. v of being understood and without his understanding we are not intelligible, we do 
not make sense, we are not solid, visible, integrated, - we are lacking. So traveling to each other'S worlds 
would enables its to be, through loving each other. " M. Lugones (1987), p 8. 
60 "Ifere, I oni not particularly interested in cases of White women's parasitism onto women of colour but 
1110rcpoinfedýv in cases where thefailure of identification is the manifestation of the relation. I am 
PorticularIv interested here in those many cases in which Whife. `Anglo women do one or more of tilt, 
Jollowiniz to women of colour: they ignore us, ostracise us, render us invisible, stereotipc us, leave its 
completel 
,v 
alone, interpret us crazY. A// of this while ive are in their Inicist. The more iiidependent I am, 
the more indepciident I am left to be. Their world and their integriýv do not require me at all. There is no 
sense ofseUllost in theinfor mY own lack of soliditv. But thev rob ine of niv solidi1v through indiffi, rmce, 
an indiffi, rence Ihev can af seems sometimes studied. " M, Lugones (1987), p 7. 
61 . 
7brd and which 
NI. Lugoncs (1987), p 17. 
62 Pvt. Lugonc,, -, (I I)S7), p 17. 
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to] understand what it is to be them and what it is to be ourselves in their eycs. 01111. 
when we have traveled to each others worlds are we fully sub i 6ý' jects to each other' 
1 think that Fowles' interpretation over intellectualizes the process of world traveling, 
forgetting that one of the central elements of world traveling is getting actually involved in 
the ways of life of the other and, also, developing a relationship based on love and 
friendship. She argues that you can travel to the world of others and, therefore, see 
yourself through their eyes merely by engaging in a conversation with them or by reading 
their works. Even if I agree that reading and speaking are very important vehicles for 
trying to understand others and that they can produce important changes in our views of 
the world, I think that this is a misrepresentation of Lugones' work. I think that the type 
of relationship that Lugones is trying to promote is more complex than the one suggested 
by Fowles, and therefore, I think that the kinds of world traveling for which each is 
arguing are very different. Fowles' description of the process of world traveling involves 
only an intellectual exercise and, even if understanding others is an intellectual process, it 
also necessitates getting involved with them on more levels, rather than just intellectually. 
In her article, Fowles claims that the world traveling can be done by reading and 
publishing. 64 She also says that reading the work of other feminist scholars can make us 
'feel a need and desire to j. oin the struggle to change structures that oppress some in 
part by priiileging others in part. , 6' Even if I agree with Fowles in the motivational value 
of the exchange of theories, I still do not think that this reading is enough in order to 
enable us to see the world through the eyes of others, or to travel to each other's worlds 
in the way in which Lugones suggests. There are various reasons to support im, view 
First, reading the work of other feminist scholars, however open minded the reader, does 
not amount to understanding what it is like to be the writer, and even less what it is to be 
ourselves in their eyes. Second, this form of world traveling is not going to take us to \, Crý, 
remote places, only people who are already in a determinate word get to pLiblish in 
63 D. L. Fowles (1997), p 110. 
64 - Thus, ij'others both similar and differentfi-om the ivriters rcspond through readhig these complex 
idef7fit 
*v 
narrativcs, through speaking ivith and to these narrators, and throughjoining instrafegicalýv 
ChOSC17 political actions, then toýqether these ivrifersInarrators and readers, responders um build the 
coalitiO17S WC choose to build. " D. L. Fowles (1997), p 12 1. 
6S D. L. FoNvIcs (1997), p 12 1. 
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journals or produce monographs, and those who read them are already in that world as 
well. Third, world traveling by reading the work of others presupposes the complete 
sharing of a language, which means that one of the voices is being silenced. 
Fowles' attempt to apply the work of Lugones toward improving academic feminism by 
means of reading and publishing captures just a small part of what world traveling implies 
and, therefore, it does not deliver the same results. This distribution and sharing of 
information plays an important role in the formation of theories, but it does not amount to 
understanding the other in the way in which Lugones suggests. 
IO. Lugones and Spellman: Why talking is not enough. 
"No quiero habler por ti sino contigo. Pero si no aprendo fus modos y tu los mios la 
conversacion es solo aparente. "66 
In this section I will analyse some of the most important problems of epistemic exchanges, 
some of which I have already hinted at in the previous section. Feminist theory has showed 
the importance of listening to those who have remained silent in the construction of our 
common view of the world. The theorists have argued that, unless we listen to women's 
voices, there are parts of the world that will not be represented adequately. One of the 
aims in this thesis is to show how it can be argued that women have experiences 
inadequately captured by our common conceptual systems. 67 Within the women's group 
we can find significant differences, so it is important to listen to all voices, because the 
variety of opinions "invites some further directions in the exploration of women's lives 
and discourages or excludes others. )168 One of the results of broadening the participation 
of different groups of women, is that we have realized how women who belong to 
privileged groups show more interest than those belonging to minorities in engaging in 
conversation about their different views of life. Oppressed groups within tne -women's 
66 M. Lugones and E. Spellman (1983). p 573. 
6' ., One experiences life in terins of the impoverished and degrading concepts others have found it 
COnvenient to us(, to describe her. We can't separate livesftom the accounts given of them; the 
articulation of our experience is part of our experience. - M. Lugones and E. Spellman (1983), p 574. 
6' M. Lugoncs and E. Spellman (1983). p 574. 
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communities are aware of the political value of articulating their own experienceS69 and 
making them available to the society as a whole, but at the same time, have also grov'-n 
suspicious of the methods proposed by privileged groups fo- doing it. It has been 
proposed that in order to understand the other, we must get involved in a dia ogue with 
different groups. However, this approach has been cfiticIzed by different oppressed 
groups, for the following reasons 
First of all, as I have already argued, we are aware that there are experiences that cannot 
be captured by a common language. This is made more evident when there is a group that 
shares those experiences and whose first language is different form the one spoken by the 
rest of the society. Experiences that can be expressed in a particular language might be 
untranslatable into another: "we and you do not talk the same language. When we talk to 
you we use your language: the language ofyour experience and ofyour theories. We try 
to use it to communicate to our world experience. But since your language and your 
theories are inadequate in expressing our experiences, we only succeed in communication 
our experience of exclusion. 1)70 
There is a clear asymmetry between what the common language can express and the 
experiences of latin women, which is parallel to that felt by women in general when raised 
within a patriarchal conceptual system, which defines males' experiences as universal. The 
inadequacy of universal discourses is also acutely felt by women belonging to non ruling 
classes when feminist theories try to speak in the name of all women. As Lugones puts it 
very clearly, in order to survive, las hispanas have to inhabit the world of white american 
women and learn their ways. "we have to learn your culture and thus j, oitr language and 
seýf-concej-? tions. "" Nevertheless, "in fact just i17 order to survive, brown at7d black 
"'onien hai, e to k17011' a lot more about whitelanglo ivomen- 1701 through the suslained 
conlemlVation themy requires, but through the sharp obserl,, alion stark exigency 
demands. 1172 So even if, apparently, there is a --hared conception of the world, 
latinas get 
to knowMOFe about the world than their Nvhite counterparts, and also have access to a 
69 NI Lugones and E. Spel I man ( 1983) claim that "the articulaf ion of experience (in myriad ways) is 
among the hallmarks ov'a sclf-determining individual or communitv. " p 574. 70 
Nl Lugones and E, Spellman (1983), p575. 
I Nl Lugoncs and E. Spellinall (1983), p576. 72 
NI. L. twonc-s, and E. Spellman (1983), p 575. 
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view of the world that is not accessible to them. The asymmetry stays in place even when 
there is an intention of mutual understanding on the part of the privileged group, because 
"there is nothing that necessitates that you understand our world: understand, that is, not 
as an observer understand things, but as a participant, as someone who has a stake in 
them and understand them"73 
So the first difficulty for engaging in a dialogue is that the common language does not 
belong to both parties equally. And that distorts the experiences of some women. 74 The 
second difficulty is that, in order to understand the world inhabited by the latinas, white 
women should participate in it, get involved in their way of living in the same way that 
latinas have to participate in the lives of the ruling classes, but latinas are not happy to 
oblige, because they have been approached too many times as objects of study without 
getting anything in exchange, rather, being left more confused than before. Lugones and 
Spellman insists that understanding another does not amount to having information about 
them or theorizing about them. In order to understand others, one should immerse oneself 
in their world, which is different from adopting the stance of the researcher untouched by 
the source of knowledge "the suggestion made here is that if whitelanglo women have to 
understand our voices, they must understand our communities and us in them. (.. ) from 
within friendship you may be moved by friendship to undergo the very difficult task of 
, 75 tinderstanding the text or our cultures by understanding our lives in our communities. 
In this task, the outsider also has to reconsider her role in respect to that other world, 
become aware of her own identity and be open-minded. " 
73 M. Lugones and E. Spellman (1983), p 576. 
14 "None of thefeminist theories developed so far seem to me to help Hispanas in the articulation of our 
experience. ffl'e have a sense that in using thein we are distorting our experiences. Most Hispanas cannot 
even understand the language used in these theories- and only in some cases the reason is that the 
HiSpOna cannot understand English. TT'e do not recognize ourselves in these theories. They create in us a 
schizophrenic split between our concern for ourselves as women and ourselves as Hispanas, one that we 
do notfeel otherwise. " M. Lugones and E. Spellman (1983), p 576. 
75 M. Lugones and E. Spellman (1983), p 581. 76 .. This learning callsfor circumspection, for questioning of. yourselves andyour roles in ' vour 
own 
culture. It necessitates a striving to understand while in the comfortable position of not having an official 
calling card (as 'scientific obsei, ers'of our communities hm, e), it demands recognition that " vou 
do not 
have the authoriýv of knowledge; it requires conting to the task without readv-inade theories to franie our 
lives. This learning is then extreineýv hard because it requires openness (including openness to severe 
criticism of the whilelanglo world), sensitiviýv, concentration, seýf questioning, circumspection. " M. 
Lugones and E. Spellman (1983), p 581. 
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I will argue, with Lugones, that in order to be able to understand the experiences that 
members of other groups have undergone, it is necessary to participate in their waly of life 
and to introduce changes in our own conceptual system in order to accommodate those 
experiences. But how can we come to understand the meaning of the experiences of 
others? There are many ways in which we can try to make sense of the experiences of 
others, but the one that is favored by Lugones and Spellman is that in which there is a 
genuine dialogue between the two parties, in which both are insiders and outsiders in 
each others" systemS. 77 As Lugones and Spellman say: "It should be clear that it does not 
consist in a passive immersion in our cultures, but in striving to understand what it is that 
our voices are saying. Only then can we engage in a mutual dialogue that does not 
reduce each one of us to instances of the abstraction called 'woman P. ))78 So the point is 
not just to go the world of the other but also the get the other into your world. It is also 
important to pay careful attention to the motivation for such a study. The only respectable 
motivation is that it will benefit those whose experiences or lives are being studied. 
Summarizing, we are looking for ways in which to produce more objective theories of the 
world, and we have argued that listening to those who are at the margins is important 
because they have privileged access to certain aspects of the world and, also, because they 
can point out biases in our own theories. But we have encountered various difficulties in 
pursuing this project: the first one is that this ideal puts too much weight on the merely 
intellectual understanding of the other, without taking into account that, in order to 
understand, it is also necessary to become emotionally involved with the other. The second 
difficulty is that it postulates a false distance between ourselves and others. It does not 
allow us to recognize how much their situation defines our own. The third difficulty that 
we have to face is the asymmetry of our exchange; in all cases there is a party who has 
more power than the other, the one who belongs to the ruling group is the one whose 
77 - Our suggestion in this paper, and at this time it is no more than a suggestion, is that only ivhen 
genuine and reciprocal dialogue takes place between 'outsiders'and 'insiders'can we trust the outsider .s 
account. A Ifirst sight it ma 'v appear 
that the insiderloutsider distinction disappears in the dialogue, out it 
is important to notice that all that happens is that we are now both outsider and insider ivith respect to 
each other. The dialogue puts us both in position to give a better account of each other's and our own 
experience. Here ive should again not that whitelanglo, women are much less preparedfor this dialogue 
ivith women of colour than women of colour are for dialogue with them in that women of colour have had 
f-conceptions, and conceptions of them. " M. Lugones and E. Spellman to learn whifelAnýglo wavs, sel 
(1983), p 577. 78 
M. Lugoncs and E. SpcIlman (1983), p 581. 
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language and or culture is shared by both parties, and this is the one who imposes the 
common view of the world, so there are a set of experiences that cannot be expressed. 
Those experiences can only be shared by sharing a way of life but, even if the one 
belonging to the privileged group wants to join the underprivileged, there is still a natural 
resistance to accepting her in the community. Why should the community accept him/her? 
We have established that a set of conditions have to be spelled out in order to obtain a fair 
exchange in which both the motivations of the "researcher" and the personal relation that 
is established with the members of the community are of central importance. The picture 
that is beginning to emerge is different from the one with which we began: it emphasizes a 
more holistic involvement, the end result of our search will be that our view of the world 
will be changed. The "other" is not there solely to provide us with a set of useful 
criticisms, but rather, a personal involvement with a different community will make us 
change our own perspective. Let's us explore this process in more detail. 
I I. Seller on traveling the world. 
A serious engagement with the position of the other is only viable if we share their world. 
But this project has difficulties to overcome, as the work of A. Seller illustrates very 
clearly. I am going to analyse her work closely because she encountered many of the 
difficulties that I have already listed, and she attempted to surpass them in effective ways. 
A. Seller is a white, British, single philosopher who was invited to lecture in an Indian 
university. She was committed to what she called Democratic epistemology which does 
not privilege the view of intellectually educated women, but rather, considers that 
everybody's experiences are equally valid, and believed that the best way of enhance our 
picture of reality is to listen to others and compare "experiences and beliefs U, ith others 
it, ho share ai least some of our meanings and values. "'9 She thought that her visit to tht 
Indian university would be especially fruitful because their differences would provide a 
very fertile ground for discussion. Her own views on knowledge supported her 
expectations: "Thus knoi4eýige is not so much an achiei., enlent as a process, all ongol . 1W 
79 A. Sellcr (1994), p 230. 
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engagement in a conversation with a community in which we both discovel. and recreatc, 
our world. With these views,, I assumed that ourfist talk would be to set an agemki and 
exchange reading materials. , 80 
As many other feminists interested in epistemological questions, her expectations were 
that she would engage in a constructive dialogue with her colleagues and students in India 
and that both parties would benefit from the exchange. As we have already seen, her 
expectations fit well with that of a member of a privileged class (an academic in a western 
university) who believes that the "other" is going to be willing to engage in a dialogue on 
her own terms and that both will benefit from it. Nevertheless, her experience was very 
different from what she expected. The following are some of the difficulties that she 
encountered: 
The first difficulty was that the expectations of the women in the Indian university were 
very different from her own. They wanted her to lecture in a traditional way and were not 
interested in discussing the theories from their own tradition. They did not want to talk 
about their personal experiences, and rejected this particular tendency of Western 
feminism " because they considered it to be too individualistic and self-centred, 
supporting an ideal of autonomy that clashed with their own values of community and 
family. This was closely related to their lack of interest in theoretical issues, given that 
they considered that universities must be pragmatic institutions, providing appropriate 
solutions to practical problems 82 in order to benefit the community. Equally, their rnain 
interest was not critical, they did not want to change structures, "ihey theii- oii, n 
aciii4ty as a conlinuation of refoi-ni by government, in full co-opei-ation wiih, and oliell 
iniflated by men. iiU In previous sections I have explained how common this attitude is 
within academic feminism, it is taken for granted that it is desirable to engage in 
theoretical discussions with people from other groups, without thinking that they might 
not find this necessary or desirable. 
80 A. Seller (1994), p 23 1. 
81 A Seller (1994), p 234, 
82 A. Seller (1994), p235. 
8.1 A. Seller ( 1994), p 23 5. 
1 
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Second, she found that even if they both spoke English, in important ways they did not 
share the same world, so they had problems of understanding.: "Now the problem of the 
feminist philosopher abroad looms clearly. If she does not kPow or understand the 
culture that she visits, does not understand it conceptually, how can she work? I spent a 
lot of time simply not understanding how the concepts worked, what meaning words had 
in this changed context (.. ) We had to create and recreate a vocabulary between us, 
explaining and re-explaining our terms to each other, with no agreed canon to work 
upon, particularly since I was resisting their pressure to base our discussions on western 
feminist texts. "" 
Finally, she recognized that the dialogue was not possible because they did not share the 
same values and because there were important issues about power that were not 
acknowledged. Given that I have already explored the other two difficulties in former 
sections, I will focus now on the last one: 
She had to confront the fact that there were inequalities of power in their relationship and 
that their relationship was heavily mediated by their common history, as the coloniser and 
the colonised. Also, given the structure of university education in India, the dialogue that 
she was aiming at was almost impossible. It was not a dialogue between equals, in the 
sense that she was in a position that allowed to her to impose her own views on the way in 
which their relationship developed. On the one hand, she admitted the necessity of 
engaging in a dialogue about their different values but, given her position as British in 
India, she felt she had no right to interfere. " While, on the other hand, her daily 
86 
engagemOnt with her colleagues meant that she had to make judgements and intervene! . 
For instance, she perceived the university in India as an authoritarian 87 institution that 
precludes dialogue, therefore, she considered that, in order to understand her colleagues 
there, she had to challenge their structures. But then she found out that, by insisting on a 
certain approach to dialogue and exchan, (, ),, e, shc was actually inhibiting a dialogue. " She 
describes the situation in the following terms- "I failed to tiolice that the foi-in of 
84 A. Seller (1994), p 232. 
85 A. Seller 1994), p 212 
Seller 1994). p 23 87 
Seller (1994). p 237, 
A. Sel Icr ( 1994), p23 )8- 
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discussion I aspired to was all idealisation of western liberalism. I had unwittinglyfallen 
into seeing the women in the seminar as radically "other ", paralleling this with all 
unreflective ideal o autonomous thought ay wholly independent of outs We 'n/hiences, ýf II 
whilst being highly critical of both these positions in the abstract. " 8-9 Finally, she was 
acutely aware that they had different values that could not be discussed, only 
acknowledged. She expresses her feelings very clearly in the following quotation: "When 
equals set about trying to change each other's minds, something like dialogue emerges; 
indeed the difficulties I have written of seemed to imply that dialogue is only achievable 
between peers within a community of shared values. Not only were we not equal, but we 
seamed not to share those very values which I deemed essential for meaningful 
dialogue"90 
Did Seller surpass the difficulties listed above and get to any useful level of understanding? 
She was actually able to have glimpses into their lives, she was able to engage with them 
occasionally. But not in the ways that she expected, and not in the terms that she 
expected. She puts it very clearly when she says that "The situation was saved, I suspect, 
only because of relationships outside the seminar. "91 The communication emerged in 
contexts other that the classroom, and sometimes was not verbal. For instance, she learned 
what awareness creation is, not by discussing the concept with her colleges in the 
university, but rather by visiting GANDHIGRAM where she discovered that "at "TVU, 
thejusfification lay in what can be donefor the group that has beenstudied , 92 
A. Seller discovered the importance of being involved into the other's way of IiVing as 
inuch as possible, in order to understand the other. She reached an understanding by 
sharing experiences with the Ghanaian workers, by sharing emotions and efforts. For 
instance, after she lived there for a few days, was able to explain to the Indian students 
that the feminist ideal of autonomy (which they loathed) was in actual fact more similar to 
their conception of swarej than to the concept of egoisni. She realised that understanding 
W, 1s not based on dialogue but on shared ways of life "R'hat I ii, as discoiering itay a it-m- 
89 A. Seller (1994), p 240. 
A. Seller (1994). p 240. 
V Sellei (1994), p, 240. 
92 A. Seller (1994), p ? 30, 
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o being with others whose immediate understandings were not my own. This required a )f 
full engagement, with all of my skills and values in play, helping me tofeel my it, ay. 
By engaging in personal relations with the women in the university, she felt more 
comfortable in passing judgement about their conflicting values: "the ftiendships I made, 
my engagement in and responsiveness to their lives necessarily involved my emotions and 
concerns, my values. To feel your way through a countryside, you must have feelings. " 
For instance, she realised that it was not constructive to critique their way of life 
continuously, because this implied the imposition of a western way of thinking. Also, she 
began to analyse her own beliefs ( is arranged marriage that bad, after all? ). 9' She still 
wanted them to attain a critical perspective on their institutions by engaging in a dialogue 
but, at the same time, realised that by resisting her desires, they made her aware that she 
was using her own power to manipulate their relationship: she was wrongly "simply 
persuaded of my right to determine the quality of our exchanges, behaving like a teacher 
whilst refusing to be one, and actually teach. "9' 
Her initial tendency to not pass judgement was changed when she developed closer 
relationships with her colleges, now "Sometimes when I did not understand, I thought that 
they simply had different values to mine, without any inclination to judge. , 97 She 
recognised the appeal of their position, she could not apply those values to her own life. 
Other times, she as a feminist, simply could not share their values, but she also realised 
that even if they would support them in public, in private they would also have doubts 
about them. 98 
The main lesson that we can draw from Seller' experience is something that has already 
been discussed in relation to the work of other feminist academics, and this is that "A 
dialectic was undet-ivay, offtiendship, shai-ed concerns and political alipiments. I 
no/ 1*17 dialogue ivith a system of thought, not even with an institution. (.. ) I am not simp1j, 
93 A. Seller (1994), p 245. 
94 A. Seller (1994), p 245ý 
95 A. Seiler ( 1994), p 239. 
96 A. Seller ( 1994), p 299. 
97 A. Scl ler ( 1994), p 240. 
98 A. Seller (1994), p 24 1. 
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saying: people, not systems, have dialogues. Rather that people engage in the world, 
developing and changing identities, commitments and concerns. The way that we bear 
those commitments and concerns determines whether or not dialogue is possible. "99 
Instead of a useful dialogue, in which information was exchanged about different theories 
she found out that the way of getting to understand others is by trying to develop 
relationships with them and becoming a changed person in the process: "Oil my return to 
Britain, I asked myseýf 'how shall I live the rest of my life? 'for Ifelt that we shared one 
world. This does not mean thinking about how to solve 'their'problems (what can I 
suggest to improve the income of head-loaders? ), but rather rethinking my own problems 
within a context that includes them (how can I continue to enjoy my life of wealth it? a 
world that contains head-loaders?. " "' 
12 On building bridges: the protocol of understanding across differences. 
In this section I will put forward a protocol of understanding across differences in which I 
will try to encompass all the points that I have been making in the former sections. I will 
rely on the work of ST Scahach and D. Ewin to illustrate and to explain the process. '01 
Steve and Doris, the authors of the work mentioned above, have been engaged in the 
project of searching, for ways in which men can acquire a feminist perspective. Steve is 
aware that he has to be guided by women in order to obtain this new point of view '0' and 
he explains how the friendship and companionship of feminist women (not just the theories 
that they produce) have helped him to step out of his world dominated by patriarchal 
experiences. Doris points out that even if she has a favorable attitude towards males and 
their interest in feminism, she is troubled by the asymmetry of their relationship. 103 
99 A. Seller (1994), p 243. 
100 A. Seller (1994), p 247. 
101 On the sanic line, see U. Naravan (1988). 
102 S. P. Schach and D. ENN-in (1997) -0/71V women can be midwives in the bii-th of anv short qjfeminist 
consciousness. -p 16 1. 
103 S. p. Schach and D. ENvin (1997) "1 recognised the need to ivo, -k- co-ope, -ative4v with men, but m. v 
previous expel-iences have taught me to proceed with caution. Such relationships arc seldont bascd on 
equalpowc, -. - p 163. 
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Unlike Harding, they are aware that men cannot share the same standpoint that feminist 
women share. They offer a traditional analysis of how women acquired a feminist 
standpoint and consider that they do it by undergoing certain experiences that men cannot 
have access to, so the source of a feminist perspective for men has to be different. In this 
case, they suggest both women and books as the source of this knowledge. Aparl from 
acquiring information, men have to take a few steps in their lives in order to become 
enlightened by feminism: 
"We propose that there are four basic principles a man should consider addressing and 
acting upon if he hopes to gain a feminist consciousness: (1) through the reading of 
feminist works and actually listening to women, he should try to learn about the depth 
and unjust nature of women's oppression; (2) he should consider asking himse4f in what 
ways does he personally, and as a man in general (structurally) , oppress women; (3) he 
should consider ways to reject traditional notions of masculinity that are oppressive to 
others and replace them with women andfeminism as his referent; ; and in sum (4) he 
should consider ways to put women's needs as equal to, or even greater than his own. 404 
They explore, in some detail, those four points and, in doing so, they express the same soil 
of worries as we have already seen in other feminist writers. For instance, they realize that 
men have to re-learn their habits in relation to listening to people, so they analyze the way 
in which they are relating to one anothe, in the same manner that Seller was careful in 
engaging in a fair exchange with the women in the Indian university. The way in which we 
communicate with each other has to be scrutinized and not taken for granted. 
They underline that men should be respectful of the opinions expressed, and suggest that 
Nvhen a man is in a female space he should suspend any advice or judgmental attitudes he 
nught have unless he is asked to participate. There is a difference with the work of Seller 
\\, ho thinks that value judgment is appropriate once a relationship based on friendships is 
formed. They suggest that men should question the ways in which they personally oppress 
\\, omen and should learn to appreciate the traditional values and activities associated to 
beino a N\,, oman. Here, N\, -e find echoes of Lugones' work, where she insisted that, in any 4t> 
104 
S. P. Schach and D. Ewino, (I 99-)ý p 169. 
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relationship, both parties define each other, and that we are supportinor the structures ol- 0 
oppression if we do not fight against the way in which the other is defined by these 
structures (let us remember the way in which she used to relate to her mother, mediated bN, 
an androcentric cuiture). As a result, they argue that males should find new %vays of 
relating to women, here again we find echoes of Lugones' work when she explained how 
her challenge to the acquired view of her mother make her "love" her mother properly. 
Another of their recommendations led them to claim that men will be transformed by 
maintaining this sort of behavior on all occasions, you cannot be feminist just part time. 
This idea was particularly well expressed by A. Seller, when she claimed that her travel to 
India made her see her own life in a new light. Finally, they claim that men have to rank 
women's need as equal to or greater than their own. And this includes respecting women's 
spaces, giving up their privileges, and waiting to be asked to enter women spaces. They 
should decline any invitation to activities to which they cannot add anything. We should 
remember Lugones' recommendations on when a member of any privileged group should 
enter the communities of those at the margins and how it should be done: she claimed the 
there was a single reason to allow this encounter and this was if it benefited the 
marginalized group and if it was founded in a relationship grounded in friendship. The 
world of those who are marginalized should be the main benefitiary of the exchange. They 
claim that this is the case when men follow the protocol that has been developed above 
and that, if they do it they can assume a bridge role- 
"A Irulyftillillist oriented man Ca17 peiform four 7niportantfiI17C11017S when he assumes a 
bridge role. - (1) he can educate other men and build a ýtrotigfoiitidatiOl7for. f(-, niit7iSt 
social change aniong them; (2) he can gainaccess to sem . ngs where wommare excluded, 
al7d utilising a ftminist lens, explore and expose these settings for a larger ftn7iIIISI 
audience; (3)he can serve as a bridge to the established poiver structures tral7slating 
feminist agendas to the 'good old boys', al7d overall (4) he can provide and important 
linkage betweetiftininist i-vomen and men. "'0' 
think that this is an excellent example to explain how we should take the task of 
understanding each other, as women approaching other groups of women or in our 
los P. Schacht, D. Ewing (1997), p 169. 
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dealings as feminists with different communities. In the last section of the chapter I Nvill 
explain how this relates to the question that prompted the analysis: Harding's Stron 
Objectivity. 
13. Is Harding's Strong Objectivity a viable project? 
Strong Objectivity has two main goals, first to make visible the values that are embedded 
in any scientific research, by relying on reflexivity, and second, to begin our research from 
the lives of marginalized people in order to get a better starting point for our models. 
I have agreed with Harding that we get a better critical perspective on our own theories if 
we listen to the criticisms that people belonging to different groups make and also, if we 
attempt to understand their own theories and perspectives. But I have argued against 
Harding's project of beginning our research from the lives of others in any stronger sense. 
In actual fact, the examples and criticisms that I have brought into the debate seem to 
suggest the extreme difficulty of engaging in a dialogue with others who belong to 
different epistemic communities. I have argued that a proper understanding in only 
possible if we become engaged in the lives of others. And I have underlined the 
importance of actually doing it, because a metaphoric or imaginary world traveling is 
insufficient to produce a proper understanding. 
I have argued that understanding has to imply more than a mere intellectual exercise, 
having an emotional link with those whom we are trying to understand seems to be an 
important factor in the process of understanding, but I have also pointed out how those 
belonging to marginal groups feel threatened by this invasion of their worlds and consider 
that it is only justifiable if it is done for their benefit. Also, I have explained hoýv the 
perspective of marginal groups is not innocent and it has its own problems, so we should 
not think that we will simply obtain a better view of the world as Socri as we become 
engaged with a different way of life or set of practices. Rather, we will still see the w'orld 
from our own perspective. Maybe \ve \ý, 'oLfld have developed new skills that would change 
S11"IltlY Our capacity to see new aspects of the \\-orld, and maybe wc would begin to t'eel 
that Nvhat appeared familiar is, after all, strang, e. 1. 
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Nevertheless, this is a project that has difficulties. Given that there are many epistemic 
communities, how can we become involved in the ways )f life of all of them? To what 
degree do we have to travel to one another's world? I am aware of the difficulties that this 
ideal raises, I will try to spell out some problems by introducing the idea that there are 
several stages in which this exchange can take place: 
-There is a level of exchange, on which we are able to talk about our different worlds and 
to exchange information about them. We can read about the world of others and 
understand them. We can work in a mixed community environment and be able to 
exchange points of view. This sort of exchange can even be about practices, (in chapter 41 
explained how, in some cases, those who have a practical knowledge can express it 
propositionally and can be share it with many others). 
-There is another level of exchange, on which two people belonging to different groups 
express their differing opinions, and the one from the marginalized group is accepted on 
the basis of trust in their expertise, even when they cannot justify their knowledge in the 
sense of providing us with a set of propositions, logically linked. For instance, let us 
imagine that we travel to some country with which we are not familiar and encounter a 
problem that we have not faced before. The people of that country solve the problem daily 
and present us with an answer. We would probably accepted without asking them to 
justify their knowledge. The same can be true in a community in which a marginalized 
group has developed skills that allow them to solve particular problems. You would 
accept their expertise. It is importance to notice that you would have to be told (or shown) 
the solution, you would not be able to see the problem from their point of view. 
Unlike the first type of knowledge to which I referred, this type of knowledge, based on 
the expertise acquired by practices vihich cannot be justified in a traditional way or 
N, erbalized, has been marginalized in our epistemological traditions. Occasionally this has 
been because we have denied expertise to the sources of this knowledge, not simply 
because it is prounded on practical knowledge. 10' I suggest that we should alter our 01 170 
See L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993). 
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epistemological evaluations and re-evaluate knowledge based on experience and practical 
knowledge in general, promoting especially the knowledge of those who have been kept 
silent, because this will give us a better critical insight into our own practices and also 
improve chances for the creation of new theories. 
-A different level of dialogue is reached when people from different groups get involved in 
each other's lives. Then it is possible to acquire new skills and to see our own theones 
critically without relying only on the judgement of others. Those who belong to the 
marginalized groups have less to learn because the common culture belong to the ruling 
groups and it is imposed on them, but they also have to approach their own knowledge 
critically in order to improve their theories. 
Summarizing: strong objectivity is obtained by self- reflectivity and we can get it to a 
certain point by promoting dialogue between different groups. We can begin our research 
from the lives of others by listening to their descriptions of their experiences, and by 
getting involved in their practices, but never by looking at the world from their point of 
view. Therefore, we should make an effort to integrate as many different perspectives as 
possible when we are developing new theories, by giving people the possibility of making 
contributions towards the common theories. We should also try to maximize self-reflection 
by world traveling. 
14. Implications for a feminist epistemology 
The implications for a feminist epistemology will be developed in detail in the folloýving 
chapters, but I will mention briefly some of them. 
I explained in the opening chapter of the thesis how, often, philosophers tryincy to de,,, 'elop 
a feminist epistemology have relied on what they have called women's experiences as the 
-rouncis tor a aitterent epistemoiogy. in tne iormer cnapters i iiavc dIgUrU Mat, IL 
these experiences are not the basis of women as an epistemic group, they can, 
nevertheless, ground knowledge. I will argue that these experiences are the product of' ID ID 
particular practices within communities. The members of different communities develop 
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different skills, which allow them to organize some aspects of the world in diverse ways. I 
will discuss to what extent particular types of embodiment preclude subjects engaging in 
particular communities. We all belong to several different communities, Ný"hich in this 
context I will call epistemic communities, and we can made use of the different skills that 
we acquire by belonging to them while changing from one community to the other. Given 
that many of those skills are only tacitly known by us, we will not be making an explicit 
use of them but rather they will be part of our cognitive make up. Those skills are 
acquired by having particular ways of living, by performing and understanding diverse 
practices. 
In chapter 51 claimed that entering the space of reasons is a process closely linked with 
sharing a particular way of life and with speaking a language. Those who belong to the 
same community, share a world. But within these communities there are other possible 
groupings, and the members of these might be able to relate to certain aspects of the world 
in a different way. Then the common language shows that it is insufficient to capture all 
aspects of the world as it is experienced by some members of the community. The 
dissidents, by belonging to a group of people who are able to capture somehow those 
aspects of the world, might develop ways of articulating what they are perceiving by 
changing the common language. Some of these changes are comparable to changes of 
paradigms in the Kuhnian sense, while others are just smaller changes in the use of words. 
Sometimes the insights acquired by the members of these groups will not be of the kind 
that can be put into words, and therefore will not be transmissible by any other mean than 
by joining the practices that are particular to that group. Occasionally, the expertise of 
those in the know will have to be accepted even if they are not able to explain why they 
know what they know. I will develop all these claims in more detail in the next two 
chapters, but now, in order to illustrate my claims, I will rely on two examples taken from 
feminist writers: 
The general arguments in this chapter support the view that women, as a group prone to 
having particular experiences, are justified in arranging reality In a different way from that 
generally accepted. For instance, before the creation and spread of the expression "sexual 
harassment" wornen who were undergoing situations of that type were lost wlien trying to 
fit those behaviours to the then current descriptions of reality. The conclusion reached in 
this chapter means that it is possible to validate and justify dissenting views of the world. 
The following (fictional) story illustrates how a non-traditional way of reseach, closely 
linked to the practices of women, can help to make sense of certain situations better than a 
more "detached" and supposedly "scientific" one: 
A man dies on his remote farm. His wife declares that he died in his sleep. The sheriff goes 
to the farm, accompanied by another man and both their wives, who go there to collect a 
few things for the victims'wife who is in prison. While their husbands go around the house 
following the normal procedures for discovering the truth, the wives reconstructed the 
story by putting together clues that they collect by wandering around the house. "their 
'knowing-why' is no mere accumulation offacts. This is an effective, mulliple-lextured 
knowing, a knowing in depth of aspects of Mrs. Broke's life that are palpable ftom what 
these women, her peers, have known of her in the past, andfrom the analogies they call 
construct, empathetically, with their own lives. W07 
Those women are able to see things that their husbands cannot perceive because they have 
a personal interest in the search, and they can identify with the woman who is being 
investigated, which is something which is not appropriate in the light of traditional 
methods for investigating the "truth" in which detachment is desirable in order to promote 
objectivity, also because they seek the clues both empirically and also affectively, and 
finally, because their activity is random. 'O' The result of the search is that "Out Of the 
bareness and isolation of thefarnihouse, ivith no near neighbors andnOtelel)hOne, out (? / 
their inemoriesOf Minnie Burke as a young girl, out of too n7any things broken, 1701 
. 
Anctioning, destroyed, out of 'trivia, 'Irifles'lhat a standard, fornial Investigation would 
pass over irithout notice, the ii, onien read a stoiy of relentless brutality, coldness, and 
despair. When theyfindAllrs, Burke's canary ivith its neck ivring, its cage broken, its boqi, 
)vrqI)pedInpieces of cloth 117 her quilting box, they haiv no doubt about ivho iWirdered 
John Burke, and why. "'0'9 The wives can perceive aspects of the life of Nlr, Burke that 
107 L. Code (1995), p 145. 108 L. Code (1995), p 146. 109 L. Code (1995), p 14 5. 
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escape their husbands, and by putting all these together, they can guess that she was the 
one who murdered her husband. They might not be able to produce "objective" proofs for 
use in a trial, but they guess correctly what happened. 
I (I 
CHAPTER 8 
0. Introduction. 
In this chapter I will review some of the questions that arose in previous chapters and 
which are still unresolved. First, I will expand on the concept of expertise, Ný, hich I 
mentioned briefly at the end of chapter 7. In my analysis of the relations that are 
established between agents belonging to different epistemic communities, I argued that 
there are occasions on which we should accept that the knowledge provided by some 
epistemic agents is justified on the basis of their expertise. In this chapter I will explain the 
implications of such a move and I will introduce the concept of virtue epistemology. 
In the second part of the chapter I will address issues related to encompassing the inputs 
of different communities in order to obtain objective knowledge. I will be arguing for a 
realist pluralist epistemology that avoids relativism. I will rely on the work of Longino and 
Haraway in arguing my case. 
Knowledge as expertise. 
In the last section of the last chapter, I distinguished different levels of exchange between 
individuals belonging to diverse epistemic communities. The first level to which I referred 
was an exchange of information, mainly verbal, which did not involve travelling to each 
other's world. The second level of exchange that I acknowledged was that in which the 
information provided by one of the groups is accepted as more reliable, on the basis of 
their expertise, even when they are unable to give reasons for their knowledge. I argued 
then that we would consider it to be reliable because it is based on community practices 
and based on experience. The last type of exchange that I considered was that of getting 
involved in one another's lives. In the following sections I will analyse more closelý- the 
second type of knowledge to which I referred, that of expertise, which is attributed on the 
basis of experience. 
have already said that we should alter our epistemological evaluations and re-evaluate 
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knowledge based on experience and practical knowledge in general. I have explained how 
certain knowledge claims have been marginalized because of their sources, being produced 
by "lesser" epistemic agents or/and because, being based on experiential or practical 
knowledge, they could not be put into a propositional form. I have pointed out that, in 
general, knowledge obtained by means other than the application of the scientific method 
has been considered unreliable, unless their findings have been sanctioned a posteriori by 
science. We have trusted the expertise of scientists and denied the value of knowledge 
acquired by experience or in a more traditional (and non-scientific) way. I will argue that 
we should revise our actual concept of expertise, to include those who have acquired their 
knowledge as a result of an involvement in practices sanctioned by their epistemic groups, 
even when those practices seem "unscientific". 
Furthermore, I want to take a step further by suggesting that we should develop an 
epistemology that takes into account the epistemic character of the knowers as another 
criteria for attributing and justifying knowledge. On some occasions, the knowledge 
endorsed by experts who are the bearers of particular epistemic virtues should be taken to 
be justified on the basis of having been obtained from a reliable source. In this way, we 
will be supporting the knowledge of those who have been kept silent because they were 
not considered as reliable knowers in a traditional epistemology, given that, now, they 
could count as experts in their spheres of activity. The acceptance of these knowledge 
claims will enlarge our body of knowledge, and I believe that this will give us a better 
critical insight into our own practices, by means of contrasts and, also, improve our 
chances for the creation of new theories. 
2. On the concept of expertise. 
In chapter 41 explained how the body of knowledge that midwives had before the 
niedicalization of childbirth was ignored as soon as the medical establishment developed 
their own theories. The marginalization of this knowledge was due to several causes. In 
the first place, it was based on practices and transmitted in a practical way, that is, it was a 
practical knowledge, as opposed to the new knowledge, which was highly theoretical 
Also, it was produced by midwives, who did not have enough "scientific" knowledge and 
their training was not validated by the scientific community, the result was that their 
knowledge was considered to be "Old wives' tales". This is just an example of a storý that 
has been repeated again and again, in different spheres of knowledge and ýý, ith different 
episternic groups. 
In chapter 21 explained how, in our epistemic tradition, we have attributed epistemic 
authority to those who have acquired their knowledge by particular means but, also, and 
this has been a determinant factor in the exclusion of many, to those who, due to t1leir 
personal characteristics, can be considered to be reliable epistemic agents. By relying on 
the work of D. Haraway, I pointed out how it has been stipulated that only certain types of 
people count as reliable witnesses in science, how their testimony is considered to be 
acceptable and how many others, women and working class people, were not counted as 
reliable epistemic agents. M. Jarnack refers to work by Shapin, who explains that the 
XVIIIth century development of the ideal that gentlemen were reliable epistemic agents Is 
based on a "long tradition of associating bloodline with intelligence and competence 
[that] flowedftom Aristotle and stillprevailed in Tudor and Stuart courtesy literature. ", 
It was the independence of gentlemen that supposedly allowed them to be disinterested 
observers, and that precluded women and working class people from being such. 
Currently, the same criteria apply, because "if we do not have first-hand laiowledge about 
hoic reliable, sincere, and honest a person IS, we MUSt gO 017 'outward signs P -2 , and these 
signs are still linked to the assumptions that we make about people based on their 
education plus their perceived class, race or gender. ' 
I aim to support an epistemology in which expertise is attributed on different criteria. I 
agree with the idea that there are two factors to be taken into account when deciding who 
is to count as an expert: the way in which knowledge has been acquired and, also, the 0 
personal characteristics of the epistemic agents. But, by chanaging our concept of I- 
Knowledge in the ways the I have been suggesting, we will also vary the perception of 
N\-ho is to count as a reliable epistemic agent. 
I li. Jarnack ( 1997)ý p 134. 
2 1j. Jarnack ( 1997), p 13 5. 
3 H. Jarnack ( 1997) cites empirical studies to report her assertions. 
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By revaluing practical, experiential knowledge and not making it reducible to propositional 
knowledge, and by supporting the view that those who have epistemologica pri Ia I i-vile, )e are 
those who are involved in the production of knowledge and ývho are perceived as 
"situated" knowers, instead of as external "objective" observers, we will be able to 
attribute epistemic authority to agents to whom it has been denied. 
Scientists are beginning to acknowledge that, in many cases, ignoring the knowledge of 
those who have acquired it in a traditional way, by being initiated in particular practices, 
means that they lose their time and their money, funding unnecessary projects. In a recent 
article in New Scientist it is claimed that "All around the globe, scientists have too offen 
ignored local or traditional understanding of the environment. Bill biologists are 
beginning to realise that information amassed over the centuries by indigenous peoples 
about wildlife, agriculture and medicine can be more accurate than information gained 
from modern investigation. PY4 In the same article, Daniel Buckles, a senior scientist with 
the Canadian government's International Development Research Centre claims "Science is 
standing on the shoulders of centuries of innovation by traditional hunters, healers and 
farmers. "' 
There are a variety of examples that illustrate how scientists have been unable to match the 
results of non-scientist experts: how geneticists have failed to produce more productive 
yaks while the indigenous nomadic herdsmen of the area have succeeded, plus, at the same 
time, caring for the environment, OF how hill farmers in Honduras have devised a system 
to fertilize their crops, which scientists have not been able to improve upon. Scientists 
recognise that if they had paid more attention to what the "real" experts had to say, they 
would have saved time and money. But how it is possible that the information provided by 
a non-scientist is more accurate than that provided by a scientist? It has been su, _-_, CStCd 
that this is the case because scientists are constrained by their budget, by their traditional 
methods of investigation, and are only able to gain a fragmented understanding of their 
surroundings. 
A revaluation of our concept of expertise would allow us to include, as such, krimvers 
R. Edwards (1998), plS. 
R. EdN%ards (1998), pl'S 
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who belong to epistemic communities that have traditionally been marginalized. Their 
input in the development of science is beginning to be considered invaluable, and I believe 
that science is not the only activity where this sort of knowledge can be useful 
Nevertheless, as I have already argued, we have to approach any episten& contribution 
critically, because having good information about a particular issue does not guarantee 
that the knower is going to make the best use of it6 and also, there are limits to what 
reasonably be accepted without any other guarantee apart from that which comes from 
authority. If we develop an epistemology in which expertise is enough justification for 
validating certain knowledge claims, we would have to pay more attention to the 
following questions: given that the expertise is based on practices and is community 
sanctioned, we should look closely at these processes in order to decide on the reliability 
of the knowledge. Also, we should learn to recognize good epistemic traits in knowers, 
given that expertise is mainly the acquisition of certain abilities. 
3. Knowers as virtuous epistemic agents. 
In this section I am going to argue for a model of virtue epistemology that will allow us to 
develop the concept of good epistemic character. There is a central issue in virtue ethics 
that is very relevant for a virtue epistemology of the kind for which I am trying to argue. 
Most virtue ethics are based on the idea that we can decide what a virtue is if it procures 
happiness for the others, so the criteria for what is a virtue is its relation to benevolence, 
which is the virtue "model". In virtue epistemology, epistemic virtues are such because of 
their relation to truth. Traditional epistemic virtues are those that we can rely on as 
sources for true beliefs. There is an alternative virtue ethics' that does not have 
6 In the article quoted above, there are some examples that illustrate that local knowledge has not stopped 
the population living in particular areas from damaging the environment. 7 
P. Foot (1998) offers some convincing arguments against consequentialism in ethics and provides us 
with a non-consequentialist virtue ethics. She argues that consequential Ism in ethics cannot make sense of 
the idea of "the best state of affairs", which is central for it, without making reference to a theory of 
general welfare, which cannot be justified unless is related to the vi rtue of benevolence. Furthermore, for a 
consequential i st theory of virtue we must the consider the outcome that virtues produce in order to 
determine if they are virtues or not. P. Foot's arguments against this kind of ethical theory imply that we 
have to show first why all virtues should be directed to the promotion of happiness and consider desirable 
only if this is its end. But it is possible to decide whether or not a virtue is a desirable trait of character 
without considering its relation to benevolence. She claims that benevolence is a desirable Nirtue, but "We 
hm, e no reason to think that whatever is done with the aim of improving the lot of other people wi// be 
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benevolence as the model for the rest of the virtues. I want to argue for a virtue 
epistemology that does not use truth as the model for deciding what the way of obtaining 
reliable beliefs is. 
According to a consequentialist theory of epistemic virtues, epistemic virtues are those 
that will help us to achieve the truth. E. Sosa supports this sort of theory and claims that 
(9 justification emergesftom the operation of the epistemic virtues. A belief isjustifled if it 
is the product of a reputable epistemic faculty (intuition, memory, perception, reason, 
introspection) " and these are episternic virtues in "relation to truth as an end that unifies 
the different virtues. "' 
I will argue for an epistemology in which truth is not solely the end of our inquiries, and in 
which justification is not only linked with truth. Therefore, I am very sympathetic to I 
Dancy's suggestion that there is a second possibility for deciding what counts as an 
intellectual virtue. He thinks that we can "recognize the states of a character trait as a 
virtue before examining its relation to truth " and, also, that there are intellectual virtues 
whose status as such does not derive from their relation to truth " but, rather, "it derives 
ftom consideration of the sort of intellectual being one should be. "" He offers examples 
of character traits that are epistemic virtues and that do not have a relation with the 
production of truth: intellectual diffidence, curiosity, tolerance. He points out how there 
are epistemic virtues that are an end in themselves, such as wisdom. In the case of wisdom 
is clear that it is not its relation to truth that makes it valuable. 
In a consequential i st theory of reliabilism, such as the one supported by E. Sosa, the 
relation between truth and justified belief seems quite straightforward: we have a just, fied 
belief when it has been reached through the right method. The question that I have to 
answer now is how can we have justified beliefs if we switch our attention from the 
methods of obtaining beliefs to a virtuous life/character? I will rely on C. Hookway's work 
Morallv required or even morallVpermissible. " (1998), p 235. She adds that benevolence is not the onIN 
desirable virtue and that, sometimes, its application clashes with other virtues such as justice. Therefore it 
is not right to use benevolence- the desire of happiness for other human beings- as the paradigin to decide 
wlien an action is right or wrong. 81 
Dancy (1995), p 189. 9 
10 
1 Dancy (1995), p 196. 
J. Dancy (1995), p195. 
to answer this question. He argues for a different use of the term itistification and claims 
that "a general notion of Justification' may have relatively little work to do in a 
developed account of epistemic evaluation: at best we might say that someone isjusfýfled 
in believing something if their belief issues fi-om responsible and 1, irtuous inquiry. 
Justified beliefs are those that issue ftom the responsible inquiries of virtuous inquirers. 
It is a mistake to put it the other way round: epistemic virtues are those habits and 
dispositions which leads us to have justified beliefs. 7-he primary focus is oil how we 
order activities directed at answering questions; it is not upon the epistemic status of 
beliefs. "" Therefore, what is relevant for justifying certain beliefs is having the 
appropriate epistemic character, which is acquired through the fight training: "I am a 
good epistemic character if, in general, I treat belief as not needing defence when those 
beliefs are formed or sustained in ways that make it likely that they are true. So far, we 
are in agreement with the reliability theory: one goal for education, presumably, is to 
train people's epistemic sensibilities so that their instincts about which questions to ask 
and which to ignore are sound we should be sensitive to the kinds o information that 
should lead us to doubt current certainties; we should be good at asking the right 
questions. "" 
We could recognise that some knowers, by means of their participation in certain practices 
of which we have not got much knowledge, have became experts in particular areas of 
knowledge. In order to decide who counts as such, we have to rely on our perception of 
who is a reliable epistenuc agent, instead of an analysis of the methods that they have used 
in order to obtain their knowledge. C. Hookway argue that there are certain traits of 
character that are desirable in order to make good epistemic evaluations. I think that this 
does not imply that there are epistemic traits that the members of all communities should 
share in order to count as reliable epistemic agents. I think it improbable because the sort 
of practices that will make a knower competent in one community do not have to be 
shared necessarily by the members of another community, which means that kno"vers will 
develop different abilities and epistemic virtues. The question of what it is to count as a 
good epistemic character remains open. But an analysis of what counts or could count as 
I' C. Hookway ( 1994), p225. 12 C. Hookway (1994), p 22 1. 
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one can help us to re-evaluate what counts as a good episternic trait. I will give an 
example in section 4. 
4. Some undervalued epistemic virtues. 
I have pointed out that some forms of knowledge have been marginalized because they 
were produced by agents who were considered to be unreliable, using methods that were 
not sanctioned by the ruling communities. V. Camps remarks how the virtues that have 
been traditionally attributed to women have been considered inferior to those attributed to 
males. " These virtues have actually been rightly attributed to women who acquired them 
while fulfilling their roles as women in particular societies, but I have already argued that 
there is nothing essentially "feminine" about any of these "virtues". V. Camps thinks that 
we should re-evaluate those virtues that have been marginalized because of their origin. " 
She underlines that the fact that these virtues are the product of subordination should not 
make us forget that they can have very positive uses. " 
I will put forward an example of an epistemic trait that has been attributed to women and 
that has been considered to preclude rational judgement: caring. Traditionally, it has been 
considered that emotions and feelings will cloud our understanding and, therefore, should 
be avoided in our rational judgements. M. 0. Little defends the importance of the 
epistemic roles of emotion and desire in gaining moral knowledge. She says that "there 
are some truths (.. ) that can be apprehended only ftom a stance of cognitive 
engagement. ""She uses the example of caring for people, a feminine virtue, to show how 
13 "La sub cultura femenina, precisamente por sit inferioridad con respecto a la cultura predominante, ha 
dado origen a una serie de 'valores' propios v, en Inuchos casos, contropuestos a los tipicamente 
inasculinos: la paciencia, /a falta de agresividad o de competencia, la discreccion, la ternura, la 
receptividad Desde A ristoteles, que sepanios, se habla de unas 'Wrtudes' de la lnujer distintas de las del 
i, aron, porque lafuncion de la Inuje, - en la casa, en la polis, es tambien diversa. " V. Camps (1990). p 
129. 
14 V. Camp (1990) argues that the fact that those virtues have been generated as a product of the oppresion 
against women is not enough to make them undesirable, in the same way that it Is slavery what we should 
fight against, but that the values generated by slaven, are not bad in themselvcs. 
is She argues that most feminine values "aparecen como negativos 'V 
17ihilistas, porque son la antitesis del 
Poder, las cualidades que, porfuerza, h(717 de desarrollar los sercs dominados. Pero, Es imposible %yerlos 
desde otra perspectiva? 0 podrian llegar a afirmarse coino valores una ve. - puedan ser predicados tie 
seres libres e ýguales? - V. Camp (1990), p 130. 16 M. 0. Little (1995), p 118. 
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that particular character trait can enhance our moral judgemems. 
She acknowledges that, on the one hand, it looks like in taking away emotions and desireý 
we can see situations more clearly but, on the other hand, if we want to take into account 
all the relevant aspects of a situation, we have to admit that our attention reflects what 
things we care about. A very simple example that illustrates this is to think of how 
different it is to listen to a person for whom you care from listening to another for whom 
you do not. In the second case "We objectify the person in a certain way: we see her as a 
means of aiming our agenda, including agendas as laudable as furthering justice or 
diminishing suffering. "" We can take Lugones' analysis of her relationship with her 
mother as a good example of how acknowledging our feelings towards our interlocutor 
can help us reach a better knowledge of her. Little claims that it is because mothers love 
their children, and care for them that they have what might sometimes look like privilege 
knowledge (often called women's intuition) about them. "It is because the mother cares 
for her child that she is attuned to subtle dangers, picks up on delicate signals, notices 
when help is needed. , 18 
She offers a further example that illustrates how a change in attitude towards someone can 
help to see the whole context from a completely different perspective: "take, for instance, 
someone i4)ho gives change daily to the homeless person near her office bill li, ho does so 
to qualm herfin-M)e feelings of giall, to compensate for 117C irritation she can't help 
fteling at his presence, and to maintain a se4f-iniage she can tolerate. Noli, imagine that 
one day, it, alking Ioi, i, ard the homeless person, she suddenly sees the situation dif) ercnlýv. 
Her perspecti iv shifts; the elements fall into place; she has fit the case into a differcia 
conic. d. Perhaps she suddenly sees 717 this person the loneliness she herseýf has ftli, and 
the picture resoNes itseýf into a simple case of helping a felloit, human in a bit of need 
1his change IS a change in her apprehension of the situation. This i's not to Sal? that she 
necessarill, came to knoir some neit, detail of the case. Seeing n7ore cParýv is often a 
I ýf the *ndh, idual elements 
in a itlai, that leis one nialler qf discern'tig a dýf . 
Terent Gestalt oI 
recWnisc sonic. furtherproperty they togetherfix. 
I, M0. Little (1995). p 124. 
IS N1.0, Little (1995), p 122. 
I"M. 0. Little (1995). 1) 127. 
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In all the former examples M. 0. Little has showed how having or acknowledging that we 
have certain feelings helps us to make different judgemer-s, it provides us with more 
information that will allow us to make better judgements and also, it allows us to engage 
more appropriately with others. Furthermore, her main argument is stronger, she argues 
that having certain feelings is necessary in order to be able to make moral judgements: she 
thinks that, in the same way in which a person who has not seen green as such can label 
what is green, a person who has no moral feelings can label what it is good or bad, but he 
does not know why something is called good or bad, his use of moral terms is parasitic on 
the use made of them by others who do know this. They will err in the long term in their 
moral judgements because "there are no conversion manuals-not even immensely 
complex ones- for inferring moral properties ftom nonmoral properties, no algorithms 
into which one canfeed the latter to derive all and only the right moral answers. "' 
Therefore, according to Little, being emotionally involved with people can make us better 
epistemic agents, because: first caring for people makes available information about others 
that we could not access otherwise. We can therefore make more informed judgements. 
Caring make us aware of certain facts about them that would be invisible otherwise, 
because it make us more receptive to our own surroundings and their needs. Second, 
caring for someone switches our perspective so, even if we are not aware of new "data", 
we can see the whole situation from a new light. Third, it helps us to adopt the right 
attitude regarding the testimony of others. And finally, regarding moral judgements, it help 
us to understand the meaning of moral terms and therefore, it is necessary in order to 
niake good moral judgements. 
In the previous chapter, I remarked that, in order to be able to understand across 
differences, feelings of friendship or love were the key to smoothing and initiating the 
process .2' 
Given the importance that exchmaes between epistemic communities have in 
my overall project, it is obvious that epistemic agents who are sensitive to feelings and 
emotions will be better able to undertake this task than those who are not. In later sections 
20 M. 0. Little (1995), p 129. 21 U. Narayan (1988) argues that it is important to take into account several emotions and feelings iii order 
to be able to understand across differences. 
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I will explain how Understanding across differericcs is In essential step it, order to Obtain 
objective knowledge, then the need to revalLie some episteinic virtues, ; in(] to reconsidei 
who should count aS FCliable enistemic agents will became evident. 
5. Towards a different epistemic project. 
Little shows how certain practices provide agents with particular epistemic traits, She 
chooses the example of caring in order to illustrate a more general thesis on the value of' 
feelings in moral evaluations. The choice of this particular example helps Lis to re-evaluate 
episternically certain traits of character that have traditionally been devalued by their 
attribution to women. I have suggested that caring for others is a trait of character that can 
produce more reliable epistemic judgements. As I explained in the first chapter, 
traditionally, but especially in the Enlightenment, philosophers have identified feelings with 
women and men with reason. Feelings have been considered to contaminate our 
judgements and also to be inferior to reason. Little shows how feelings are necessary in 
order to reach appropriate moral explanations. Agents who are used to 'listening' to their 
feelings instead of trying to distance themselves from them in moral judgements will be 
better off than those who are not trained to do the same. Given that, traditionally, worricri 
have been encouraged to develop this part of' their personal] ties, it could be aigiied that 
they are more likely to have these epistenlic virtucs. What Little has done wIlh hel Choice 
of example and her argument is a revaluation of' sorne of' our inore deeply eiflicnched 
notions in relation to reason, knowled-e and -, erider. ZD - 
A virtue epistemology that flocuses oil a good episternic character as well as on a WhAhIC 
method of acquiring Justified belief's will not centrc its investwation solely Oil the coticept 
Of truth and will not firvour propositional knowledoe as the paradigni of' krio%ý ledge This 
does not mean that truth will not be in Important part of' epistelliolopy, but lathel, that it 
will not be Cie only one. To Illustrate illy claim I will look at the project developed 
by AlcolTand Dalrnlya. They claim that traditional women's knowledge has been unjustiv 
marginalized because it do not fulfil the standard criteria flor justification. They arý-, ue that 
women's knowledge is not expressible in propos, t, on, "I 1,01-11), duc to he J'act that oldmiliv 
language is det'ective. Its content could, lievertlicless, be expicssed in a gendef-specit'ic 
? 71) 
idiolect. They try to justify knowing how by converting it into knowing that. " They trý, to 
accommodate feminist epistemology into a traditional epistemological framework, but 
acknowledge that there is a second way of justifying women's knowledge that it is not 
based on this framework: "On the other hand this strategyfor legitimising Imowing how 
is informed by an attempt to question and overthrow these assumptions about k? 7011, ledge 
and to dislodge truth as the sole epistemological norm. Knowing is not necessarily a 
matter of saying and representing what is the case but can also be a kind o practical ýf 
involvement with the world. 
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They have favoured the first alternative because they think that "if we can show that 
knowing how can be a feminine use of knowing even when knowledge is conceived as 
involving propositions, then the discriminatory exclusionism of the traditional 
epistemology becomes all the more suspect on i. ts own terms. "' The second alternative is 
more congenial to the sort of epistemology that I have been defending. My choice of a 
non-consequentialist virtue epistemology over a consequentialist one is in tune with this 
project. This move will allow us to switch the focus in epistemology from truth to 
epistemic virtues such as wisdom. It is interesting for feminist epistemology because it will 
also re-evaluate, practical knowledge and virtues that have been marginalized due to their 
origins. 
There is a question that still remains and that links with the issue that I will address in the 
second part of this chapter. I have claimed that different communities with different 
practices will nourish diverse epistemic virtues. Occasionally, when we have to confront 
the theories of other epistemic communities, we will accept their discourses merely on the 
basis of their expertise, we will be able to recognise that they are making justified 
knowledge claims. But, often, there will be a conflict between the accounts given by 
different communities. 
I have already looked at the possibility of understanding, across differences, and I claimed 
that understanding across differences is possible even if it is more difficult than some 
22 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993). p 235. 
3 L. Alcoff and V. Dalniiya (1993), p 235. 24 L. Alcoff and V. Dalmiya (1993), p 236. 
epistemologies suggest. I showed how sometimes understanding implies gettin a engaged 
in practices that are different from our own. In some cases the question of evaluation does 
not arise, they are simply different practices, but in other cases, the knower has to make 
judgements. Some of which will be moral judgements. I talked about this issue in chapter 
7 where I concluded that if the relationship between the knower and the epistemic group 
fulfils certain criteria it is appropriate to make moral judgements. But I have not yet 
answered the question of how to make epistemological choices, ie, how to make 
epistemological judgements when confronted with a theory that is different from the one 
that we hold and that we can understand without having to engage in any new set of 
practices. I will attempt to answer this question in the next sections. 
6. Longino's account of objectivity. 
In the former chapter, I explained why people belonging to different epistemic 
communities hold different theories on particular aspects of the world. I have argued that 
it is important to promote diversity in order to get more objective theories: in this way we 
obtain the critical element necessary for acknowledging our own biases, and also obtain 
interesting new metaphors and models that can give rise to theories that will illuminate 
aspects of the world that remain hidden in our actual theoretical structures. On a number 
of occasions I have said that a diversity of theories does not necessarily imply relativism, 
but acknowledged the fact that I have not explained how this is possible. In this chapter I 
will argue for a concept of objectivity that will allow us to account for diversity, while, at 
the same time, claiming that it is possible to choose between rival theories on the basis of 
their representational value. I will argue for a realist epistemology able to embrace 
diversity. 
Realist theories support the view that there is an empirical adequacy between our theories 
and the world. Traditionally, realist theories have a commitment towards truth as 
correspondence and a tendency to accept the idea of progress in science. At first sight it is 
difficult to see how a realist theory of science can be pluralist, that is, admitting the 
Possibility of a variety of theories offering different representations of the world. And this 
problem takes us back, again, to the concept of objectivity as it has been traditionally 
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used: we seem to be accepting both subjectivity and relativism in our picture of science, so 
how can we still claim to have objective knowledge? 
In chapter II explained how our traditional view of objectivity implied two 
presuppositions. the first one is that subjectivity was erased from science by applying the 
scientific method, and the second one, that observation was the basis of change in science 
and of choice between rival theories. It was possible to arbitrate between rival theories by 
assessing which one fitted better our "theory-neutral" data. Longino challenges both 
assumptions. First, she believes that, in the production of our theories, there are values 
that remain undetected by the methods of science and that bias our theory evaluation. She 
thinks that values are intrinsic to our theories of the world, and that we should be aware of 
them if we want to obtain proper objectivity. Second, she challenges the neutrality of 
observation, by arguing that observation is theory laden and, also, supports the thesis that 
theories are underdetermýined by data. This is a direct attack on what has classically 
constituted objectivity because "One claim challenges the stability of observations 
themselves, the other the stability of evidential relations. (.. ) If observation is theoly 
laden, then observation cannot serve as an independent constraint on theories, thus 
permitting subjective elements to constrain theory choice. Similarly, if observations 
acquire evidential relevance that changes with a suitable change in assumptions, then it's 
not clear what protects theory choice ftom subjective elements hidden in background 
assumptions. PY25 
Longino wants to preserve the criterion of empirical adequacy of theories because she is 
committed to realism, but at the same she is aware that this is not the only criterion that 
we use in our theory choice. She points out that some of the elements present in our 
theory choice remain hidden to the scientists themselves, for instance, the values that all of 
them share by belonging to the same epistemic groups (their belonging to the group Is 0 
partially constituted by the acceptance of certain values). Longino includes "values" 
among what she calls subjective background assumptions and claims that these are central 
to our theories because "iti light of the semantic gap beticeen hi7? otheses and the 
statements descrihing data, the latter acquire evidential relevancefor h, 1pothese, % onh, it, 
ýs H. Longino (1993), p 110- 111. 
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light of background assumptions. , 26 Following closely the rules of the scientific method 
does not make them visible, but Longino argues that these assumptions can be made 
obvious by including in the research projects people who belong to other epistemic 
communities 'that have traditionally been excluded from scientific communities. The model 
of science that she proposes is based on a dialogue between members of different 
communities: "Scientific knowledge, on this view, is an outcome of the critical dialogue 
in which individuals and groups holding different points of view engage with each other. 
It is constructed not by individuals but by an interactive dialogic community. PY27 
Harding and Longino agree on the critical value of the contributions made by members of 
communities that have traditionally been outside science, but they disagree on how to use 
their input in science. Harding wants the scientist, as an individual belonging to a 
particular group, to make changes in his/her own way of approaching the world, and to 
begin from the experience of the other; while Longino does not require this individual 
change of vision, but rather, considers that we should change the constitution of scientific 
communities. 
7. Justificatory practices. 
I have just explained how the role of background assumptions must be recognised if 
attempting to obtain proper objectivity. So, in opposition to our traditional view on the 
methodology of science, I will claim that justification is not obtained only by testing the 
hypothesis against the data in our theories, but rather, we have to make sure that our 
theories receive criticisms from a variety of perspectives to make obvious our background 
assumptions. Longino thinks that in our justificatory practices we must make sure that 
"hilei-subjective discia-sive intei-action is added to interaction wilh the material ivorld 
""del, investigation as components of methodology. , P28 Empirical adequacy and plurality 
in the constitution of epistemic communities are two of the factors that should guide us in 
our theory choice. Empirical adequacy is possible because "observalion providcs the 
least 
26 H. Longino (1997). p 29. 
27 H. Longino (1993), p 112. 
24 H. Longino (1997), p29- 
defeasible evidence we have about the world P29 and she believes that objectivitv \vIII be 
promoted by assuring diversity within epistemic communities 
Longino puts forward some conditions for considering communities as legitimated in 
producing knowledge. She considers that a legitimate episten-& community "njust hal-e 
structuralfeatures that ensure 'the effectiveness of critical discourse taking place ivithiii 
it '. P, 30 She suggests four conditions that all communities have to fulfil in order to 
guarantee diversity and an appropriate level of critical activity: "a) the provision of venlies 
for the articulation of criticism, b) uptake (rather than mere toleration) of criticism, c) 
public standards to which discursive interactions are reference, d) equality of intellectual 
authority for all (qualified) members of the community. Y, 31 Communities constituted in 
such a way as to guarantee that the above conditions take place will be the appropriate site 
for theory development and theory choice. 
Longino thinks that the criterion of empirical adequacy must be shared by all epistemic 
communities, but the rest of criteria adopted by legitimate communities for theory choice 
are only locally normative. Longino call these criteria epistemic virtues, and claims that 
they differ according to the community that is evaluating the theory. Therefore, the 
normativity of those virtues applies only to the epistemological community that has put 
them forward: "the alternalli)e virtues are only binding in those communities sharing a 
Cognith)e goal that is advanced by those O'rotes. -3 ? To illustrate her claim, she gives a list 
of feminist epistemic virtues with which feminists should evaluate theories, but claims that 
it is only provisional. The goal of feminist communities is to reveal the operation of 
gender, to make visible how it has been naturalised, etc... so these virtues could be 
different in time or even different for different feminist communities with different 
concepts of gender: " Each group has to agree on the criteria for theory choice, but their 
criteria can be changed. These virtues regulate the discourse in the communities but they 
11 can be criticised or challenged relath. v to the cognitive aims iheý- are taken lo adlance 
or to other i)alues assigned higher priority and thej, can i. n turn seri)e as grounds for 
29 E. Anderson (I 995)ý p5 1. 
30 K. Lennon (1997), p 45. 
3'H. Lorigino (1997). p29. 32 H. Longino (1997). p2S. 
33 For a good stininiary on the different Nvivs In which gender Inflticnces theories see E. Anderson (1995). 
ca . lique. 
, 34 
As I have pointed out already, this is a very important feature of epistemic communities, 
their willingness to change their own normative discourses, given that they should ideally 
be constituted by a diversity of agents from a variety of groups in continuous dialogue. 
But, even if there is scope for value change and discussion in each episternic community, 
there will always be tensions within communities, because on the one hand, objectivity 
requires dialogue and negotiation, but on the other hand, it is necessary to reach 
agreements and this could mean marginalizing certain options, so it is very important to 
keep in mind that agreement should not be obtained at the price of consensus. According 
to Longino, when you have different values in a community "what is calledfor is not 
integration of the virtues by one research community, but the tolerance and interaction 
with research guided by different theoretical virtues, the construction of larger meta- 
communities characterised by mutual respect for divergent points of view, i. e., by 
pluralism. iY35 We have the difficult task of keeping a balance between preserving diversity 
and reaching a comprehensive model in each community. It is very important to 
remember, as Lennon points out, that for Longino "the legitimacy of the criteria 
emploved de ends on theCOnStitlition of the communityftom which they are derived 
o36 
Ip 
In the following sections I will analyse the three most important features of Longino's 
theory: 
The possibility of developing local epistemologies. 
The empirical adequacy of our theories. 
The consequences of developing an epistemology based on virtues. 
8. Local Epistemologies. 
Apart from the reliance on the crýticlsms originated within different episternic groups in 
order to improve our own theory, we can argue that pluralism promotes more empirically 
adequate theories on other grounds. I argued, In the previous chapter, that people Nvho 
34 H. Longino (1997), p 29. 
35 H. Lon, jilo (1997), p 30. 
H. Lon 
_gl no 
( 199 7), p 44. 
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belong to particular epistemic groups can access aspects of the world that would pass 
undetected otherwise. We can presume that different communities will capture different 
aspects of the world and they will reflect it with the creation of different models, their 
different contributions can help us to create more complete representations. This idea of 
complementarity, even if it is desirable, does not come without problems. Longino asserts 
that there are public and non-arbitrary criteria for the assessment of theories, but as I have 
already pointed out, she also thinks that these criteria are community related, they cannot 
be claimed to be universally applicable. The view of an all-encompassing theory that 
benefits from the discoveries of different epistemic communities does not seem to be an 
attainable ideal. 
It has been argued that, if rational engagement is possible intra-communites, then it should 
also be possible across communities, therefore local epistemology does not have to be 
local 
. 
3' Longino makes a contribution towards this possibly when she claims that criticism 
is not limited to intra-community discourse because "The areas of overlap or intersection 
make possible critical interaction among as well as within communities. "" Nevertheless, 
there is still the unanswered question of how this interaction is going to take place if the 
communities do not share a set of criteria to guide theory choice. I will tackle this problem 
in my next section. 
A pluralist realism. 
We have already seen that there are two criteria that should be applied equally by all 
epistemic communities. The first one is empirical adequacy, and the second one, the 
constitution of the epistemic communities. I have already talked about the problems 
presented by the appropriate constitutions of epistemic communities, and I will 
concentrate now on the criteria for empirical adequacy. 
At the beginning of the chapter I claimed that I will be arguing for a realist epistemology 
that allows for diversity. I signalled, then, that traditional realist theories support an ideal 
37 K. Lennon (1997). 
38 H. Longino (1997). p 29. 
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of truth as correspondence and the ideal of progress. Now I will analyse Longino's theor-', 
in order to see how she develops an epistemology, the theories of which are con-trained s 
by empirical adequacy, are plural and at the same time, capture the world appropriatel%,. 
Longino insists that we should move away from models of science that consider that 
"truth" is at the end of the scientific enquiry, so the view of epistemic communities as rival 
communities that aim for a complete and exclusive explanation of the world should be 
changed. She promotes a picture of scientific theories in which many different models or 
theories can function at the same time, while being all of them constrained by empirical 
considerations. 
It does not seem possible that there are different theories that describe the world in 
different ways and that all of them are empirically adequate. In order to make sense of this 
apparent impossibility, Longino thinks that we should take science to be a practice or set 
of practices and also we should characterise it under some version of a semantic or model- 
theoretic theory of theories. " 
Let us begin with the second move, taking a semantic view of science means that we have 
to move away from the idea that science is a set of propositions. We will take science to 
be a structure, and Longino claims that "A structure is neither trite or false, is just a 
structure. The theoretical claim is that the structure is realised in sonic actual. system. ""' 
The switch from truth to another model of theoretical adequacy is explained in the 
following way "The adequacy of a theory conceived as a model IS determined bY our 
being able to map some subset of the relationsIsiructures posited in the model onto sonic 
Portion of the experienced i4, orld. (.. ) Any Ghýen model or schema ivill necessarilyselect 
among those relations. So its adequacy is notjust afittiction of isomorphism of one of the 
/. n1eipretations of the theory ii)ith a portion of the i, i, orld but of the fact that the relations it 
picks out are ones in ivhich ive are interested A model guldes our interactions With and 
I. nIervCI7IiOnS in the ij)orld. ý41 
39 H. Lononio (1993). p 114. 
4o H. Longino (199-33). p 114. 
Lonj,, 1 no (1993), p 115 
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This characterisation of theories as being something other than a collection of propositions 
with a truth value is very congenial to the model of knowledge for which I Ilave been 
arguing, as the following quotation illustrates: "Knowledge is not detachedfi-om 101olvers 
in a set ofpropositions but consists in our ability to understand the structuralftalures of 
a model and to apply it to some particular portion of the world; it is knowledge of that 
portion of the world through is structuring by the model we use. P, 42 Also, it allows that 
members of different communities, will provide us with different models, preserving the 
pluralism necessary for obtaining objective knowledge "(.. ) Given that different 
subcommunities within the larger scientific community may be interested in different 
relations or that they may be interested in objects under different descriptions, different 
models (that if taken as claims about an underlying reality would be incompatible) may 
well be equally adequate andprovide knowledge, in the sense of and ability to direct our 
interactions and interventions, even in the absence of a general consensus as to what's 
important. YY43 
Longino promotes partiality and multiplicity, complementarity and a criterion of adequacy 
that substitutes for that of truth. In her view, knowledge does not offer a transparent 
propositional account of the world any longer, but rather knowledge is an ability to direct 
our interactions and interventions. This links with the second move that I mentioned 
before, which consists in taking science as a practice, "-"; e understand inquiry as ongoing, 
that is, ive g7 . ve up the idea that there is a terminus oJ inquiry thatjust is the set of triahs 
about the ivorld (.. ) scientif1c knoivledgeftoni this perspective is not the static endpoini 
of inquHy, but a cognitive or intellectual expression of an ongoing interaction with ow, 
natural and social environments. 244 
In the previous chapter I explained how our different ways of engaging with the word 
niake different aspects of it available. I also argued that the justification of theories relies 
on the practices shared by determinate epistemic communities. Propositional knoMedge is 
not the only type of knowledge that can be justified. One of the most interesting 
implications of this characterisation of theories is that it is possible to hold ri%, al theories 
-12 H. Longi no (1993), pI 15. 43 H. Longii no (I 993)ý p 115. 
44 H. Longino (1993), p 116, 
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simultaneously without danger of contradiction. Different theories attend to dIfferent 
relations between elements present in the world, so we can maintain their empirical 
adequacy while accepting different accounts of it. I think Longino's epistemolog allo\ý"s oy 
us to argue for a pluralist realism. Nevertheless, If we take the more salient elements from 
the account that I have just given of Longino's epistemology, we can see that, from the 
point of view of a traditional epistemology, she could be classified as anti-realist. She 
denies that truth is at the end of scientific inquiry and also promotes the validity of more 
than one model or theory. 
I will argue that: 
1. The model of "reality" or the "world" as the ground for our theories that is suggested 
by this epistemology is one that does not correspond easily with our traditional concepts. 
Therefore, it is necessary to adjust our conceptual system. I will support Haraway's 
characterisation of the world as agent as a good model for understanding the relation 
between our theories and what it is represented. 
2.1 will support the thesis that Longino is not an anti-realist philosopher by looking at her 
use of models. 
In the next section I will argue for 2, leaving I for section 11. 
10. The threat of anti-realism. 
The threat of anti-realism is also present for another philosopher who maintained a similar 
position. Kuhn claimed that we can see the world in different ways according to the 
theories that we hold, and he says that, in a sense, scientists who look at the world from 
different paradigms live in different worlds: "Something even more fiindamental that] 
standards and values is, howei)er, at stake. I hai, e so far argued only that paradigms are 
C017SIifuthýe of science. Now I wish to display a sense in which they are conslimime (? f 
nature as well. In a sense that I am unable to explicate fiii-ther, the proponents (ýf 
competingparadigms practice their Iradesif7different irorlds. One contains constrained 
bodies thatfall slowly, the other pendulums that repeat Iheir 177011'017 Cýqal .n al7d qiýalll. 117 
017e, solutions are compounds, i17 the other inixtin-es. 017e is etnbe&led in aflal, the other 
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in a curved matrix of space. Practising in different worlds, the two groups of scientists 
see different things when they lookfrom the same point in the same direction. , 45 
Despite his insistence on the different ways of seeing the world, Kuhn claimed that 
scientists could not see whatever they wanted, there are constraints about what they can 
see. Different theories simply stress different aspects of the world. Still, Kuhn is notis not 
considered a proper realiSt46 because he does not think that the changes of paradigms 
provide us with theories closer to the truth "Perhaps there is another way of salvaging 
the notion of truth for application to whole theories, but this one will not do. There is, I 
think, no theory-independent way to reconstruct phrases like 'really there'; the notion of 
match between the ontology of a theory and its 'real' counterpart in nature flow seems to 
me illusory in principle. PY47 
I think this also applies to Longino's theory, it is difficult to classify her as a realist 
following the normal criteria. On the one hand, she does not embrace the traditional 
definition of knowledge as the seeking of truth, and also, she underlines the fact that 
knowers engage in different ways with the world. She would have to agree with the idea 
that scientists are embedded in different worlds. On the other hand, she claims that "there 
is a world independent of our senses with which those senses interact to produce our 
sensation and the regularities of our experiel7ce. There is something out there that 
imposes limits on i-Mat we can say about it. 
As I have already said, I want to support the case that Longino is a realist. Her reading of 
the use of metaphors in science suggests that Longino attributes a central role to the 
constraints that the world imposes on our creation of models. 
45 That quotation is reproduced b), N. W. NeNvton-Sm, th (1994), Nvho writes the following before he 
includes it: "I return to the suggestion to befound in Kuhn that such a shift in paradigins not ot,. y -p-ings 
about changes in how ive describe the world and how and where we look at the world, but also brings 
about changes in the world itseýf Kuhn writes as if he subscribed to this non-objectivist idealist doctrine: 
( .. ) ", p 219. 46 Following N. W. Newton-Smith (1994), from a traditional perspective is not possible to saý- that Kuhn 
is a realist but he will be classified as an embi-N-onic rationalist because he "takes it that the five Nva)ýs can 
bejustified as the criteria to be used in achieving progress in science, that is, In Increasing puzzle-solvilig 
capacity. " p 125. 
47 Kuhn in N. W. NeN\Ion-Siiiitli (1994). p 120. 
48 H. Longino (1990), p 221. 
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There are several theories to explain the way in which metaphor works. The substitution 
model claims that the two subjects compared by the metaphor have something in common 
that is indirectly described by the metaphor. In contrast, the model that Longino seems to 
support is the interaction model, which can be charactefise in the following way: "Oien 
we use a metaphor, we have two thoughts of differing things active together and 
supported by a single word or phrase, whose meaning is the result of their interaction. "49 
The substitution theory makes us more inclined to mistake the model in science for the 
thing modelled, for instance to think that nature is mechanical instead of being seen as 
mechanical. The interaction theory, allows for a change of meaning in the two parts of the 
metaphor, so our concept of nature might change if we see it as mechanical, but at the 
same time, our concept of mechanism will also change if we think of it as an organic 
mechanism. What makes this model of metaphor so useful in our understanding of science 
is that "instead of commonplace associations, a metaphor may evoke more specially, 
constructed systems of implications (.. ) what makes an analogy suitable for scientific 
purposes is its ability to be suggestive of new systems of implications, new hypotheses, 
and therefore, new observations. "" Longino defended the view that scientific models, as 
analogy or metaphor do not describe the world isomorphically. The model, the metaphor, 
contains elements that are not in the world and vice-versa. Both clarify each other but do 
not substitute each other. A model does not picture reality in all its detail and forever, it 
does not make the world completely transparent, it is necessarily partial. That is why there 
can be many models of the same event, each underlying different aspects of it, and in a 
sense, all adequate for describing reality. Longino is a realist because she insists on the 
empirical adequacy of our theories. Therefore, it is obvious that she accepts that the world 
constrains the possible models that we construe, even if at the same time, she allows 
for a 
picture of the world that shows different aspects of itself to different agents, allowin,, the 
possibility of developing different theories. I favour an ontological model that allo\, k. s 
for 
this type of pluralism while still supporting realism. A model that it 
is exemplified in the 
work of Haraway. 
49 A. 1. Richards quoted by N. Leys Stepan, (1996), p 126. so N. Lcys Stepan (1996), -p 127. 
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11. Haraway: The world as agent. 
There are two ideas in the work of Haraway that I find particularly congenial. In the first 
place, she claims that all theories are laden, while at the same time admitting that not all of 
them are valid, because there are limits to be set to theories about the world, and they are 
set by the internal logic of these discourses and also by the world. 5' In the second place, 
she claims that the world is not passive, it is not there to be "the ground for the 
construction of the agent Y)52 but rather it is viewed as an agent. 
Theories are laden because the stories that we tell about the world are influenced by the 
histories that each of us carries. She argues for a position that is very close to the one that 
Harding and Longino promoted: all theories include values and background assumptions 
that reflect the ideological, cultural, historical make up of the knower. To illustrate her 
claims Haraway says that if we practice science as biologist, we have to accept that it is a 
discourse which has been used to naturalize and construct race and gender, for instance, 
so we cannot pretend to be doing Pure science, uncontaminated by the tradition of the 
subject, and we cannot pretend, either, that that discourse has not influenced our sense of 
self: "we have to engage in those terms of practice, and resist the temptation to renlaill 
pure. You do that as a finite person, who can't practice biology without assumi . fig 
responsibility for encrusted barnacles, such as the centrality of biology to the 
construction of the raced and sexed bodies. You've got to contest the discow-se from 
ii, ithin, building connections to other constituencies. This is a collective pi, ocess, and we 
can't do it solely as criticsftom the outside. 103 
Diverse theories are produced because different subjects relate differently to the world 
Haraway is aware of the fact that we do not relate to the world in an unmediated manner, 
51 D. Haraway in an intmiew by C. Penley and A. Ross (199 1) claims tilat "the practices oj'the sciences 
(.. )force one to accept two simultaneous, apparently incompatible truths. One is the historical 
contingenqv of what counts as naturefor its. (J And siniultaneousýY, scientific discourses, without eveii 
ceasing to be radicallv, and historicalýv specific, do still inake claims on _vou, 
ethicalýv, phývsical4v- The 
objects of these discourses, the discourses themselves, have a kind of inateriali(v: the ,v 
hm, e a sort ql- 
realiýy to them that is inescapable. N'o scientific account escapes being theoýv laden, but is equalýV true 
that stories are not equal here. "p2. 
51 C. PenIcy and A. Ross (199 1)ý p 3. 
5.1 C. Penley and A. Ross ( 199 1)ý p 5. 
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but she also acknowledges the limits that the world imposes on our discourses. In my 
view, she tries to keep an equilibrium between accepting a certain constructionism in 
relation to nature, and the importance of accepting the materiality of the world. In this 
sense, she agrees with C. Penley and A. Ross' analysis of her theory- "A. R: It seems that 
you are increasingly , in your work, sympathetic to the textualist or constructionists 
positions, but it is clear also that you reject the very easy path of radical constructionism, 
which sees all scientific claims about the object world as merely persuasive rhetoric, 
either weak or strong depending on their institutional success in claiming legitimacy for 
themselves. Your view seem to be: that way lies madness... 
D. H: Or that way lies cynicism, or that way lies the impossibility ofpolitics. 7hat's what 
worries me. )154 
This reading of Haraway's theory is accentuated when we examine her claim that the 
world is an agent. She is aware of the fact that this is an odd suggestion, so she draws a 
difference between agents and subjects: subjects are organised by language. Therefore, the 
world cannot be considered to be a subject, but still, can be an agent. Haraway tries to 
change further the traditional view of the world as passive when she claims that "Nature 
emerges from this exercise as 'coyote' this potent trickster can show us that historically 
specific human relations with 'nature' must somehow- linguistically, scientifically, 
ethically, politically, technologically, and epistemologically- be imagined as genuinely 
social and actively relational. And yet, the pal-Iners of this lively social relation remain 
inhomogeneous. "" 
Haraway underlines the homogeneity of all the actors involved in knowledge when she 
claims that "nothing, no sets of actot. - in the world are preconstIllited with their skin 
boundaries already clearly pre-established. There are not pre-established actors in the 
world. Be those actors hunian, machine, other organisms, various kinds of machines, 
I)arious kinds of humans. There are no pre-constituted identities. All the actors in the 
world aren 't 'us', whoeiýeryou think of as like yozirseýf]t IS 117 relational encounters that 
worlds emerge, they emerge in plots of n7aterialised stories. A nd the actors are the result 
5' C. Penlcv and A. Ross (1991)7 p 4. 
is D. Haraway, 1n Penley and Ross (199 1), p21. 
293 
of encounter, of engagement. (.. ) One of the problems with using the word discourse is 
that the metaphor of language can end up carrying too much weight. I'm willing to let if 
carry a lot of weight, but I'm not willing to let it thenfinally really be eveiphim,. 777cre 
are non-language like processes of encounter. 
Conceiving the world as an agent, a trickster with whom we have to engage In dialogue, 
an entity that resists conceptualization, allows us to favour an epistemology that allows for 
pluralism, and that resists the idea that we can represent the world as a whole. The world 
changes as it changes our relation to it, which also changes us in the process. Realism is 
only possible if we embrace pluralism, the only way of reflecting the multiple aspects of 
the world. 
12. Towards Situated Objective Knowledge. 
I have been arguing that we can change our traditional picture of objectivity, in order to 
accommodate the fact that all knowledge bears the marks of its makers. Acknowledging 
the situatedness of knowledge is a prerequisite for obtaining objective knowledge. 
Keeping this in mind, I have explored two different theories in relation to objectivity: 
Harding's strong objectivity and Longino's theory. In this section I will offer a conclusion 
regarding them. 
I have claimed that Harding's strong objectivity has important elements, which I would 
like to keep, but I also criticise some other aspects of it. I agreed that the context of 
discovery should be scrutinised in order to disclose the values at play, that all knokviedge 
should be critically examined, and that certain knowers are more likely to produce 
objective knowledge. I disagreed with the strong interpretation of her clain, that we should 
begin our search for knowledge from the lives of marginalized groups. I agreed that Nve 
can learn from others by readint-) or talking, in an exchange of knowledoe transmitted in a 
propositional form, and we also can acquire further knowledge by engaging in their ways I- 
56 D. llarw; iv (199 1), p 32. 
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of life, but I argued against Harding because this does not amount to begin our research Z- 
from their perspective. I believe that we cannot produce knowledge from the lives of 
others, the most we can do is change our own perspective via the interaction with them, 
obtaining a kind of knowledge that does not consist on merely in understanding 
propositions. 
My analysis of practical and experiential knowledge supports my point of view. I argued 
that the acquisition of all knowledge is linked to practices. By being trained in particular 
traditions we acquire skills (some of which we are unaware) that mediate all our 
knowledge claims. Knowledge is necessarily embodied, and in an important sense 
personal, but at the same time also deeply social because it is acquired and sanctioned 
socially. These remarks link with my above claim that a mere propositional transmission of 
knowledge is not enough for capturing all types of knowledge, and that even if we can 
share part of our knowledge with others, other aspects of it are not acquired unless we 
adopt a different way of life. This made me aware of the importance of challenging our 
current concept of expertise: we should be able to recognise as reliable agents those who 
have acquired their knowledge throughout other means than the ones most valued in our 
current epistemological paradigm. In this sense, the work of Longino becomes central to 
the obtention of objective knowledge, given that she supports a concept of objectivity in 
which "objectwity is analysed as a funciion of con7nninaj, practices rather than wý an 
atlitude of indiiidual researchers toivardy their material or a relation between 
representation and represented. , 57 The appropriate constitution of epistemic communities 
is central in the process of justification, and also necessary to obtain objective knowledge. I 
Longino argues for local epistemologies, the claims of which are justIfied partly by the 
way in which those communities are constituted, and also by the empirical adequacy of the 
claims and by the adherence to epistemic virtues that have been negotiated within each 
COMMUnity. 
57 H. Lon,,, mo (1990), p 216. 
' 
I agree with Longino's claims on the justification of theories, but I would like to Include a 
second mechanism within it. I have argued that there are epistemic virtues that are not 
necessarily known by the subjects who posses them, therefore it is not possible to enter 
into negotiations about these. Nevertheless, by favouring pluralism, we will be including in 
our communities knowers who posses those virtues. Longino's theory focuses on 
epistemic virtues as implemented by theories. My point is that the negotiation of personal 
epistemic virtues should also be taken into account in theory choice and in the process of 
justification. Often, these virtues cannot be explicit, and therefore in any set of criteria for 
theory choice they will not be included. Together with the negotiation of particular virtues 
in theories, it is also important to develop the idea of expertise, and of personal epistemic 
virtues. This will mean that in certain situations the judgement of particular individuals in 
the context of theory choice could be more valuable than that of others, the decision 
making will not be made on the basis of a "traditional" rational choice, i. e., not as the 
conclusion of an argument made up of propositions. The decision making will be the 
product of having certain epistemic virtues, and the epistemic community will trust their 
judgement on the basis of their socially sanctioned training. This implies that we will be 
able to accept as privileged epistemic agents those who belong to communities that have 
been traditionally marginalized for not following the mainstream methods of knowledge 
acquisition. 
Apart from playing an important role in the justification of theories, diverse epistemic 
communities should be promoted because they allow us to approach knowledge claims 
critically, making visible their biases and the background assumptions included in them. I 
would like to remark that apart from the critical advantages that encouraging different 
perspectives offers, pluralism plays a second important role, and that is that by engaging 
with the world in diverse ways, different communities apprehend different aspects of the 
world. Therefore, the process of understanding across difference becomes central in 
providing us with the possibility of disclosing the values and background assumptions that 
underlie all theories, and also, in allowing us to account for different aspects of the world 
that would be hidden otherwise. Again, the role of marginalized communities becomes 
central, they will be able to point out biases in the mainstream theories and also, thq will 
be able to produce original alternatives. Both elements are central in our aini to obtain 
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bjective knowledge. 
'herefore, I agree with the picture that Longino gives of objective knowledge as a 
lurality of metaphors that capture different aspects of the world. I have underlined how, 
.i 
Longino's work, there is a definite commitment to realism in the sense that the world 
hows in our theories, but at the same time, she make us aware that our theories are 
ýonstructions upon the world and their validity is agreed on the terms dictated by our 
lifferent epistemic practices. The tension is captured by Haraway who claims that the 
vorld is an agent and that somehow it resists all our efforts of conceptualisation. I am 
ympathetic to this theory because it allows me to emphasise the role of practical and 
, xperiential knowledge, which allows us to establish relations with the world and capture 
; ome of those aspects of the world that are not captured because they resist 
, onceptualisation. This does not mean that, by including this aspect 
in our epistemology, 
ve will be able to apprehend the world completely, but rather, that we will be able to 
)btain a more appropriate image of it than we would obtain if we do not acknowledge the 
mportance of those other types of knowledge. 
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CONCLUSION 
In this thesis I have defended the possibility of gendered knowledge and argued for a shift 
in our conception of epistemology. Given our epistemological tradition, the concept of 
gendered knowledge seems almost an impossibility, because it precludes the possibility of 
developing objective ways of apprehending the world. Here objective ways of 
apprehending the world are conceived of as ways available in principle to anyone, 
anywhere. A project supporting gendered knowledge also has to overcome criticisms 
levelled by postmodern and postcolonial thinkers. These believe that gendered knowledge, 
as it has been depicted by some feminist thinkers, is a universalist and essentialist project 
that does not account for the diversity present in the women's community. 
I have argued that the traditional concepts of objectivity obscure the fact that 
acknowledging that all knowledge is situated is the first step to obtaining objective 
knowledge, though in the process of recognising that, our concept of objectivity becomes 
refigured. Regarding the postmodern and postcolonial arguments, I have suggested that it 
is possible to talk about collective identities without excluding diversity. Consequently I 
have defended the view that the experiences of marginalized epistemic agents, concretely 
embodied in specific environments, grounded in practices and sanctioned by 
communities, can form the basis for privileged epistemic positions. 
If this type of experience is going to be taken as valuable for grounding knowledge, we 
have to change our concept of knowledge. The experiences that I am referring to cannot 
be captured prop o sitionally. The epistemic subjects do not need to be able to express their 
knowledge propositionally in order to be able to show that they know. Therefore, 
knowledge cannot be defined as justified true belief, because this will not account for these 
types of knowledge that cannot be expressed as beliefs. I have analysed different reductive 
moves that try to reduce practical and experiential knowledge to propositional or 
knowing-that knowledge. I concluded that a reduction is not possible and that these non- 
propositional knowledges count as such because they are constituted by normative 
engagement with the world. By participating in various practices, women are able to 
apprehend aspects of the world that remain opaque otherwise. Such apprehension is 
I OR 
warranted and justified, consequently deserving the tittle "knowledge". These types of 
knowledge can form the basis for gendered knowledge. Furthermore, my arguments can 
be used to suggest that these types of knowledge also ground the knowledge of other 
marginalized epistemic groups. More radically ( and tentatively) I suggest that all 
knowledge is anchored in practices. 
To rely on the idea that all knowledge can be expressed propositionally implies that all 
knowledge can be expressed in words. I have challenged the idea that knowledge with non 
propositional content cannot be justified. I claimed that non-conceptual content belongs to 
the realm of reasons when it is apprehended by subjects who are already in that realm. 
Subjects who apprehend aspects of the world that are not included in our conceptual 
systems can justify critiques of such systems based on these apprehensions. I suggested 
that those that are not at the centre of our epistemic practices are able to became aware of 
how our conceptual system does not account for all their interactions with the world. 
Therefore they can point at the gaps in our conceptual systems and suggest ways of 
enlarging them. Awareness of the inadequacy of conceptual systems to account for 
different ways of experiencing the world can warrant the modification of such schemes, 
even while the awareness concerned may not be conceptually articulable. 
The enlargement of what counts as knowledge allows me to enlarge the concept of 
rationality. I argue that intuition is a form of tacit knowledge based on experience. We 
acquire tacit knowledge by participating in practices. Our tacit knowledge remains 
generally unacknowledged to us, but it can be made evident in the form of intuitions. Our 
intuitions allow us to have glimpses of aspects of the world that are not captured by our 
current ways of theorising the world. I conclude that intuition is part of reason, instead of 
its opposite. Characterising intuition in this way, I am challenging our current concept of 
reason and including elements in it that belong to the realm of the feminine. 
The consequences of attributing a privileged episternic perspective to mar(yinalized aroups 
is a recognition that there are types of knowledge that can only be produced bý! those 
Is belonging to these groups, therefore if their knowledges are epistemically desirable, it 
necessary to develop xvays of engaging with them. Furthermore, there are man\, 
marginalized groups whose knowledge may not be obviously compatible. The epistemic 
privilege of marginalized groups has two aspects. a critical aspect and a creative one. 
Marginalized epistemic agents can make visible the values included in mainstream theories 
which may not be recognisable to those within the mainstream. They can also access 
distinctive aspects of the world. Therefore we need to develop ways for including the 
inputs of different epistemic communities in order to obtain objective knowledge, and I 
suggest some protocols to ease the process. Regarding the questions afising from the 
acceptance of a multiplicity of theofies, I have argued for a pluralist realism that allows us 
to embrace different theories without falling into contradiction. I believe that this is the 
most appropriate way of apprehending a world that is able to present different aspects to 
different epistemic agents. 
My thesis therefore consists in a critical analysis of elements present in mainstream 
epistemology that symbolically, and actually, exclude gendered knowledge. It also 
presents a positive proposal that revises our concepts of knowledge and reason, allowing 
us to consider women and other marginalized epistemic agents as reliable knowers-, 
reassessing practical and experiential knowledge, and situating them at the centre of our 
epistemology. 
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